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ABSTRACT
»
"The Concept-Of 'the Human* in the Work of Hermann Hesse 
and Paul Tillich” by Wilbur B* Franklin is an interdisciplinary 
study in theology and literature. Three chapters each on Hesse 
and Tillich discuss the life# work, and critical significance 
of both men# The seventh chapiter compares their similarities 
and their contrasting views.
In his work Hermann Hesse singles out the artist as the 
best example of true personhood and believes that individuals 
become fully human by being aesthetes, possessing ironic humor, 
learning to love unconditionally, expressing themselves while 
at play, transcending themselves through magical thinking, 
i.e., bringing into harmony the polarities of life, and finally, 
by assuming ethical responsibility for life to the point of 
sacrificial service#
In the work of Paul Tillich existential man experiences 
estrangement, but essential man possesses a vision of wholeness 
and therefore of potentiality. However, maturity is to be 
found in becoming reconciled, Jesus as the Christ is the 
Hew Being who reunites man with God. Sanctification describes 
what it means to be fully human, and participation in a theono- 
mous culture requires that one help make human life more human 
for others.
The final chapter compares the life and work of Hesse 
and Tillich and concludes* both men have a tripartite view
of human nature, they reoognlae the ambiguities of life as 
well as the demonic element in man, perfection is beyond an
"■1
individual's grasp but fulfillment is not, and both men are t
humanists who oppose dehumanisation# They differ in that 
Tillich is more interested in ontology than in psychology,
Hesse stresses self-realization, whereas Tillich stresses 
becoming whole by way of reunion with Being-itself. -Hesse 
appreciates the aesthetic and ethical stages of life but 
lacks Tillich's emphasis on the depth dimension* Hesse's 
answer to the human situation is autonomous r&ther than 
theonomous as advocated by Tillich.
The implications of both Hesse's and Tillich's thought 
include the following *■ becoming fully-human-, is a lifelong 
process; man is most human when he reflects his best self -4
or the image of God/being human must address itself to the 
perennial problems of man (sin, suffering# and death); 
anthropology rather than dogmatic theology is the arena in 
which the theological enterprise, should take place; and 
finally, the contemporary church needs to be aware of the 
necessity for both personal religious experience and social 
action.
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INTRODUCTION
m
3
One of the most serious problems of modern man is whether or |
not he is going to have a human future. There are ecologists who are 
vary concerned about the survival of the human species. Responsible
Christians are equally concerned about human survival. But those who 
believe man will survive the enormous problems that face him are just 
as concerned about the quality of life he is, and will be, living. Is 
it, and will it be, a human life? The emphasis here is on the quest 
for a human future.
Although human existence is a concern for every generation, it 
is especially so for this generation. The power man possesses, and 
the magnitude of the problems he both has inherited and is creating, 
force him to confront the human situation with greater alarm and ur­
gency than in previous generations. Much is being written by persons 
in many academic disciplines about the future of man. The quality of 4«
life man will have will depend upon his responsible use of freedom.
Out of the general concern over human existence, the specific 
purpose of this thesis is to raise the fundamental question: what 4
does it mean to be human? Is it something man is by birth; or, is it |
something he becomes? Certainly there is evidence in every century 
(and the twentieth century, in particular) of those persons who choose 
to live less than human lives.
An attempt will be made to answer this question by comparing 
the thought of two men from different professional disciplines and 
seeing what they have to say about what it means to be human. Paul |
I
Tillich will be one of the two men selected to assist in this search
y
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for self-understanding. He has boon a philosophical theologian with 
significant influence in the Christian community as well as outside 
of it. Because of his profound grasp of the human condition, his 
Christian commitment through which he sought constantly to enter into 
meaningful conversation with other persons in various disciplines, and 
his genuine concern over a human future for man, he has been chosen 
as a theological spokesman who addresses himself to the issue,
Tillich has said that if you want to know the values and ulti­
mate concerns of any age you will find that it is not the theologian 
or churchman who gives the best clues. It is always the artist who is 
most able to reflect the values of any given period of history. For 
modern man, Tillich includes the social scientist and depth psycholo­
gist along with the artist, as being the persons most able to tell 
where man is and where he seems to be going, Howevsr, if he ware to 
choose between the persons just mentioned, Tillich would say it is the 
artist who expresses himself in novels, poetry, or in painting who 
gives the best analysis of human experience. Is this observation true?
Hermann Hesse has been chosen to test Tillich's high praise for 
the artist. Hesse was a novelist and poet by profession and enjoyed 
painting as an avocation. Because of his enormous influence upon the 
youth culture of this century and because his life style and writings 
have included so many contemporary concerns, he deserves serious atten­
tion as a person who may be helpful in the quest for what is human.
Therefore, this thesis is an interdisciplinary study in theology 
and literature with "The Concept of 'the Human' in the Work of Hermann 
Hesse and Paul Tillich" being the subject of research. Brief defini­
tions of what it means to be human are impossible. Man is more than a 
concept and defies being categorized in a capsuled statement. That
is why the concept of "tha human" is set off in quotation marks.
Consequently, it will be necessary to paint with broad strokes, so 
to speak, the portrait of human existence.
The method of research will be to examine various human experi­
ences as observed by a literary figure and to compare his findings 
with the thoughtful reflections of a Christian theologian. With what 
do they agree, and wherein do they differ in assessing what is human? d
Is there an ethical dimension to their concept of "the human"? How 
does man become fully human? Can he accomplish it on his own, or is 
assistance necessary? These are some of the questions Hesse and 
Tillich will be asked to answer. It is hoped that soma clues will be 
found to one of the crucial questions of modern man* what does it 
mean to be human?
Primary sources are in abundance since each man was a prolific 
writer. They will be depended upon for the central substance of this 
study. Practically all of the primary sources (certainly the most 
important) have been translated into English, Whenever significant 
ideas are not available in English (e.g,, cogent insights from Hesse's 
Gesammelts SchriftenK they will be translated from the German into 
English,
In addition, there are numerous volumes of secondary sources.
Reference to the selected bibliography at the end of this thesis will 
show the extent to which Hesse and Tillich have provoked a response 
from other scholars. However, the writers most helpful in understand­
ing Hesse's work are* Mark Boulby, J, C. Middleton, Joseph Mileck, 
and Theodore Ziolkowski, The writers most helpful in comprehending 
Tillich's work are* Guyton 8. Hammond, Alexander J, McKelway, Bernard 
Martin, William L, Rowe, and J, Haywood Thomas, These persons writs
from differing points of view, but all of them have something worth 
saying. Everything in the selected bibliography has been examined and 
has contributed to this study,
Sevan chapters will comprise the structure of this thesis.
Three chapters will focus on Hermann Hesse, Chapter one will be en­
titled "Hermann Hesse the Man," The work of Hesse is inseparable from 
his life. Therefore, it is essential to know the man if one Is to 
appreciate his understanding of what it means to be human. Chapter 
two will be most important, "The Concept of 'the Human* in the Work 
of Hermann Hesss" is at the heart of this research. Different human 
experiences present in Hesse's work will be isolated for interpretation, 
A chronological presentation of his work will be made. Chapter three 
will look at "The Significance of Hermann Hesse," It will try to see 
Hesse in perspective by evaluating his literary efforts in general and 
by presenting a theological critique of his concept of "the human" in 
particular.
The next three chapters will focus on Paul Tillich, Chapter 
four will look at "Paul Tillich the Man," His personal life was not 
as closely related to his work as was Hesse's, but it is to be expected 
that, from his life, insights into what it means to be human would be 
made evident in his work. The fifth chapter will be vital, because it 
is "The Concept of 'the Human' in the Work of Paul Tillich." It will 
include a systematic presentation of Tillich's threefold view of man. 
Chapter six will be an evaluation entitled "The Significance of Paul 
Tillich," Positive and negative critique of his theology plus response 
to his concept of "the human" will be given.
The seventh and final chapter will be a comparative study of 
the elements which Hesse and Tillich had in common and the lines of
thought that separated them. In addition, an attempt will be made to 
show the implications of Hesse's and Tillich's thinking.
In this introduction the specific problem that will occupy our 
attention has been presented. The scope of the problem will be inclu­
sive and broad, because man is a complex and many-faceted being, A 
brief reference to the relevant resources has been made. And the 
structural shape this work will take has been suggested by looking at 
the main topics of each chapter. Following the substance of this 
study, an attempt will be made to summarize the lessons learned about 
being human through examining the life and work of Hermann Hesse and 
Paul Tillich,
I
CHAPTER I 
HERMANN HESSE THE MAN
If what Hermann Hesse has to say about what it means to be
human is to be understood, it is necessary to look first at Hesse as
a man. It is true that the thinking of most writers is affected by
their personal experience, but this is especially true with Hesse,
His writing is that of self-portrayal and self-analysis; he consciously
restricts his writing to what he can draw from his own immediate environ-
ment and from his own experience of life. Upon carefully examining his
work, one can practically write his biography (certainly his spiritual
biography). It has been said, "Hesse's work reflects his life trans- 
2
formed into art." The timing and internal action of each of his novels 
or short stories reveal the dynamic level of his life.
Therefore, in this chapter the main biographical factors that 
have affected the thinking of Hesse will be related. Secondly, the 
most important intellectual influences of Hesse will be discussed.
And finally, the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung that so profoundly 
shaped Hesse's life and work, will be examined.
The Life of Hermann Hesse
The life of Hermann Hesse divides into three natural periods* 
his early years (1877-1916) tell of his life from birth to his personal 
crisis; his middle years (1915-1931) tell of his triumph over his crisis 
and his reestablishment as an important author; and his later years 
(1931-1962) tell of his mature life and work and the honors granted to 
him in recognition of his accomplishments. Attention will be paid to
his struggle and growth as a person; the relationships that were 
important to him; and the historical events that coincided with, and 
contributed to, his development as a writer.
Early Years
Hermann Hesse was born on July 2, 1877, into a family of 
Protestant missionaries in the town of Calw in Württemberg, Germany.
His father, Johannes, came from Estland, and his mother, Marie Gundert, 
was from Swabia. His parents met through their common involvement in 
missionary work. Hermann was given the Christian name of his two grand­
fathers. His paternal grandfather. Or. Carl Hermann Hesse, was a physi­
cian who was known as " . . . the doctor who gives everything away."'^
His maternal grandfather, Dr. Hermann Gundert, was a distinguished 
Pietistic scholar and a missionary to India for many years prior to 
returning to Germany where he directed a Calwer publishing house. Dr. 
Gundert*s familiarity with numerous European and Asiatic languages was 
evident in his work but also in the number of international visitors 
he had from all parts of the world,
Marie Gundert Hesse was a small but lively person with imagina­
tion and warmth. She had been married previously. She and her first 
husband were missionaries to India, and they had two sons, Theodore 
and Karl. When her husband died Marie came to live in her father's 
house in Calw, Johannes Hesse served three years as a missionary to 
India but because of poor health had to return to Germany where he was 
employed as an assistant to Dr. Gundert. In 1874 Johannes married 
Marie; they had six children, two of whom died in infancy, Adele was 
their first child, and she was followed by Hermann who was born two 
years later. Then another daughter, Marulla, was born, followed by
a son, Hans, Of the four Hesse children and the two stepbrothers,
Adele and Hermann were particularly close, although there was harmony 
among them all.
From 1881 until 1885 the Hesse family lived in Basel where 
Johannes was called to edit a missionary magazine. Very early Hermann's 
mother detected unusual traits in her son: "The boy shows liveliness,
physical robustness, and strength of will, and in addition a percep- 
tiveness that is astounding in a four-year-old,"^ By the time Hermann 
started to kindergarten his independence was beginning to be a problem. 
In 1886 the family moved back to Calw where Hermann attended 
the town's preparatory school until 1890, During these four years 
Calw became the town that would be idealized as Gerbensau in his writ­
ings, It was a quiet town with beautiful natural surroundings, and
Hesse, with his sensitivity and keen observation, identified with
everyone and everything.
It is interesting to note that Hesse, when reflecting about 
his early years, could say: "Like all boys, I loved and envied many
callings: the hunter, the raftsman, the railroad conductor, the high-
wira performer, the Arctic explorer. My greatest preference by far,
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however, would have been to be a magician," This meant a rejection 
of reality, for with magic he would transform reality. Already the 
polarity of what was, versus what could be, via his imagination, was 
evident.
The strange Indian symbols of the curios kept by his grand­
father Gundert in a glass cabinet fascinated him. The international 
visitors who came to his home and the various dialects spoken added to 
the mystical and magical dimension of reality. Eastern religions and 
philosophies occupied daily conversation. The home library contained
mysterious and awe-provoking titles and authors, and they were impres­
sive factors that influenced young Hermann.
He made noteworthy comments about his parents and their differ­
ences in personality and temperament. He saw his mother as one who, 
like her father, possessed the veiled wisdom and magic of the East.
She was clever and humorous and full of music. But his father was
different. He was learned and kindly, a person who stood on the side­
lines, He was a seeker and a lonely sufferer, a person with no trace 
of mystery.^
One of Hesse's biographers, Franz Baumer, points out that young 
Hermann was very musical. At an early age he learned to sing Lieder
7
melodies and chorales by heart. When he was nine years old he received 
a small violin which ha learned to play well. He later learned to play 
the flute and continued to play both the violin and flute as an adult.
Hesse's school experiences were not happy ones. He had trouble 
with teachers. They were demanding and at times inhuman. He said, 
" . . .  there were so very few who had not completely unlearned and
forgotten what a child is, how it lives, works, plays, thinks, what it
likes and what it h a t e s , H e  found them condescending and many times 
superior to children only in strength. They taught him to lie and to 
disguise the truth and one's honest feelings. There were but two ex­
ceptions* a Mr, Schmid, a teacher of Greek at the Calw Latin School;
and Rector Bauer, a distinguished Latin and Greek teacher at Goppingen, 
Hesse respected both teachers because they assumed the best in him and 
regarded his highest accomplishment as natural while at the same time
they allowed him to be a boy of his age. He went to Goppingen to
prepare for the district examinations that would enable him to go to 
seminary.
10
After passing the district examination at the head of his 
class, he was expected by his parents to follow in his father's foot­
steps in preparing for the ministry. Maulbronn was an Evangelical 
theological seminary with a rich history that extended back to pre- 
Protestant day?. In fact, it was a Roman Catholic Cistercian monastery 
with beautiful buildings and memorable surroundings (the setting of 
several future novels).
The rigid daily routine and the regimented way of life at Maul­
bronn were in direct opposition to the spirit of young Hermann, He 
later said* " , . , from my thirteenth year on, it was clear to me
9
that I wanted to be either a poet or nothing at all." These two 
factors resulted in his running away from seminary and creating con­
siderable alarm. He spent a night in the woods when the temperature 
dropped to ten degrees centigrade, and he almost died from exposure.
He returned to school, but it was only a matter of time before it be­
came obvious that Maulbronn was not for him. His parents tried to cope 
with him by sending him to other schools. Some of these were exceed­
ingly strict, with a purpose of breaking his will. Other schools were 
sympathetic to problem children. On one occasion a faith healer was 
sought to cure Hesse's restlessness and inability to adjust to school 
life. From May of 1092 onward, the sensitive and easily excitable young 
man lived in a period of psychological turmoil. At different times he 
suffered minor nervous breakdowns and at times seriously considered 
suicide. He wrote his mother on January 20, 1893, saying that he had
sold some school books and bought a pistol, as life was too great a 
10
burden. Suicide would later became a repeatable literary theme, but 
at this time of his life he was experiencing it existentially. He was 
sick (having severe migraine headaches), angry, and unhappy.
11
"Hesse was struggling to discover and assert himself, and to 
protect his identity from the inroads of the stubborn religious atti­
tudes and traditions of his family and from the powerful complex of
11authority by which he saw himself surrounded," He attended the Gym­
nasium for over a year and began drinking at the local bars and running 
up debts. In his rebellion and flight he tried to be an apprentice at 
a bookshop in Esslingen, but it lasted only three days. He then became 
an apprentice mechanic in a clockmaking business for fourteen months.
Finally, between June of 1894 and September of 1095, Hesse began 
to find and master himself. While living at his home, he started to 
read seriously many books in his father's and grandfather's library.
He read widely in the areas of world literature and the history of art, 
languages and philosophy. Although he did not have much formal educa­
tion after the age of fifteen, he read during these unsettling years 
what would have been equivalent to a college degree.
By October of 1895 he was ready to take on responsibility. He 
moved to:Tubingen and became an apprentice in a bookshop. In his pri­
vate hours he subjected himself to a rigorous program of self-education, 
"He replaced friends and social life with the world of books and poetry,
and with neither teachers nor close acquaintances he proceeded to build
12
a world of his own," He wrote poetry and expressed his feelings. His 
first poem was published a year later and was significantly entitled 
"Madonna,"
Hesse became financially independent from his parents the autumn 
of 1898 at the age of twenty-one. But more important was his personal 
identity that exerted itself, "He constructed for himself an aesthetic 
world picture, a kind of poetic pantheism, and though he told his wor­
ried parents in his letters that the Christian faith signified for him
12
a strong and living power, it was the world of beauty in which he 
found faith— and that meant the world of poetry."
During his last two years at Tubingen he was part of a group of 
friends who met weekly to drink beer and discuss the important ques­
tions and issues of the day. It was a happy experience in which Hesse 
was not the lonely outsider but was included as an important member of 
the inner circle.
After finishing his apprenticeship in Tubingen in 1899, he as­
sumed a position in Basel where he was to live for five years, Basel 
was the town of Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt, His acquaintances were 
related in some way to the University. He drank in the Basel taverns
with a group known as "The Failures' Club" and dreamed of the transience
14
of things and was plagued with hypersensitivity.
It was during this time that Hesse fell in love with a proud 
young lady named Elizabeth LaRoche, but because he was shy he would not 
reveal his feelings. Also, it was in Basel that he came into his own 
as a writer while working as an assistant in a bookshop. His first 
collection of poems. Romantic Songs, was published in 1899 followed by 
his first prose. An Hour after Midnight. Hesse's attention had long 
been turned backward— to his origins, to childhood, to the fairy tale. 
His early work would reveal these themes.
In July, 1900, Hesse went for a physical examination for the 
Army selective service. He was rejected due to serious nearsightedness, 
"But his weak eyes were to plague him throughout his life, and he fre­
quently suffered the headaches and neuralgia of which his father was a 
lifelong victim,
On April 24, 1902, Hesse's mother died after a long and painful 
illness. He dedicated his third book, a large collection of poems, to
13
her since it was published the same year as her death. He wrote, "I
have my dear mother, whose living spirit I constantly feel around me,
to thank for what is best in me,*'^ ^
One year later Hesse became interested in Maria Bernoulli, a
woman nine years older than himself. She was from a well-known family
17
in Basel, and she ran a photography studio with her sister,
Hesse was able to leave the book business in 1903 and devote
ail his time to his writing. Although he was barely existing on what
he was able to earn writing, he was enthusiastic about his work. When
the novel, Peter Camenzind. was published in 1904, it brought its author
immediate fame and success. He became a celebrity and received the
18
"Wiener Bauernfeldpreis," the first of many literary awards.
By the summer of 1904, Hesse had received enough royalties from 
the sale of Peter Camenzind to enable him to marry and pursue a full­
time literary career. The many years of struggle had now brought rec­
ognition and stability and a sense of satisfaction. The youth of
Hermann Hesse was behind him,
Maria Bernoulli was very much like his mother and could easily
have stepped out of one of his early poems. The wedding was celebrated
in Basel, and together they decided to live a simple life in the coun­
try, somewhat in the vein of Ruskin or Tolstoy, In the village of
Gaienhofsn on the shore of Lake Constance he and his wife found an
empty farmhouse (half of which was the house and the other half barn).
They had to draw water from a nearby well, and there were no utilities 
such as gas or electricity. But Maria " , , , laid great emphasis on 
living beautifully as well as simply, meaning in handsome, dignified
houses in a lovely landscape with a beautiful view, in short, in houses
19that were not ordinary but had beauty and character," It should also
14
be noted that there was a movement current in Germany of flight from
the city to life on the land, a movement with moral and artistic 
20
foundations.
Hesse felt secure for the first time, and his three years in 
this Bauernhaus ware happy ones. His first son, Bruno, was born there 
in 1905, and there became need for a larger and more comfortable house. 
They decided to build further outside of the village of Galenhofen 
with a view of the shore and distant mountains. But while ha was still 
building his home, he sang the praises of the vagabond and the wanderer 
as a way of life. Nevertheless, in his new location there was room 
for a garden, and Hesse spent considerable time working In it.
On the surface things went well. Two more sons ware born*
Hainer in 1909 and Martin in 1911, And these years were most produc­
tive professionally. He created dozens of stories, poems, and such 
A
novels as Beneath the Wheel and Gertrude. He also contributed to papers
and journals, wrote reviews, and did some editorial work. As early as
1907, together with two other persons, he founded the periodical, Marz.
21
which was directed mainly against the personal rule of Kaiser Wilhelm, 
But he did not as yet taka these political activities too seriously.
He had several friends; e,g,, Ludwig Finckh, a friend from his 
Tubingen days, was a medical doctor practicing in the vicinity. Friends 
who were musicians were frequent guests, as Hesse enjoyed music, and 
his wife was an accomplished pianist.
However, Hesse's restlessness began to evidence itself, Ha 
would have to go for walks with no particular aim, and there were times 
when he would question whether or not he was really happy. His loneli­
ness was revealed in a poem he wrote in 1911, It was entitled "The 
Poet" and was obviously autobiographical.
15
Only on ma, tha lonely one,
The unending stars of the night shine,
The stone fountain whispers its magic song,
To me alone, to me tha lonely one
The colorful shadows of the wandering clouds
Move like dreams over the open countryside.
Neither house nor farmland.
Neither forest nor hunting privilege is given to me,
What is mine belongs to no one.
The plunging brook behind the veil of the woods,
The frightening sea,
The bird whir of children at play.
The weeping and singing, lonely in the evening, 
of a man secretly in love,
Tha temples of the gods are mine also, and mine 
The aristocratic groves of the past*
And no less, the luminous
Vault of heaven in the future is my hornet
Often in full flight of longing my soul storms upward,
To gaze on tha future of blessed man.
Love, overcoming the law, love from people to people*
I find them all again, nobly transformedi 
Farmer, king, tradesman, busy sailors.
Shepherd and gardener, all of them
Gratefully celebrate the festival of the future world.
Only tha poet is missing.
The lonely one who looks on,
The bearer of human longing, the pale image 
Of whom the future, the fulfillment of tha world 
Has no further need. Many garlands 
Wilt on his grave, .
But no one remembers him.
He found more and more reasons to get away from his home in the country.
He said, "I am the exact opposite of a peasant, i.e., a nomad, a hunter, 
an unsettled lone wolf." Finally, he found life unendurable at Gaien- 
hofen, and in 1911 he took a trip to the East with a painter friend,
Hans Sturzenegger.
Hesse, who had been intrigued with the East, found that the lan­
guage barrier and his own poor health prevented him from getting to know
the countries and their people as well as he would have liked. But he
said, "I have achieved my main object which was to observe tropical sce­
nery and the Asiatic way of life, and I must be satisfied with that."^^
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However, the trip wae a flight from Europe and from himself, and he
did not find in the East the inner peace of mind and the contentment
he was seeking. From this standpoint his journey was a failure.
After his return from the East, it was clear that life at
Gaienhofen would have to end. He would not admit that his marriage
was over yet, but signs that it was were beginning to increase. His
wife wanted to move to Barn, He wrote.
She wants the children to have Swiss nationality. It’s all the 
same to me, since I have the feeling that I won’t put down roots 
anywhere: at least wife and children might as well attempt to do
so. My relationship with my family began a long while ago to be­
come nothing more than concern to bring them in enough money to 
care for them . . .  25
At the and of 1912 they moved to the outskirts of Bern into the home 
of the recently deceased painter, Albert Welti. Hesse did write 
Rosshalde. a novel depicting the dichotomy of art and life, which to 
a considerable extent portrayed the tension of his own marriage and 
vocational calling.
When Hesse was thirty-seven the First World War broke out. He 
went to the German consulate in Bern and volunteered for military ser­
vice as a noncombatant. He did not want to shirk his duty as a German 
citizen, but he was refused. He offered his services in humanitarian 
work, and a little later he was assigned to the Prisoners of War Welfare 
Organization, He worked selflessly in the local internment camp and 
edited books, journals, and newspapers, providing reading material for 
distribution to German prisoners of war in other countries,
He published three short stories in a book entitled Knulp in 
1915, but the war brought with it mental agony and privation for Hesse,
"Deeply upset by what was happening, he opposed the madness of nation-
27alism and appealed to humanity and reason." He was an outspoken
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pacifist, and as a result he was attacked and his work was considered
disreputable. The German press called him a traitor, and he was
harassed incessantly, even though he lived in Switzerland,
Added to this, in 1916 his father died; his youngest son,
Martin, became seriously ill with meningitis; and his wife suffered
a nervous breakdown that resulted in her being put into a mental
institution, "Hesse himself was compelled to seek relief in psycho- 
23analysis," The secure world of Hermann Hesse had fallen apart.
Middle Years
When a long rest did not produce any results, in 1916 Hesse 
went to a private clinic near Lucerne for help. Dr. Joseph B. Lang, 
a disciple of Carl Jung, became not only Hesse’s analyst but a trusted 
friend, "From May, 1916, to November, 1917, Hesse had seventy-two
on
sessions with Lang," While undergoing analysis he was also doing
war relief work. It was at this time that Hesse began to study the
writings of Freud and Jung,
Analysis revealed to him new dimensions that he had previously
only surmised. Hesse had succeeded in controlling the conflicts that
had pursued him since youth. He found himself forced to put the blame
for his suffering and despair not outside himself but within himself:
I was entirely wrapped up in myself and my own fate, though occa­
sionally I did strongly suspect that my case had to do with every­
thing that is inhuman , . , first I had to lose my self-respect, 
and then my self-contempt; my task was quite simply to endure to 
the end my glance into chaos in the hope of finding nature and 
innocence on the other side.30
Demian was an attempt to interpret himself to himself, as becom­
ing conscious of oneself leads to self-knowledge. This new novel con­
veyed Hesse's experience with psychoanalysis in that it revealed the 
vital unity of opposites and the law of countermovement.
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By tha time Demian was published Hesse had come to terms with
himself. Since his wife was in a mental institution he had to board
his children at homes of friends, or when necessary, to place them in
institutions. In the meantime, he had sat alone in his desolate home
long enough. In the spring of 1919, he said:
It had become clear that from now on there was morally only one 
possibility of existence for me: to put my literary work ahead
of everything, to live for it, and no longer to take seriously 
money troubles or any other considerations. If I did not succeed 
in this, I was lost,31
The same year his marriage ended in divorce, although it was not offi­
cially dissolved until 1923,
Hesse found in Ticino, in southern Switzerland, the place where 
he wanted to live. He discovered a home, Casa Camuzzi, in the village 
of Montagnola, He buried himself in his work and lived as a hermit 
for four years. He called his balcony his "Saint Jerome’s study" and 
observed:
I see the world down there and think, "They can have it," I have 
no luck in this world, I have not fitted well with it, and it has 
answered and repaid my aversion abundantly. But it has not killed 
me, I still live, I have defied it and held my ground, and if I 
have not become a successful manufacturer or boxer or movie star,
I have become the thing that as a boy of twelve I set myself to 
be— a post. And I have learned, among other things, that if one 
desires nothing of the world and simply observes it quietly and 
attentively, tha world has much to offer of which the world’s 
successful darlings know nothing,32
In the last years of the war Hesse had lost faith in tha value
of his creative work. While still at Bern he did discover a new joy,
painting. It was an activity of an almost meditative kind, and in
Ticino it was to bloom. Already past forty, Hesse painted because it
made him more glad, more patient toward reality, for it gave him an
additional means of transforming that reality.
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His work was beginning to be published again, Demian, published 
under a pseudonym, Emil Sinclair, proved to be most successful and even 
won a prize, which forced Hesse to reveal his identity. Other books 
that followed were: Klein and Wagner. Klingsor*s Last Summer, Siddhartha;
and a collection of essays, In^  Sight of Chaos,
Hesse saw the collapsing culture of Europe, and he saw the role 
of the artist and poet as a reintegrating factor in the cultural situa­
tion following World War I. He saw the reconstruction as a gamble be­
cause of the temperament of some artists. This was illustrated by a 
comment in his Autobiographical Writings:
. . .  the old somewhat antisocial hermit and lone wolf Hesse, the 
old wanderer and poet, the friend of butterflies and lizards, of 
old books and religions, that Hesse who faced the world with deter­
mination and strength and who became deeply disturbed if he had to 
have a certificate of residence filled out by tha authorities, or 
even had to fill out a form for the census takers,^3
He was able to combine his interest in painting with his writing
when he published Wanderings, a book that contained his poems, prose,
and pictures. Painting was a pleasant pastime, and Hesse did not care
whether what he produced had artistic value.
Also, he edited a monthly journal. Vivos Voco. whose object was
to assist in the creation of the new Germany and a new way of life.
The periodical treated practical social and educational problems. For
example, one article Hesse wrote for the journal was a response to tha
nationalism beginning to occur among the youth. Jews were being blamed
for the problems of Germany. Hesse wrote in 1922:
Whether one loves the Jews or not, they are men, frequently much 
more clever, more active, and better man than their fanatical op­
ponents . . .  to make a whole race the scapegoat for the evil in 
the world and for the thousand serious faults of the German people 
is a vile exhibition of decadence.
Such writing brought more personal abuse for Hesse,
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In 1923 he sought and was granted Swiss citizenship. Although 
he had been living in Switzerland for several years, he did not want 
to sever his ties with Germany during the war years, as it would seem 
as though he ware running away when his country needed him. He also 
thought that he would be able to assist the cause of German culture if 
he remained a citizen. Historical developments within Germany changed 
his mind.
However, the hermit from Montagnola was becoming a stronger 
person inwardly. He periodically would leave his retreat-like existence 
and his work to visit friends. On one occasion he met Ruth Wenger, the 
daughter of a Swiss authoress, Lisa Wenger, and a courtship developed.
In January, 1924, he married Ruth, The marriage lasted only a few 
months, but it was not until 1927 that the divorce actually took place.
He was approaching fifty and was bothered with rheumatism. He 
made trips annually to the health resort in Baden for tha mineral baths 
available there. He recorded his observations about life in such a 
place in his little book, ^  Guest at the Spa, During these years he 
gave selected readings from his work at various universities and cities,
A brief book. Journey to Nuremberg, described such an experience.
In 1927 one of tha most important of his novels, Steppenwolf, was 
published. The leading character, Harry Haller, not only had Hesse’s ini­
tials but revealed tha inner life of a man the same age as he, A fragment 
from his journal, along with a few poems, entitled Crisis, was published 
a year later. In it he wrote: "My life is characterized by alternating
periods of intense sublimation, asceticism of the spirit, and surrender
3*5to naive sensuality, childlike behavior, and also madness and peril,"
When Hesse celebrated his fiftieth birthday quietly with a few 
Swiss friends, among them was Ninon Dolbin, She was an archeologist.
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36philologist of ancient languages, and scholar of fairy tales. Hesse 
called her affectionately his Auslander, i.e., his foreigner, since she 
was from Austria, They had mat a year before, and prior to that they 
had corresponded for several years, but in 1927 they began to live to­
gether, She was more than twenty years younger than Hesse, but it was 
a relationship that would continue until his death.
In 1928 he was at work on another significant novel, Narziss and 
Goldmund, It was a spicy book that was vary popular (it more than doubled 
the sale of his other books). In the same year that it was published 
(1930), Hesse was at a social gathering with a friend, Dr. H, C, Bodmer, 
and in conversation shared his dream of a house he would like to build 
someday. His wealthy benevolent friend said he would build it for him 
and give it to him as a gift to last his lifetime, A new turning point 
was taking place in the life of Hermann Hesse,
Later Years
In November, 1931, Hesse and Ninon were married and together 
moved into their new home, "Casa Hesse," situated on a hill just outside 
Montagnola, It had a beautiful view of Lake Lugano and the peaks of 
Monts Generoso, This was to be his home for the rest of his life, Hera 
he would balance his life as a writer with the demands of nature in gar­
dening, He would paint, too, and in general enjoy a degree of serenity. 
But life was not over yet. Changes would take place in fascist Germany 
that would dramatically affect him, and his last two books of consequence 
would be new ventures in allegory and in futuristic thinking that would 
reflect a maturity unknown in his earlier work. Certain perennial themes
would still be evident but with a new sense of responsibility. His work
37was changing from "aestheticism to engagement,"
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With the rise of the Third Reich Hesse chose to hold himself 
apart from political involvement, but from the beginning of the new 
regime his work was placed on a list of unwelcome literature. His 
books were not burned, as were those of others, but paper was unautho­
rized for the publication of his writing by the time The Glass Bead 
Game was ready to be published,
Hesse had been recognized as a critic of literature, and he 
reviewed about a thousand books over a sixteen-year period. However, 
he did not consider himself a real critic; in fact, if he came across 
a book he did not like, he would not review it. Because of the perse­
cution by Hitler’s government, significant Jewish authors were black­
listed, It was these writers that Hesse would make a point to review,
"Quality, not the author’s standing in Germany, was Hesse’s sole cri- 
3Bterion.” He recommended books by Jews, and as a result, inflammatory 
articles were written attacking him. It became clear that in Germany 
Hesse’s antinationalist and antimilitarist attitude had never been 
forgiven ; since the First World War,
With the increased persecution of Jews, members of the intelli­
gentsia were critical of what was taking place in Germany, Conse­
quently, the "Casa Hesse" became a frequent resting place for those 
persons having to escape from Germany by way of Switzerland, Thomas 
Mann and Martin Buber were among tha many such visitors during these 
years. It also should be noted that Hesse’s wife, Ninon, had a Jewish 
background.
The crisis created by Hitler affected Hesse, He said it was the 
moment in which he had to summon up all redeeming powers in him to 
examine and make secure all he possessed of faith, "In the midst of 
tha threats and dangers to the physical and spiritual existence of a
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writer in the German language, I turned to the salvation of every 
artist— work,
Hesse once declared that The Journey to the East was his first 
attempt to formulate and sat out his credo for life. The action took 
place in the inner world of the spirit. The leading character was 
H, H, (an obvious reference to himself) and was an allegorical repre­
sentation of Hesse’s own journey through life— from innocence through 
despair to self-knowledge and meaning. It was published in 1931,
The ten years before the outbreak of World War II made Hesse 
" , , , increasingly aware that his poetic mission was by creating to 
educate: and to construct an image of the humanist tradition as he
saw it, with a kind of patient defiance of the times in which he was 
e n c i r c l e d , T w o  things mattered to him during these years: the need
to construct a refuge in which he could breathe and live in defiance of 
the poison around him; and to express the spirit’s resistance against 
the barbaric powers and, if possible, to encourage his friends across 
the border in their resistance and perseverance,^^
Besides working on his last novel. The Glass Bead Game, he re­
vised and combined soma of his shorter works into new editions. He 
worked daily in his garden, and his wife said his favorite pastime was 
making earth fires, feeding them, and then dreaming and meditating in 
front of the smoldering ambers. Fire was a sign to him of the return 
of all things to unity, of purification and refinement,*^
The Glass Bead Game was several years in the making. It was to 
be Hesse’s final statement about life. He saw it as the culmination of 
his life’s work. It was finally completed and published in Switzerland 
in 1943, Very little attention was given to it until it was published 
in Germany in 1946, The imaginary utopian community, Castalia, existing
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several hundreds of years in the future, was the setting for The Glass 
Bead Game. Castalia was to be the model for a world that had lost its 
integrity, and the purpose of the game was serenity.
The Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to Hesse in 1945 for 
The Glass Bead Game. The city of Frankfurt’s Goethe Prize was also 
awarded to him in the same year. And the University of Bern granted 
him an honorary Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1947 in recognition of 
his literary achievements.
During the last twenty years of his life Hesse received thou­
sands of letters, and between answering many of them, plus receiving 
visitors, there was little time left to do much else. Most of his 
letters were from young people. Hesse commented: "For twenty years
these letters have been the only real proof of the meaning of my exis­
tence and work, though they have also been my daily burden and trial, 
Young people were seeking his advice. The letters were personal in 
nature and reflected confidence in Hesse, On one occasion Hesse gave 
this reply:
I can no more answer your questions than I can my own, I am as 
much oppressed by life’s brutality as you are. But I have faith 
that life’s meaninglessness can be overcome insofar as I am always 
able to assert a meaning for my own life. I believe I am not 
responsible for the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of life, but 
that I ^  responsible for what I do with the life I’ve got,44
Although he put a sign at the entranceway to his home to dis­
courage mere curiosity seekers and tourists, one rarely could go to 
his home without finding some visitor there. In spite of it all, he 
did find time to write some short stories, essays, a few poems, diary 
entries, meditations, and open letters published privately and in 
newspapers.
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Looking back over his work, Hesse commented in 1953j "This was
a Fine feeling, alternating between a timeless, primeval world and the
brief epoch of one’s own life, but it fatigued one too, to realize that
everything experienced and able to be experienced by humans seems so
transitory and unimportant."*^ On the whole he believed that he had
remained true to his own nature and had not abandoned the path of self-
46realization even at times of crises.
The last eleven years of his life he had been suffering from 
leukemia, although he was unaware of it. He wrote his last poem during 
the first days of August, 1962, It was called "The Creaking of a Broken 
Branch,"
The broken, splintered branch 
hanging year after year, 
dryly rattles its song In the wind; 
without foliage, without bark, 
it is barren and faded.
Tired of living too long, 
tired of dying too long, 
its song is hard and tenacious; 
it sounds arrogant, hiding the fear
One more summer.
Another long winter,
Hesse, the creaking broken branch, was tired and old (he had celebrated
his eighty-fifth birthday in July), and he was not looking forward to
living another long winter. He died August 9, 1962, in his sleep, of
a cerebral hemorrhage.
Intellectual Influences 
The intellectual influences that affected Hesse’s thinking are 
important in understanding his work. Many persons were responsible for 
shaping his thinking, and it would be impossible to suggest in what 
way they all contributed to his development as a creative author. 
Therefore, only those persons and movements that most influenced him
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will be included in this section* It must be recognized that whereas 
a certain person or school of thought might have been appreciated by 
Hesse, he did not completely follow anyone or any particular philosophy. 
He understood life to be dynamic and open, and he believed it absolutely 
essential that each parson be himself.
His intellectual influences will be divided into three general 
areas: religious mysticism, German romanticism, and humanism (a term
representing a composite of several diverse ideas, personalities, and 
thinkers). The following influences contributed to making Hesse the 
kind of man he was.
Religious Mysticism
Hesse was influenced by mysticism, and he would agree with 
Paul Tillich’s definition of it: "Mysticism means inwardness, par­
ticipation in the Ultimate Reality through inner experience,"^® It 
is the union of the Divine with the human. Feelings of timelessness, 
bliss and serenity are the result of this immediate contact with the 
Divine, And it is contemplation that leads the way to self-mastery.
Some mystics have rapport with the world while others withdraw from 
the world. Both of these types will be represented in Hesse’s char­
acters,
Christian mysticism, by way of Protestant Pietism, was very 
much an integral part of Hesse’s life. His parents and grandparents 
were committed Pietist Christians, and while it was true that he rebelled 
against this strict Pietism, nevertheless, he had an appreciation for 
the deeper issues at stake. From his religious background Hesse re­
ceived the critical analysis of motives, the search for conscience, and 
the emphasis upon reflection present in his work. Also, the conflict
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between the spiritual and the sensual poles within man was a conscious­
ness he possessed as a result of his religious heritage.
Hesse remarked: "Christianity, not preached but practiced, has
been the strongest among the powers which have educated me and formed 
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me." Yet Hesse’s father tried to break his son’s will; he tried to 
get him to submit to his parents’ interpretation of the Christian faith. 
Hesse’s will could not be broken. As a result, he was an individualist, 
even a nonconformist, "I am an individualist and I regard the Christian 
veneration for every human soul as what is best and most holy in Chris­
tianity,"^^ But his nature remained Protestant in that it was unresting 
and critical, for he preferred the risk of uncertainty to the security 
of orthodoxy. He could admire the heroes of Pietism, e.g., Friedrich 
Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782), an eighteenth-century Swabian Pietist 
pastor, who was a dedicated Christian with great sensitivity to human 
need, Oetinger was a theologian of some consequence, and his thought 
was oriented toward the central question of being. This ontological 
concern Hesse appreciated.
But Hesse’s liberal, indeed radical, interpretation of Chris­
tianity was a problematic area for his family. At the time of his 
sister Marulla’s death in 1953, he wrote her a letter stating that he 
could never seriously talk out with their parents his doubts and criti­
cisms of the Christian faith. They did not like to hear of his extra- 
confessional piety drawn from other religions as well as from the 
Christian religion. He said, "I have taken leave of you, Marulla, 
without believing in that reunion of which you were certain , , , you
are with me , , , to warn me against forgetting in everyday life the
51divine and solemn , . , "
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Attention should be called to the influence of Roman Catholicism 
on Hesse. Although the authoritarianism and institutionalism of the 
Roman Catholic church contradicted his own free spirit, there were cer­
tain elements he valued. The inward stress on meditation, as present 
in the monastic movement, intrigued him. Notice the monastic settings 
of several of his novels, such as Narziss and Goldmund and The Glass 
Bead Game, Persons in control of their emotions, frequently celibates, 
appear as important characters in his work. St. Francis of Assisi was 
the model for Hesse’s first novel, Peter Camenzind, The commitment 
and sacrificial character of St, Francis’ life was inspiring to Hesse,
On one occasion he traveled to Assisi in Italy to catch the flavor of 
the community that produced the humble man who chose the servant role.
One of the significant contributions of Roman Catholicism was 
its emphasis on symbols and aesthetics as a means of communicating the 
reality of its beliefs. But perhaps the most influential contribution 
was the maternal element of Catholicism, For Hesse, Mary symbolized 
more than the fact that she was the mother of Jesus, She represented 
the feeling level of existence, a feminine and earthy dimension absent 
in Protestantism, Analytical Psychology made this evident to him.
Intellectually, Hesse had difficulty with the Christian faith.
At an early age he deserted the Protestant faith; subsequently, he never
belonged to any church, "In letters and essays he repeatedly asserted
that he would join the Catholic church if he should ever feel the need
52for an institutionalized religion," He considered Catholicism to be 
superior to Protestantism as a power to create and preserve culture.
At the opposite extreme, he rejected nihilism as an answer to the funda­
mental questions of existence, "He was deeply aware of an all-embracing 
divinity which could not^be expressed in concrete anthropomorphic images;
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but was always accessible to mystic intuition," The intellectual 
giants he read and revered led him in the direction of pantheism and 
a mystical attachment to nature.
It should be recalled that in the eighteenth century German 
intellectuals (such as Goethe and Novalis) turned to pantheism after 
rejecting traditional Christianity and after being unwilling to adopt 
an atheistic position. Pantheists essentially affirmed two things: 
that everything that exists constitutes a unity, and that this all-
inclusive unity is divine. Pantheists have a capacity for awe and
j
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wonder in the face both of natural phenomena and of the apparent
totality of things,
J, C, Middleton, a Hesse scholar, says that the radicaljpan-
theism of Hesse can be observed in that he traces all problems of
evil to God, where there is no choice between evil and good,®* Poetry
is another place where we see evidence of pantheism in Hesse, Among
the most serene of poems are those pantheistic confessions of faith
in which death is welcomed as a bridge between the individual life of
man and the cosmic life of the w h o l e , T h i s  pantheistic view of
death can be seen in an interview between Hesse and Miguel Serrano,
Hesse is reported to have said;
If you can live in fantasy, then you don’t need religion, since
with fantasy you can understand that after death, man is reincor-
porated in the Universe , , , it is not important to know whether 
there is something beyond this life. What counts is having done 
the right sort of work; if that is right, then everything else 
will be all right. The Universe, or Nature, is for me what God
is for others,56
The religions and philosophies of the East must also be added
to that of pantheism and Christian mysticism as having entered Hesse’s
stream of consciousness in a meaningful way. From childhood on, the 
East held a fascination for him. Grandfather Gundert’s library
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provided an introduction to Eastern thought. Later, while studying 
Schopenhauer, Hesse’s interest was furthered when he read a number of 
basic works of Indian philosophy in the German translations, Hesse’s 
conception of the soul was drawn from the then current texts and com­
mentaries on Oriental thought. Intuition became the psychic organ of 
cognition, for through the eyes of such intuition the soul saw immedi­
ately into existence, and its knowledge was not theoretic but organic,
"In Siddhartha Hesse aimed to establish his ’Asiatic* values;
57the Justification of impulse and the transfiguration of evil," The 
emphasis on discovering and following one’s own dharma, the search for 
the self through correct action, and the river symbolism for oneness 
with the All, were examples of Eastern values. The name Siddhartha 
was one of the names for Buddha, i,e,, one who attained perfection.
So, too, were the other names in the novel taken directly from Eastern 
thought, "Siddhartha was largely an' actualization of the concepts of 
the Gita,"^^
The irresponsible urge and the detached mind were fundamental
aspects of human life, in Eastern thought. In Hesse’s thinking the mind
was the father side of man. It was here that reverence for, and obedi­
ence to, spiritual values took place. Contemplation was an important 
means to the spiritual life. The influence of these ideas on Hesse came
first from Indian, and later from Chinese, philosophy and literature.
Death also was understood by Hesse from an Asiatic point of
view. Death was never absolute— it was absolved in rebirth. Even the
glass bead game had an Oriental origin, A Chinese game called "Go" was
played similarly to chess and had a variety of complex strategies that
59required real intellectual mastery. Although the glass bead game was 
a fictional game created by Hesse, there was a pattern of play and a
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history that was similar to "Go." The academic concern for the East 
revealed Hesse’s respect for Eastern values. His intellectual curi­
osity included other esoteric interests such as Gnosticism, astrology, 
and the occult. Some of these ideas appeared in his work as well*
German Romanticism 
The second major intellectual influence upon Hesse was the 
phenomenon of romanticism, Hugo Ball, Hesse’s first biographer, called 
him the last knight in the glorious cavalcade of romanticism,®® Accord­
ing to Bernhard Zeller, Hesse said, "I began to study romantic literature
at tha age of eighteen, and along with the literature of India and China
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it has greatly influenced my own thought and writing,"
Romanticism was a literary, artistic, and philosophical movement 
originating in the eighteenth century, characterized chiefly by a reac­
tion against neoclassicism; it emphasized tha imagination and emotions; 
it made use of autobiographical material, exalted the primitive and the
common man; it had appreciation for nature, and was interested in the
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melancholy and even remote aspects of human life. Historically, it 
was a reaction to the Age of Reason and the overemphasis on fact, devoid 
of mystery, Tillich observed: "The symbolic-romantic interpretation of
nature attempts to give back to nature its qualitative character, its 
depth, its meaningfulness, by Interpreting nature as a symbol of the 
spirit,"®^
Romanticism was an intense attitude toward life that included 
such elements as; the reunification of nature and spirit, obsession 
with the absolute, irrationalism (if not antirationalism), a longing 
for the Middle Ages and the Orient, It was a temperament that stressed 
the uniqueness of the individual (frequently to the point of eccentricity)
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The romantic valued intuition and natural feelings to such an extent 
that he could be accused of subjectivity and sentimentality.
Historical romanticism had long since passed (it covered approxi­
mately the period 1770-1830) when Hesse began to write. However, it 
was German romanticism and the cultural heroes of that era that loft 
a mark on Hesse, One of the "immortals" was Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
(1749-1832), Hesse said*
Of all German poets, Goethe is the one to whom I owe most, the one 
who has preoccupied me most, oppressed, encouraged, and forced me 
to follow him or to rebel , , , To surrender myself to Goethe the 
poet was easy, for he brought with him the fragrance of youth, 
together with the fragrance of forest, meadow, and wheat field, 
and in his language, beginning with the counselor’s wife, all the 
profundity and playfulness of folk wisdom, the sounds of nature 
and men at work, and in addition a high degree of m u s i c . 64
Goethe had a passion for nature, and his early work revealed
the "Storm and Stress" that was characteristic of the period. He
possessed an enthusiasm for Greek culture, especially the Dionysian
elements in it,
Goethe’s novel. The Sorrows of Young Werther, expressed tha 
soul of a hypersensitive individual who was unable to adjust to the 
real world. This theme was evident in Hesse, Also, in the first part 
of Faust (written early in Goethe’s career) magic had replaced learning 
as the means by which the mysterious universe could be fathomed. In the 
second part of Faust (written near the end of Goethe’s life) the skepti­
cism over knowledge had been replaced with a trust in the capacity of 
man to use his mind as well as his heart and with a belief that man 
could find relative contentment in serving his fellowman. Similarities 
could be found in Hesse’s work,
Hesse accepted other convictions held by Goethe, For example, 
Goethe believed the universe contains and expresses a creative force
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which appears as a duality but is in fact a unity. The idea of
polarity, of attraction and repulsion, was seen as basic cosmic forces
present in life. Reason alone was insufficient for grasping reality.
Imagination and intuition were necessary in order to comprehend the
infinite whole, Goethe outgrew these earlier inclinations, and the
Greek emphasis on balance and harmonious expression of body and soul
became apparent. This found a similar response in Hesse, The idea of
striving was important to Goethe and Hesse alike. They thought every
man innately felt an urge to strive upwards. And there was a mutual
respect for the wisdom of the East, Hesse’s high praise for Goethe is
apparent in the essay, "Gratitude to Goethe,"
, , , I would forbid the reading of Goethe and keep him in reserve 
as the highest reward for the best, maturest, and worthiest 
students, , , , they would find, in the spirit that can save us 
and in the readiness to serve that spirit by every sacrifice, no 
better guide and comrade than Goethe,65
In Steppenwolf Hesse made the confrontation with Goethe a major
motif. And in The Glass Bead Game " , , , a good case could be made for
associating Joseph Knecht with Goethe and with Goethe’s alter ego,
Faust: both experience a crisis in middle age, after mastering the
extant body of knowledge; both manifest an insistent striving; both
arrive at a practical, limited sphere of activity,"®® Certainly there
is little doubt between the kinship of The Glass Bead Game and Goethe’s
Wilhelm Meister. Hesse’s chief inspiration for what is universal in
man seems to have been Goethe,
Another of the "immortals" who had a great bearing on the thought
of Hesse was Novalis, i,e,, Friedrich von Hardanberg (1772-1801),
Novalis represented the intentions and achievements of romanticism with
the emphasis on yearning. According to Karl Barth, Novalis studied
life as an artist (be he painter or musician) and believed the more
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67poetic a thing was the truer it was. The true poet was considered
a genius, and was the true man. Poets exercised a magic power, and
were rare nomadic men. The creative man in every age finds himself
driven at times to the edge of an abyss of appalling loneliness, yet
the secret path to meaning leads inward,
Novalis was a romantic on the border between: the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, philosophy and art, nature and history, and
between love and religion— all of which merge into each other at
times. He considered philosophy in its original form to be feeling*
it was nostalgia, an urge to be at home everywhere,
Hesse’s novels revealed this yearning quality. It was evident
in man’s restlessness and in his search for ways to fulfill himself.
And Hesse chose artists (painters, musicians, and poets) as his main
characters. He believed the aesthetic life was in touch with what was
real. His characters were wanderers, very much at home in the woods
or in mountain climbing. They were able to sleep under the stars
without cover, for they had an ability to survive in nature, Hesse
emphasized feeling, nostalgia, loneliness, and inwardness— dimensions
of romanticism present in Novalis,
Hesse said, "I consider him (Novalis) to be the finest of all
recent German poets because he never wrote a single word that was
69merely decoration or rhetoric," And a major concern for Novalis was
his search for the self. It was
• , , tantamount to monastic contemplation and discovery of Self, 
the ultimate reunion of the spirit with Creator, the magical 
merging of truth and love, Novalis’ emblem for the mystery of the 
revelation of Self was the veil of Isis; the visionary lifting of 
the vail was an outward symbol of inward triumph— Hesse, too, 
seemed to discover in the vision of the veiled Other the imminent 
recognition of Self.^O
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Novalis died at an early age (twenty-nine years), but his death
was not considered tragic, Hesse said Novalis withdrew into death*
, . , he died by consciously consuming himself from within, a 
magical, early blossoming followed by an enormously fruitful 
death, — It is precisely from this strange and of the poet, 
from his positive, magical, extraordinary relationship to death, 
that his strongest influence radiates,71
While it was true that Novalis died of tuberculosis, his will to live was
affected by his own personal convictions and by the loss of his young wife.
It was his attitude toward death that affected Hesse. Death was not to
be feared but to be accepted as a meaningful part of life. This view of
death was a familiar theme in Hesse as he confronted the issue of suicide.
Another influential person was Johann Paul Friedrich Richter
(1763-1625), a German romantic novelist who wrote under the name of Jean
Paul, Sentimentalism, formlessness, irony, and whimsical humor charac-
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terized his writing. His work portrayed the struggle between idealism 
and reality. He thought that small joys of the senses were to be valued 
higher than great joys; and man was made happy by little strokes of luck. 
His romanticism could be seen in the themes of freedom-at-any-price and 
the transition of youth to adulthood. His books portrayed the idyllic 
forms of ordinary life, and he saw the contrast between aim and achieve­
ment clearly, Hesse said: "Jean Paul is the perfect example of a genius
who has not cultivated a single specialty but whose ideal is the free
play of all the powers of the soul, who would like to say yes to every-
73thing, enjoy everything to the full, love and experience everything,"
But Jean Paul’s greatness derived essentially from his relation­
ship with tha unconscious. He had a profound intuitive sense, and he 
sought to combine thinking and feeling in a juxtaposed but harmonious way, 
Hesse gained from Jean Paul tha sense of the continuity and transcendence 
of tha self. Self-consciousness was a means of fathoming the universal 
in man.
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The person responsible for inspiring Hesse to be a writer was
Friedrich Hdlderlin (1770-1843), a German poet who wrote lyrical versa
and prose-poems. Part of Holderlin’s originality wae his desire to
satisfy his religious longing within the realm of Greek myth and the
gods or in some realm where Greek myth could be united with Christian
or Germanic or Indie divinities.^* In a poem entitled "The Only One"
he tried to bring together Apollo, Zeus, and Hercules, with Christ and
the Christian God in a syncretistic way. He advocated a universal
harmony between incompatible theological affirmations.
However, it was Holderlin’s poem, "Night," that continued to
enchant Hesse as no other poem did. It was this poem, that he had
encountered as a child, that made him want to be a poet* It was not
surprising that in a collection of poems written by Hesse he would
include an "Ode to Holderlin,"
Friend of my young manhood, on many an evening 
I return gratefully to you, when in the elder bushes 
Of the garden fallen asleep
Only the rustling fountains still make a sound.
Nobody knows you, my friend; this new age has driven
Far away from the silent magic of Greece,
Without prayer, and cheated out of gods,
People stroll reasonably in the dust.
But to the secret gathering who sink in their inner lives.
Whose souls God has stricken with longing.
The heavenly strings of your songs 
Are ringing, even today.
We turn passionately, exhausted by day,
To the ambrosia, the night of your music.
Whose fanning wing casts us into 
A shadow of golden dream.
Yes, and luminously, when your song delights us.
Sorrowfully burning for the blessed land of the past.
For the temples of the Greeks,
Our homesickness lasts forever,
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It was Holderlin’s restless life— his defiance of the contemporary 
world, his loneliness, his vagrancy, and finally, his long period of 
insanity that caused Hesse to have empathy for him.
In the early poems of Hesse the influence of German romanticism
was very much in evidence. After writing Peter Camenzind Hesse said*
My intention was to familiarize modern man with the overflowing 
and silent life of nature, I wanted^ to teach him to listen to the 
earth’s heartbeat, to participate in the life of nature , . , I 
wanted to remind people that, like the songs of the poets and our 
night-time dreams, rivers, seas, drifting clouds, and storms are 
symbols and bearers of our yearnings , , , 76
Hesse was a romantic in his estimation of feeling. He would not deny
all feeling in order to avoid being called a sentimentalist. The
capacity to love and to experience the "more than normal" was for him
exactly what made a writer.
Romanticism was not something " • , , that inspires teenage girls
and causes sensible men to shake their heads, , , , it was not a question
of progress or romanticism, of moving forward or moving backward, but
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of the exterior and the interior world," Even the nature that he loved 
he occasionally observed with realistic detachment. And with the passing 
of time his undisciplined romanticism began to be tempered by the social 
realities of the twentieth century. Personal and political tragedies 
brought existential awareness.
Humanism
The third and last category of thought that influenced Hesse 
includes a strange assortment of individuals. It is difficult to find 
a term that designates diverse ideas and personalities; therefore, this 
section is called "humanism," An alternative choice is "individualism," 
Humanism and individualism are basic concepts which Hesse valued highly. 
Individualism advocates the liberty, rights, or independent action of 
tha individual.
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Humanism is any philosophy which recognizes the value of man 
and makes him the measure of all things. The limitations and interests 
of human nature are taken as its themes. Humanism is also a return to 
the classical world. The exaltation of freedom which man can exercise 
in nature and society is important, Man is seen to have the capacity 
to form his world, to vary it, and to better it. Humanists exalt the 
soul of man, but they also call attention to the body. The value of 
pleasure is recognized in contrast to asceticism. Note, however, that 
for Hesse humanism does not necessarily have an antireligious character.
The religious views held by most humanists are permeated by a spirit of
tolerance.
The persons who most influenced Hesse all have something to say
about man, but the convictions held by these persons range from the
religiously committed, to the indifferent, to the hostile. Each, in
his way, makes his contribution,
A significant influence on Hesse was another "immortal," Wolfgang
Amadeus Mozart (1756-1791), Karl Barth suggests that the most obvious
qualities of Mozart’s music are probably brightness, gaiety, and 
78serenity, Mozart’s acute Insight into human nature made it possible 
for him to penetrate into tha hearts of men, "The exciting and appeal­
ing aspect of his music was that it came from a height where everything
is known and from where the right and left side of existence, happiness
and pain, good and evil, life and death have all been perceived in their
79reality as well as in their limitation,"
The music of Mozart is universal because it has no message. To 
Mozart it was all the same* religious aspiration or amorous pursuit—  
there was no difference between such extremes for him as an artist. It 
is interesting that even though Mozart’s own subjective experience was
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far from happy, his music is free and objective» He did not use music 
to speak about himself.
It is to be expected that Mozart would appear in a prominent 
way in the work of Hesse, For example, in Steppenwolf he is the one 
to pronounce sentence on Harry Haller, And the impact of Mozart on 
Hesse can be observed in Hesse’s journal of 1920 in which he made this 
entry:
At the start of this day, of this page from the colorful leaves 
of my life, I should like to write a particular word, a word such 
as ’world,* or ’sun,’ a word full of magic and radiant power, full 
of sound and richness, fuller than full, richer than rich, a word 
signifying total fulfillment, total knowledge.
And now in a flash the very word occurs to me, tha magic sign 
for this day, I shall write it large at the top of the page: 
MOZART, That means* the world has meaning and we can sense this 
meaning allegorically through music.80
Hesse included Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) among
his "immortals," It was Byron, Holderlin, Schopenhauer, Darwin, and
Wagner that Nietzsche most admired. He respected the man who had the
courage to follow his instincts, and he believed absolutely in becoming 
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who you are.
According to Nietzsche, God, if He existed, was unknowable— only 
an idea in the minds of man. Nothing that existed in the phenomenal 
world could have come from "outside" man. If the universe were intel­
ligible it must be from within, Man was in touch with no "beyond," 
Nietzsche preferred religious uncertainty to certainty, and his apho­
ristic style in Thus Spake Zarathustra was formulated to shock and to 
give offense.
Even though Nietzsche lost his mind and died after several years 
of not knowing who, or where, he was, he left a tremendous impact on 
German intellectuals. He called for an authentic existence, for man 
to affirm himself, to have courage to say yes to life when there is
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30 much evidence for saying no, and for man to stand and be counted— to
master himself and become the Ubermensch. "Nietzsche was the greatest
critic, not of the Christian idea of love, but of the sentimentalized
82idea of love, where love is reduced to compassion."
When Hesse was twenty years old he discovered Nietzsche's
greatness. He read Thus Soake Zarathustra and later purchased all of
Nietzsche's available books, and ha read them as though possessed or
drunk. Nietzsche was a rebel, a wrecker of traditions, the foe of the
self-satisfied bourgeoisie. He had a genius for suffering, a boundless
capacity for pain, Hesse appreciated Nietzsche's discriminating mind.
On one occasion Hesse said: "It is more proper to be a psychopath than
to adapt oneself to circumstances of the time at the sacrifice of all 
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ideals," Hesse had two pictures of Nietzsche in his room when ha lived 
in Tubingen and Basel, and from that time on he considered Nietzsche his 
spiritual mentor.
While Nietzsche was an existentialist who proclaimed that "God 
is dead!", Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky (1821-1081) was an existen­
tialist who believed God was very much alive. Hesse was fascinated by 
the thinking of both man. At the center of Dostoyevsky's writing is 
the problem of freedom. Man wants to be totally free, but in fact ha 
is limited by society, economic conditions, history, and especially by 
God. Man is constantly in revolt against anyone and anything that denies 
him his freedom. But total freedom can lead to destruction as well as 
to new life.
During the First World War Hesse studied Dostoyevsky's work and 
benefited from his thinking about man's ambiguity. For example, Hesse 
concluded in an essay he wrote in In^  Sight of Chaos;
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The "Russian man" (which we have long since had in Germany also) 
is not signified by the single word "hysteric," neither is it by 
the word drunkard, or criminal, or poet, or saint— but by all 
these characteristics simultaneously co-existing. Russian man—  
Karamazov--is at once murderer and judge, ruffian and creature of 
most tender soul. He is the most perfect egoist, just as he is 
the hero of the most perfect self-sacrifice. Together in this man 
are exterior and interior, good and evil, God and Satan,84
Ha also learned from Dostoyevsky that every individual bears the guilt
and responsibility for everyone and everything.
Hesse was an existentialist in the sense that he took the 
individual as his starting point and saw the concrete uniqueness of 
each person. Most of his characters knew the fate of the prodigal son 
whose inner needs made him break out of the shelter of his father's 
house, and away from the security of fixed mores and traditions, in 
order to face the naked reality of life. The motif of "awakening" 
extended throughout Hesse's work. It was an adventure that could never 
last longer than some flashing moments in duration. But these moments 
transformed the human being and his consciousness. The emphasis was 
on experiencing life rather than being merely a spectator of life, 
Narziss and Goldmund and SteppanwoIf would illustrate this.
The man who became a spiritual brother to Hesse was Romain 
Rolland (1866-1944), a French novelist, playwright, and musicologist. 
They corresponded over a period of several years, and it was no secret 
that through Holland's pacifism, and consequently, his persecution, a 
friendship was produced that meant much to Hesse.
As a young man Rolland had been seeking spiritual guidance after
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being oppressed by the materialism of his day. He turned to Tolstoy 
for help, and it resulted in a changed life for Rolland. When he became 
a recognized writer his themes included; the conqueror being conquered, 
the great being defeated, and criticism of contemporary civilization. 
During the First World War he wrote pacifistic papers in which he
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appealed to a spirit of internationalism. Due to his unpatriotic
stance he was threatened with imprisonment.
It is interesting to note that Holland's most significant work
is Jean Christophe, a novel about a musician who is confronted with the
problem of being an artist in an alien world. This "outsider" approach
to writing is a repeated theme of Hesse's,
The last person included in this section is Jacob Christoph
Burckhardt (1818-1897), a Swiss historian and native of Basel, praised
by some as the wisest man of the nineteenth century, Hesse said that
three strong influences, at work throughout his life, made him what he
was: the Christian and almost totally nonnationalistic spirit of the
home in which he grew; the reading of the great Chinese thinkers; and
the work of one historian, Jacob Burckhardt.
Burckhardt's specialty was art history, especially Italian
Renaissance History. His early romantic ideas of youth lost their
attraction for him, and he turned to classicism. He was interested in
the Middle Ages and in the dawning of a new civilization from the
ancient world to Christianity,
During his student days Hesse read two of Burckhardt's works.
Civilization of the Renaissance and Constantine, and came to appreciate
the importance of history in regard to values that endure. It is no
mere coincidence that a significant character in The Glass Bead Game
was a Christian historian named Father Jacobus, The wisdom of the ages
seemed to be present in this sage, A study of history contributed to
the movement from romanticism to realism in Hesse. It was his long
look at man that made him think on the level of universals and the
common values of all men, "Jacob Burckhardt was to occupy in the second
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half of my life a place that formerly had belonged to Nietzsche."
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Many more outstanding thinkers and creative artists (such as 
Lao-tse, Shakespeare, Bach, Schopenhauer, and Tolstoy) played their 
part in making Hesse the man he was. It is impossible to discuss all 
the people who shaped his mind and work. In the final analysis great 
personalities elude all attempts at classification. Drawing from many 
sources and traditions, they remain themselves. This is true of 
Hermann Hesse, However, one last section must be presented if his life 
and thought are to be understood— the impact of psychoanalysis upon him*
Analytical Psychology
In the biographical section it was learned that Hesse sought 
help for his personal crisis in psychoanalysis. In order to grasp the 
significance of this experience it will be necessary to examine the 
relationship between Hesse and his analysts; attention will be given 
to the principal concepts of Analytical Psychology; and illustrations 
of Hesse's use of these psychological insights following analysis (in 
the references and imagery obvious in his work) will be presented.
Psychoanalysts
Hesse underwent psychoanalysis with Dr, Joseph 8, Lang, a
disciple of Carl Jung, Jung commented on Lang:
He was a curious, though extremely learned man, who had studied 
oriental languages (Hebrew, Arabic, and Syrian) and was particu­
larly interested in gnostic speculation. He got from me a con­
siderable amount of knowledge concerning gnosticism which he also 
transmitted to Hesse.88
Hesse's analysis with Lang was directly reflected in Demian,
Hesse said that he first met Jung in person in 1916 and read
89Jung's Symbols of Transformation the same year, Jung made an impres­
sion on Hesse, so that he read some of Jung's other books. In 1921 
Hesse had several analytic sessions with Jung. The origins of
44
Siddhartha and Steppenwolf ware, to a certain extent, the direct or
indirect result of talks with Jung. Although Hesse read selections
from some of his own works to Jung's psychoanalytic association (as he
had much respect for Jung), analysis did not greatly interest Hesse
after 1922, "Then too I had a fine impression of him [jung], though
at that time I began to see that for analysts a genuine relationship
90to art is unattainable: they all lack sense for it."
There seemed to be soma reticence beneath the surface regarding
Jung, for Hesse said that Freud made the stronger impression on him.
Hans R, Schmid, in his book, Hermann Hesse, published in 1928, says:
Hesse's abnormal preoccupation with nature and with childhood are 
considered manifestations of a mother fixation which is rooted in 
an Oedipus complex and is commonly accompanied by an obsession of 
guilt , . . Hesse's anxiety neurosis, in turn, can be considered 
a by-product of an attempt to sublimate his Oedipus complex.91
Another scholar. Max Schmid, agrees with Hans Schmid, and adds 
the thought that Hesse's efforts to adjust himself to a peaceful bour­
geois way of life are expressions of a ceaseless quest for a Heimat.
92Viewed psychologically this unrest would suggest an Oedipus complex.
However, the confidential analytical data that resulted from the 
many sessions with Lang and with Jung are not available. One cannot de­
termine what unique problems of Hesse's were discussed. A critic, Stephen
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Koch, accuses Hesse of being an overt homosexual. But Hesse's many bio­
graphers do not reveal this aspect of his life, if it is a well-known fact 
as Koch suggests. It could be read into his work if one were trying to do 
so. For example, in 1931 Hesse wrote a letter in reference to the essen­
tial bisexuality of life as explored in Steppenwolf and in Narziss and 
Goldmund, In Narziss' chaste kiss and confession near the end of the book 
the latent emotional bond of homosexuality is particularly obvious, and it 
has led critics to suspect Hesse of this problem. But Hesse replied;
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OaS3 disse Freundshaften, well zwischen Mannern bestahend, 
vollig frei von Erotik saien, ist ein Irrtum, Ich bin 
geschlechtlich "normal" und habe nie korperlich erotischa 
Baziehungen zu Mannern gahabt, aber die Freundshaften deshalb fur 
vollig unerotisch zu halten, scheint mir doch falsch zu sain,94
That these friendships, because they exist between men, are 
completely free of eroticism is an error, I am sexually normal 
and have never had physical sexual relations with men, but to 
insist friendship therefore to be entirely unerotic seems to me 
false, however,
A case also could be made for a Freudian analysis of Hesse,
But the internal evidence of Hesse's work reveals the extent of the 
influence that Jung's Analytical Psychology had on him. It is actually 
the key to understanding his work, particularly after 1917, For that 
reason, some of the basic elements of Jung's thought must be presented. 
Only those ideas of Jung's that have a direct bearing on the thinking 
of Hermann Hesse will be considered.
Psychic Reality
Jung uses the terms, psyche and psychic, to cover both conscious­
ness and the unconscious, Ha insists upon the psyche being no less real 
than the physical side of man's life. But Jung says, "Consciousness 
grows out of an unconscious psyche which is older than it, and which 
goes on functioning together with it or even in spite of it,"^^ Man 
participates in a reality that goes far beyond that of consciousness, 
Jung gives the inner psychic process a value equal to the outer physical 
process, but the psyche is not dependent upon the physical.
The psyche is dynamic and in constant movement. It serves the 
purposes of life. In opposition to Freud, Jung prefers to think of the 
psyche in terms of general psychic energy rather than as a bundle of 
impulses organized into the adult sexual driv e . P s y c h i c  energy is 
the "libido," The individual cannot control the libido at will.
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Irrational elements coming from the unconscious often determine the
actions of man, Jung says, " . , . there can be no reality without 
97polarity," These opposing poles are called "the opposites," The
libido progresses, i,e,, adapts to one's environment, or it regresses,
i,e,, adapts to one's inner needs, Man has a need to be in harmony
with himself, which means taking into consideration his inner world,
"But the psychic phenomenon cannot be grasped in its totality
by the intellect, for it consists not only of meaning but also of
value, and this depends on the intensity of the accompanying feeling- 
98tones," Symbols are the means by which we come to understand the 
psyche. The symbol unifies the conscious and the unconscious, the 
rational and the irrational factors, and is the expression of the 
psychic totality as manifested spontaneously at any given moment. A 
symbol signifies something relatively unknown in itself but known to 
be present by its dynamic effect. Dreams are natural and spontaneous 
products of the psyche, and dream language is symbolic, "Considered 
from the standpoint of realism, the symbol is not of course an external 
truth, but it is psychologically true, for it was and is the bridge to 
all that is best in humanity,
Myths are also important for Jung. "Myth, says a Church Father, 
is 'what is believed always, everywhere, by everybody'; hence the man 
who thinks he can live without myth, or outside it, is an exception,"1^0 
Man receives the security and inner strength needed to cope with life 
by way of religious myth. Myths are expressions of human nature and 
put man in touch with the creative forces of his being. They express 
the unconscious.
The ego is the center of consciousness. It is the matrix of 
knowing and willing. It is what a person means when he refers to "I,"
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The ego is able to forget or repress what is socially unacceptable.
The area that contains the memories of these repressions is called the
"personal unconscious," However, all our experience of the outer and
inner world must pass through our ego in order to be perceived, and
our consciousness is dependent on the unconscious.
Consciousness is composed of four psychic functions; thinking,
feeling, intuition, and sensation.
Thus thinking is the function which seeks to apprehend the world 
and adjust to it by way of thought or cognition, i,e,, logical 
inferences. The function of feeling, on the other hand, apprehends 
the world through an evaluation based on the feelings of "pleasant 
or unpleasant, acceptance or rejection," , . , Sensation perceives 
things as they are and not otherwise, , , , Intuition also "per­
ceives," but less through the conscious apparatus of the senses 
than through its capacity for an unconscious "inner perception" of 
the inherent potentialities of things.101
Thinking and feeling are antithetical but rational functions, whereas
sensation and intuition are just as antithetical but are irrational
functions.
Individuals have a tendency to develop one function more than 
the others. The way one reacts to inner and outer experience will 
indicate either of two attitudes; extraversion or introversion. The 
extraverted attitude is characterized by an outward interest in people 
and things— a relationship with them, and a dependence on them is evi­
dent. This person is sociable and confident even in unfamiliar sur­
roundings, The earliest mark of extraversion in a child is his quick
102adaptation to the environment. The child moves and lives among 
objects with trust. He is less cautious, and everything unknown seems 
alluring. Extraverts have a tendency to be superficial, and they lack 
the ability to be self-critical. The introverted attitude is charac­
terized by withdrawal and a looking within. This type is very subjec­
tive and lacks confidence— tending to be unsociable and preferring
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reflection to activity. Introverted persons are very sensitive and 
overly conscientious, pessimistic, and critical of themselves,
for Jung, persons are a combination of the four functions of the 
psyche, and it is a matter of degree as to whether one is an introvert 
or an extravert. In the life of an individual an attitude of extraver­
sion or introversion is usually constant, but the two attitudes can 
alternate at certain times.
Most people use one function (or its modification), more complicated 
people use two functions, and a vary highly differentiated person­
ality would make use of three functions. The inclusion of the 
fourth function belongs to what Jung has called the individuation 
process, and the reconciliation of the opposing trends of one's 
nature,103
Individuation will be discussed later.
In the process of living, however, man adapts himself to his
world. He develops along the line of least resistance, and he develops
a side of his personality that is turned toward the outside world. It
is called the "persona” and is a mask behind which people live,
"Fundamentally the persona is nothing real; it is a compromise between
individual and society as to what a man should appear to be,”^^^ In a
sense, the persona mediates between the ego and the outside world. The
relationship of the various aspects of consciousness can be seen in the
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following diagram by Jolande Jacobi,
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Archetypes
Another Jungian term is the "shadow,” It is to be found in the
personal unconscious and is the inferior being within us. It is that
dimension of life that wants to do all the things one is not allowed
to do, "The shadow is the personal unconscious; all those uncivilized
desires and emotions that are incompatible with social standards and
our ideal personality, all that we are ashamed of, all that we do not
10fiwant to know about ourselves.” The shadow is the instinctive side
of man. It takes moral effort to become conscious of the dark aspects
of the personality, for the shadow challenges the whole ego-personality.
The integration of the shadow marks the first stage in the analytic
process, and that is necessary, for without it a recognition of arche-
107types is impossible.
As one passes through the personal unconscious one discovers a 
deeper and darker area of the unconscious, Jung calls it the "collec­
tive unconscious,” Just as the body contains elements that are common 
to all men, so also are certain characteristics in the psyche common to 
all men. Primordial images, or archetypes, are left over from bygone 
evolutionary stages. An archetypal image is like a portrait of an un­
known man in a gallery. His name, biography, and existence in general 
are unknown. But it can be assumed that the picture portrays a once 
living subject, a man who was real. The collective unconscious is the 
reservoir of human psychic experience from man's ancestral past. Dreams, 
myths, and religions reveal these images of the collective unconscious. 
Archetypes can be recognized as human or semi-human forms such as gods 
or goddesses, dwarfs, or giants. But archetypes are not only images, 
they are experienced as emotions as well.
The "anima” and "animus” would be two examples of archetypes in
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the collective unconscious. They are the feminine and masculine compo­
nents within a person, A man contains a feminine element (anima) and 
a woman a male element (animus). They serve as mediators between the 
conscious mind and the unconscious, "An inherited collective image of
woman exists in a man's unconscious, with the help of which he appre-
10Bhands the nature of woman," The anima expresses herself in fantasy,
mood, and in emotional outburst. The anima is a " , , , semiconscious
109
psychic complex, having partial autonomy of function," She is wise 
and good and goddess-like, or she can be the opposite, a prostitute or 
witch.
The animus in woman is " , , , the collective image of man which
a woman inherits; her own experience of masculinity coming through the
contacts she makes with men in her life; and the latent masculine prin-
110
ciple in herself," The animus is the opinion side of woman, the side
that craves power. It is evident in acts of aggression, "The animus
corresponds to the paternal Logos just as the anima corresponds to the 
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maternal Eros," These two elements are most important in understand­
ing Hesse— note Narziss and Goldmund. in particular.
Two other archetypes are the "wise old man” and the "great 
mother," The wise old man is the archetype of meaning. He possesses 
"mana," i.e., power, A person possessed with this archetype has a feel­
ing of being godlike or a superman. He feels endowed with unusual powers 
of wisdom, prophecy, and even healing.
Persons possessed with the great mother archetype believe them­
selves to be capable of infinite love and understanding— a person who 
will be willing to help another at any price. This involves the motif 
of a dual-mother. One of the mothers is the real, human mother, the 
other (the archetypal) is the symbolic mother, "He who stems from two
51
mothers is the hero; the first birth makes him a mortal man, the
112second an immortal half-god,"
There are other archetypes, but they do not directly affect the 
work of Hesse, What needs to be examined next is the concept of "the 
self" in Analytical Psychology,
Selfhood
Whereas the ego is the center of the conscious life of man, "the
self" includes the conscious and the unconscious. Its function is to
unite the opposing elements in man and woman. It involves struggle
and suffering. "For, paradoxically, the self is not only the centra,
but represents the whole man; making a unity out of the contradictions
of his nature, all that is felt to be good, and all that is felt to be
bad; maleness and femaleness, the four functions of thinking, feeling,
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sensation, and intuition; the conscious and the unconscious," The 
experience of the self is archetypal and frequently it is a child who 
symbolizes the self. The expression in dreams of roundness, the circle 
or sphere, or by the "quaternity," are symbols of wholeness which the 
child archetype represents.
Historical figures, such as Buddha and Christ, are examples of 
those persons who achieved full selfhood, i.e., they realized their 
potential. They were individuated, and consequently, fully human. For 
Jung the self is the center of man worth coming to know. Becoming a 
self is dangerous. It can lead to a sense of realized potential, of 
peace and harmony within; or, it could lead to madness. Symbols of the 
self are mandalas in the form of a magic circle, wheel, egg, or even a 
cross, Mandalas serve as symbols of the nature of deity, and a typical 
mandala is based upon the number four. It brings together many diverse 
elements into a single unity, and it points to a center or goal.
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A hermaphroditic figure is also a symbol of completeness. Hesse |
uses such a figure in Steppenwolf and in The Journey to the East, The
symbolic conjunctio oppositorium is reflected in Haller's mind in the
conjunction of Pablo and Hermine— they represent the creative union of
mala and female principles (the hermaphrodite) in his own soul. "Yet
Haller is proven unable to recognize this symbol of the unity of his
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psychic and conscious life in the self." In The Journey to the East 
H, H. discovers a figure that unites Leo and H. H, (back-to-back like 
Siamese twins). This symbolizes the fact that Leo is in reality H, H,, 
an image of his own self at a deeper level of consciousness.
According to Jung, in the past, when symbols of wholeness ap­
peared in dreams, man felt reconciled or at one with a deity. This is 
not true today, "Thera is no deity in the mandala, and there is also
no submission or reconciliation to a deity. The place of the deity
115seams to be taken by the wholeness of man."
If a man wants to be happy, he cannot live at odds with himself.
Self-realization, or coming to selfhood, is what Jung means by "indi­
viduation," It means bringing to consciousness what is unconscious.
Individuation is to Jungian psychology what reconciliation is to Chris­
tian theology— both are concerned with the idea that man becomes what 
he is meant to be, Man becomes psychologically whole.
Experiencing the self is the same as experiencing the God within.
The self is a God-image, or at least cannot be distinguished from one.
However, for Jung, God includes both good and evil (he points to the 
Old Testament concept of a God who is both good and evil, i.e., gets
angry and punishes people, as well as loves them). Evil is psychic and
can be accounted for within man. In order to avoid a dualism, Jung adds 
the evil, or negative, side of reality to the Trinity to form the
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four-sided deity. At other times he realizes that the feminine compo­
nent is missing in the deity, so she becomes the fourth element. On 
one occasion Jung combined the negative and the feminine to make up the 
completed quaternity. He was not always consistent, but ho did believe 
quaternity was a symbol for integration, "The quaternity is an organiz­
ing schema par excellence, something like the crossed threads in a
i. 1 .116telescope."
The concept of opposites was a problem for Jung in accepting
Christ as an archetype of the self. He opposed traditional theology
and the perfect goodness of Jesus by saying; "There can be no doubt
that the original Christian conception of the imago del embodied in
Christ meant an all-embracing totality that even includes the animal 
117side of man." The Antichrist corresponds to the shadow of the self.
God and Christ are psychological realities that can be known, but
whether either have a "higher" or "other" reality cannot be established,
The important thing for Jung is that the experience of the self
means the personality is liberated, healed, and transformed. Wholeness
is a human experience. The following diagram may be helpful in under-
118
standing the various elements present in the unconscious.
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Implications
The significance of the impact of Analytical Psychology on the
thinking of Hesse will become more explicit in the next chapter, but a
few of the implications can be shown at this time. For example, in
1916, at the age of thirty-nine, Hesse arrived at a crisis in his life.
Jung said, in his book, Modern Man in Search of a Soul: "Among all my
patients in the second half of life— that is to say, over thirty-five—
there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of
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finding a religious outlook on life." It was not surprising that 
Demian. Siddhartha. and other of Hesse's writings reflected this search­
ing within for answers to the problem of what it means to be man. Jung
was a person who lived on the boundary of poetry and science, of philoso­
phy and psychology, and his unique observations and findings affected 
Hermann Hesse.
Certainly Hesse was an introvert. He was a Seelenmensch and his
whole life reflected a quest for a Heimat. for a Saelenzustand. a world
120in which life's tensions would be resolved. He was concerned about
self-knowledge and self-realization. Acceptance of life and loving
relationships centered upon looking within and meditating.
Hesse would defend himself when he was criticized for being too
inward looking by agreeing with Jung's thinking: "In the East, the
inner man has always had such a firm hold on the outer man that the
world had no chance of tearing him away from his inner roots; in the
West, the outer man gained the ascendancy to such an extent that he
121
was alienated from his innermost being.”
Psychoanalysis allowed Hesse to experience the raw materials of 
the mind in which the primitive and instinctual exist in relation to 
reason and the intellect, and all of this had its effect upon his
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imagination. He profited from finding in psychoanalysis what he
regarded as a living philosophy of inward phantasy, an insight into
the relation between myth and fiction,
Hesse possessed a personal belief in the reality of a force
within oneself that one could surrender to and from which one could
take direction. He referred, in his Autobiographical Writings, to "the
little man" within him who appeared in times of danger and whom he was
122
compelled to follow. Obviously in Jungian terms this was an arche­
type manifesting its power over Hesse,
i
Both Hesse and Jung considered themselves magicians, and they
emphasized being true to oneself, Man was to live according to his own
nature. After coming to self-knowledge, one should than live with the
truth about oneself,
A number of Jungian ideas can be seen in Hesse's work, Demian
reveals the shadow side of man, and Abraxas is the Gnostic god of the
opposites, Steppenwolf portrays man's various selves, and the anima of
Harry Haller is Hermine, She exercises authority over him. She gives
Harry lessons on how to live, "Harry recognizes that the special attrac*
tion he has for Hermine is based on the fact that she serves him as a
123kind of mirror in which he learns to know himself." Jung believes
that a person who expresses his inner life must progress beyond the
anima archetype to that of the wise old man, Mozart is metamorphosed
into Pablo at the end of Steppenwolf and can do wonderful things with
his powders, cigarettes, and liqueurs, and of course he is the operator
of the Magic Theater in which processes of psychological transformation 
124take place. Also, water is a symbol that is understood in Jungian 
thought as representing the mother of man. Several characters drown 
(e.g., Hans Giebenrath, Friedrich Klein, and Joseph Knecht), and yet
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their death is not seen as tragic in the usual sense of the term. 
Sometimes it is meant to be understood as fulfillment.
Under analysis Hesse came to see the relativism of all concepts 
and the need to accept the ambiguities of life. The polarities of 
human existence (such as contemplation and action) were constantly in 
tension in Hesse, Another Jungian concept that was frequently symbol­
ized in Hesse's work was the motif of rebirth. Present in all rebirth 
symbolism is the transcendent dimension which results in an increase 
of consciousness.
The impact of Jung's thought on Hesse has been indicated. How­
ever, to temper what has been said, reference may be made to an essay 
on "Artists and Psychoanalysis," written by Hesse, in which he says:
What analysts have recognized and formulated scientifically has always
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been known by the poets. They are the dreamers; the analysts are
the interpreters of their dreams. Analysis cannot make a man into an
interpreter of the soul who has not been a poet before, who has not felt
126the inner flams and heartbeat of the emotional life. The poet has a
grasp of emotional processes, and this is an intuitive thing— not an
analytic thing. Analysis confirms the value of fantasy or fiction and
helps one come to terms with his own unconscious, "It teaches us to
see, to acknowledge, to explore, and to take seriously exactly that
127which we have most successfully repressed," It makes visible what 
has been repressed, and it helps one to see the significance of life 
and the importance of personality. But note also that Dostoyevsky and 
Jean Paul are examples of artists who explored the same avenues of
thought and experience as the analysts.
In summary, Hermann Hesse was a man whose life and work revealed 
many crosscurrents. First of all, his personal destiny dramatically
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affected his writing. Biographical circumstances were constantly 
being translated into his literary efforts. In the second place, there 
were three main intellectual influences upon Hesse's life: mysticism
by way of Christianity, pantheism, and the religions of the East; German 
romanticism by way of the personalities of Goethe, Novalis, Jean Paul, 
and Holderlin; and humanism by way of Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Mozart, 
Rolland, and Burckhardt, Psychoanalysis was the last major contributing 
factor in making Hesse the man he was, Freud and Jung's disciple, Lang, 
each played a part, but it was the thought of Jung that influenced his 
work the most. Analytical Psychology was a source of stimulation for 
Hesse's creative imagination,
Hermann Hesse has been seen to be a very human writer. What he 
has to say in his work about being human will be the task of the next 
chapter.
CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF HERMANN HESSE
What does it mean to be human? It is something man is by birth; 
yet it is also something man becomes. History is full of examples of 
persons who lived less than human lives. The purpose of this chapter 
is to examine the concept of "the human" in the work of Hermann Hesse.
Man is a complex being with a variety of dimensions to his par- 
sonhood; he is a physical being, possesses a life of the mind, lives 
in society, and experiences a depth dimension within him that can be 
designated as spirit or soul. Hesse's writing is concerned about these 
different elements in man. This chapter will be divided into four main 
sections* man as an individual, man as a social creature, man as a 
religious being, and man as a fully human person.
Man as an Individual
In a sense it is artificial to take man out of a context, i.e., 
a community of other men. Although it is true man can only be man when 
in relation to others, it is also true he needs to see himself as a per­
son separate from others. What Hesse has to say about human nature is 
not exhaustive. He has some favorite ideas and themes which he uses 
frequently. Attention now will be focused on Hesse's thinking regarding 
the individual's experience of being human.
The starting point for Hesse is* a person must learn to be him­
self. "The questions may be the same for every man, but the answers 
vary from individual to individual. 'Loneliness is the way by which 
destiny leads man to himself.'" Most of Hesse's characters (especially
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in his early work) are lonely individuals trying to discover who they
are and what life is about, in the fullest sense. In the short story,
"The Poet," the leading character, Hans Fook, " . . .  realized that at
all festivals and with all Joys of this earth he would never feel wholly
comfortable and serene at heart; even in the midst of life he would
2
remain solitary and be, to a certain extent, a watcher, an alien."
To be human man must be honest with himself. Demian illustrates 
this: "Through total honesty he is able to discover himself and the
3
way appropriate to him and to affirm this way as his own destiny."
The character, Knulp, makes it clear that " . . .  no matter how close 
two human beings may be, there is always a gulf between them . . .  In 
the end, we all have a life of our own that we can't share with anyone 
elsa,"^ This uniqueness of man is seen in a further statement when 
Knulp says, "Every human being has his soul, he can't mix it with any 
other . . .  A father can pass on his nose and eyes and even his intel­
ligence to his child, but not his soul. In every human being the soul 
is new."®
The novel, Demian. shows not only the uniqueness of man but the
importance of each individual.
. , , Every man is more than Just himself; he also represents the 
unique, the very special and always significant and remarkable 
point at which the world's phenomena intersect, only once in this 
way and never again. That is why every man's story is important, 
eternal, sacred; that is why every man, as long as he lives and 
fulfills the will of nature, is wondrous, and worthy of every con­
sideration. In each individual the spirit has become flesh, in 
each man the creation suffers, within each one a redeemer is nailed 
to the cross.6
If we are to find out who we are we must look within. "There is 
no reality except the one contained within us. That is why so many 
people live such an unreal life. They take the images outside them 
for reality and never allow the world within to assert itself."^
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This sense of inwardness and introspection is prevalent in Hesse's
work. It is essential for man to come to terms with himself and then
to do what his inmost heart desires. "An enlightened man had but one
duty— to seek the way to himself, to reach inner certainty, to grope
0
his way forward, no matter where it led," The difficulty is that 
human beings rarely live in touch with their inmost selves. But for 
Hesse this is essential.
The reason that it is difficult for man to live a real life is 
the ambiguity that he experiences everywhere. "If only there were a 
dogma to believe in. Everything is contradictory, everything tangen-
9
tial; there are no certainties anywhere," Man has to be prepared for
conflicts because everywhere in life there is simultaneously nobility
and baseness, eternity and death, grandeur and absurdity. Throughout
Hesse's work there is the longing to find a reconciliation of opposites,
to discover an absolute behind the polarity in man's nature.
For ambiguity to exist there must be polarity, and for Hesse the
basic issue man encounters is the pulling within himself to obey the
life of the mind or spirit (Geist) or to obey the natural life of the
instincts (Natur). Steppenwolf illustrates this u^en Harry Haller says;
. . .  ha was always recognizing and affirming with one half of him­
self, in thought and act, what with the other half he fought against 
and denied . . .  It is open to a man to give himself up wholly to 
spiritual views, to seeking after God, to the ideal of saintliness. 
On the other hand, he can equally give himself up entirely to the 
life of instinct, to the lusts of the flesh, and so direct all his 
efforts to the attainment of momentary pleasures.10
This conflict or tension is the cause of man's ambiguity. Hesse fluc­
tuates between these two poles which lead him " . . .  to define his own
11
artistic ideal as a 'counterpoint for two voices,'"
The first night Harry Haller, in Steppenwolf, spends with Marie 
(a prostitute) he discovers " . . .  a new interior of his mind opens
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12by his discovery of the body," Man lives in time and space and the
call of the flesh is loud while at the same time the call of the spirit
haunts man with what can be. This theme of antagonism between the ideal
world which is pure, and a real world that is impure, dominates Hesse's
work. Consequently, Hesse's characters vacillate between noble hopes
and disillusionment. His early work, e,g,, An Hour after Midnight
(1899), draws images from the fantasy world of dreamland,
Hesse is not always clear when he uses the term, "soul," At
times he seas it as something which is pure and not affected by the
will, desire, or intellect. It is something which is spontaneous— it
is unbiased instinct and feeling.
The terms "soul" and "spirit" in the work of Hesse are comparable
to clouds which continually change their shapes and outlines . . .  
some refer to the "world of images" and to the sphere of truly
human feelings , , , the Soul could be defined as the battleground
and meeting place of Nature and Spirit . . .  in Hesse's later stages, 
the spirit at times appears as equivalent to God the Father.13
The soul is not to be understood in a psychological way, nor is it to be
understood as merely intellectual activity, for Hesse. Soul, or Seele.
is to be understood on a metaphysical level. It possesses an element of
transcendence above that of mind or intellect.
Whenever one looks at the polarities in Hesse, one discovers that
Geist and Natur have a masculine and feminine interpretation. The father
element is the head and the mother element is the heart. The novels
Beneath the Wheel. Demian. Steppenwolf. and Narziss and Goldmund all have
this motif. Conflict exists between the creative sensuality (feminine)
and the controlling intellectuality (masculine). A desire for a synthesis
is seen in a quest for the integration of a transcendental soul. It is
interesting to note that the feminine pole has a " , , , double function
of mistress and mother, woman embodies for Hesse the libidal force which
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represents the artist's material (the world of nature which he must 
incorporate and merge with his own) and the maternal goal, the Unqrund.
14
in which salvation and aesthetic reconciliation are found,"
In the last chapter it was learned that Hesse was spiritually
akin to his mother in whom mystery and magic were present. This mother-
principle was explicit in Goldmund who said; "The thing I love and
hanker for is mysterious , , , in her the furthest opposites shall be
reconciled, living together in my work; birth and death, pleasure and
pain, life and destruction; all which, outside her, could never make
15peace in the world," Hesse saw the poet as one who belongs to the 
world of the naive and the individual, to the world of children and 
women— even to the world of fools— hence he is constantly longing for 
the night, the Eternal Mother, the symbol of death, for the night 
transports him again to the dreamworld of childhood,
In addition to the life of the child, the vagabond is a popular 
character in Hesse, and he is usually the kind of a person who gives in 
to "nature," i.e., he lives an unrestrained life, without consideration 
for social concerns. He experiences loneliness but also a radical free­
dom, He follows the mother side of life in which chaos can be found.
It is important to note that Carl Jung, too, locates the evil and emo­
tional side of life in the feminine component. It should not be surpris» 
ing that Hermine in Steppenwolf is the feminine archetype of Haller and 
brings him to new levels of consciousness by way of physical pleasures.
Hesse's heroes are out to master life. "They want to be artists in the 
17
art of living," And this means coming to terms with the dark and 
mysterious (feminine) side of life.
The opposite pole is the Geist. Thinking is a most important 
part of being human, Hesse's early heroes are all thinker types, i.e.,
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they are most aliva whan they ara using their minds. His work portrays 
mental histories, and the plots of his stories are monologues. For 
example, Petar Camenzlnd is a mental history of a single person seen 
during a brief period of mental conflict— the excursion of a private 
and eccentric young man into the public world and his return home,^^
Hesse is criticized for having two-dimensional characters that are 
flat— not real live human beings. This is due to his overdevelopment 
of the mental life (typical of introverts), and it is not until Demian 
that a fuller characterization takes place.
Mental man lives detached from much of life. Hesse identifies 
with these persons, and he Is able to describe the existence of a person 
such as Lauacher (one of his earliest characters, in An, Hour after Mid­
night) who is caught in the dichotomy between the ideal and actual 
worlds, Lauscher is the first Narziss, i.e., a reflective parson who 
lives most fully in the life of the mind.
In Steppenwolf a portrait of an intellectual is depicted, "Harry
Haller leads a highly verbal existence; he soliloquizes in solitude, hie
silent words circling that most familiar of monologic questions: to be
19
or not to be," In spite of everything, Harry remains actively cere­
bral, He cannot forget himself and let himself go. That would take an 
act of irrationality, and he could not relax the controlling checks on 
his inhibited life. He cannot live with reckless abandonment. Haller 
can recognize the fact that many people refuse to stop thinking, "After- 
all, they are made for life, not for thought. Yes, and he who thinks, 
what's more, he who makes thought his business, he may go far in it, but
he has bartered the solid earth for the water all the same, and one day 
20
ha will drown," Water is a Jungian symbol for mother, and Haller is 
condemning his predicament.
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In his musings recorded in the book, Wandering. Hesse says that
" • , * there is no center in my life; my life hovers between many poles
and counterpoles. . . .  between my urge to travel and my homesickness.
, . . My concern is to be unsatisfied and to endure restlessness, , , ,
21But to be satisfied was the very thing I could not bear," Everything
is built on opposites, on division: man or woman, vagabond or citizen,
lover or thinker. His poetic words say it bast.
Saying yes to my heart , , •
Gaze at the circling moon and stars.
Guessing their direction.
Feel myself one with them 
On a journey 
No matter where,
To be human means to live with ambiguity— to accept life with its
contradictions. This acceptance of life in all its forms finds its most
emphatic expression in Hesse's poetry. "The relative insignificance of
one man's life does not release him from the perpetual civil war within
himself. Each man's life is the plaything of two forces, mind and mat-
23ter, and few there are who reach a synthesis,"
Hesse's work also shows the tension between an individual's use
of freedom and his sense of personal destiny. In the collection of
three short stories named after its central figure, Knulp, the importance
of freedom in Hesse's thinking is seen. Knulp says, " , , ♦ I've never
relied on anyone's word and I've never given my own, , , , I've lived my
own life as I saw fit, I've had my share of freedom and good things, but
I've always been a l o n e , O n  a different occasion Knulp portrays the
independence he has experienced as a directionless wanderer*
I'm a pretty good whistler, I can play the accordion, and I make up 
a little poem now and then; I used to be a good runner and I wasn't 
a bad dancer. That's the sum of my talents. But I didn't enjoy 
them alone, • , , My little gifts gave them pleasure and sometimes
they were thankful to me. Why ask for more?25
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But later on Knulp came to realize the misuse of freedom. He 
had wasted his life. "Ha had thrown himself away, he had lost interest 
in everything, and life, falling in with hie feelings, had demanded
26nothing of him. He had lived as an outsider, an idler and onlooker."
Ha was very much aware of what he could have been. He could have been
something mors than a poor tramp. He had gifts, more than a lot of
27other people, but he made no use of them.
Opportunities can be lost if one is indecisive and fails to
exercise one's freedom responsibly. Rosshalde is a story about a middle-
aged painter, Johann Veraguth, who has an estranged relationship with
his wife— the only reason for remaining together is the love they have
for their youngest son. Although they are living on the same estate,
they sleep in separate buildings and live separate lives— trapped in an
empty marriage. A friend of Veraguth's tells him*
You sit here buried, engrossed in your work and your unhappy mar­
riage. Take the step, break away from all that; you'll open your 
eyas and see that the world has thousands of wonderful things to 
offer you. You've been living with dead things too long, you've 
lost your contact with life.2°
This at least starts him thinking about his hollow life and his refusal
to seek an authentic existence. He has to admit that he " , . . had
lived the unnatural but consistent life of a man who, having immured
himself of his own free will, had lost interest in life, which ha
29
endured rather than lived,"
Just as Veraguth has to act in order to alter the circumstances 
that keep him from living a full life, sometimes also a person has to 
accept the circumstances that become part of his destiny. This is true 
in Gertrude, a novel about a crippled composer, Kuhn, who loves a woman 
(Gertrude). She, however, loves and marries another man. In spite of 
being lonely and frustrated in love, Kuhn expresses himself through his
66
music and the creative process, Kuhn could soy, * . . . my inner life
has been of my own making. I deserve its sweetness and bitterness and
3n
accept full responsibility for it." But at the same time there is an
awareness that destiny is the other pole, opposite of freedom, with which
one must reckon. "If what matters in a person's existence is to accept
the inevitable consciously, to taste the good and bad to the full and to
make for oneself a more individual, unaccidental and inward destiny
alongside one's external fate, then my life has been neither empty nor 
31worthless."
To live is to choose. But choices are limited by the "givens" of 
each person's personal history. It is important to see that the poles 
of man's being are not contradictory but parts of a greater whole. In 
the short story, "Klein and Wagner," Klein is a man on the run from his 
domestic and vocational life. He is trying to make sense out of a pre­
dicament he created (he embezzled money from his company), Ha tries to 
rationalize his current existence in another country. After attempting 
to forget what he has dona, he still cannot make peace with himself.
He is having difficulty living with the guilt involved.
Freedom does involve risk. In Narziss and Goldmund. the story of 
a scholar and celibate (Narziss) and a handsome artist (Goldmund) who is 
irresistable to woman, the Apollonian and Dionysian theme again appears. 
Usually this tension is within the life experience of one man, but Hesse 
chooses two characters to live out these counter pulls. Goldmund is a 
person willing to take all kinds of risks to enjoy the pleasure of the 
moment— a person who lets his senses have free rein, "He had no care 
for any heaven. He wanted nothing but the passing, uncertain life on 
earth— but to breathe, and be at home in his own skin. He wanted nothing 
but to live!"^^
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This most popular of Hesse's work might seem to advocate promis­
cuity and the sensual life, devoid of commitment* But Goldmund, attrac­
tive and lovable though he might be, is a tragic figure. What he seeks 
to accomplish in life (an artistic creation of Eve, the Mother of man), 
ho is never able to realize. And although ha has sexual experiences 
with many women, and loves them in his way; not one returns his love, 
all are temporary relationships, "That had been his life, he thought,
leave-taking, running away, being forgotten, being alone again with
33
empty hands, and an icy heart." Choosing to live one's life only on 
the feeling level comes at a high price. It is emotionally costly.
In Hesse's last novel. The Glass Bead Game, the leading charac­
ter, Joseph Knecht, rises through the ranks to become head of the elite 
community, Castalia, only to find it a sterile and utopian environment 
lacking in reality. Freedom in Castalia extends only to choosing one's 
profession— afterwards, all freedom ceases. Knecht says, " . . .  we 
haven't done anything, we haven't taken any leaps. . . .  I mean being 
able to take a plunge, to take things seriously,
This existential demand for risk and decision is absent in Cas­
talia, "If the high Authority appoints you to an office, know this* 
every step upward on the ladder of offices is not a step into freedom 
but into bondage." A person who is chosen to be a member of the elite 
finds himself in a rarified atmosphere devoid of many valuable human 
emotions. An individual like Knecht feels confined and locked into a 
fate that is lacking in personal satisfaction and over which he has 
little control.
Just as the element of freedom is important for the individual 
in the work of Hesse, so is the element of destiny. Each individual's 
destiny is unique, and fulfillment is not to be gauged by objective
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standards; it should instead be subjective, indicating only the extent 
to which individual potential is realized. "Last all this emphasis on 
subjectivity and individuality be taken as an injunction to megalomania, 
Hesse warns of the dangers of egocentricity."^^ But Hesse is more con­
cerned about the person who will not be true to himself— who conforms 
to what others want him to be, or refuses to make the journey inward to
discover the possibilities of his own personhood.
In the essay, "Zarathustra's Return," the Nietzschean call is to 
every man to act as his own need and conscience dictate.
Zarathustra is a man, he is you and I. Zarathustra is the man for 
whom you are searching in yourselves, the forthright, unseduced 
man . . .  He has learned to be Zarathustra. . . . You must learn to 
be yourselves . , , You must unlearn the habit of being someone else 
or nothing at all, of imitating the voices of others and mistaking 
the faces of others for your own,"37
This call for an authentic existence means living your own life and 
seeking your own destiny. It is essential to follow the path of soli­
tude and suffering. This radical individualism does not mean self-
improvement or changing the world. "The world wasn't made to be bettered.
You ware made to be yourselves. . . .  Be yourself, then the world will
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be rich and beautifulI"
Hesse believes that built into the natural man is someone or 
something that knows who man is and that directs his life toward ful­
fillment. This divine power (in the form of the Gnostic deity. Abraxas) 
is what Sinclair, in Demian. can affirm; "It's good to realize that
within us there is someone who knows everything, wills everything, does
39everything better than we ourselves."
According to Hesse there is a dual pull in man; he can exert 
his freedom to decide and make of his life what he wants, or he can 
relinquish personal control over his life and surrender to a "given"
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power that will direct him toward fulfillment. The nature of thie 
"given" is blurred. Haeee does not clarify its content. It certainly 
is not the Providential Deity known in the Judeo-Chrlstian tradition of 
ethical monotheism. For example, in "Klein and Wagner," the central 
character, Klein, vacillates between feelings of absolute evil and abso­
lute good. "But finally there is submission to fate, in the belief that 
'all is innocent,' since all beings and things proceed out of God."*^
This understanding of the nature of God is very Jungian, i.e., it is 
the god of the opposites. Nevertheless, Hesse understands it to be an 
underlying force that affects human destiny.
In the short story, "The Marble Works," a twenty-four-year-old
young man falls in love with a girl who is engaged to another older
man. The agony over this dilemma is climaxed with the girl's death by
drowning. It is uncertain whether it was an accident or a suicide.
Prior to the tragedy the young man's attitude toward life can be seen;
"Life, I told myself, was a brisk and spirited horse, to be ridden
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boldly, but also with caution." Hesse uses the term, fate, inter­
changeably with destiny, and both terms can be influenced by free will. 
Fate and destiny do not mean a total predestination. Willful action 
can alter and affect, at least in some degree, the course of one's life.
A quotation in the same short story illustrates this; " . . .  each one 
of us has his fate in his own hands and is in duty bound to make himself 
a life that Is entirely his own work and belongs to him a l o n e . T h e r e ­
fore, it is not fair to Hesse to call his concept of human destiny merely 
fatalism. It is closer to Nietzsche's amor fati. Reflecting upon this 
issue, in Gertrude. Kuhn says; "One can acquire money, fame and distinc­
tion, but one cannot create happiness or unhappiness, not for oneself or
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for others. One can only accept what comes, although one can, to be 
sure, accept it in entirely different ways.*^^
This requires a considerable amount of self-understanding. It 
can mean seeking and finding the center of one's life. It can mean 
running away from what one may discover. It can mean that dissension 
is at the center of one's existence. It can mean discerning some 
degree of meaning in life, in spite of the absurdities experienced.
Being able to see life clearly is necessary in order to have some under­
standing of who one is.
To be an individual entails a lifelong search for understanding 
the many facets of human nature. It is a quest for personal values and 
identity. What is involved is a struggle in the art of becoming. "Man 
. . .  is not an animal; he is not a determinate, finite entity, not a 
being completed once and for all, but a coming-into-being, a project, a 
dream of the future, a yearning of nature for new forms and possibili­
ties,"^^ Yet man does not always exercise his reason; in fact, man's 
actions rarely spring from rational considerations. Hesse says, "I was 
beginning to feel that what is really interesting and worthwhile, what
can truly concern us, excite us, and give us fulfillment, is not outside
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us but within us," Many people abandon this inner world of the truly 
important. Hesse urges those who have not forgotten the inner world 
to go on searching until they find that for which they are looking.
In the "Flute Dream," contained in the collection of short stories. 
Strange News from Another Star, the concept of struggle and movement in 
life is evident. "Death was life, and life was death, and they were 
locked together in an eternal, mad love-battle, and this was the final 
word and the meaning of the w o r l d . T h e  only direction is forward if 
one wants to understand life.
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Tho road man must travel is toward himsslf.
No man has been entirely and completely himself. Yet each one 
strives to become that • • * each as best he can. Each man carries 
the vestiges of his birth— the slime and eggshells of his primeval 
past— with him to the end of his days. Some never become human • • • 
Each represents a gamble on the part of nature in the creation of
the human.47
However, on the basis of the amount of time and attention man gives to 
the task of becoming human, it seems that nothing is so distasteful to 
him as the path that leads to himself. But loneliness and solitude can 
drive a person to discover himself.
This struggle to be a whole person is lifted to the level of a 
quest for perfection in The Glass Bead Game. "Each of us is merely one 
human being, merely an experiment, a way station. But each of us should 
be striving to reach the center, not the periphery,
It may be helpful to turn to the wise old men portrayed by Hesse 
as clues to what a mature individual would be. What is found in his 
early work is the experience of psychic instability and pathos. But in 
his later work the old sages range from a primitive magician to Jungian 
archetypes. The monastic historian. Father Jacobus, in The Glass Bead 
Game, is patterned after Jacob Burckhardt, Jacobus is worldly-wise, 
and " , , , his balance of scholarly pursuits and practical politics 
places him in an exceptional position among the wise old men; he achieves 
an equilibrium between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa.
Hesse's interest in Oriental learning is reflected in his elderly sages 
in so far as they portray mystical beings at peace with themselves and 
the world.
As an individual,man must live with ambiguity, possess freedom
and have a destiny, yet experience finitude while questing permanence.
Hesse is very much aware of man's limited time in space. In Klinqsor's 
Last Summer a painter named Klingsor lives with wild extravagance—
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intensely and madly. In his comparatively short life he has lived ten 
lives, and he is very much aware of how short life is. For example, 
he is aware that his bright watercolors will fade in but ten years into 
white again, for tho colors have no lasting quality. So, too, is he 
aware that the color of his hair (brown) will be gray in the same num­
ber of years. This consciousness of finitude became acute when he 
declared, "How much longer, and than this wonderful game was over! How 
much longer, and then hand and mouth and eyes would be full of earthl"^^ 
A poem adds to this feeling:
Leaf after leaf descends 
From my life's tree,
0 world's magnificence 
How you fill me.
How you fill and satiate.
How you inebriate 
What burns today 
Is soon decay,51
This consciousness of finitude gives the individual a passion 
for the moment, an existential concern for making the most of the time 
allotted to him. This means possessing a sense of urgency about life, 
an intensity about one's subjective experience. In "A Dream Sequence"
one is told* "All the books of the world full of thoughts and poems
are nothing in comparison with one minute's sobbing when feeling surges 
in waves, soul perceives and finds itself in the depths. Tsars are the 
malting ice of the soul, all angels are close to one who weeps.
Hesse has his characters conscious of transiency, the swift movement of 
time. He has made them aware that the whole world is in process, and 
this means individuals must see the significance of the now.
In the novel, Peter Camenzind. a story is told of the adolescence 
and early manhood of a writer who leaves his Swiss mountain village home 
and takas to the road to encounter the world. St. Francis of Assisi
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becomes his model for a meaningful life; and Peter, after several 
escapades that occur during his wandering, returns home to care for a 
helpless cripple. But during his drifting stage Peter makes significant 
comments about life as a journey; " . . .  I would drift through life
like a cloud— voyaging, everywhere a stranger, hovering between time
53and eternity." He sees himself as rudderless and adrift, going where 
the currents lead him. Although he considers himself to be incompetent 
in the art of living, he is able to differentiate between the momentous 
and the trivial. For Camenzind, life involves learning', creating, see­
ing, and voyaging.
This characteristic of wandering is a prized human experience 
for Hesse. He writes a book by that title, and the vagabond motif is 
a favorite subject of his. In Wandering Hesse sees himself as a nomad; 
a person who searches but does not find; a person who admires the un­
faithful, the changing, and the fantastic; a person who follows his 
inner calling. He likens this quest to trees that " . . .  struggle 
with all the force of their lives for one thing only; to fulfill them­
selves according to their own laws, to build up their own form, to
54represent themselves."
Despair is a human experience that is part of being an individual. 
Man cannot live intensely except at a price. Despair can bring man to 
the point of suicide. Because Hesse himself is haunted by this possi­
bility it is natural that his characters consider suicide seriously, and 
several succumb to it (Hans Giabenrath and Friedrich Klein are but two 
examples). In SteppenwoIf Harry Haller, contemplating taking his life, 
says, " . . .  suicide, though a way out, is rather a mean and shabby one, 
and that it is nobler and finer to be conquered by life than to fall 
by one's own hand,"^^ This interpretation of suicide differs with the
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earlier positive reference to it (see supra, p. 63). Harry has to 
come to see that the motive power behind the lives of all outstanding 
men is the struggle against death— an unconditional and self-willed 
determination to live.
But Hesse has a different twist in understanding suicide. He 
does not see it as merely the tragic ending of life— he thinks it can 
be fulfillment as well, Hesse scholar, J. C. Middleton, is of the 
opinion that death by drowning has the meaning (for Hesse) of returning 
to one's origin. Hesse illustrates this idea with the death of Hans 
Giabenrath in Beneath the Wheel. "Giebenrath's death cannot be called 
suicide; since his lack of a mother is in some respects his reason for 
defeat, his death as a 'return to mother' in the mother-element of water 
makes it appear that the misdirection of his life is corrected in death,"
When Klein, in "Klein and Wagner," takes his life by drowning, one is
left with the feeling that it is not tragic but an appropriate end to a
life that seemed pointless. Hesse describes the experience as almost
pleasant, rather than traumatic.
It would be unfair to Hesse to suggest that suicide is an option 
equal to living, in his thinking. He is only trying to point out the 
reality of meaninglessness and emptiness in human existence and the 
difficulty in being able to cope. Life is bearable for most individuals 
because of brief, meaningful moments. "Hesse does not attempt to give 
an answer to the unanswerable question (how to eternalize the moment)
57. . .  there is the attempt to face the insoluble bravely and honestly." 
This requires courage. He turns to the religions of the East for help 
in dealing with temporality. Some of the religious conclusions Hesse 
reached in regard to the question of meaning in life will be examined 
later in this chapter.
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Lauscher, a character in "November Night," says: "Life isn't
worth living altogether; a life without purpose is barren and a life
with purpose is torment,"®® In "The Latin Scholar" another character,
Karl Bauer, says: "He learned that inexorable fate is not the highest
and ultimate power, and that week, frightened, bowed human beings can
59get the better of it." Hesse's characters are not all out of touch 
with reality, i.e., dreamers who do not see the real world. Some of 
them believe it is essential to accept what is, rather than longingly 
to desire the ideal without hope. In "Dream Journeys" the central 
character is a writer who would like to write something of the quality 
equal to the immortals. He wants to have his work read and remembered 
by generations to come. "Only at long last he abandoned these wishes 
and efforts and realized that he must content himself with being a true 
poet, a dreamer, a sear only in his soul, and that his handiwork must 
remain that of a simple man of l e t t e r s . A n  individual may have 
goals, but sometimes he is limited in his ability to realize them. It 
then becomes necessary to adjust one's goals to match one's capabilities. 
This means compromise.
In "Walter Kompff," a young boy seeks to fulfill a promise made 
to his dying father, that he would carry on the business in the family 
tradition. Walter's life is made miserable in trying to be a merchant 
like his father. "A secret yearning, which he himself did not under­
stand, for the freedom of a life that was its own clear meaning and 
satisfaction never left him, but it lost its intensity and came to re­
semble the faint sorrow with which, as he outgrows his youth, a man
âi
with deeper aspirations resigns himself to the inadequacy of life."
This attitude of resignation is one way in which an individual accepts 
his own personal history. "It's plain that very few people find what's
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right for them in life. Everyone has his share of trouble and suffer-
ing, even if he doesn't show it." Calm resignation is only one
answer, not the answer for everyone.
The opposite of accepting life with resignation is seen in the
individual who lives with high resolutions. This would be the person
who energetically drives himself to compete and succeed at all costs.
Hesse does not concern himself with this characteristic in man, except
indirectly. He criticizes the person who becomes too dependent on fame,
title and rank, or money and possessions. A man who is pray to such
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dependencies will live like a madman. He calls this type of person a 
philistine— one who lives off others and is not true to himself. This 
person is too outward directed and superficial, Hesse prefers inward­
ness, He says, " . . .  man should not wish for greatness or happiness, 
for heroism or sweet peace, that he should wish for nothing at all but 
the pure and wakeful mind, the brave heart and faithful, knowing patience
that will enable him to endure happiness as well as suffering, tumult
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as well as silence."
When one journeys inward one discovers not only a divided self, 
but many selves. In Steppenwolf this is one of the key ideas— Harry 
Haller looks into his soul in "the Magic Theater" and finds a picture 
gallery consisting of a hundred, or even a thousand selves. His life 
oscillates not merely between two poles but between thousands of poles* 
"Man is an onion made up of a hundred integuments, a texture made up of 
many threads."®® One needs to face these many selves and realize they 
are there, but one should not take any one of them too seriously* in 
fact, one should be able to laugh at some of the images mirrored in 
one's soul.
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In summary, this section has been looking at man as an individual. 
Elements Hesse has suggested as important in the human experience are; 
solitariness or loneliness, honesty, uniqueness, inwardness, ambiguity 
(as seen in the Apollonian end Dionysian man, Geist und Natur. masculine 
and feminine), freedom and destiny, wandering and aimlessness, indeci­
siveness, finitude, passion for the moment, despair that could lead to 
suicide, risking, willing, struggling, searching, accepting, and coping 
with one's many selves by either resignation, resolution, or courage 
that has an "in spite of" quality to it.
Man as a Social Creature
Hesse is more at home in relating the life of an individual. He 
could identify with the outsider— the lonely, struggling introvert who 
would rather be on the move than face up to the problems and satisfac­
tions that are part of interpersonal relationships. Of course his work 
includes leading characters who are involved with other people; after 
all, man lives in a social context. But Hesse dwells on the inner, 
subjective experience of his heroes (there is a conspicuous absence of 
heroines), for it is here that Hesse knows the most about what it means 
to be human.
In this section Hesse's world of social relations will be explored. 
The areas oft love, friendship, marriage, sexuality, middle-class society, 
technology, education, and international relations (as observed in Europe 
during the war and in postwar years) will be examined. Hesse is more or 
less explicit (depending on which area you are looking at) in his expres­
sion of these different concerns. He is limited to broad, sweeping opin­
ions and convictions rather than a deep, penetrating analysis of social 
conditions. As usual, his value judgments reflect his own personal 
experience.
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Love is a fundamental human experience. Man cannot be man 
alone. He needs a relationship with someone else to bring to his con­
sciousness who he is. When Harry Haller, in Steppenwolf. is at the 
point of despair and seriously considering taking his own life, he is 
prevented from doing so by Hermine breaking into his lonely world. Ha 
could be a human being once more because;
All of a sudden there was a human being, a living human being, to 
shatter the death that had come down over me like a glass case, 
and to put out a hand to me, a good and beautiful and warm hand.
All of a sudden there were things that concerned me again.66
It is love that makes him recognize the fragmented existence he has 
been living. A new interest has entered his life when he finds a human 
being once more— one who wants to teach him to dance and to laugh and 
to live. Hermine starts her task by telling Haller ha has to stop tak­
ing himself so seriously. She tries to bring out what is present within 
Haller's life. Hermine serves a double role: as a female character 
with a life of her own but also as the anima within Harry. She has a 
separate existence as a vital member of the plot who interacts with 
Harry as a person, but she fulfills the Jungian role as well.
It is not always a woman who assists a man in seeing greater 
dimensions of reality. For Peter Camenzind it is St. Francis of Assisi 
who teaches him to love other people, and in the process he conquers 
the human fears of pain and death. Peter comes to see that the purpose 
of love is not to be happy; it is, rather, to help one endure the dif­
ficulties in living. As St. Francis discovers the language of the 
eternally human, so Camenzind offers his love to every visible thing and
sets out to regard nothing with indifference or contempt, for nothing
67is nobler than dispassionate love. All children are of the earth and 
need to listen to the pulse of nature. One needs to partake of the
79
wholeness of life. Peter wants, like St. Francis, to implant the secret 
of love in everyone's heart. He wants to teach everyone to be brothers 
to all living things and become so full of love that one will not fear 
even sorrow and death.®® Whereas Peter fails to communicate with people 
(to be aware of other people's needs) earlier in his experience— the 
novel ends with Peter taking the cripple, Boppi, to live with him, and 
by so doing being able to gather the ideals and fragments of his life 
about one living center, external to himself. St. Francis had taught 
Peter to suffer as well as to love. "That's the way it is when you love. 
It makes you suffer, and I have suffered much in the years since. But 
it matters little that you suffer, so long as you feel alive with a sense 
of the close bond that connects all living things, so long as love does 
not die!**®^
It is essential that people accept each other. Love given and
received helps one to accept oneself, and in turn, be more accepting of
others. In Gertrude Kuhn weeps secret tears for himself because he feels
he lives among everything as if on another planet, not understanding life
70and longing for love, yet afraid of it. He could remember when someone
cared for him and that he felt part of all people, but that was some time
ago* He wants to remain himself but not in such a restrictive way. He
is ready to devote and sacrifice himself to someone who wants him, to
someone who really understands him. When it happens he knows what love
is, and it seems that a thin, gray veil has fallen from his eyes and the
world lay before him in its original light as it does to children, and
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as it appears to one in dreams of Paradise. This sounds like infatua­
tion but it is not. Kuhn has come to love Gertrude even though the same 
kind of love is not returned. It is a mature love that gives and does 
not count the cost. It is not a sexual love (although Kuhn wishes that
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circumstances would have mads this possible), but it is a relationship
with depth. Kuhn knows, as Klingsor came to know, " . . . to be loved
72is not happiness. But loving— that is happiness!" It is Hesse's 
conviction that man knows only one happiness* love— and only one vir­
tue: trust.
Even in Siddhartha. the story of one man's pilgrimage to find
himself, love is portrayed as the most important thing in the world.
"It was true that he had never fully lost himself in another person to
such an extent as to forget himself; he had never undergone the follies
73of love for another person." He has come to see that passivity is 
not the answer. Active concern for others is the answer. Siddhartha 
chooses not the role of a monk, but a ferryman, one who could show his 
concern for other travelers, as well as for his friend, Govinda, and 
his son.
Friendship is important in Hesse's understanding of love. He 
seems to grasp the significance of this relationship, whereas the depth 
of the male/female sexual relationship is not to be found in his work. 
This can be understood in his early work since Hesse lacked a personal 
knowledge of this kind of relationship. But when his involvement and 
later, marriage, with Ninon Oolbin occurred, one would think ha then 
would have included something in his work to convey this experience, 
but not so.
Friendship in Hesse's world resembles the role of marriage in 
that there is a commitment to one another, and a responsibility for one 
another, as is usually part of a primary relationship. More than one 
critic has called attention to the role of women in Hesse's work.
"Women are there only as objects to serve for the satisfaction of the 
hero."^* Women are not rounded and active characters in their own right.
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They are the result of man's fantasy world; consequently, they appear
as illusory characters.
In the one novel, Rosshalde. where marriage is a crucial part
of the plot, it is portrayed in a negative light. Veraguth and his
wife are so estranged that they block out the real hurt they inflict
on each other. They do not want to come to terms with the things that
cause the hurt. A hopeless coldness prevails, Veraguth says.
But I was disappointed and I didn't hide it very wall, I kept de­
manding the very thing that Adele was unable to give. . . . Her
only response to my demands and my moods, my passionate yearning
and in the end my disappointment, was a long-suffering silence, 
a touching, quiet, heroic patience which often moved me but was 
no help either to her or to me.75
So he abandoned himself to painting. This retreat into himself and 
refusal to communicate honest feelings continued until the death of the 
youngest son, whom he loved very much. "At the bedside of his dying 
child ha had known, all too late, his only true love; then he had for­
gotten, and risen above, himself," It is interesting to note that it 
is a father's love for his son, rather than a husband's love for his 
wife, that Hesse describes as true love.
But it is unfair to overlook the value of family life, for he is
conscious of the importance of the family when in The Glass Bead Gama 
he criticizes the sterile community life of Castalia, with the absence 
of the feminine presence. "You people of the Province have your Order 
and your hierarchy, but you do not have a family, you do not know what
family, blood, and descent are, and you have no notion of the powers,
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the hidden and mighty magic of what is called 'family.'"
Still, when Hesse discusses good remedies against depression ha 
suggests the drinking of wins, the making of music, the writing of 
poems, or just wandering. He does not include woman as part of the
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cure for overcoming depression. Obviously, the women in his own life 
(or, more correctly, his reactions to women) are the cause of depression 
and not an aid in coping with depression.
However, sexuality is not absent in the work of Hesse. He is 
very much aware of the human need for sexual expression. A variety of 
sexual manifestations are present in his writing. In "Iris” the motif 
of incest is dominant. If man is to live at one with himself it means 
accepting the shadow side of his being. Man has to integrate the 
irrational and unpleasant sides of his life with the actual world, even 
if it means dealing with such taboos as incest.
Nor is homosexuality ignored in Hesse's presentation of man's 
sexuality. Beneath the Wheel is about Hans Giebenrath's inability as 
an adolescent to adjust to an adult world. Adults (father, teachers, 
and minister) put pressure on Hans as he struggles with the problems of 
puberty. Hans' friend, Hermann, refuses to be cast into the typical 
mold of good student. He rejects the educational system and seeks to 
escape through art. But the significant thing is a relationship, be it 
only friendship, that develops between Hans and Hermann, It reveals 
innocent and naive sexual experimentation.
Comment has already been made on the sensual nature of Steppenwolf.
Not only does Harry Haller have sexual contact with a prostitute, Maria,
but he also is approached by Pablo to engage in homosexual and group sex.
Haller refuses these offers, but Hesse is showing that he recognizes
this side of human existence. In a conversation with Hermine, Harry
Haller recalls that;
. . .  she talked to me about Herman and about childhood, mine and 
her own, and about those years of childhood when the capacity for 
love, in its first youth, embraces not only both sexes, but all and 
everything, sensuous and spiritual, and endows all things with a 
spall of love and a fairylike ease of transformation such as in later 
years comas again only to a chosen few and to poets, and to them
rarely.78
83
The Imagination that leads to art deals with the world of the senses, 
including human sexuality. Sensuality makes possible artistic integra­
tion, but it must be wedded to the intellect or chaos will result.
Hesse sees man as a social creature in need of love that man can 
both give and receive. Love involves friendship and sexual expression 
with one's own sex as well as with the opposite sex, in or outside of 
marriage.
It is true that Hesse prefers to write about the eccentric, the
isolated, provincial person who is rootless in society, but he does
touch upon the larger community at times. He would pit the men of soul
against the men of the world, or those committed to the interior world
of the mind against those given to exterior convention, Hesse's heroes
are outsiders, those who stand over against society and its values.
The Outsider is depicted by Colin Wilson " . . . as the lonely individual
who is estranged from the conventional way of life, revolted by it, who
seeks through the cultivation of his individuality to achieve a better
way of life, and who because of his very endeavors in defiance of the
every-day world (especially bourgeois) prevents it by way of stimulation
79from becoming completely obsolescent." Hesse's characters live on the 
fringe of society and refuse to participate in what they consider the 
hypocrisy of people who conform to the usual norms of society. The 
simple way of life sought by the outsider is considered escapist and is 
in direct opposition to most of society.
It is not strange that;
There is nowhere any real society in Hesse's work. Neither the 
family, nor the nation, nor time are realities that mean anything 
to the individual. The individual is alone, on the one hand, but 
always in search of an ideal condition of something universal that 
belongs to him.80
Society is, nevertheless, an essential need of man.
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The way of conformity and compromiso Is, for Haasa, the middle- 
class way, the philistine way, a way of falsehood and delusion. Hesse 
seas the middle class as neither good nor bad, neither heroic nor immor­
tal. It is such a contrast to the realm of the genuinely great, i.e., 
that of Mozart and Goethe,
Paul Tillich reminds us that "bourgeois" is a French word which
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means "ha who lives inside the walls of the town," And members of 
the bourgeois class compare the man of dreams and visions to madman. 
Therefore, one can see that the poet who elevates wandering as a worth­
while use of life is in direct opposition to a bourgeois society. How­
ever, Hesse (like his literary double, Haller) and most intellectuals 
still have their roots in the middle class. The comforts and security 
of middle-class society are desired. For example, even though Harry 
Haller is in a middle-class rut and wants to break free of convention­
ality, he still appreciates the scents and appearances of the tidy 
house where he rooms— symbols of bourgeois values. Ha is an educated 
man, in the formal sense, but not really educated for life. In fact, 
Steppenwolf " . . .  tells what happens when the intellectual becomes
isolated from the society which gave him birth and from which he derives 
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his support." But at the same time Harry can criticize the foibles 
and scruples of middle-class intellectuals by shunning demands for 
compromise and by being repelled by its hypocrisy.
Hesse, like many intellectuals after the First World War, was 
quick to predict the downfall of European culture. Hesse saw the appro­
priateness of Dostoyevsky's and Kafka's writing and the readiness with
which German youth appeared to understand and accept it. He believed
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that Europe was in the process of "returning to the mother."
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With the historical situation being what it was immediately 
following the First World War, Hesse wrote Siddhartha (note the Oriental 
setting and the emphasis on inner values) and was critical of property, 
possessions and riches, that almost trapped Siddhartha, For Hesse this 
was a criticism of the superficial values of the bourgeois world of 
Europe.
One of the concerns of Hesse that was pact of middle-claaa so­
ciety, was the rise of mechanization. "Hesse regarded it as his life's 
work to help defend the individual existence against the threat of 
mechanization."®* He felt that the individual's freedom and identity 
ware at stake. He singled out technology and nationalism as the two 
greatest sicknesses of our era, and he called resistance against these
"megalomanias" the most important task and Justification of the artist
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and the intellectual. Hesse was disturbed over the technology used 
during the war, but he also abhorred even the inventions of the radio 
and telephone. Radio was popular with the masses, but for Hesse, its 
commercial use and unsophisticated entertainment ware repelling. Notice 
hie attack on the radio (and the Jazz music it played) in Steppenwolf.
In 1961 (the year before Hesse's death) Miguel Serrano reported
that when Hesse was asked about the nature of man in the future, he
said, " . . .  in fifty years the earth will be a graveyard of machines, 
and the soul of the spaceman will simply be the cabin of his own 
rocket."®®
In The Glass Bead Game such devices as radios, films, loudspeakers,
and television sets appear, but they are always servants of the game
itself. The problem of modern technology is not the machines or gadgets 
themselves but their misuse.
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Hesse is overly critical of machines. Ha has little appreciation 
for them. This is partly due to his growing older and refusing to ap­
preciate the new and modern conveniences of life. But it is also due 
to his being able to see through the obvious (like Thoraau) to the more 
serious problems that result from mechanization and technology, e.g., 
the dehumanization of man. In his Autobiographical Writings he says;
I saw all this only in the exhaust fumes from the damned machines,
everything swallowed up, everything vibrating with a life that I 
cannot believe to be human but only satanic, everything ready to 
die, ready to turn to dust, longing for collapse and destruction, 
disgusted by this world, weary of existence without purpose, of 
beauty without soul.8?
These negative attitudes are an exaggeration of the threat caused by 
machines. But Hesse is fearful of machines because of his low estima­
tion of human nature. "We are compelled to say that mankind is still
far closer to the gorilla than to man. We are not yet human, we are
88on the way to humanity." He wants man to overcome this pessimism, 
i.e., he would like to see man reverse his low opinion of him by learn­
ing to value ideas more highly than money or weapons of war. He would 
like for man to advance more rapidly from his instinctual level toward 
his potential of full manhood. The various ways Hesse suggests by which 
man may attempt to accomplish this will be discussed in a later section 
of this chapter.
Another middle-class social phenomenon Hesse commented on was the 
educational system. He saw early, through traumatic personal experience, 
the weakness of the educational system in Germany. Themes that motivated 
his writing called attention to the gulf between youth and society, and 
he blamed the educational institution as a major causa of this gulf. For 
example, in his Autobiographical Writings. Hesse said; " . . .  we had 
grown accustomed to teachers whom we either feared and hated, avoided and
87
deceived, or laughed at and despised. They possessed power, that was
unalterably true, an overwhelming power completely undeserved, often
89
frightfully and inhumanly exercised. . . . "  He thought teachers
were trained to restrict human freedom; consequently, students were not
inspired to accomplish much. The novel, Beneath the Wheel, was about
such a youth who was crushed by the inhuman demands placed upon him to
excel but only by way of the method of authoritarianism. Hesse knew
sxistentially tho pressure that adults could exert in trying to break
the will of young people. To be a nonconformist meant paying a terrible
price— it cost Hans Giabenrath his life.
Satirical literature in Germany between 1890 and 1914 (mostly
novels) discussed the dilemma of the school system, with its long school
day and quasi-military ethos and discipline. Irreparable damage was
dons to the emotional life of many students, and there was an epidemic
of suicides among high school boys which continued during those years.
"At their deeper level these school novels were a rebellion not merely
against the school system, but against the whole ethos of Wilhelminian
Germany and against the monolithic intellectualism of the later nine-
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teenth century, the overwhelming preoccupation with fact." These 
novels elevated the cult of "life" and biological vitality. They 
appealed to the emotions and were antireason, in a Nietzschean way.
Hesse was one of the writers who criticized German education, 
and his ideas are currently popular among the youth culture who desire 
a revolution in the structure of the educational process, Hesse's 
recognition of accepting youth where they are (in aga and stage) and 
appealing to their better selves, plus letting them participate in the 
teaching/learning experience, are favorite themes today. Motivation 
for learning should not be out of fear of punishment or failure;
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rather, one's native curiosity and interest should be stimulated and 
provoked by an imaginative teacher. In Hesse's day his thinking was 
considered unconventional and radical by those in positions of authority, 
but young people knew exactly what he was saying and they were in agree­
ment with his fundamental ideas. This was illustrated in The Glass Bead 
Game when Joseph Knecht sought a relationship with Tito, his pupil, in
which they would teach and learn from each other. When Tito jumped into
the mountain lake and began to race to the other side, Knecht tried to 
emulate his pupil and overestimated his own strength and died of heart 
failure in the freezing water, Knecht was enacting the educational 
principle he believed was important if the maximum learning were to take 
place.
The last social concern to be considered in this section will be 
Hesse's stand on war and peace. In the biographical section it was noted
that Hesse was a pacifist and was opposed to war. His own experience was
a painful one when it came to living by his convictions. There were few 
who supported his antinationalistic stands. But he passionately 
believed;
. . . the elimination of war remains our noblest aim and the ultimate 
consequence of the Western, Christian ethic. , . . Human culture 
comes into being through the conversion of animal drives into more 
spiritual impulses, through the sense of shame, through imagination 
and knowledge. . . , the conviction that life is worth living is 
the ultimate content and consolation of all art. • . . love is higher 
than hate, understanding than anger, peace than war.91
He believed that everyone was to blame for letting war exist in a civi­
lized world, and he exhorted everyone to demand more of himself. Only 
through overcoming indifference, through voting out political leaders, 
and by devoting himself exclusively to overcoming the barriers to peace,
has man any hope. "And it is only through ourselves, through our insight
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and our will, that a change can come about."
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Hesse was an internationalist in the tradition of such great 
personalities as Goethe and Tolstoy, He waa in a company of very few 
intellectuals (such as Rolland) who thought about peace on a world, 
rather than a national, level. Here is another reason that Hesse was 
ahead of his time and a reason for his contemporary popularity among 
the young.
In this section an attempt has been made to look at the areas 
of interpersonal relations and to observe man as a social creature, 
especially in a middle-class society. Only on occasion does Hesse 
address himself directly to social institutions, but he alludes indi­
rectly to the values and conventions of the bourgeois. He comments 
on conformity and compromise, mechanization and technology, the educa­
tional system, and the issue of war and peace. Hesse is not a system­
atic critic who argues his case. He would periodically write public 
letters in the newspapers or express his views in his published work. 
Only segments of his thoughts and feelings, therefore, have come to 
our attention.
Men as ^  Religious Being
The third section of this chapter will be devoted to man as a 
religious being in the concept of "the human" in Hesse's work. The 
human predicament of sin, suffering, and death will be discussed, 
along with the content of religious experience. Hesse's understanding 
of the nature of God and the meaning of salvation will conclude this 
section. Hesse's grasp of the human situation starts with the reality 
of man and does not postulate a God who explains man.
Man can be less than man, and never is he as conscious of this 
being true as when hs sins against himself. It is expected that a
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writer with a German Pietist background would address himself to man
the sinner, Hesse does not ignore this factor; early in his work this
Christian doctrine appears, "Natural man is unpredictable, opaque,
dangerous, like a torrent cascading out of uncharted mountains. At the
93start, his soul is a jungle without paths or order," Man is not ba­
sically good. In fact, the scales lean toward his propensity for evil.
When man is reflective and meditates, i.e., when he is honest 
with himself, he realizes a sense of sin, Hesse attempts to deny this
awareness in such a lovable character as Knulp. When a mishap occurs
in Knulp*s love life, and is the cause of his wandering without direc­
tion, Hesse has God intervene and accept Knulp*s wasted life by bless­
ing it, God justifies what appears to be a meaningless existence by 
saying Knulp may not have done anything with his life; yet because of 
what ha is (childlike, foolish, and happy) he brings these characteris­
tics into the lives of people with whom he lives even temporarily.
Knulp*3 spontaneity and his naturally passive disposition make' him
enjoyable company. He does not bring with him a sense of dread or sin.
It was in the experience of psychoanalysis that Hesse came to 
recognize the depth of evil and ugliness that is part of being human.
He could not avoid this reality, and he began to articulate its presence 
in his work that followed his analysis. Man's irrationality and the 
"shadow"side of his personhood began to evidence itself. Analysis made 
him more awars of the role of the subconscious in artistic creation 
. . .  consequently, a total picture of man emerged, not the simple one­
sided rational man of his earlier work.^*
Demian is the first novel after analysis and reveals explicitly 
the consciousness Hesse now has for sin. The Kroner episode portrays 
the debilitating action of sin. Kromer epitomizes the devil for Emil
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Sinclair— in fact, he calls Kromer Satan. Sinning requires a conscious 
act. An act of disobedience can be seen in Demian. For example,
Sinclair goes against his parents* traditions and values and shows the 
willfulness and ease with which an individual enters the sinful life.
But what is important in Demian is Hesse*s belief that sin is imposed 
on human nature from circumstances that create the possibility for 
betrayal of ons*s true or best self. Without the possibility of sin, 
man would live only in a state of innocence and in ignorance of the 
world. Sin is an aid in the development of one's consciousness of a 
full life. A guilty conscience serves man in this way.
Sin is seen as essential, and Hesse is able to portray its hold
over man. In his short story, "A Child's Heart," a quotation deveals;
"Again and again I rose up, ardent and devout, prepared to dedicate
myself to God and to tread the ideal, pure, noble path toward the
heights, to practice virtue, to suffer evil silently, to help others.
And alas, again and again it remained only a beginning, an attempt, a
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brief fluttering flight!" Sin is the experience of all but heroes 
and saints, and even those rare elect seem possessed by their struggle 
against it.
Sin is misplaced love. It is self-love. To be human means to 
have to cope with this tendency to love oneself unreservedly. In "A Man 
by the Name of Ziegler" Hesse says, "Like every other man, he regarded 
himself as an individual, though in reality he was only a specimen, and 
like other men he regarded himself and his life as the center of the 
w o r l d . S i n  is placing oneself at the center of one's world. When 
this happens one experiences disorder and dissension. Friedrich Klein 
is aware of two Friedrich Kleins within; " . . .  one visible and one
97secret, a civil servant and a criminal, a paterfamilias and a murderer."
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Disintegration and chaos can result when man loses his innocence and 
faces the reality of sin.
Sin has to do with the will of man. In his early work Hesse
cannot reconcile his belief in the goodness of man with Pauline theology
concerning the sinful nature of man. He later comes to see the presence
of evil in the human heart but believes man is left alone to deal with
it. In Stsppenwolf Hermine says, "Oh, Harry, we have to grope through
so much dirt and senselessness, to reach home. And we have no one to
98lead us, our only guide is our homesickness!"
The will of man becomes the key to coping with human perversity.
Hesse knows, from his religious background, that the will of man has to
be broken if a "Christian man" is to emerge. But he chooses to follow
Nietzsche's lead and elevates the will of man to that function that
affirms and brings into being man's full humanity. In his essay on
"Self Will" Hesse says;
There is one virtue that I love, and only one. I call it self-will. 
. . .  Only an individual who has fashioned his "self-will," his 
noble, natural inner law, into his destiny can be a hero. . . .  But 
in reality life would be richer and better if each man independently 
followed his own law and will.99
Hesse's understanding of sin has an Eastern influence. The East 
is a metaphor for the Kingdom of the Spirit. In The Journey to the East 
Leo is the man in whom light and darkness are intertwined. H. H. cannot 
write the history of the League so long as he remains in ignorance of 
his true self. The willful personal self roust die in order that the 
suprapersonal self may come into being. But H. H. is unaware of the 
hold that sin has on him. His isolated egotism is the flaw, and until 
he comes to terms with it, forgiveness is not possible.
With The Glass Bead Game Hesse is still struggling with the 
significance of sin. Father Jacobus says to Knecht;
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"You do not know man, do not understand him in his bestiality and as
the image of God,"^^^ It ie revealing that it la a Christian historian
in a monastic setting that has to remind Knecht that Castalia lacks a
real understanding of human nature. However, in the "Rainmaker," a
story that is at the conclusion of The Glass Bead Game, there is the
following quotation;
You had to learn to see man as a weak, selfish, and cowardly 
creature; you also had to realize how many of these evil traits 
and impulses you shared yourself , . * man is also spirit and 
love, that something dwells in him which is at variance with hie 
instincts and longs to refine them.101
Man sins in being human, and he also suffers. In "The Cyclone,"
the story of a storm during which the metamorphosis of innocence occurs,
a boy moves from the stage of innocence to the stage of innocence lost.
When the storm is over he sees his town in a new way, a more adult way,
the rose-colored view of permanent bliss has now changed into reality.
Life is a process; there is movement (soma gradual, others traumatic);
there is transiency. Consequently, there is suffering. Man is tormented
over the conflicts arising from within his divided nature. Hell is being
out of control of the forces within. Suffering can be abated if one
learns to know oneself, if one becomes free.
Suffering occurs when one has never said yes to oneself. One
needs to descend into the subconscious, into the lower world. "To know
oneself, to explore the hidden corners of one's soul, not to flinch even
if one finds these corners populated with beasts and demons, this is the
102purpose of Emil Sinclair's, Stsppenwolf's, Goldmund's travels."
Whenever man asks the question, "Why?" or whenever he is concerned 
about the meaning of life, he is involved in some degree of suffering. 
Peter Camenzind tries to philosophize his way out of this predicament.
He says, " . . . suffering and disappointments and melancholy are there
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not to vex us or cheapen us or deprive us of our dignity but to mature
103and transfigure us," Camenzind is distressed over the lack of a 
motivating force or great passion in his life; Most upsetting to him 
is the feeling that he is living life as a spectator. This means liv­
ing with anxiety and the threat of meaninglessness,
S-taaoenwolf establishes this point too. Everything is marked 
" . , . with the plight of lonely men, with the problem of existence 
and with the yearning after a new orientation for an age that has lost 
its b e a r i n g s . H a r r y  Haller is experiencing suffering because he 
feels he is caught between two ages and two cultures. He is approach­
ing fifty, no longer young nor yet old. He has been reared on the 
culture of the immortals (Mozart and Goethe), and now he is faced with 
the inane, popular culture of jazz and the mass medium of radio. Harry 
has a genius for suffering and a boundless capacity for pain. He is 
not a man who has made peace with himself. He is the cause of much of 
his own suffering. Hesse suggests that it is self-contempt that is at 
the heart of the problem. "It was always at himself first and foremost 
that he aimed the shaft, himself first and foremost whom he hated and 
despised,
Whereas one message of Stsppenwolf is that the way to true man­
hood is through suffering and loneliness, another message is that the 
surest way to death is to cling to the self and to life. The answer 
comes in self-surrender. This means living victoriously with suffer­
ing. Man must not succumb to cynicism and pessimism. Required is an 
act of will— an act of moral courage. Hesse's elevation of suffering 
to a virtue would have had Nietzsche's approval, for it is in suffering 
that man participates in a universal human experience. How he deals 
with the phenomenon will reveal the substance of a person.
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The highest place in Hesse's hierarchy is reserved to the greatest 
sufferer, to the man who lives in complete defiance of the Philis­
tines, " • • ♦ the hero who perishes because he follows his own 
stars in defiance of the accepted laws," , • • However, its highest 
honors are not granted to the patient and docile but to the few who 
are stubborn, who follow their inner voice and remain true to their 
own mind,106
In the collection of essays, JJP the War Goes On. Hesse says:
"As long as a man is well off, he can afford to do superfluous and fool­
ish things. When well-being gives way to affliction, life begins to 
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educate us," Man only comes to a level of existence of being able
to smile in the midst of sorrow when he lets love help him master him­
self, Progress toward achieving selfhood comes when both pleasure and 
pain are seen as intersecting streams that flow from the same source.
In regard to the thinking of Hesse concerning death, it is 
important to sea that Hesse was in a group of contemporary novelists 
(a.g,, Rilke, Mann, and Joyce) Wio unanimously react to death by striv­
ing to create an aesthetic realm of simultaneity or timelessness in
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which the threat of death is annulled. This attempt to cope with
transience by ignoring it can be seen in Hesse's words:
Dagegen habe ich mein Leben lang viele Wage versucht, auf denen
man die Zeit überwinden und im Zeitlosen leben kann • • • 109
On the other hand, my entire life I have tried many ways by which
one can overcome time and live in the timeless , , ,
But the question of a living death, i.e., not really being alive, 
is a most important question for Hesse. This possibility of meaningless­
ness is what plagues Kuhn in Gertrude. The lonely composer is driven 
to distraction over the emptiness of his life. He expresses his feelings 
in a poem entitled "Is That God's Will?"
When the south wind blows 
The avalanche tumbles 
And death's dirge rumbles.
Is that God's will?
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Through the lands of men 
I wander alone.
Ungreeted and unknown.
Is that God's will?
Pain ie my lot.
My heart is like lead.
I fear God is dead,
— Shall I then live?' ^
Klingsor, also, is concerned about finitude. He takes aim at
death, with empty wine bottles as cannon, and tries to shoot down time,
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death, and suffering. And Friedrich Klein tries to deal with noth­
ingness by refusing to cling to anything and just falling into the 
water and into death. He would resist nothing, including God's will.
Mark Boulby makes a relevant comment at this point. He says Klein could 
have just as easily let himself fall into life since "letting-oneself- 
fall-in life" is the doctrine of Demian and of the Tao. Siddhartha,
too, lets himself fall into life. This act of submission is equivalent
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to the German mystics' "de-becoming" (Entwerden).
Knulp has a different approach to the subject of death. In his
113eccentric way ha wants nothing but to make "Sundays out of weekdays."
He lives with an existential awareness of the passing of time. He thinks
one should make the most of each day and not worry about tomorrow. He
says, "If a beautiful thing were to remain beautiful for all eternity
. . . I'd say to myself: You can look at it any time, it doesn't have
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to be today." Life is to be enjoyed and death is not to be resisted. 
There is little room for agony or anxiety. Apparently the existential 
void does not haunt Hesse very much, nor does the possibility of personal 
extinction. His characters surrender to the inevitability of death and 
do not fight against its eventuality.
In Stsppenwolf Harry Haller's inner war causes him to raise the 
question of life's meaning. He wonders whether human existence is a
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terrible mistake. Is man born to be immortal as a child of God? He 
receives an answer, as the novel concludes, that is vary much this-world 
oriented. Qualitative existence, here and now, is all men can hope to 
expect. Only the elite, the great of history, become immortal,
Goldmund has a passion for filling his life with as many amorous
pursuits as possible (although none of them are permanent nor do they
produce any children). As he moves from lover to lover he becomes
increasingly fearful of the loss of sense experience, "The transience
of orgasm is the kernel of all experience, and it is the germ also of
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the "kernel of his frequent tendency to sadness and disgust.*" This 
realization is responsible for Goldmund's artistic endeavors. His 
vision of creating the mother figure. Eve (a quest deriving from his 
own loss of his earthly mother), by way of artistic expression, symbol­
izes this search for permanence, Goldmund confides to Narziss that he
seeks to suspend death through sexual ventures, but it is to no avail.
Death and suicide, actual and projected, are very much in evi­
dence in Hesse's work. However, the best illustration of Hesse's
handling of death is seen in The Glass Bead Game. Theodore Ziolkowski 
points out the fact that the power of death, i.e., the threat of death, 
is sublimated to the extent that it becomes unimportant. For example, 
"The old Magister Muslcae does not really die; he gradually dematerial- 
izes until his spiritual element is subsumed, as it were, in the 
abstract realm of spirit.
The posthumous writings, added to the narrative of Knecht's life, 
are significant. They are the creative writings from his student days; 
they serve to emphasize the real motif of Knecht*s life and death. One 
of the poems in these posthumous writings is called "Stages" and is not 
only an integral part of Knecht*s life; it shows a strong element in
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Hesse's life that wants to accept the Christian affirmation of Eternal
Life even though it contradicts the main ideas of Hesse regarding death.
As every flower fades and as all youth 
Departs, so life at every stage.
So every virtue, so our grasp of truth.
Blooms in its day and may not last forever.
Since life may summon us at every age 
Be ready, heart, for parting, new endeavour.
Be ready bravely and without remorse 
To find new light that old ties cannot give.
In all beginnings dwells a magic force 
For guarding us and helping us to live.
Serenely let us move to distant places 
And let no sentiments of home detain us.
The Cosmic Spirit seeks not to restrain us 
But lifts us stage by stage to wider spaces.
If we accept a home of our own making.
Familiar habit makes for indolence.
We must prepare for parting and leave-taking 
Or else remain the slaves of permanence.
Even the hour of our death may send 
Us speeding on to fresh and newer spaces.
And life may summon us to newer races.
So be it, heart; bid farewell without end.
The human experience of sin, suffering, and death provokes 
speculative philosophical questions. It also causes one to enter the 
area of religious experience in search of some of the answers to these 
questions. Hesse's work does not start with a faith commitment that 
can be labeled. His ideas are a combination of many different religions.
It is important to look at the content of religious experience, 
and this involves Hesse's understanding of the nature of God. This will 
mean looking at the Divine/human encounter that results in the experience 
of salvation. Although Hesse is not a systematic theologian he is con­
sistent about one aspect of what he thinks is present in the Divine Life. 
God contains the opposites of male and female, good and evil, light and 
darkness. Hesse objects to the Judeo-Christian belief in a God of ethi­
cal monotheism. Ha agrees with Jung in wanting to attribute the negative
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as well as the positive aspects of existence usually ascribed to deity, 
to a dynamic tension within the Godhead. The reason for this is not an 
attraction to Zoroastrianism but to the Oriental emphasis on wholeness 
and unity. Dostoyevsky influences him as well. In his essay on "The 
Brothers Karamazov" Hesse claims; "In the Russian man, good and bad,
God and Satan, are one and the same. He worships a god who at the same 
time is the devil and who resides in a (Nietzschean) realm beyond good 
and evil."^^^
Hesse looks within man to discover what deity there is. "In
each one of you there is a hidden being , , . Bring it to life! In
each of you there is a call, a will, an impulse of nature, an impulse
toward the future, the new, the higher. Let it mature, let it resound,
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nurture it!" Hesse constantly exhorts people to look within their 
own being and not elsewhere. He wants man to listen to his inner voice.
He cautions people against looking to external sources for the Divine 
Presence, e.g., Bibles, pulpits, or thrones. He also cautions men 
against an abaolutistic arrogance, for he thinks it is better not to be 
certain whether there is a God than to know without doubt. But he asserts, 
"Our mission is solely to remind you that there is a God and only one God;
he dwells in your hearts, and it is there that you must seek him out and
speak with him."^^^
The significance of this one God that lives in all men is that 
every man is seen as a brother. Therefore, man cannot be divided into 
race and nationality, for everyone is related to one another and is re­
sponsible for one anotheri " . . .  the only way to a higher and nobler 
humanity leads through this forever-repeated experience of unity, through 
the forever-renewed insight that we men are brothers and of divine 
origin . . ,
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Therefore to us erring brothers 
Love ie possible even in discord.
Not judgment or hatred 
But patient love 
And loving patience lead 
Us closer to the g o a l , 122
The content of this God within is other than Hesse's Protestant 
background would indicate. For example, the eternal mother is a symbol 
that fascinates Hesse, It is the maternal principle that indicates a 
sense of permanence and rebirth. What is permanent, for Hesse, is the 
continuity of change, and it is the mother figure that symbolizes both 
change and permanence. The mother is a panentheistic symbol and, as 
seen in Goldmund's experience, has grown from his idea of his earthly 
mother into a universal mother image. Eve— the "One" in whom the oppo­
sites (pleasure and pain, good and evil) reside.
It is with Demian that Hesse develops his God of the opposites. 
The reason for Damian's protest against the traditional religion of 
Christianity is because it ignores the reality of sax within its under­
standing of God, Demian wants a deity that combines sexual and evil 
aspects as well as the usual positive characteristics of deity.
Prior to Hesse's contact with Analytical Psychology, his writing 
gives hints of what disturbs him about the religious tradition of his 
ancestry. In Gertrude the quest for meaning is reduced to a series of 
brief, meaningful moments. Only occasional flashes of light make a 
long weary life bearable. "However, I do know that if there is a state
of bliss and paradise, it must be an uninterrupted sequence of such 
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moments . . . "  What is more significant is the belief, indicated 
later in the novel, that unless there is something better ahead, the 
whole of life is not worthwhile. But it is his concern over finding so 
much meaninglessness that requires a religious belief that would include 
the negative as well as the positive dimensions of life.
101
Well, either the world is bad and worthless, as Buddhists and 
Christians preach, in which case one must do penance and renounce 
everything • , • Or else the world and life are good and right- 
then one can just take part in it and afterwards die peacefully, 
because it is finished, , , , Most people believe in both , , ,
And those who really believe do not live in accordance with their 
beliefs, , , , For instance; I believe as Buddha did that life is
not worthwhile, but I live for things that appeal to my senses as
if that is the most important thing to do,124
This conflict between belief and practice, plus the reality of
evil in the world, prompts Demian to say;
The Christian God is simply not adequate for our times. As the 
divine manifestation of all that is good, noble, beautiful and 
lofty. He is fine, "But the world consists of other qualities.
And all that is simply ascribed to the devil. This whole part of
the world, this entire half, is denied and buried in silence,"
Demian, however, feels that all of creation should be affirmed 
and worshipped,125
Abraxas, the ancient Gnostic deity, becomes the acceptable name 
of a deity for modern man. But for Sinclair, Abraxas is merely the 
symbolic representation of the realm beyond good and evil, to which he 
aspires. He realizes Abraxas represents a stage he must pass through 
as he continues to find himself and his personal God,
Siddhartha is a character whose life implies perfection (his name
suggests it and the narrative concludes with that impression). Water
is the symbol for the eternal. It flows continually and yet it is always
there; it is always the same and yet every moment it is new. Listening
to the water means hearing " , , , the voice of life, the voice of Being,
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of perpetual Becoming."
Stepoenwolf further elucidates the development of Hesse's idea of 
deity, Harry Haller admits that the Divine in life is blurred most of 
the time. But there are times in which golden sparks gleam through for 
a short time before being lost again, Haller could say, "I might be a 
beast astray, with no sense of its environment, yet there was some mean­
ing in my foolish life, something in me gave an answer and was the
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receiver of those distant calls from worlds far above. In my brain
127
were stored a thousand pictures." What he has in mind is suggestive 
of Jung's Collective Unconscious.
Although Haller can see the meaning of life in these rare experi­
ences that occur, there are other times when he thinks that " . . .  per­
haps the whole of human life is but a bad joke, a violent and ill-fated
abortion of the primal mother, a savage and dismal catastrophe of 
128
nature." However, the novel does affirm love as an important value
that gives meaning to life. "The sacred sense of beyond, of timeless-
ness, of a world which had an eternal value and the substance of which
was divine had been given back to me today by this friend of mine who
129taught me dancing." It is love that provides Harry with a sense of
meaning as he discovers it in Hermine. He then projects the source of
love to a divine origin, but he does not expand on this.
In The Journey to the East it is clear that " . . .  the East was
not only a country and something geographical, but it was the home and
youth of the soul, it was everywhere and nowhere, it was the union of 
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all times." The problem is that on the journey to find oneself, and 
one's God, man is plagued with forgetfulness. It is easy to get sids- 
tractsd and lost.
The League represents a rare, organized group search for meaning. 
It resembles a religious community, in that one joins by way of an 
"awakening" experience which is given by grace, similar to Christian 
conversion as known in the Pietistic tradition. Hesse is opposed to 
institutional religion, although he repeatedly asserts that he would 
join the Catholic church if he should ever feel the need for an insti­
tutionalized religion. It is interesting to note that a Protestant 
minister officiates at Hesse's funeral, but it is because he is a
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personal friend from Maulbronn days rather than as a representative of 
the church.
Hesse does not usually write about institutions even though ha
places the setting of some of his novels, such as Narziss and Goldmund.
in a religious monastery. He concerns himself with the life of the
individual rather than with the institutional life of an organization.
In The Glass Bead Game Castalia is portrayed as a secularized church
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(the ideal secular monastery). The Roman Catholic church is seen as 
yet surviving in the year 2400 A.O., and although smaller in size, still 
producing capable people, such as Father Jacobus, who are wise and worth­
while witnesses to traditional values that manage to endure. Hesse 
appreciates the altar and the confessional, and in spite of his Protes­
tant background and natural criticism of the political life of the Roman 
church, he sees it as a maintainor of a culture worth continuing. Also, 
it is an interesting aside to realize that Dr. Lang, Hesse's analyst, 
had had a Benedictine education.
To summarize this section it can be said that Hesse is fascinated 
with a religious understanding of man, but when he discusses the nature 
of God ha is vague and unclear. He knows man has religious experiences 
and that usually they are uncertain feelings rather than coherent ideas 
that can be articulated clearly. These experiences are ecstatic and 
mystical in nature, but sometimes they seem to be nothing more than 
yearning or wishful thinking. The unique characteristic, in which Hesse 
is consistent, is that the experience originates within man and possesses 
a bipolar dynamic that includes both the feminine and masculine, as well 
as good and evil, qualities,
A theme that is repeated in the work of Hesse is that of "awaken­
ing," i.e., the existential experience of reality (in contrast to the
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abstract view of life). He believes man is capable of experiences that 
are life-giving, occasions of rebirth and renewal. Man need not be only 
what he is— he can become what he is meant to be. Most of the time, an 
awakening comes after a process of considerable time and thought— the 
product of little decisions and attitudinal changes. Veraguth and 
Knecht would illustrate this slower process of change. At other times, 
an insignificant event, but with considerable ramifications, would cause 
an awakening, e.g., Knulp's unhappy romance as a young man. Occasionally 
an awakening would occur as a result of a traumatic experience, such aa 
Klein's crime or Haller's elimination of Hermine.
The term, awakening, is being used to mean a human experience 
during which one's consciousness is expanded." Man comes to see reality 
more clearly, himself more honestly, others more sensitively, and some­
times receives a small glimpse of God.
Salvation, from the viewpoint of humanism, can be seen in Hesse's
work. In Wandering he says: "Everything is within you, gold and mud,
happiness and pain, the laughter of childhood and the apprehension of
death. Say yes to everything, shirk nothing, don't try to lie to your- 
132self." Man is a free spirit and needs only to trust in himself. 
Whoever says no to himself cannot say yes to God, Man needs to obey the 
law within himself, his own law, the law of self-reliance. To be true 
to yourself is more important than being obedient to laws that are made 
by others or considered given by God. This means man must take upon 
himself the burden of responsibility of choice in a pluralistic world 
devoid of a deity. "Hesse does accept, with distress, that 'God is dead'; 
he accepts the consequences that the individual must rethink metaphysical
concepts by himself, that is, without the support of recognized reli-
133
gions." For Hesse, the God of traditional theism is dead and with
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this Ziolkowski would agree. Instead of cringing in despair, or being 
driven to suicide by this new found freedom, man should respect himself 
and accept the new morality that will come as a result of the breakdown 
of old values,
In the Kurqast Hesse follows Nietzsche's lead in agreeing that
it is better to become a psychopath than to adapt oneself to conditions
that deny all ideals. And Goldmund dies declaring; "I want no peace
with God. He made the world too ill, we need not esteem it, and He will
135not care much that I praise or blame Him. He bungled the world!"
In humanism salvation means man saves himself. Hesse says in
one of his Letters;
Ich habe im "Glasperlenspiel" die Welt der humanistischen Geistigkeit 
dargestellt, die vor den Religionen zwar Respakt hat, aber ausserhalb 
derselben lebt.136
I have presented in The Glass Bead Gama the world of humanistic 
intellectuality, which has true respect for the religions, but exists 
outside of the same.
It is for this reason that some scholars (e.g., Walter Neumann) believe
Hesse must be considered nothing but a humanist. Man is in the middle
between nature and mind, and the artist is the measure of man, for he
is responsible only to h i m s e l f . T h e  artist's goal is to perfect his
individuality and not to be a mediator of the Divine Life to man.
Certainly Hesse is a humanist, but is he not also a Christian 
humanist? A case could be made that Hesse talks as though he is very 
much grounded, i.e., he limits life only to what is verifiable and 
present in the here and now. But he writes a considerable amount of 
material that hints at, or alludes to, the real possibility that there 
is a divine dimension in life that transcends human existence. It Is 
true that the tormented Klein could say life becomes more meaningful 
when a person loses hold of all meanings. But he later says, "Why,
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everything was so simple, so good, so meaningful, as soon as you saw
things from inside, as soon as you saw the essence dwelling behind
138
everything, saw him, God."
It is true that some persons can find meaning in life without a 
metaphysical orientation. Such a person is the old typesetter in 
"Tragic" who finds that all he needs to live is a task, a job to do.
This is sufficient to provide meaning. But in "Dream Journey" Hesse 
tells us that
. . every man, even the apparently normal, even the apparently 
happy and successful, nourishes within himself exactly the same 
foolish and hopeless self-deception, that every man strives con­
stantly and incessantly after something impossible . . . striving 
for something valid, enduring, valuable in itself « . • All human 
beings were striving in some fashion, however cleverly or stupidly, 
to transcend themselves and the possible, fired by secret desires, 
dazzled by models, enticed by ideals.139
It is this transcendent quality that Introduces one to the
religious life in Hesse. There is a sense in which all of his work
seems preoccupied with the process of awakening. His Protestant Pietism
gives him a consciousness of original sin, and the temptation to eat of
the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge is present in his work.
Awakening from innocence comes with fear and trembling, and yet to remain
in innocence is to deny the fascination and attraction of reality. "The
urge to find out the 'secret* about one's self and the hidden corners of
life, curiosity in the widest and most dangerous sense, is the driving
140
force behind Hesse's work."
Awakening to new life is a favorite theme. Its origin can be
traced back into Hesse's childhood when he first becomes conscious of
wanting to be a magician— for then he can change things. This is true
also when Hesse discovers the joy of painting, "I could change reality,
141
make houses laugh or weep, give face and wings to trees," As man.
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by way of artistic expression, can alter things, so man himself can 
be changed. When a soul is awakened transformation takes place. One 
feels taken hold of by reality, and life cannot be the same again.
The experience of individuation is the psychological description
of spiritual experience. It is
. . .  a painful and yet wonderful process of "coming into being"
, , , He will experience shocks which reveal things that are hidden 
to him and stood in the way of his inner progress. The experience 
of being "awakened" will enable him to shed the past, to be trans­
formed and to go forward,142
Hesse believes each individual needs to be "awakened," i.e., "reborn," 
for this is the only way the evolution of man will come about. Awaken­
ing brings with it ah expansion of consciousness and an inspiration for 
venturing into new directions that otherwise would not occur.
In the short story, "Inside and Outside," a statement is made 
that is peculiarly similar to Pauline theology; "A man in search of 
rebirth must be prepared to die,"^*^ The old man passes away to make 
room for the new man. The process of change is not easy. Jung is 
aware that striving to achieve individuation can mean disintegration for 
some persons. In "Walter Kompff" such an experience does take place. 
Waiter possesses a belief in an absolute transcendent God with whom he 
has a relationship of consequence. However, due to circumstances within 
the plot, Walter moves from security and stability to insecurity and 
disillusionment. At the conclusion Walter loses contact with reality, 
and his faith (rather than helping him cope with life) contributes to a 
shallow and lonely existence forming a community of one— which is madness.
Demian is illustrative of the struggle involved in the birth of 
consciousness. "The only duty and destiny we acknowledged was that each 
one of us should become so completely himself, so utterly faithful to 
the active seed which Nature planted within him, that in living out its
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growth he could be surprised by nothing unknown to come."^** The 
central symbol of the novel Is religious in nature: the bird breaking
out of an egg is a symbol of spiritual rebirth of the individual. This 
symbol has a religious basis in Jung's concept of the Collective Uncon­
scious,
Siddhartha is filled with the awakening motif. He begins with 
recognizing that he knows little, if anything, about himself. He awakens 
and feels like he is just born. He says, "I will no longer try to escape 
from Siddhartha . . .  1 will learn from myself, be my own pupil; I will 
learn from myself the secret of S i d d h a r t h a . B u t  he also learns the 
pleasure of love from his wife. He observes how many people drift through 
life like leaves falling to the ground, and all he knows is that he is on 
the way— he is becoming— he is in search of self perfection within natural 
limits.
Achieving salvation, for Hesse, is a threefold process. Ziolkowski
calls it a " . . . triadic rhythm of the sort ideally represented by the
Christian conception of an original state of grace followed first by the
fall into sin and despair and finally, the ultimate r e d e m p t i o n . " I n
Hesse's essay, "A Bit of Theology," he says that there are three stages
of human development. It
. . . begins with innocence (paradise, childhood, the irresponsible 
first stage). From there it leads to guilt, to the knowledge of good 
and evil, to the demands for culture, for morality, for religions, 
for human ideals. . . .  consistent goodness is unattainable. Now this 
despair leads either to defeat or to a third realm of the spirit, to 
the experience of a condition beyond morality and law, an advance into 
grace and release to a new, higher kind of irresponsibility, or to 
put it briefly: to faith,147
He says most people prefer remaining in the childish state and resist mov­
ing into the second stage of conflict and development. Many would prefer 
the animal world of impulses and infantile dreams. Those who do enter the
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second stage encounter despair which can lead to meaninglessness and 
suicide or to the third stags (salvation) which Hesse calls the Kingdom 
of the Spirit, This level of existence is one of faith and responsi­
bility. It is one of authenticity whereby a person lives according to 
his beliefs. Another term for this third stage is individuation, which 
leads beyond the individual back to the community, where service to 
others is Important. Such characters as the old Siddhartha, Leo in 
The Journey to the East, and Joseph Knecht, are examples of those who 
achieve this third stage. And each of them assume the role of the 
servant. "Hesse has admonished others to be true only to themselves, 
in the understanding that consummate self-knowledge will ultimately 
bring the individual back into the community on the third level of 
human ization.« ^
Hesse tries to follow Jung's path to integration until he real­
izes that introspection alone will never lead to salvation. A social 
approach to culture is necessary, too. Upon entering the third stage 
one has an awareness of the Holy and of the relationship of one's whole 
being to the sacred Ground of Being. The methods used to achieve salva­
tion will be discussed later. What is important to see now is the fact 
that man can experience union with reality, even though reality contains 
the demonic and lawless. Man can know moments of inspiration during 
which ha is awakened to a new reality. There is no reason for ultimata 
despair, as there will always be a chance for a new beginning. Some­
where near will be a human being who will be a channel for the possi­
bility of new life. Man can be hopeful because there are Joseph Knechts 
in the world who are willing to sacrifice themselves to awaken the young, 
like Tito, to what it means to be human. Knecht is under the magic 
spell of a new beginning himself, and in the swimming race with Tito he
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follows his will rather than his instinct to save himself, Hilde Cohn 
makes an interesting observation in pointing out the maternal signifi­
cance of water in Jungian psychology where the sea is the symbol of 
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birth. Knecht and Tito are submerged in the water, the religious
symbolism of baptism, and even though the novel has a tragic ending
with Knecht*s death, there is hope that it Is not in vain. His death
is sacrificial and demonstrates his commitment to, and concern for,
Tito, Consequently, a redemptive act has taken place,
Knecht* 3  leap into the water, the sun upon the lake, is sacrifice, 
integration of opposites, "marriage of heaven and earth," and Tito 
is a "new man" born alchemicaily out of that process in which the 
"old man" is consumed. In picking up his drowned master's bathing 
robe Tito accepts the discipleship.150
Reconciliation is the experience of salvation. What has been 
fragmented and partial is made whole. The key word in Hesse's concept 
of reconciliation is balance. To be human means to become a parson, 
an individual, who can think, feel, and act independently of the masses 
while accepting the ambiguity and chaos within— yet obeying the high 
ideals and demands of one's inner self, A person must fight the pres­
sures of society to conform, but at the same time he must not completely 
withdraw from society. The individual must establish a balance between 
the poles of existence.
The achievement of balance is most difficult. According to Demian 
Sinclair wanted to try and live with the promptings from his true self.
the world and oneself.
Siddhartha, too, shows how problematic it is to let the self 
die— to experience one's goal— a peaceful and meaningful existence. But 
the way of the Buddha is not the way for Siddhartha. He has to find his 
own way— as each person must. Hesse Is often called a Buddhist on the
3I
but this is not easy. To be fully alive requires being in battle with
I
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basis of Siddhartha. but a close examination shows this cannot be the 
case. Overt world denial is nowhere to be found in the book. In fact, 
it reveals
• • • Hesse's movement away from Buddhism, not toward it, as his 
interest was more in the multiple Indian gods. Hesse was throughout 
his life probably more influenced by Hinduism than by Buddhism; ha 
apparently found that yoga answered better the needs or yearnings 
of himself and his contemporaries than did the Eightfold Path.151
From Klingsor it is learned that balance means accepting the 
spiritual and the sensual as belonging together and not to be separated.
Passion and contemolation belong together. Apollonian man and Dionysian 
man must be balanced against each other by recognition and acceptance of 
these dynamic elements within man. "Klingsor is convinced that all feel- 
ings are good, 'even hatred, even envy, even jealousy, even cruelty.'"
Harry Haller, in his loneliness, restlessness, and homesickness, 
knows emptiness, boredom, and despair. He has to learn to love himself, 
in the right way, as wall as his neighbor. He has to come to terms with 
the irrational In himself— he has to learn to dance, which means self- 
surrender.
After writing Stepoenwolf Hesse comments, in a letter, that his
own personal life has not reached the level of reconciliation.
Ich bin ein Oichter geworden, aber ein Mensch bin ich nicht geworden.
Ich habe ein Teilziel erreicht, das Hauptziel nicht. Ich bin 
gescheitert. . • . main Leben 1st nichts als Arbeitsbereitschaft;
. . . Der Wert und die Intensitat meines Lebene liegt in den Stunden, 
wo ich dichterisch produktiv bin, also wo ich gerade das Unzulangliche 
und Verzwaifalte meines Lebens ausspreche.153
I have become a poet, but I have not become a human being. I have 
reached a partial goal, but not the important one. I am frustrated 
. . .  my life is nothing else but a readiness to work; * . • The value 
and the intensity of my life lie in the hours when I am poetically I
productive, also when I speak out directly about the inadequacy and 
despair of my life.
Hesse has come to disbelieve in self-development, by 1929. He could see
that his ideal aims in life would not be reached. He would have to be
satisfied with limited goals. I
' i
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Balance means achieving a synthesis of the mother and the father 
principles. The answer to life's problems means balancing thinking and 
doing, contemplation and activity in an alternating rhythm which consti-
154tutes the summum bonum toward which the art of living should be directed. 
This message of Hesse's follows Goethe's lead. "For Goethe, man must 
first contemplate what is. above him, secondly, that which is below him,
and thirdly, what is beside him— his fellow man. This contemplation
155results in reverence for all three." The inner and outer worlds are 
real, and man's destiny has to do with both. The only hope of salvation 
for man is in the fusion of thinking and doing.
An example of this balance can be seen in the Music Master in
The Glass Bead Game. His wisdom combines an inner balance of reason and
emotion which permeates his whole life. Hesse calls him a secular saint 
and shows him aging by merging his personhood with a suprapersonal unity 
of all life. He fulfills Jung's archetypal projection of the wise old
man in that he appears at critical moments in Knecht's life. "He is
responsible for Knecht's calling to the Eliteschule; he answers philo­
sophical questions which perturb the student; he rescues Knecht as a 
student when his emotional equilibrium is most seriously threatened; he 
appears, finally, with advice when Knecht is inaugurated as Magister
In addition to balance, another key word that conveys the concept
of reconciliation in Hesse's work, is harmony. It is a synthesizing
word. "As a writer, Hesse longs to be a musician, not because he might
feel more at home in a nonliterary metier, but because music embodies
the very concept of harmony within dissonances which is his prevailing 
157
theme." Since man is caught between the pull of Geist and Natur he 
finds himself dangerously fragile and desires harmony— a blending of
1
a
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these two notes of his existence. In his early work Hesse is following
romantic faith in the belief that man lives fully only in nature; and
therefore, he seeks to achieve harmony With the earth. This return to
nature motif is popular with today's youth culture. Vitalism allows no
dualism, says J, C. Middleton, and life and death are understood by |
Hesse as processes in one vital current in which every separate existence 
158
participates. Harmony between the abstract and the concrete, know-
Christian view of God. It has to do with reconciling the opposites of 
beauty and ugliness, light and darkness, sin and saintliness. If, for 
one brief moment, these contrasting human experiences could merge into 
one another, then harmony could be known. This is one reason why the 
hermaphrodite figure is used by Hesse on different occasions. For in­
stance, when H. H. in The Journey to the East lifts the veil, he finds 
nothing but a small sculptured figure. However, upon closer inspection
%
1ing and acting, is part of the same quest of man for fulfillment.
In Demian people are not in harmony with themselves, "People are
afraid because they have never owned up to themselves, A whole society if
159composed of men afraid of the unknown within them!" In order to
bring one's life into harmony it means discovering one's own destiny, 
and this means standing alone like Jesus in the Garden of Gsthsemane.
Siddhartha is Sanskrit for "he who achieves his goal," and the
term is synonymous with "one in whom harmony dwells"— another definition
160
for his name is "the man who is on the right road," He is the one
who has confidence in life and is in harmony with nature. He is the one -H
who recognizes the need to express both the sensual and spiritual dimen­
sions of life, A man is free who is in harmony with himself and the 
world.
Hesse's understanding of reconciliation does not require a Judeo-
J
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he finds that the form is two figures which are united in the back. %
The one is an image of his own imperfect self. The other is his best 
self— the features of Leo. The hermaphrodite symbolizes the blending 
of opposites into a unity. It suggests wholeness, harmony and balance. 5
Becoming Fully Human 
The concept of "the human" in Hesse affects man as an individual, 
as a social creature, and as a religious person. Man can be less than 
human, but he can also realize his potential— he can be fully human.
It has already been noted that man can become what he is meant to be.
The concern in this section is how Hesse believes man could accomplish 
his full humanity.
Hesse begins his literary career as an aesthete. He preaches 
disinterested love as the only remedy for sorrow and disappointment, 
and he combines this sense of detachment with a rural mentality of 
self-sufficiency and an antagonism to urban life. Peter Camenzind 
reveals the introspection and lack of involvement in much of real life.
It is by artistic expression that man is enabled to cope with 
the problems of human existence. Hesse says he was " . . .  convinced
161that the contemporary world was as much out of joint as his own life."
He thinks the poet is the prototype of man, for the poet is in continual
conflict with the external, commonplace world of the philistine. The
poet is the mediator between the polarities in man, "According to Hesse,
poetry and, indeed, all the arts have a spiritual function. Through
162
them the universe achieves self-awareness and self-expression,"
As meditation assists man in perceiving the unity of all things, 
so art is one of the means by which the polarities in human life are 
overcome. As Veraguth paints in Rosshalde because he needs some form 
of self-expression, so other Hesse characters use art in the same way.
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Sinclair is not really an artist, but in successive drawings ha portrays $
his own changes, Klingsor is an artist whose self-portrait is a true |
revelation of his inner world dissolving around him as death approaches.
And Goldmund contemplates the permanence of art as he compares his own
aging image, mirrored in a well, with an artist’s ageless creation of
the image of man,
"Art is the medium through which opposites are reconciled and the
threat of death annulled, in which totality of life is eternalized and
163simultaneity of spirit broadened to include nature," The artist
tries to capture the abstract in the concrete, the idea takes on form,
the passing takes on permanence (at least to a degree). One may ask if
the reality of death is the cause of all art. It can make mortal man
immortal to the extent that he will be remembered for generations, or
even centuries, after his death. An explanation of this characteristic
of permanence can be seen in a statement by Ziolkowski, Art is a
" , , • unification of the worlds of the Father and of the Mother, of
mind and blood; it could begin in the most sensuous experience and lead
164
to the most abstract,"
Goldmund is the best example of the aesthetic way. He emphasizes 
the theme of Hesse’s, to be yourself. For example, Narziss says to 
Goldmund*
Men are transitory, we become, we are possibilities, and for us 
there is no perfection, no final being. But in all by which we pass
on, from potentiality into action, from possibility to fulfillment,
we have our share in this true being of God, That is what I mean 
when I say, "to fulfill oneself,"165
Man is a combination of matter and spirit. Natural man is in conflict
with spiritual man— the one draws him to the perishable and the other
to that which is eternal, Narziss, reflecting on the way Goldmund lives
his life, says;
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• , . perhaps it was not merely simpler and more human to live a
Goldmund-life in the world. Perhaps in the end it was more valiant,
and greater in God’s sight, to breast the currents of reality, sin, 
and accept sin’s bitter consequence, instead of standing apart, with 
well-washed hands, living in sober, quiet security, planting a pretty 
garden of well-trained thoughts, and walking then, in stainless 
ignorance, among them— the sheltered beds of a little paradise,^66
Narziss cannot help comparing his life with that of his friend. He has
chosen the secure environment of the monastery whereas Goldmund has
plunged into a sensuous sea of lust and even murder. Yet does Goldmund
" , , , never kill the God in his mind, and though he wander for years
through the blackest darkness still carry, without risk of its extinc-
157
tion, the light which made him a creator," Goldmund is a wood carver, 
a sculptor. Ha finds meaning in the way of the aesthete.
The eternal nature of art fascinates Hesse, and in The Journey to
the East he has H, H,, a violinist and storyteller, speaking for him 
when he says to a friend, Lukas: "I either had to write the book or be
reduced to despair; it was the only means of saving me from nothingness, 
chaos, and s u i c i d e , I t  is interesting to note that writing is an 
artistic expression whereby a person can defend himself against disinte­
gration or chaos, H, H, is on a voyage that includes both faith and 
despair; it is in Leo that he finds at-one-ment, Leo is a man who is 
both a leader and a servant. He is one in whom darkness and light are 
intertwined. There is consistency between who he is and what he does.
He represents the conjunction of the opposites, H, H, has tried to 
write the history of the League without knowing himself. He comes to 
see the vanity of his egotism and the intimate relationship he really 
possesses with Leo, and in the image of the double figure with a single 
back individuation begins to take place, H, H. comas to discover that 
Leo is his own best self.
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Music, perhaps more than any other of the art forms, is elevated
by Hesse to the highest of the disciplines that produce reconciliation
of the opposites within man. Music demands a synthesis of the abstract
and the concrete and is one of the most conspicuous elements in Hesse’s
life and work. He says, in his Autobiographical Writings;
I would like to find expression for duality, I would like to write 
chapters and sentences where melody and counter-melody are always 
simultaneously present, where unity stands beside every multiplic­
ity, seriousness beside every joke, , , , I would like always to 
show that the beautiful and the ugly, the bright and the dark, sin 
and holiness are always opposites just for the moment, that they 
constantly merge into each other,
He feels compelled to write in such a way as to attempt, at least, to
force the poles of life together into life’s melody, even though it is
an impossible task, Hesse longs to be a musician because music embodies
both harmony and dissonance. Music suggests a transcendent solution,
170
albeit an aesthetic solution, to the opposing motifs of life,
Kuhn, in the novel, Gertrude, is a composer in whom the excite­
ment and importance of music can be seen as the means by which a man is 
assisted in becoming more fully human. The ego satisfaction that comes 
to Kuhn when he creates music provides meaning for his thwarted life 
(in adolescence, an accident left him crippled). He tries to compose 
so that everyone can feel the pleasure and pain that are present in life. 
Composing enables him to weather the storm within that he experiences.
At times, he even questions the value of music, "Could it really have 
a meaning and justify and fill a person’s life, this building up of
sound patterns and the exciting play with images, which at the best
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would help other people to pass a pleasant hour?" His answer is yes! 
Music stirs his very being, and he can understand everything without the 
aid of words. He can say, "I was then aware of pure harmony in the es­
sence of life and felt that there must be a meaning and a just law behind
172everything that happened,"
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Music is equated with blessedness and service to Cod, for Hesse.
In the short story, "The Poet," music is the key to being a good poet,
so Hans Took learns to play the lute, the zither, and the flute. With
music, time and eternity seem to be one. The central importance of
music is seen, in Steopenwolf. with the jazz of Pablo and the sublime
harmonies of Mozart, What counts is not music theory or passive music
appreciation but the making of music, Pablo sees his purpose in life
to be that of making music, as often as possible, with all the intensity
of which he is capable. He says he enjoys seeing " , , , eyes sparkle,
173legs twitch, and faces begin to laugh. That is why one makes music,"
This kind of music belongs to the will and not to the intellect or feel­
ing level of man. Music is not to be thought about but performed. 
Obviously, Pablo represents Dionysian man in that he is absorbed in 
sensual delights, but he is also a Nietzschean man in that he exercises 
his will in the playing of music rather than in the Apollonian emphasis 
of talking about music, as Harry Haller is tempted to be satisfied with 
doing.
Other of Hesse’s characters have musical talent (such as H, H, 
who plays the violin) and music is a minor theme in the plot of The 
Journey to the East, but with The Glass Bead Game music plays a major 
role in the entire narrative, Joseph Knecht is an accomplished pianist 
and music theorist, and he thinks perfection is achieved in the works 
of Bach because the intellectual and the sensual are in delicate balance. 
As a boy, Knecht was drawn to the study of music as a vocational choice, 
attracted to the joy-giving harmony that symbolizes the best in the world 
of the mind. Whan he encounters music as created and played by the Music 
Master, Knecht has what approximates a religious experience— ha is in 
touch with the whole of the cosmos and the spirit of music. He says;
I
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"the soul Is awakened by it, transformed or exalted • • • A portion
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of reality presents itself and makes its claim." He has come to 
know a vocational call.
Castalia is based on the game which Hesse compares to an organ 
on which one can play the music of the intellectual cosmos. The human 
and the Divine meet in music. The game is played as an aesthetic ex­
pression of the spirit— it combines music and meditation. The game 
seeks to show the superiority of the life of the mind over that of the 
senses, and the novel seeks to work out a harmonious synthesis between 
them. However, music is the aesthetic means by which one becomes fully 
human.
Another way in which man is able to achieve wholeness is through 
humor. For Hesse, humor serves as a mediator between the real and the 
ideal. It is the quality of irony and humor in his work that attracts 
many sophisticated readers. Yet it is the ability to suffer that de­
velops humor in a person. Hesse is indebted to Novalis, Jean Paul, and 
the romantic tradition, for it is here that dreaming and reality are 
reconciled in humor. It is humor that enables a person to live in the 
world without being overcome by it.
Those of Hesse’s characters that become aware of the unity,
totality, and simultaneity of all being can be identified with the
smile— this is the symbol of inner perfection. "The beatific smile in
Siddhartha as the symbol of fulfillment recurs in many of Hesse’s novels;
we find it again in Steooenwolf. The Journey to the East and The Glass 
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Bead Game."
In Steooenwolf Goethe approaches Haller and tells him that ha 
takes life too seriously— he must learn to laugh and enjoy jokes.
Notice, too, that each time Haller encounters Goethe and Mozart they
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laugh at him for hia " . • • reluctance to forsake bourgeois prejudices,
for his inability to laugh at appearances and look for a deeper reality
beneath the surface of t h i n g s . T h e  tractate in the novel suggests
that to survive, those on the fringe of life (such as Harry Haller) have
to develop a sense of humor, for it is necessary to learn to laugh at
those aspects of life that obscure eternal values. One could sum up
Steppenwolf as " . . .  an act of faith imposing form on chaos, time on
space, and music on life, by the sovereign acceptance of the old Calw
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dualism, by the apotheosis of irony (laughter of the Beyond),"
Because of his vie* of humor it is not a coincidence that Hesse 
sees life as a game. A beautiful life is happy when a person makes of 
it a game rather than a duty, a battleground, or a prison. It is for
i
this reason that Hesse's final novel is about a game. It is a serious j
game that helps one on the path from becoming to being, from potentiality J
to reality. The game is elevated to almost an act of worship, and it ,
takes Father Jacobus to interpret this fact to Knecht. After all, it j
is only a game and not real life. The significant thing that Hesse j
points out is that sometimes man is only truly himself when at play. |
It is the Music Master who encourages Knecht to move from the periphery i
of life to its center, through the playing of music and the glass bead 
game. And it is the Music Master who possesses the beatific smile and 
who arrives at the center of living and achieves blessedness. j
In addition to humor Hesse uses the term, "Magical Thinking," as 1
a means of accomplishing the experience of reconciliation. Hesse defines |
Magical Thinking as the ability to exchange inner and outer reality— the |
acceptance of the reversibility of nature and spirit. j
Magical Thinking is Hesse's rather romantic term for the act of men- ^
tal projection that permits us to escape the sphere of polarities: >>
it is a spiritual revaluation of life, proceeding from an uncompro- ]
mising examination of the chaos in our own souls. The very opposite 1
of anarchy, Magical Thinking implies the acknowledgment of a meaning- >
ful totality beyond chaos. 178
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Fire can ba a symbol of Magical Thinking in that it suggests 
boundaries that disappear. Magical Thinking is similar to Novalis"
"magical idealism" in that magic is equated to the art of using the |
if
world of the senses at will, Hesse does not use the term in the usual |
superstitious and derogatory connotation that accompanies immature and 
wishful thinking.
Magical Thinking has a transcendent quality to it in that it 
means getting outside of oneself and seeing the synthesis of nature and 
spirit. It is the affirmation of all being, which includes sensual 
gratification and intellectual or spiritual pursuits.
I
i
Art embodies the union of dualities— of self and world and the pro­
jection of their conflict into the self— and portrays it in a state 
of "magic" • • . the act of "magic," which is linked to the aesthetic 
mods of harmonizing, is a merging of dissonance in harmonies; in 
individual experiences it may manifest itself in madness, but, if 
publicly exhibited and consciously applied according to rules, it 
becomes analogous to art.1?9 m
An example of Magical Thinking, outside of Hesse's work, is seen 
in Prince Myshkin in Dostoyevsky's The Idiot. He is in touch with the 
unconscious and possesses the wisdom of a mystic in whom all antitheses 
are resolved. Polarities are denied and unity is experienced. There 
is no separation of the outside and inside world.
The magical conception of life has long been a part of Hesse's
life. As a writer of fairy tales he displays this desire to cross over
the barriers of logical thinking. Hesse thinks opera is the highest
form of fairy tala and wants to compose an opera because "In my opera
I wanted to do what I had never quite succeeded in doing in my poetry*
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to establish a high and delightful meaning for human life."
Magical Thinking makes use of imagination and the intuitive side %
of life. The tale, "Augustus," illustrates this. Binswanger, the god­
father of Augustus, possesses magic. He does not age and has power to I
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accomplish extraordinary things, e.g., he grants Augustus* mother her 
wish to have a son who is popular with everyone. Being loved by every­
one becomes a problem for Augustus, He finally asks Binswanger to ful­
fill his wish: to be able to love others rather than to be loved. It
is done. Binswanger is an example of the wise old man archetype in 
Jungian thought. Ha is a wise teacher with a serene radiance emanating 
from his person while at the same time he possesses power to affect life 
dramatically,
Demian portrays " , . . a world which is not fully obeying the
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laws of reality, but is rather moving in its own magic orbit." At 
the end of the book, Sinclair finds the ultimate synthesis of the con­
flicting worlds within himself through Magical Thinking, I
)
Significant also is the "Magic Theater" in Steooenwolf. It is j
the place where one encounters the depths of one's own being— where one j
is forced to embrace the realms of light and darkness. It is here Haller j
learns to stop viewing life as a dichotomy and to accept all aspects of vi
Jw|
his personality as being natural. j
It is important to see the means by which one enters the Magic
}
Theater— through the use of drugs. It is interesting to realize that
‘■i|
Hesse is saying that drugs can be used to expand one's consciousness of 1
reality. Pablo is not only a musician, he is an expert on various drugs
'1that can produce beautiful dreams and insightful experiences. "At the J
first meeting Pablo offers Haller a powder to improve his spirits . . .  j
and later Haller admits that he frequently partook of Pablo's narcotic 1
1B2
cocktails." The Magic Theater is an opium fantasy that Haller in- ,
dulges in with Hermine and Pablo. j
Jm
Everything Haller is to see in the Magic Theater is a reflection of
his own inner life and a product of his eidetic vision under the
influence of narcotics . . .  As the effect of the drugs begin to
wear off, Harry has his most sublime experience: direct contact |
with the Immortals in the person of Mozart.183
'i
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Most of Hesse's work relies on aesthetics as being the means by |
which a person becomes fully human. It is not until he writes The Glass
Bead Game that a noticeable shift in his thinking occurs. This is due 
to both a personal maturity and to a disenchantment with the detachment 
that accompanies aestheticism. Also, he is alarmed by the world situa­
tion caused by the Nazi menace. The result is a change from aesthetics 
to ethics as the solution to man's dilemma— detachment to engagement.
The inward way must include the outer world of reality. Diffi­
culties must be faced. It is significant that the study of history
/
provides the aid for coming to terms with what is. "Hesse argues that 
history may be the one field in which the man of intellect can find the 
outer world merging with inner reality, with inner truth,
It is the Benedictine historian. Father Jacobus, who precipitates 
the rejection of the aesthetic realm of Castalia by Knecht. Father 
Jacobus' function in the novel is that he forces Knecht, the representa­
tive of a province which knows practically no history, to confront his­
torical reality. Castalia cultivates only the history of ideas rather 
than the history of man. To think historically is to think inhumanely, 
for Knecht. Therefore, the recognition of the importance of history 
prompts the change in thinking that has important consequences. During 
the apprenticeship under Jacobus, Knecht has made the discovery that he 
" . . .  was not only a Castalian, but also a man; that the world, the 
whole world, concerned me and exerted claims upon me. . . .My Teacher
Jacobus had kindled in me a love for this world which was forever grow-
185
ing and seeking nourishment."
This sense of responsibility for the world becomes a new theme for 
Hesse* He creates Knecht as a humanist endowed with some of the qualities 
of Universal Man. "In this world of the humanist, each individual is hiro-
4 OjC
self responsible, being the mediator between his beast and his angel."
iat
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Hesse creates Castalia as a community of the future, and the 
time of Knecht is approximately 2400 A.D.. Castalia comes into being 
as a result of the turmoil of the twentieth century. People " . . .  did 
not take the time and trouble to strengthen themselves against fear, to 
combat the dread of death within themselves; they moved spasmodically on 
through life and had no belief in a tomorrow. . . The dreary mechani­
zation of life, the profound debasement of morality, the decline of faith
187
among nations, the inauthenticity of art. . . . "  Such are the alarm­
ing signs of the time.
Through the exercise of meditation, the well-spring of energy can 
be tapped, and the renewal of mind and soul can take place. But the 
world is present; history reveals that it has been present. The problem 
is how to combine the contemplative life with the active life. During 
the early years that Knecht is in Castalia (as recorded in the "Rain­
maker" biography), the seeds of discontentment with Castalia are planted. 
For example, a quotation from the "Rainmaker" indicates this. "A man is 
the more useful, the more his life and thinking is turned towards matters
of the spirit, matters that go beyond the personal realm, the more he has
188
learned to venerate, observe, worship, serve, and sacrifice."
Knecht comes to the conclusion that his task is to continue a life
in the Castalian sense but in the midst of the world where he can ba a
mediator, interpreter, and arbitrator. He says, " . . .  I did not want
to be a hermit, cultivating my peace of soul and preserving a calm,
meditative state of mind. I wanted to conquer the world, you see, to
understand it, to force it to understand me. I wanted to affirm it and
189if possible renew and reform it."
With time Knecht's attitude toward Castalia becomes increasingly 
more critical. More and more he sees it as a place where eunuchs.
w
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confined to an eternal childhood, live in a neatly tidied playground 
where emotions that are troublesome are soothed and safe, bloodless 1
games are played for a lifetime. It is " . . .  an artificial, steril-
1
ized, didactically pruned worldj a mere sham world in which you cravenly i
vegetate, a world without vices, without passions, without hungers, 
without sap and salt • • . drones' lives , , , while outside in the 
filth of the world poor harried people live real lives and do real 
work."1*°
It is time for a decision when Knecht realizes history is made
by those who take responsibility for the world. He believes that those
who receive the elite training for membership in the select society of
Castalia should be the ones who shoulder some of this responsibility.
"The higher a person's cultivation, the greater the privileges he has
enjoyed, the greater must be his sacrifices in case of need. . . .  He
would be a coward who withdrew from the challenges, sacrifices, and dan-
191
gers his people had to endure." He feels a summons to serve his
fellowman. He tries to convince Alexander, the next in command, that 
he is not desirous of freedom but of a commitment to someone who needs
live it. Commitment to some person is essential if Knecht is to put
into practice the very meaning of his name. "Knecht in German means
•menial servant.' It is connected with knight and carries the connota-
192
tion of noble faithfulness." He decides to leave Castalia and go 
into the world where he intends to devote himself to the service of man. 
He has come to see that divorced from life and moral commitment, art is
him. What he seeks is not so much the possible satisfaction of a j
worldly life, but rather, the unconditional.
The ethical stance requires a commitment to be responsible for
one's fellowman. It is not enough to know the truth; a person has to kî
i
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suicide. He wants to educate and help develop the personalities of
others. He wants to undertake the difficult task of teaching his
friend's problem son, Tito. His commitment cost him his life, but he
does fulfill his mission.
Knecht is not rejecting Castalia totally* He really wants a
marriage of Castalia with the world. It is not either/or but both/and.
Commitment that leads to ethical action is seen in the three stories
that follow the death of Knecht. They are an integral part of the novel
and have in common not only service but " . . .  the transmission of the
193spiritual seed— the essential function of Knecht's contact with Tito."
Self-realization through service is another way of saying salva­
tion depends upon the individual— through education, will power, and 
moral effort. Needless to say, this works-righteousness method of sal­
vation is in conflict with New Testament theology. But it is a step 
further than the aestheticism earlier advocated by Hesse. It at least 
takes seriously the real world and man's need to participate responsibly 
in it.
A further comment needs to be made about the message of The Glass
Bead Game. Intellectual responsibility and personal devotion to a life
of service are only part of the ethical message. Being a servant to the
point of self-sacrifice means going all the way with one's commitment.
"The sacrifice of Knecht's death, however, is not a question of atoning
194
for sin, but one of at-one-ment with the divine." It consummates an 
integration of the opposites. "Knecht's plunge into the frigid mountain 
waters symbolized the immolation of the Self in the All, the recognition 
of Truth, the acquisition of immortality in the transcendence to a
iQC
Higher Self, to union with God."
    . ....     .. . .___ '....  J ._______      j.
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Masse believes he is making a contribution to life by writing
his last novel. "Such themes as the sacrifice of the individual, the
continuity of Geist. the polarity inherent in the dialectical process,
196
service to Geist becoming in a higher synthesis service to life,"
Sacrificial service to others produces new life. It has already
been mentioned that an obvious change in Tito's life is implied whan he
puts on Knecht's discarded bathing robe. It appears that the seeds of
faith, hope, and future service have been planted in Tito's life.
Middleton says that the name, Tito, stands for the "young," or "new
man," who is born out of the elements in which the "old man," (Knecht),
is consumed, and in a sense Tito becomes the "fiery youth" as symbolized
197
in the Phoenix of Western alchemy.
In addition to the effect on Tito, Ziolkowski says, "Knecht's
sacrifice had profound implications for Castalia itself, which underwent
a revaluation of its principles after the abrupt defection of the re-
198nowned Magister Ludi." - And the narrator of The Glass Bead Gama has 
been substantially influenced by Knecht's sacrificial life. The entire 
community of Castalia has undergone reform because of the cogent criti­
cisms made by Knecht prior to his defection. The ethical way can produce 
constructive results. At least it has more effect upon life than the 
way of aestheticism.
In the ethical stage the attitude of detachment is impossible, 
because love is at the center of an ethical life. Love is the motivat­
ing factor that opens up and brings a person out of self-seclusion, and
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in so doing conquers the demonic. Detachment is overcome by existen­
tial involvement. Notice Leo in The Journey to the East. The more lov­
ing one is, the more understanding one will have for others, and the 
less self-conscious and egocentric one will be. Self-abandoned love
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produces sacrificial living, "For all those torn between the two poles
of nature and the spirit there is but one remedy; the miracle of love—
not only the personal love of man for woman but above all the humanitarian
love of man for man. Self-dedication to humanity heals the elemental rift
in man and leads from chaos to harmony,
Hesse's essay, "My Belief," states;
Later on, my own personal religion often changed in form, never sud­
denly in the sense of a conversion but always slowly as growth and 
development. The fact that my Siddhartha puts not knowledge but love 
ahead of everything, that he rejects dogma and makes the experience 
of unity the central point, may be interpreted as a swinging back 
toward Christianity, yes, as a truly Protestant characteristic,201
And in a "Letter to Adele" he writes: "If anything can cure the world
and make mankind pure and whole again, it is the actions and sufferings
of those who refused to be bent or bought, who ware more willing to lose
their lives than their humanity , • , "^^2
It is love demonstrated that is the hope for man and the world.
Love enables man to live with courage. Following the Second World War
Hesse wrote a letter that says: "Today we all live in despair, all
awakened people, and all thus cast between God and Nothingness. Between
these poles we breathe, sway, and pendulate. Each day we are tempted
to throw away our lives, but we are sustained by that within us which
is suprapersonal and supratamporal. So our weakness . . .  becomes
bravery.
In conclusion it can be said that man becomes human by exercising 
the inward way of meditation and contemplation, artistic self-expression, i
humor. Magical Thinking, and finally, by living an ethical existence, -
In the next chapter Hesse's work will be evaluated.
I
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CHAPTER III 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HERMANN HESSE A
This chapter is a critical evaluation of the work of Hermann 
Hessa. An attempt is made to be fair to him by including the positive 
and negative dimensions of his literary endeavors. Perspective is 
gained when the extent of his influence is seen in the context of those 
who appreciate, and those who criticize, his writing.
In order to present a balanced appraisal of Hesse's work, a 
general literary critique is followed by a theological critique, and 
finally, by a specific critique of Hesse's concept of "the human." In 
each of the three areas the strengths and weaknesses of his efforts |
are examined. ■p
Literary Significance |
Hesse is appreciated by many uncritical young people and by many 
literary critics. His influence has extended from the publishing of 
his first novel in 1904 to the present time. In the English-speaking 
world, however, his influence was slight prior to the 1960a. When 
Timothy Leary pronounced Steooenwolf his favorite work of literature, 
a Hesse cult developed in America.^ Today his popularity goes beyond 
the counter-culture. His work is read in progressive high schools, and 
Hesse seminars are taught on the university level. Before information 
is presented that is critical of Hesse, his accomplishments need to ba 
viewed.
129 *
I
r : :  x ,  X X . . . ' X X -  '  *     " I
130
;#
I
Literary Appreciation
Hesse was held in high esteem by many of his literary peers. |
According to Baumer,
The very critical Andre Gide stated that in Hesse what is moderate 
is neither the emotion nor the thought, but— through an exquisite 
feeling for the seemly and reserved— the expression. This is 
marked by a restrained irony . . .  2
This trait was rare in German writers, according to Gide. Baumer also
made reference to Thomas Mann's statement that Steooenwolf was not
inferior in experimental boldness to Joyce's Ulysses or Gide's The
3
Counterfeiters. Furthermore, in his introduction to Hesse's Damian.
Mann commented on Hesse's work* " . . .  the many levels of thought it 
touches and its concern with the problems of the world and the self is 
without peer among his contemporaries."*
The reasons for Hesse's recognition and appreciation include the 
following. In the first place, he was one of the first to recognize 
the significance of the subjective world and its power over man. He, 
along with Kafka and Marcel Proust, was able to plumb the depths of 
man's inner world (coming to light by way of Freud and psychoanalysis).
Hesse used portraiture as a lyrical form, and his hero (although neurotic
and vulnerable) became a symbolic representation of himself, and his
5
world, on the way to salvation. He was successful in creating a dis­
tinctive lyrical novel in the tradition of Jean Paul and Novalis;
, . . his novels evolved a sharp diagnosis of modern life, directly 
psychoanalytic in the work of the early twenties, tenpered by more 
spiritually defined harmonies in the work of old age. . . .  he con­
densed the time-bound hero and the timeless ideal into a dual vision, 
embodying equally a dialectic of ideas and the physiognomy of the 
generation for which he wrote.6
To a considerable extent Hesse's popularity could be attributed to the
contemporary themes that occupied hie attention. These themes were
evident in chapter two of this thesis.
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In the second place, Hesse was a prophet who pointed to what is
universally human. He had a clear understanding of his vocation.
Our business is not to preach or command or to plead but to stand |
fast amid hells and devils. . . .  If we poets and thinkers are of 
any importance, it is solely because ws are human beings, because 
for all our failings we have hearts and minds and a brotherly 
understanding of everything that is natural and organic. . . .  I 
have many times raised my voice and have devoted a large part of 
my life to the responsibility that was than borne in on me. . . .
I have time and time again reminded my readers of the fundamental 
commandments of humanity . . . ?
Hesse's life and work testified to his degree of commitment and his
ability to ba responsible. His work was praised by literary critics
because it want into " . . .  the realm of universal humanity, emulating
the wide-ranging love of Saint Francis, the mysticism of Buddha, the
psychological insight of Dostoyevsky, the world-embracing striving of
8
Goethe, and the Europeanism of Nietzsche." Man, in the final analysis, 
may be an unsolved problem. The ambiguities of life may remain in ten­
sion with each other. For Hesse this did not mean that man should give 
up and resign himself to the inevitable. Rather, he must learn to live 
with his ambiguities. He must engage in the struggle for that which Is 
uplifting and universal in the human condition.
The official citation of the Nobel Prize for Literature which 
Hesse received stated; "For his inspired writing which, in its develop­
ment toward daring and depth, also represents classic humanistic ideals
9
and high stylistic quality." This prize increased the reading audience
of Hesse. According to Stanley R. Townsend, "It is from such posts as
Hesse, maladjusted and 'immature* in terms of the normal person, who are
driven to question every aspect of human personality, that we learn the
10
significance of our own experiences."
On Hesse's eightieth birthday, in 1957, a few friends gathered 
in Stuttgart to honor him. Martin Buber was present and summed up 
Hesse's life and work with the words "service to the spirit.
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The third reason for Heese's literary acceptance was the way in
which he expressed this concern for the spirit. He was a critic of
society. He understood his mission
. . , to ba a custodian of the spiritual and cultural values of the
past and the protagonist of those values in the present . . , He 
lashes the modern world unsparingly for its scientific rationalism, 
its unfeeling intallactualism, for its worship of the machine, 
whose logical masculinity is Insensitive to dreams, fantasy, music 
and love,12
His writing had a definite ethical impulse--he insisted that the primary 
impulse of his writing was in the broader sense religious, and his life 
and work embodied a rejection of anything that contributed to the de­
humanizing process. According to Hesse,
Our era is one of moral depravity and intellectual mediocrity, of 
surface glitter, smug comfort, sham conventionality, and foolish 
optimism. It is a materialistic age where science has become a 
religion, and the ultimate criterion of value is function. Man has 
lost his soul in this world of money, machines, and distrust, . • •
He has become a mere "Froramer des Fortschritta" (Bilderbuch. p. 224), 
worshipper of the slide rule,13
Hesse's analysis of modern life struck at the core of middle-class cul­
ture, He considered the bourgeoisie to represent all that was negative; 
mediocrity, cowardice, compromise, irresponsibility, and servility. 
Although he could not appreciate the positive side of middle-class so­
ciety, ha was one of the few who were concerned about cultural values 
and their meaning for people. For these reasons, and for those mentioned 
earlier, his peers praised his literary accomplishments.
Literary Criticism
I
In order to understand the significance of Hesse it is necessary 
to examine his literary weaknesses. The most common criticisms of his 
writing are the following.
First, he is criticized for his subjectivity. "Hesse becomes so 
engrossed in his psychological self that his art tends to suggest the
: - "-*o
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efforts of an analytic talent more than the work of a creative artist,"
A large part of his work is written in the first person singular. His
earliest work, i.e., that written prior to 1917, reveals an uncertainty
and a sense of groping. He resorts to fantasy and retreats into the
realm of beauty, A lethargic atmosphere pervaded by melancholy, along
with a sentimental introversion and melodramatic exaggeration, is
15accompanied with an emotionally intense romanticism.
Because Hesse was an outsider he wrote about outsiders. He
refused to adjust to the way things happened to be in life. He could
sympathize, so he claimed, with the saint and with the libertine, but
16
not with the man who timidly lived between both. This affected his
scope as a writer in that it narrowed his concern to the state of mind
and the psychological feelings of the individual. His obsession with
his own personality produced sentimental monologues that were what
17Hesse called "Sealanbiooraohie."
Hesse placed an undue amount of emphasis on inwardness— another 
phase of his subjectivity. The genuine achievements of man, he thought, 
took place in the inner realm, and whatever reality was experienced out­
side the inner realm would always be disappointing. Existence was a 
process which appeared in the soul, something private, intricate, and
mysterious, and whan it became necessary for Hesse to face social reality
18ha was not inwardly comfortable. Hesse, however, came to recognize 
his refusal to accept life as it is.
When Hesse reviewed books and acted as a critic he did not strive
for objectivity. He considered subjectivity to be a virtue in being a 
good critic. He thought it was impossible to be neutral in reading 
another person's work and that the more one could experience what was
being read the better one would be as a critic. His reviews were
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a response to ideas and ideals ha himself held. When he did not like
their intentions. It is not surprising that they are escapists by nature
what he read he would refuse to review the work. Nevertheless, Pater
Contrum stated, "Hesse has deprecated long-windednsss, extolled economy, I;
deplored artificiality, praised fidelity to nature even to the point of
naivete; ha has decried tones of cynicism and skepticism and favored an
19
optimistic view of life and the future,"
Secondly, Hesse's concern for the life of the mind, or the life
of the spirit, has prompted accusations that many of his major characters
(e.g., Joseph Knecht) are unbiological. An author who scorns the "shabby
reality" of the material world and who has heroes with a melancholy
mandarin quality is not to the taste of many readers living in today's 
20world. An illustration of this criticism can be seen in Roashalde.
Johann Voraguth is a famous artist who hardly exists as a man, "He, who
never sent a bungled drawing or painting out into the world, suffered
deeply under the dark weight of innumerable bungled days and years,
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bungled attempts at love and life." Such caustic comments as the fol­
lowing have been made: "Hesse is a highly cultivated person, he is the
ideal second order writer for the sort of serious-minded reader desirous
to believe that he is grappling successfully with intellectual and artis-
22
tic profundities of the first order,"
A third major criticism focuses on Hesse's passive characters.
One gets the impression, especially in his early work, that his characters
are constantly waiting for life to begin. His heroes are dreamers and not
doers. He praises meditation rather than action, and his literary figures
are plagued with chronic indecision. They are " • • • timid soula who ask
too little of life, yet expect too much of it, and hence live in perpetual
23
frustration and disillusionment," They are persons who cannot carry out
;
:
i
His art springs from an unshakabiy profound infatuation with adoles­
cence, and his vision of youth is underwritten by his incapacity to 
break loose from youth's fascination. . . . corny tenderness of 
narcissism, or the wild thrill of discovering feelings that are en­
tirely new, never felt before. . . .  ha is invariably second-rate 
• • • His thought is never cheap, never trashy, but neither is it 
ever intellectually exalting . . . ^5
His youthful heroes are notoriously unstable and ill-equipped to face
the demons of uncertainty.
His emphasis on the problems of adolescence contributes to hie
tendency towards sentimentality. This can be seen in the following poem:
I walk 8 0  often, late, along the streets,
Lower my gaze, and hurry, full of dread.
Suddenly, silently, you still might rise 
And I would have to gaze on all your grief 
With ray own eyes.
While you demand your happiness, that's dead.
I know, you walk beyond me, every night.
With a coy footfall, in a wretched drese 
And walk for money, looking miserable!
Your shoes gather God knows what ugly mess,
The wind plays in your hair with lewd delight—
You walk, and walk, and find no home at all.26
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and are always running— from themselves and from responsibility. For 
example, Klein and Wagner, Harry Haller, Goldmund, and Knulp defy estab- A
■4;
lished values and institutions and are satisfied with a pleasurable 4
i
vagrancy that includes passive drifting. These are characters who cannot
■A
master their lives, %
This passive quality was evident in Hesse's own life. He remained
an amused observer, never a member of movements but whose themes included |
the quest for identity, the search for personal values, and the impulse
24
to moral commitment.
A fourth criticism which can be leveled at Hesse is his preoccupa­
tion with adolescence. This is an emotional and intellectual immaturity 
in his work. His work provokes such sarcastic remarks asi
i
1136
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Romantic, disenchanted with Western civilization, once destined for the
29clergy, who escaped into literature." Critics such as Mark Boulby 
believe that there is an element of regression towards infantilism. The 
neo-romantic conflict between feeling and reflection can be seen through­
out his work, but it is unfair to suggest that the same criticism (re­
tarded romanticism) is true of his mature work. "It is the modern
reformulation of the romantic framework which has given Hesse an impor-
30
tant place in modern literature."
Alfred Werner refers to Hesse's writing as " . . . romantic and
31slightly effeminate novels appealing to the average German citizen."
If the thinking part of human experience is to be understood as mascu­
line and the feeling part as feminine, this may be true, but this is a 
false assumption. Women do not play a substantive role in Hesse's work, 
and they are conspicuous by their absence. Consequently, the feminine 
dimension is present in the male characters.
In addition to the criticism of sentimentality, scholars such as
Ralph Freedman note that Hesse can be criticized for the flatness of
his characters, for the poverty of his imagination, and for the fact
that his work has borrowed much from his contemporaries and predecessors.
This is a reference to similar themes and plots to those of other writers
and not to plagiarism. Nevertheless, this contributes to the belief of
certain persons (e.g., Karlheinz Deschner, an iconoclastic journalist),
2B
that Hesse is merely a second-rate writer.
Unthinking romanticism is the fifth major criticism leveled at 
Hesse. Hesse's identification with the romantic movement has been dis­
cussed (see suora. pp. 31-37), but he tempers this tendency with an 
existential dimension in his later work. However, Egon Schwarz says,
"The French Germanist, Claude David, speaks of Hesse as a retarded
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Hasae responds to this criticism by saying*
I am a non-modorn man, in that I do not disdain and hate feelings
and sentiments . . . qualities that make the poet, excitability of 
soul, the ability to fall in love, the ability to love and glow, 
to surrender oneself and to experience in the world of feeling the 
unprecedented and super-normal . . , my feelings are a thousand 
times dearer to me than all the smartness in the world , • • 32
In spite of Hesse*a justification of the feeling level of exis­
tence in his work, ha really stresses the importance of Geist as the
guiding principle of life over that of Natur. This is especially true 
from the time of the writing of Demian to the last of his work. The 
dichotomy continues to be a vital issue for Hesse, but the way of Geist 
becomes the formulative factor in human existence when it is mellowed
by a humanitarian spirit of love, service and sacrifice as exemplified
33
in Knecht's way of life*
Ziolkowski points out that "Hesse is an heir of the chronic dual­
ism that has afflicted German writers since Schiller; ha tends quits
casually to use such earfilling generalities as Spirit and Nature, In-
3d
tallect and Sense, Ideal and Reality, Art and Life, Yin and Yang."
Hesse is cognizant that conflicts of opposites need to be reconciled, 
or they can load to an individual's disintegration, "The resolution of
conflict, ultimately in mystical vision or aesthetic imagination, is
35 'I
Hesse's most consistent romantic theme." |
The romanticism of Hesse is evident in his giving full rain to |
his creative urges by recklessly yielding fully to the mood and necea- ,
sity of the moment. Joseph Milack contends that Hesse's early " . . .  art
36became confessional in form and therapeutic in function." However, his
mature work reflects his craftsmanship. This enables him to ba a modern
man even though some of his themes and concerns can be labeled romantic.
In summary it can be said that not all scholarly critics can appre­
ciate Hesse's literary efforts. Some praise him for his ability to explore
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the inner world of man; for hia being able to point to what is univer­
sally human; and for hia being a custodian of the spirit, i.e., a critic 
of society. But his work can be criticized by others for subjectivity 
that contains sentimentality and a preoccupation with the psychological 
and emotional side of man. He emphasizes inwardness to the point that 
his characters are at home in the dream world and not the real world.
His characters are passive by nature and inclined to be spectators in 
life. He is fascinated with adolescence and may reveal a poverty of 
imagination resulting in a flatness of his characterizations. He is a 
romantic who can be accused of writing novels that are slightly effemi­
nate and lacking in tough-mindedness. Nevertheless, his impact upon 
thousands of persons in his day has been significant, and his influence 
since his death has continued to grow, especially in the English-speaking 
world. More time is necessary before critics can fairly judge whether 
or not Hesse is to be classified as a second-rate writer.
Theological Significance
f
Having presented information on the literary significance of 
Hermann Hesse, it will now be necessary to examine the theological 
significance of his work. In this section the theological ideas with 
which Hesse struggled will be presented, along with a theological 
critique from the viewpoint of traditional Christianity. In the last 
section of this chapter Hesse's concept of "the human" will be evaluated 
in the light of the author's theological posture.
Theological Affirmations 
Hesse does not claim to be a theologian. He does claim to be a 
poet, and the content of his proas and poetry reveal a considerable 
amount of theological concern and philosophical reflection. Since his
I
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theology Is not articulated in a systematic way, his religious insights |
will be approached chronologically.
His first major work, Peter Camenzlnd. raises the question of the 
meaning of life. Why do things happen the way they do? Man has need 
for relationships that matter, i.e., where caring occurs. Although 
there are "givens" in life; birth, individual circumstances, aging and 
death,which must be accepted, there is still room for decision-making 
that can be meaning-producing, Peter has to stop running from responsi­
bility and begin to meet the needs of other people. His becoming aware
of opportunities for service is the result of a life inspired by and
patterned after St. Francis of Assisi. When one demonstrates one's love 
for the unlovely nothing is to be feared— not even death itself. Beauty i
(and God) can be experienced in tragic circumstances; indeed, it is here 4
that God will probably ba experienced if the belief of the Christian J
faith is true. Every person has something of himself to give to others. j
Even the hunchbacked cripple, Boppi, can teach others to observe, create, 
love, and share experiences. Love is the central and most important ]
il
element that provides purpose and meaning in life, and it can be known ]
in suffering. Giving to others and receiving from others sacrificially i
1
is the basis for a satisfying life. Becoming mature involves accepting 
responsibility for other people.
In Beneath the Wheel the ordinariness of life is portrayed. The
work-a-day world is seen as filled with " . . .  all sorts of remarkable
37
people and beautiful talents, and crazy fools." In the midst of this I
world there is imperfection. It takes form in pressures exerted by Hans' 4
■1elders who want him to be something other than what he is— a young boy i
with a soul. Hans is aware that if he does not keep pace he will be
dragged beneath the wheal of people's expectations. The tragedy of M
I
i
J
140
unrealized potential is placed in the context of an attack on educa­
tional eystems that foster intellectual accomplishment to the detriment 
of the emotional and instinctual life of young people. A person's soul 
is smothered. The world contains conflicting priorities, for example, 
duty to a friend is in conflict with Hans' personal ambition to become 
the best student of which he is capable. Hesse suggests the need for 
caring love. Love changes things— life with its melancholy and depres­
sion and loneliness can be transformed. This humanistic love does not 
have a theological origin, at least not explicitly, but it is a state­
ment about a fundamental human need.
With Rosshalde the theme of personal alienation is presented. 
Meaning resides in Veraguth's unbalanced love for his youngest son, 
Pierre. It is his only reason for living. In his sterile studio, in 
a life devoid of passion, Veraguth experiences alienation from his wife 
and his oldest son, Albert. His work and one friend, Otto, are the only 
contacts with the outside world. In his loveless silence he remains un­
reconciled to life. He plays the role of a spectator in his own home 
with loathing, and he is barely able to keep up appearances. There is 
an obstinate refusal to face facts and to come to terms with reality.
He lives in a mood of self-destruction, resigned to a cowardly stance, 
refusing to leave the unsatisfactory security of the known to venture 
into the new and unknown. He lives in an environment where no real 
listening to one another occurs— where no real meetings on the depth 
level take place. But .Veraguth does not know that genuine love causes 
one to forget oneself and to transcend the less important details of 
life. It frees one to concentrate upon relationships that matter.
The agony of one-sided love, i.e., unreturned love, is encountered 
in Gertrude. Kuhn comes to see the life-giving source of creativity.
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music. Kuhn says, ** . . . however much I thirsted for Cod, understand-
38
ing and peace, I always found them in music alone.** As noted in the 
last chapter (see suora. pp. 114-128), the asstheticism of Hesse becomes 
apparent.
The message of Wandering is the need for acceptance of life as it 
is, since ** . . . mere existence needs no justification . . Be
‘■i:
his musical compositions. He is able to express himself in music, but 
more importantly, he assumes responsibility for others (his parents) |
which gives him a reason for being. The novel shows how easily persons 
con victimize one another, e.g., Muoth and his self-destructive ways 
and their effect on Gertrude. The ambiguities of the human situation 
are seen in the hope and despair, bliss and tragedy, love and fear 
present in Gertrude and her husband. At the same time the longing for 
harmony is a goal sought by the characters.
Commitment and the **in spite of” quality are also evident in 
Gertrude. It shows the depth of human resources when circumstances 
force one to cope with what appears to be the inevitable. Tenderness 
and sympathy are human characteristics that point in the direction of fi
the key message of the novel— love endures! There is beauty in friend­
ship (such as that of Gertrude and Kuhn) and value in the making of f
'°fS
what you are! That is happiness. Yet this is contradicted with a rest­
lessness for the "not yet*’! There is a discontentedness with arriving—  
a yearning for what will be. The movement of life is seen in the desire 
to be a pilgrim who is always on a journey. Man is by nature hopeful 
and future-oriented, and it is only death, or the achievement of Nirvana, 
that causes the journey to end.
With Demian the irrational factors of human experience become 
known. Hesse portrays man as doubting and questioning. These are
••rV. "14."rv. . . -'•. . Ta ...... -
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sent in the quotation: ”We are driving in a carriage on the edge of an
abyss, and the horses have already s h i e d , I t  is important to note, 
too, that when Klingsor finishes his self-portrait it contains many faces.
important human elements. It is difficult becoming one's whole self.
Man is filled with contradictions and tensions arising from the polar '4
I
life of the opposites within his subconscious.
In the short story, ”A Child's Heart,” the struggle in the human 
heart with temptation and baseness is present. Guilt and its impact on 
the inner life (its agony and pathos) become evident. Yet growth and 
maturity come as the result of coping with conflicting views of oneself.
The observation can be made that hostility toward oneself is often ex­
pressed toward others. The importance of communication is seen when 
well-intentioned human beings, father and son, torment each other.
In ”Klein and Wagner” Hesse conveys the struggle between the 
rational and respected citizen (Klein) and the terrible thief and liber­
tine (Wagner). Both characters reveal aspects of the same person. It 
is the struggle of all men, Hesse shows how difficult it is to distin­
guish between decency and indecency when one accepts a relativistic 
position. When meaninglessness and despair are experienced it is a 
short distance to suicide.
With "Klingsor*3 Last Summer” the issue of finitude Is the central 
focus, and the anxiety about dying is seen in the wild reaching out of 
Klingsor to absorb all of life now. This stress on the present can be 
seen in the following quotations: ” . . .  this day will never come again
and anyone who fails to eat and drink and taste and smell it will never 
have it offered to him again in all eternity. . . .  Paradise Isn't Paris 
and peacetime. Paradise is hera,”^^ On the other hand, the message is one 
of pessimism and doom. The swiftness of life and its shortness are prs-
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They aayi this la man, ecce homo, here is the weary, greedy, wild, 
childlike, and sophisticated man of our lata age, dying European 
man who wants to die, overstrung by every longing, sick from every 
vice, enraptured by knowledge of his doom, ready for any kind of 
progress, ripe for any kind of retrogression, submitting to fate 
and pain like the drug addict to his poison, lonely, hollowed-out, 
age-old, at once Faust and Karamazov, beast and sage, wholly exposed, 
wholly without ambition, wholly naked, filled with childish dread 
of death and filled with weary readiness to die.^2
The Jungian ’’collective unconscious” can be seen in Klingsor*s observa­
tion that even deeper behind the faces are prehuman forms of past ages.
This theme is developed later in Steopenwolf. Man is a complex compos­
ite of many selves. The more this is realized the better man will 
understand himself and others.
Siddhartha teaches that man is a searching creature, one who is 
concerned about the meaning of life. It is easy to be preoccupied— to 
give oneself to distracting tangents. Man is always on the way; he 
never ceases seeking. The pilgrimage inward becomes a way of life.
This involves an acceptance of what is, i.e., of the polarities of exis­
tence. Yet, in the final analysis, love is the answer for Siddhartha 
(and for Hesse),
In the essay, ’’The Brothers Karamazov, or The Decline of Europe,”
Hesse states* ” . . .  we cannot kill the primal Instincts, the animal 
in us, for we ourselves would die with them. But we can in soma measure 
restrain and calm them, make them to soma extent serviceable to the 
* good* . . .  He considers Dostoyevsky to be a prophet, but ha thinks
that, in comparison to the ordinary person living in society, a prophet
;
is a sick man who no longer cares about himself. The prophet interprets -e
the movement of his own soul in terms of what is universal in man. Such
a person is Prince Myshkin in The Idiot. He is like Christ, possessing
a timid chastity (according to Hesse), and both men are so utterly human, I
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acterize what is in all men. Too much discipline limits and restricts 
life, while giving too free reign to the sensual side of one's life
?
so utterly alone, so utterly persons of suffering. Both are so in
I
touch with levels of the unconscious that when others encounter them, 
devastating truth seems to be present. The individual is thrown back 
upon himself, and a decision is required; ’’Each of us for an hour in f
his life will have to stand on the Myshkin boundary where truths can 
cease and begin anew,**^^
With Steppenwolf man is portrayed as not always being at home in 
the world as it is. Ha is an outsider, lonely, and alienated. When 
man is on the boundary of his existence, he is closest to reality but 
also to madness. Man is separated and cut off from life until he opens
himsalf to love and the possibility of being hurt. Only when one is
vulnerable can one learn to dance, laugh, and make music. Man cannot 
live in the past only or melancholy results. To be healthy, man must 
live a balanced life. The Goethes and Mozarts are important, but so 
also are the Pablos and Hermines. Finding oneself is costly, and not 
everyone is willing to pay the price. It can lead to wholeness or to 
insanity— to life or to death. Man's reason for living comes from 
others, and only when man trusts another person, and puts his life at 
the disposal of that person, can he live with hope.
Harry Haller learns that real living is possible when man alter- %
I
nates between experiencing aloneness and community. Both are essential |
to vital living. People need people, and real living is giving yourself "
away. It is caring for someone. Ù
In Narzlss and Goldmund human existence is a battleground between
the spiritual and the sensual life of man. Narziss and Goldmund char-
i
results in meaninglessness and futility. The incompleteness of life is
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communicated in that Goldmund never realizes his artistic goal— that of 
creating Eve, the Mother of man. Time runs out on him. The tragedy of 
life lived without fulfilling love (in Narziss and Goldmund) is most - 
evident. There is considerable sexual exploitation, but it is devoid 
of an enduring relationship in which there is a future. Wasted talent 
is seen in Goldmund whose life produces so little that is creative.
In contrast, Narziss recognizes the inadequacy of a controlled and 
rigid life devoid of emotional involvement with another human being.
Both Apollonian and Dionysian dimensions need to find expression in a 
life that is whole.
The Glass Bead Game is Hesse's last major statement about human 
nature. Castalia is a safe world without any risks. It does have the 
danger of a one-sided life. The Oriental emphasis on inwardness and 
the psychological views of Jung are very much present. Also, man must 
pay attention to world history, noting that, significantly, it is the 
Christian church that has had staying power. From Father Jacobus,
Joseph Knecht
« . • became fully aware of how phenomenal this Christianity was— a 
religion that through the centuries had so many times become unmodern 
and outmoded, antiquated and rigid, but had repeatedly recalled the 
sources of its being and thereby renewed itself, once again leaving 
behind those aspects which in their time had been modern and victori­
ous, 45
This is to be contrasted with the secular centers of the arts and sciences 
which have not survived historical events.
Man can lose his humanity in his work, such as when Joseph Knecht 
becomes Magister Ludi, he is changed into an inhuman instrument. Personal 
matters, such as friendship, vanish. Current events reveal the temporality 
of Castalia too. What is important is for one to be responsible for world 
history. It la not something that just happens, but it can be shaped and 
affected by individuals actively participating in the events of history.
146
The key concept that The Glass Bead Gama communicates is commit­
ment to mankind, to the point of sacrificial service. The death of 
Knecht can be interpreted as demonstrating ”the suffering servant” role 
of the biblical witness, Knecht comes to see that his mission in life 
is to put himself at the disposal of another human being in an effort 
to teach the values of Castalia in the reality of the everyday world.
What higher ethic is there than sacrificial love expressed in human 
relationships?
Hesse's theology is obviously unconventional. He is not a tradi­
tional theist. Indeed, as will be seen in the next section, there is 
much of his thinking that can be challenged as nontheological. If the 
starting premise is one of theological positivism, this may be true.
However, if self-transcendence and psychological expression are allowed 
to be interpreted as "spiritual” experiences possessing theological 
content, then Hesse has religious insight worthy of attention.
Hesse's affirmations Include the following, in summaryi man 
raises the question of the meaning of life (Tillich suggests that this 1
is a sign of God's activity); he discovers meaning when he enters into 
relationships that matter, i.e., when genuine caring occurs. Peter 
Caraenzlnd and Joseph Knecht illustrate this. Being responsible for 
others Is love demonstrated. Life is imperfect, and tragedies do take 
placet loneliness, suffering, alienation, despair, and suicide are 
examples of this imperfection. Meaninglessness and an empty existence 
cause man to search for, and abandon himself to, values ha considers 
purposeful, such as did Siddhartha and Harry Haller. The human condition 
is filled with ambiguity, but man is capable of living with courage "in 
spite of” overwhelming odds. Contradictions and tensions are part of 
every person's life. Guilt, anxiety, temptation, and finitude need
'  ■■fa. '■ ■■ iX- *■' : vv '  ' i  ..v ’ 'J- -■ i  ■■' 4'k- ■=' f L fM  '■'iî'lîT' ■> :  'J  3 ■a-
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not conquer the human spirit. Man has the inner resources to cope with
f
:
the unique circumstances of his individual destiny. It is true that X
some persons succumb to the pressures of existence (such as Klein and 
Giebenrath), but other persons (e.g., Kuhn and Veraguth) manage to sur­
vive with some degree of hops. The acceptance of life as it is need 
not mean bland resignation. It can mean a contentment that comes with 
the giving of oneself to that which is (note Siddhartha*s experience).
Inner peace and relative contentment can also be seen in the conclusion 
of The Journey to the East. The subconscious of man may contain demons, 
and there may be many selves struggling for dominion over one another 
within man, as is true in Steppenwolf. Nevertheless, the battleground 
between the sensual and spiritual sides of man (as seen in Narziss and 
Goldmund) can be channeled and given meaningful expression. Hesse's 
final statement about man is contained in The Glass Bead Game. Sacri­
ficial love and redemptive action coalesce in the character of Joseph 
Knecht. He fulfills the "suffering servant" role and represents the 
pinnacle of human achievement. To be fully human, for Hesse, does not 
require a supernatural theology, but his thinking does take man to the 
boundary of his existence and hints at something more than that which 
is verifiable. Hesse's theology is this-worldly and limiting if mea­
sured by other than the terms he sets for himself. But, granting him 
his ground rules, there is much in his work that is inspiring and up­
lifting— Christian affirmations in humanistic disguise, some might say.
Theological Critique 
Much of what concerned Hesse is noble and admirable in its human­
istic and religious concern. However, when examined from the viewpoint 
of traditional Christianity his ideas are problematic. This author's
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theology is not orthodox, and his evaluation will be presented later.
At this time it is thought that a comparison of Hesse's thinking with
that of historic Christianity will sharpen the distinctive elements
present in Hesse. According to Baumer, Hesse states;
I do not believe in any system of religious dogma. I do not believe, 
then, in a God who has created men and made it possible for them to 
perfect their progress from the stage of killing with stone hatchets 
to the stage of killing with atomic weapons— and has let them be 
proud of it# I do not believe, then, that this bloody world history 
has its "meaning” in the plan of a superior Divine regent, who has 
thereby devised for us something that, though we cannot discern it, 
is divine and glorious.46
to close one's eyes in shame when the most natural things in the world 
go on.^^ It is for this reason that Abraxas, the Gnostic deity that 
combines the qualities of good and evil, becomes the name for divinity 
in Demian. Of course, this understanding of deity is unacceptable for 
the Jew and the Christian. Anything less than a belief in a God of ethi­
cal monotheism is repulsive. A good God is not the source of evil, 
although he permits it to exist.
To be human means to face the experience of chaos in life. Reality 
contains fragmentation, and man knows uncertainty and doubt. Whenever he 
tries to find meaning in life, he is thrown back upon himsalf and his own
What Hesse is challenging is God's apparent willingness to not interfere 
in the chaos and brutality that man inflicts upon man. He thinks that 
a personal God would not permit such atrocities. Hesse does not see 1;
that the alternative would be for man to have no freedom.
Hesse is critical of the traditional Judeo-Christian concept of 
God, The major reason for his criticism is the presence of evil in the 
world. F rom his observation of life and the study of Analytical Psychol­
ogy, he concludes that whatever deity there is is a god who also encoBH 
passes within himself the devil— a deity before whom one would not need
I
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resources. As far as Hesse is concerned, revelation as understood in 
the Bible doss not occur. Meaning comes from within man by human 
initiative and imagination. Hesse attributes this occurrence to divine 
activity but not in the traditional sense of the term. The quest for 
meaning is linked to the quest for identity.
When man looks within his own life, he discovers demons that 
inhabit his interior world. Hesse's characters who seem to be possessed 
by their demons include Klein, Klingsor, and Goldmund. Hesse is taken
to task for his unorthodox affirmations and his agnosticism. Is Hesse
:
naive in his hope that man is to have a future, when the presence of 
evil seems to dominate the activities of man?
Can man find himsalf without God? The Christian affirmation says 
that man is made in the image of God; and therefore, if man is to find 
himsalf it is necessary for him to be found by his Creator, Hesse is 
unconventional in that ha does not believe ha can be saved by a God out­
side of himsalf. He believes he can be saved by the God within. This 
is synonymous with discovering the self. But is God merely the Self 
with a capital S? It may be true when Hesse says in his Letters*
Ich salbst halts fur das entscheidende Ksnnzeichen mainas Labans 
und meinar Arbeitan den religiosen Antrieb.48
1 myself consider the religious impulse to be the decisive char­
acteristic of my life and work.
The content of his religious faith is heretical. It leads to Gnosticism
or to the god of the opposites of Jung.
Reality for Hesse is another name for nature. His involvement
with nature can be seen in the following segment of the pantheistic
poem, "Holiday Music in the Evening."
Again, every time, comforting
And, every time, new in the gleam of endless creation.
The world laughs in my eyes.
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Comes alivs and stirs into a thousand breathing forms. 
Butterflies tumble in the wind streaming with sunlight, 
Swallows sail into the blessing, the blue light.
Sea waves stream on the beach rocks.
Again, every time, star and tree.
Cloud and bird, my close kindred;
The atone greets me as brother.
The unending sea calls me, friendly.
My road, that I do not understand, leads me 
Toward a blue, lost distance,
Nowhere a meaning, nowhere a definite goal—  
Nevertheless, every forest brook speaks to me.
And every humming fly, of a deep law,
A right way that is holy.
Whose firmament spreads out above me also.
Whose secret tones,
As in the pace of the stars 
Beat time in my heart as well.
A dream gives what the day wore out;
At night, when the conscious will surrenders.
Some powers, set free, reach upward.
Sensing something godly, and following.
The woods rustle, and the stream, and through the night- 
blue sky
Of the quick soul, the summer lightning blows.
The world and my self, everything 
Within and without me, grows into one.
Clouds drift through my heart.
Woods dream my dream.
House and pear tree tell me
The forgotten story of common childhood.
Streams resound and gorges cast shadows in me,
The moon, and the faint star, my close friends. . •
49
Hesse considers himself a freethinker. He never wishes to be called
anything but a seeker, a thinker, a polar opposite, a colleague from
50
another far-removed but equally competent faculty. His pantheism is 
made explicit again In the following quotation from his Autobiographical 
Writings*
To be specific, I believe in nothing in the world so deeply, no 
conception is so holy to me, as unity, the conviction that every­
thing in the world forms a divine whole, that the "I" takes itself 
too seriously, I had suffered much pain in my life, had done much 
that was stupid and unpleasant, but again and again I had managed 
to free myself, to forget my "I” and yield to the feeling of oneness, 
to recognize that the division between inner and outer, between "I" 
and the world, is an illusion and to enter willingly with closed 
eyes into the unity. It had never been easy for me, no one could 
have less talent for the holy than I; nevertheless, again and again
-I
I
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I had encountered that miracle to which the Christian theologians 
have given the beautiful name of "grace," that divine experience of , 
reconciliation, of ceasing to rebel, of willing agreement, which is 
indeed nothing other than the Christian surrender of the "I" and 
the Hindu realization of unity.51
His reference to Christian theological terms, such as "grace" and "rec­
onciliation," is not to be interpreted in a particularistic and exclu­
sive way. His combining of Christian terms with Hindu ideas shows his 
syncretism. "The oneness I reverence behind multiplicity is no boring, 
gray, intellectual, theoretical unity. It is, in fact, life itself, 
full of play, full of pain, full of laughter. It is represented in the 
dance of the god Siva, who dances the world to bits, and in many other 
images; it rejects no representation, no s i m i l e . f o r  him the reli­
gions of the East and West can be brought together without any difficulty.
Die Lehre Jesu und die Lehre Lao Tses, die Lehre der Veden und die 
Lehre Goethes 1st in dem, worin sie das ewig Menschiiche trifft, 
dieselbe. Es gibt nur eine Lehre. Es gibt nur eine Religion. Ee 
gibt nur ein Gluck, Tausend Formen, taussnd Verkunder, aber nur 
einen Ruf, nur eine Stimme. . . , [Es gibt] einziga ewig gultige 
Wahrheit. Es ist die Lehre vora "Himmelreich," welches wir "inwendig 
in uns" tragen.®^
The teaching of Jesus and the teaching of Lao-tse, the teaching of 
the Vedas and the teaching of Goethe are, as far as the eternally 
human is concerned, the same. There is only one teaching. There 
is only one religion. There is only one happiness, A thousand 
forms, a thousand prophets, but only one call, only one voice. . . . 
[there is] one eternally valid truth. It is the teaching of the 
"Kingdom of Heaven" which we carry within us.
Can this inclusive interpretation of the "Kingdom of Heaven" be correct?
Conservative theologians would say that the above quotation is an example
of Hesse's lack of understanding of the serious differences between
Christianity and the Eastern religions:
• • * the religion ultimately embraced by Hesse Is one of direct 
communion with the divine, and of supreme faith in man, the meaning­
fulness of life, and the unity of the world's apparent diversity.
It is a religion whose God seems more pantheistic and philosophical 
than Christian, a religion for which Christ is the great apostle of 
love and humaneness, and whose saints are the great religious 
spirits, thinkers, and artists of all times.54
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One may admire Hesse's universalism, but he accomplishes this at 
the price of diminishing the Christian claim that Jesus Christ reveals 
the God who creates, redeems, and sustains man. This God has made him­
self known in historic events— but supremely in Jesus Christ, A Gnostic 
god, a pantheistic god, or a syncretistic god is no substitute for the 
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob— the God who is the Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ; such is the stand of the advocates of traditional Chris­
tianity.
The second major theological criticism of Hesse centers on his 
understanding of the nature of man. Although Hesse comes from a conser­
vative religious background that emphasized the doctrine of original sin, 
his work gives little evidence that this is a significant issue. Thomas 
Colby indicates in his article, "The Impenitent Prodigal," that Hesse 
could not help but have a sense of sin since*
The techniques used by both parents to make their children aware of 
sin and the relentless demands of the law was to send them into 
exile until they had repented and confessed. . . . there are accounts 
of the children being locked into attics or rooms apart and of being 
sent,away to school as punishment.55
But for the most part, Hesse's heroes, like himself, play the role of
the prodigal who does not return.
Hesse's concept of sin is consistent with his humanistic under­
standing of the nature of God and the nature of man. The one area that 
is unequivocally offensive, if not sinful, is the refusal to be true to 
oneself— to deny becoming one's full self.
Irrational forces are active on the subconscious level of man, and 
Hesse recognizes the ambiguities of human existence, Man can be selfless 
and noble at times, but he can also be self-centered and bestial at other 
times. For exan^le, in Gertrude Hesse comments on the presence of evil in 
the world, but he elevates man's power of goodness in overcoming evil.
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This ia a fine quotation for God's acceptance of Knulp, but at a time 
when Knulp is feeling guilty for having contributed so little to life 
the only comment he receives is, "I wanted you the way you are • . • " 
This is difficult to reconcile with the biblical witness of a covenanted 
people who are expected to live in response to a relationship that 
places demands upon both God and his people.
Hesse's amorality is again expressed in Klingsor*s Last Summer:
" . . . all our art is merely a substitute, a painful substitute bought
TV
i
Fate was not kind, life was capricious and terrible, and there was 
no good or reason in nature. But there is good and reason in us, 
in human beings, with whom fortune plays, and we can be stronger
than nature and fate, if only for a few hours. . . . We can then
be gods for moments, stretch out a commanding hand and create 
things which were not there before and which, when they are created, 
continue to live within us.56
Such thinking places man at the center of the universe with the power
to play god. This is a biblical definition for sin, and Hesse appears
to ignore the insidious reality of it.
Hesse's ethical ambiguity is clearly evident. He is a principled 
parson who stands for the value of the individual. He believes in per­
sonal honesty and integrity. He opposes injustice and war, and he ia 
an internationalist in an age of rampant nationalism. There is much
that is highly ethical in Hesse's life and work.
However, there are ethical implications in his thinking that are 
disturbing. There are times when he appears to be amoral. For exan^le, 
there is little sense of accountability in Knulp. A wasted life is 
apparently alright in God's sight. When Knulp is at the end of his life ^
d
he is approached by GodZ ' ,
"Look," said God, "I wanted you the way you are and no different. |
You were a wanderer in my name and wherever you went you brought
the settled folk a little homesickness for freedom. • . • There is j
nothing you have enjoyed and suffered that I have not enjoyed and
suffered with you," 7^ \
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ten times too dearly for missed life, missed animality, missed love.
But it really isn't so. . . .  Sensuality isn't worth a hair more than 
spirituality, and it's the same the other way around. It's all one, 
everything is equally good."®® It is this indiscriminate acceptance 
of life devoid of value judgments that is problematic for the Christian.
Such an act as homicide can be committed by characters like Gold­
mund without the least concern for the moral question it raises regard­
ing the sanctity of human life* Peter Heller speaks to this issue when 
ha refers to Hesse's thinking as revealed in 8lick ins Chaos:
The poet must realize "that God is everywhere and in everything," 
he must show that "everything and nothing has importance." He 
must know "that of everything that is true the contrary must be 
true also."59
If Hesse is correct, it is a denial of every ethical code. Hesse is 
criticized by theologians for his belief that good and evil are inter­
changeable.
Society ia unable to cope with individuals who live with a radi­
cal sense of freedom in which there is no differentiation between right 
and wrong, good and evil. The world cannot tolerate Hitlers who dis­
regard such recognizable wrongs as genocide. This is the negative side 
of radical freedom. But Hesse intends radical freedom to mean freedom 
to be one's bast self. Society would not be threatened by living with­
out rules if man could accomplish this. Is man capable of doing so on 
his own?
The character, Pablo, in Steppenwolf depicts an amoral person.
His only desire is to play music (he is a jazz trumpeter), and when he
is not doing that it makes little difference to him whether he takes
drugs (cocaine or other hallucinogens) or engages In sexual activity of
various types, e.g., heterosexual, homosexual, or group sex. To him 
everything is permissible.
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The serious implication is that nothing is expected of man. He #
Just stumbles through life without any sense of the "shoulds" or the
"oughts." furthermore, there are no guidelines. This poses a problem 
when youth turn to Haase for assistance in achieving self-realization, Â
It is most difficult to find your way in the midst of darkness when %
!
there are no signposts or lights to aid you along the way, "The absence 
of general standards leaves youth suspended in a moral vacuum in which
it becomes extremely difficult to maneuver, particularly since their
ethical sense is not yet fully developed."®^
Hesse admonishes his followers to face the despair of individual 
development with courage. He has disdain for group commitments and 
leaders of youth. Therefore, the individual is left on his own, and it i
I
takes a rare mature person to possess the moral fiber to make wise use
of this kind of freedom.
In his later work (e.g.. The Glass Bead Game) Hesse advocates
responsible living, but much of his work contains amoral statements 4
about life. He does seem to distinguish between being amoral in the
Natur dimension of living and moral in the Geist dimension. It is the
amoral element that needs to be scrutinized, as it can be misleading |
to those persons who read his work without discernment.
For the Christian who desires to live freely but responsibly,
there is a moral demand that has a claim upon him. "You shall love the
Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all
61your mind. . . .  You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Here are 
obligations that cannot be overlooked. Indifference to right and wrong 
is not an option for the Christian.
The third major theological criticism centers upon Hesse's under­
standing of salvation. If he does not believe man is separated from
.a
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God, what value Is there in discussing salvation? Hesse's theology 
ignores the supernatural. Ha does not believe man needs to be saved 
from hell nor does he believe in heaven, Man does not need to be 
reconciled to the Creator from whom he is estranged, Hesse can talk 
about salvation only on the level between man and himself or between 
man and other men,
Ha sees this process as being tripartite. Every individual makes 
his way through life by participating in three important stages* inno­
cence of childhood; innocence lost, as one comes to know reality; and 
finally, a succumbing to despair, or the finding of a worthwhile life, 
"Ideally man's journey should proceed rhythmically, fluidly like a har­
mony in music, Hesse's figures have had to overcome self-centeredness, 
to battle a way out of the world that confined them and yet make their 
peace with it."^^ For example, the crucial struggle for Joseph Knecht 
is to find the way into the center of his own individuality. He wants 
to experience as much of life as it is possible for him to experience 
within his given limitations. This means accepting the risks, dangers, 
and difficulties present in the world outside Castalia.
There is a considerable difference between the human experience 
of awakening only to oneself and that of having a religious experience 
in which one is addressed by the "Wholly Other." It can be argued that 
when man comes to discover who he is, he is coming to know God, inasmuch 
as the two are related. But Hesse does not mean this except to the 
extent that Jung means it. This is not what historic Christianity 
affirms.
Salvation is what man does for himself, according to Hesse. Man 
comes to see that all feelings are acceptable— including hatred, jeal­
ousy, envy, and cruelty. This is a matter of self-acceptance rather
■I
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than of "accepting God's acceptance of us," as Tillich would say.
Human reason plays a part, even though reason can be responsible for 
creating illusions at times.
Human love plays another important role in helping man achieve 
salvation, i.e., in becoming his best self. Illustrative of this is 
Siddhartha. As one who has achieved fulfillment, Siddhartha embodies 
love for all of life. This is Christian in content in contrast to the 
Indian way of renunciation. In an essay, "A Sit of Theology," Hesse 
has divided people into principal types* men of reason and men of 
piety.
Many exceptional men seem to oscillate between the two basic types 
and to be mastered by profoundly opposing gifts which do not stifle 
but strengthen each other; among the many examples of this belong 
the pious mathematicians (Pascal). • . . the highest spiritual 
experience of which we human beings are capable is always a recon­
ciliation between reason and reverence, a recognition that the 
great contradictions are one and the same thing*53
Oskar Ssidlin refers to Hesse's statement* "There are two roads 
to salvation, the road of Justice for the just ones, and the road of 
grace for the sinners. I who am a sinner have again committed the mis­
take of seeking the road of justice. . . .  Only by an act of grace can
64
serenity be envisaged; man cannot deserve it, he can only hope for it."
1
This sounds acceptable, but Hesse does not mean what the words can be 
interpreted to mean. He is not thinking in terms of orthodox Christian
theology. Disobedience by man against the will of God, the concept of
%
the Fall from Grace, the need for a Redeemer to bring forgiveness of 
sins and a reestablishment of a broken relationship, are not part of 
his thinking. Grace is interpreted much more widely than in the Chris- |
tian religion. It is a term that means something personal to Hesse, 
but if pressed, ha would be unwilling to affirm the particularities of
i
Christian faith. In fact, he lived without any meaningful relationship |
'0
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to the institutional church, and ha disavowed any affiliation with the 
Christian life.
The key to salvation, for Hesse, involves the will. The empha­
sis on self-will sets Hesse apart from that which is negative in roman» 
ticism. For self-realization the will is essential. Hesse knows this 
personally, as it is a component part of his own unyielding individu­
alism. Self-reliance and independence are c^alities he most admires, 
and the Buddha, Jesus, and Nietzsche are exemplary examples of persons 
who possess these traits. Narziss conveys the value Hesse places on 
will power* "I call that man awake who, with conscious knowledge and 
understanding, can perceive the deep, unreasoning powers in his soul,
his whole innermost strength, desire, and weakness, and knows kow to
65
reckon with himself." It is reason, but above all, will power, that 
helps man discover and control himself. Self-sufficiency and stubborn­
ness can be seen in the following poetic creation of Hesse's, recorded 
in an article by Ssidlin*
Heaps of shards and shambles far and wide*
Thus ends the world, thus ends this life of mine.
And I wished but to cry and to resign - 
If there were not this stubbornness inside.
This stubbornness to ward off and to fight.
Defiance deep deep in my heart below,
And than my faith* that what torments me so 
Must, must one day turn into light.56
The theological issue is whether or not the individual can ful­
fill himself without God's help. The conservative Christian obviously 
says no. For man to become fully human, the presence of God in Christ 
is required. And the consciousness of this activity is what is known 
as "being born again." The basic biblical position Is that man cannot 
save himsalf. He needs assistance in overcoming his self-centeredness- 
his sin. Ha needs to "deny himself" before he can affirm himself.
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It ia only with God's help that true reconciliation between God and 
man, man and man, and man and himsalf can taka place.
Ziolkowski goes to some length to build a case for Demian being 
a Christ figure, "He is a 'healer' by the shear force of his person­
ality. . . .  He disputes with his teachers, preaches a coming kingdom,
and instructs his band of disciples through parables . . .  a book about
67
a Christ written by a disciple is called a gospel," One has to 
stretch an analogy to read this into the novel. The amorality of Demian 
is but one difference between himsalf and Christ. The ethical content 
of Jesus' teachings, e.g., Jesus could love the sinner but hate the sin,
I
plus the Resurrection event, are other important differences. These i
dimensions are missing in Demian, Ziolkowski's observation is an •
interesting hypothesis but is unfounded. |
In the final analysis, Hesse is accused of having a religion }
Î
without a Savior. This is unacceptable for orthodox Christians. Christ 
is central to the process of man's becoming fully human. Without Christ 
there will always be something lacking. The fundamental criticism of 
Hesse's theology is that of Christian faith over against the affirmation 
of humanism. The nature of God, the nature of man, and Hesse's under­
standing of salvation are major areas of criticism.
Evaluation of Hermann Hesse's Concept of "the Human"
Whereas the above information pertained to a literary and theo­
logical critique of Hesse as a writer and thinker, the following section 
will address itself to this author's evaluation of Hermann Hesse's con­
cept of "the human," The particular reasons for appreciating Hesse will 
be presented after which a few problematic areas will be suggested.
In the first place, Hesse is appreciated for his commitment to 
an authentic existence. He sees the value of human personality and the
160 1
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quest for selfhood as a consuming worthwhile endeavor, Frank Trippet #
states it well when he says*
What could they [youth] possibly get out of him? Wall, Hesse offers
but a single thing, Hesse spent his whole life trying to know him­
self, losing himself to find himself, grasping for wholeness, integ­
rity, and often pained by the integrity he found, • . . All of J
Hesse's heroes, Siddhartha, Sinclair, Goldmund, burst out of old 
selves into new. Self-search is all he offers, the quest, the thrust 
toward awareness, the yearning for the meaning and dimensions of 
being,68
There is a reckless abandonment in Hesse regarding the value of becoming
oneself. "Hesse's fiction glorifies the strategies of attempting to
become a full human being, and it celebrates the nobility of failure."®^
Young people see themselves as unchained. There are few, if any, authori­
ties or institutions a person need follow. Be true to oneself— that is 
all one needs to do. Hesse possesses a rugged individualism that is ad­
mirable. He elevates the significance of the nonconformist, i.e., the 
outsider, in society. He does not fear the unconscious and the shadow 
sides of man.
. 1
In a pragmatic society that measures a man's worth by what ha does ]
' ior by what he earns, Hesse advocates the value of being. An illustration j
can be seen in The Journey to the East in which the League does not do ; j
anything; it is composed of people who just are. Most of Hesse's charac- 1
•■'I
ters are not doers— they simply exist. Hesse is criticized for this, but
n
he is making a statement about the value of human life, in and of itself. i
'I
Human beings, by the mere fact of their existence, are important. j
The authentic life, for Hesse, is one that accepts the ambiguities 
of human existence and goes on living, Harry Haller descends into the |
cellar of his subconscious in search of an integrated life. He finds ,
much that is ugly and displeasing to him. When the novel concludes j
"Harry is condemned to go on living and to try to find his unified self.
•■'i'à
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He can find it only by looking through all the disguises of life and
by not taking any one of them seriously, be they completely sensual or
70completely spiritual," One has to accept the primitive forces within 
and then attempt to disarm their power to unconsciously influence one's 
life. The physical and spiritual dimensions of life both need expres­
sion, It is Goldmund who notes that expressions of pain in a woman's 
face during labor are very similar to the expressions of desire and 
pleasure during sexual intercourse. For this reason Eve symbolizes, for 
Goldmund, love and cruelty, the sacred and the profane,
Hesse sees the complexities of life with its tension of polar 
opposites. He encourages a discontentment with anything that threatens 
the individual. In his Autobiographical Writings Hesse states*
• • . to come to an understanding with this world, to belong to it, ,
to have a place in it and to feel comfortable there . that is M;
not for me, that is forbidden, that is a sin against everything Î
good and holy that I know and in which it is my happiness to be a "
part.71
In a world that is becoming more computerized and impersonal, Hesse %
pleads for what is human and opposes that which is dehumanizing,
Hesse's contributions to the personal dimension of life can be 
matched with a social dimension. This area has not received the atten- 4
tion that it should have, for Hesse was a social critic. Although ha
was concerned about the individual, he did not avoid the social problems |
'I
of his day. He was critical of Germany politically and educationally, 
as documented in the previous chapter (see supra, pp. 86-89), As early 
as 1910 he wrote a short story, "The City," in which ha sketched a pes­
simistic parable on the rise and fall of Western culture. This was ten 
years before the work of Spangler. And his pacifistic articles certainly 
addressed themselves to the issue of the day. In Demian. written during 
the war, the following statements echo Hesse's thinkings
%
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. , . I had given much thought to why men were so very rarely 
capable of living for an ideal# Now I saw that many, no, ail men 
were capable of dying for one. .. . The more singlemindedly the 
world concentrated on war and heroism, on horror and other old 
ideals, the more remote and improbable any whisper of genuine
Î
Î
.
humanity sounded # # # 7 2  |
Whereas most of Hesse’s prewar writings were escapist in nature, his 
work during and following the first World War saw civilization sick and 
consumed with the nonhuman# Man was a social being as well as an indi­
vidual, but it was up to the individual to assume responsibility for
life as it was. In reference to German youth.
He told them they should recognize themselves for what they ware-
average people with many faults and perhaps a few virtues# They
should try to improve the world by beginning with themselves. Cer­
tainly they were now suffering, but they must recognize suffering 
as a constituent part of life and learn to live with it instead of 
opposing it. ”from suffering comes strength, from suffering cornea 
health (VII, 213).«73
Hesse’s ethical awareness can be seen in his unpopular stand on
i
internationalism. He is like Romain Rolland in his belief in humanity# î
1
Man has something in common with all men— whether European or Asiatic. j
An important comment by Peter Heller reflects Hesse’s high esti- 1
mation of a poet*
. . , the poet must strive to preserve «the life of the soul« or,
at least, the longing for it# We must play «our little flutes"
amidst the noise of cannons and loudspeakers. We must accept the 
fact that this activity seems quite hopeless and, indeed, ridicu­
lous. This must be «our form of bravery#”74
It is the poet who has the gift of song and can speak about himself,
and in doing so, speaks for everyone, Hesse ” # « . defines the writer
as the man who takes upon himself the common burden, as the prophet who |
75
interprets his private sorrows in terms of public significance.” The 
prophet points to what is universally human. Hesse is such a person#
He did not remain silent when Hitler came to power# In an open 
letter in 1932 he expressed his opinions*
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I confess that I positively hate the word "leader,” so much misused 
by German youth. Those who need and demand a leader are those who 
do not like to be responsible or to think for themselves, , . Ger­
many is morally sicker even than in 1914, All has been forgotten 
that could have been learned through the war and its c o n s e q u e n c e s , 76
It took courage to publish such convictions, since both his publisher
and reading public were German.
Selflessness and social responsibility become important themes
in Hesse’s last two major works. In The Journey to the East Leo imparts
to H, H. the law of service. "He who wishes to live long must serve,
77
but he who wishes to rule does not live long,” One must have faith 
in the meaning and necessity of one’s actions. Although one may falter 
along the way, there is hope.
In The Glass Bead Game Hesse makes a plea for commitment to one’s 
fellowman, Ha has a grasp of the human situation, and he challenges 
modern man to accept responsibility for life on this planet. The state­
ment by Ziolkowski that follows is true:
For an age in which electronic music has combined music and physics, 
in which sculpture and painting are plotted according to the table 
of logarithms, in which philosophy has fused with mathematics to 
create the new language of symbolic logic, an age in which "literary” \
and sociological research is carried on by IBM machines— for such |
an age it is difficult to conceive of a more appropriate symbol !
than the Glass Bead Gama,78 J
For Joseph Knecht the inner peace and serenity of Castalia require an 
ethical dimension in which responsibility for other persons must be 
assumed. This is what is needed if man is to fulfill himself and to aid 
others in fulfilling themselves. The values of Castalia must be lived 
in the real world, a human world— at whatever cost is necessary, even to 
the point of sacrificing one’s own life.
In the second place, this author appreciates Hesse's religious 
insights. If either religious orthodoxy, or the theological positivism 
of Karl Barth, is the last word in understanding the meaning of Christian
' '.r c.\ '  _ _            '
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faith, the criticisms leveled earlier in this chapter still apply.
However, those of us who are of another theological persuasion believe
God works incognito in the lives of persons who may not affirm his
reality, Paul Tillich illustrates this when he maintains* "The answers
of the humanists come from hidden religious sources. They are matters
79of ultimate concern or faith, although garbed in a secular gown."
Hesse considers the decisive characteristics of his work to be 
religious in nature, and even when he is making the most heretical of 
statements he Is expressing his awareness of the importance of religious 
experience, albeit limited to an autonomous dimension. And at times,
Hesse’s position of autonomy is pressed to something more. For example, 
in his little autobiographical book, A Guest at the Spa, he describes 
his experience with a Dutchman who lives in the room next to his at a 
health resort. The door that separates their rooms does not keep out 
the sound. The daily habits of the Dutchman are exceedingly disturbing #
to Hesse, Hesse comes to hate him and all the irritating habits that 
interfere with his own concentration and different life style. Finally,
I
in exasperation, he decides to transform his hatred into love for his ir
neighbor. He willfully makes the Dutchman an object of his interest, 
sympathy and brotherly concern. He seeks to fulfill the command to love 
his enemy— and it works. He is able to recast his antagonist in a new 
light through the means of poetic imagination. He conquers his animosity
U
by being able to love. Of course, Hesse describes this experience with 
humor, but underneath he is thinking about the power of love to change 
the human heart,
Hesse confines himself to descriptions of human experience— to 
speaking about himself. But according to Bultmann, "The question of God 
and the question of myself are i d e n t i c a l , H e s s e ’s quest for wholeness
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and fulfillment Is a humanistic way of talking about salvation. For 
the twentieth-century secular mind Hesse's language is acceptable, 
i.e., understandable and meaningful in terms that do not offend reason.
God becomes known within rather than beyond the context of human actions. 
Although Hesse adheres to the necessity of ethical behavior, he does not 
recognize that genuine ethical existence is dependent upon a religious 
foundation. For Hesse, being ethical involves a faith commitment.
Knecht's commitment to Tito, in The Glass Bead Game, illustrates this. 
Hesse is not explicit in saying why Knecht should make such a radical 
and costly commitment. Tillich would say that it is indicative of a 
commitment that is more profound— to that which is Ultimate. Whenever 
the "shoulds" enter man's experience and cause him to act responsibly, 
more is implied than humanists are willing to admit. Faith commitments 
or human questions about the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of life, 
are signs of God's activity.
Hesse may not be able to be numbered among the Christians who 
consciously affirm their allegiance to Christ and his church, but cer­
tainly he is included among the members of the "latent church" (to use 
Tillich's terminology). Beneath the surface of what Hesse says is a 
firm belief in the value of human existence— a belief that this value is 
built into the nature of reality.
Considered as a whole, Hesse's achievement can hardly be matched in 
modern literature; it is the continually rising trajectory of an 
idea, the fundamental religious idea of how to "live more abundantly." 
. . , Before all, he is a novelist who used the novel to explore the 
problem: what should we do with our lives?®^
For the above reasons, this author believes that Hesse has made an ad­
mirable attempt to elevate human concerns (personal and social), in which 
he has succeeded, to a certain extent. He is a religious writer with a 
significant message that has merit for modern man.
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There is much that is commendable in Hesse's concept of "the
human," However, his thinking does have some questionable implications,
the first of which centers on his being a spiritual mentor for youth. It
is understandable why Hesse's ideas are attractive to many young people.
He can be interpreted as anti-establishment and anti-intellectual.
Whether it be the sensual Goldmund, the drug-happy Pablo in 
Steppenwolf. or the ferryman in Slddhartha,.Hesse determinedly 
contrasts the more cerebral, conventional culture with another 
culture that is essentially mystical, spiritual, inarticulate, or 
magical, • , * the youth market these days is leaning irrepressibly 
East-ward, Hesse has been there and back.82
ÏS
There is too little critical assessment of Hesse as a model for the y
I
genuinely human life. Youth see him as a mystic and a metaphysician.
Perhaps there is too much unthinking acceptance of his work. One critic,
83George Stainer, states: "When Hesse would define he blurs." It is
this esoteric and vague quality of his thinking that generates a feeling
rather than a clear perception of reality. "Hesse seems to offer ecstasy
64
and transcendence on the easy-payment plan," And Hesse does not appear 
to be certain of what he means by self-realization. It is impossible for
t
a person to live with the ecstatic moment all the time. Hesse does not
provide a discipline by which one can achieve the intensity of the "time- i
less moment" that results from aesthetic creation. Too much of what he 
seeks is romantic wishful thinking.
In the second place, Hesse's followers may not realize that his c]
humanism derives from his reaction to Pietism. His ethics are frequently 
Christian in content, even though he denies the source as being that of 
God. His disciples may not have anything against which to react. Many 
students operate from a relativistic or neutral ethical position and have 
not had a background of Pietistic values such as influenced Hesse. For 
example, a person can use selected portions of Hesse's work to justify
■i
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sexual promiscuity or experimentation with drugs and yet fall to appre­
ciate the strong call to live responsibly that is present in other 
segments of his work.
gratification present in human beings. Consequently, he does not ade­
quately confront the ugliness and evil aspects of life. He offers a 
secularized soteriology that suggests the possibility of new life, but 
is it realistic to expect that his readers will experience this new life?
&
Also, youth may miss Hesse's respect for history and the lessons i|
h
that history teaches. The "now generation" may respond enthusiastically 
to the Dionysian elements in his work but fail to realize that he argues 
for the validity of the Apollonian elements as wall. He advocates a 
meaningful balance of the thinking and the feeling dimensions of human 
existence. Man needs to dance and to make music, but he also needs to 
think and to control himself. It is not either/or but both/and. Some 
of his followers do not see this.
A third area of concern is that of Hesse's attractive portrayal 
of wandering as a way of life. The carefree tramp who merely follows |
the sun— who makes no commitments and contributes little to life— can 
result in the tragic waste of a talented life. This can lead to a para­
sitic existence in which individuals live off others. It encourages 
irresponsibility and can contribute to a person's being satisfied with 
being a spectator. There is no note of accountability in Knulo. The 
misuse of life is a negative characteristic that needs to be recognized
Ias such. Hesse's work has escapist qualities in it. Ha appeals to
dreamers and indecisive persons who are satisfied with drifting and with !
running away from the unpleasant realities which all people must face. !
,4
Hesse assumes a maturity that is not always present in his readers.
J
And he possesses a naive awareness of the self-centeradnass and self- i
f.l
ij
i
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Tha above issues are problematic areas for this author in accept­
ing Hermann Hesse as a spiritual mentor for youth. It is true that 
Hesse never sought to be anyone's leader; nevertheless, thousands of 
young people asked his advice, as indicated by the number of letters 
he received. And many thousands more look to his work for guidance in 
becoming authentic human beings,
Hesse cannot be held responsible for persons misinterpreting his 
ideas. He is not always consistent in his thinking, nor does he pursue 
his convictions to their logical conclusions. In spits of the aspects 
of his work that can be criticized, evidence is overwhelming, in his 
favor, for his being a literary figure with theological insights of 
consequence. What he has to say about man's relationship to other men 
is of enduring value. For example, in Gertrude he exhorts* "Youth ends 
when egotism does; maturity begins when one lives for others, , . , a
man is happier whan he lives for others than when he lives just for him- a;
85
self , . , " Hesse does not ask why this is so; he just believes that "y
it is. Later in the same novel he comments;
You must cultivate a certain indifference toward your own well-being.
Learn to think, what can I do? There is only one expedient. You 
must learn to love someone so much that his or her well-being is more 
important than your own. . . . Give yourself a task, inconvenience y
yourself a little, . . .  Live for others! Don't take yourself so 3
seriously!88
In Narziss and Goldmund Hesse has Narziss say, "My aim is this;
always to be where I can serve best, where my disposition, talents, and
industry may find their best soil and be most fruitful. That is tha only 
87
aim in my life," Unfortunately, the impact of Narziss' message is
muted in comparison to that of the sensuality of Goldmund.
Hesse comes closest to connecting the ideal of service to its 
grounding in the Holy in The Journey to the East. Leo characterizes
169 '4
the idea of humanités in which tha individual, of his own free will, |
is bonded to society and to the sacred, "Leo was a prudent observer
of the contingent in time, a custodian of essential personal and com-
88
munal unity, a pilot of souls through chaos toward light."
Joseph Knecht, in The Glass Bead Game, also takes on a larger- 
than-life dimension, Hesse denies regarding Knecht as a Christlike 
figure, adding*
In Knecht I would rather see a brother of the saints. There are 
many of them , , , they are the "elite" of cultures and world his­
tory, and they are distinguished from "ordinary" human beings 
through the fact that they achieve subordination and devotion to 
something suprapersonal, not because of a lack of personality and 
originality, but through a plus of individuality.89
Tha intention of Hesse is to identify his heroes with the knowabla and 
the known— in other words, with what is fundamentally human. There is 
nothing wrong with this, but it does show Hesse's humanistic stance as 
opposed to a theistic one.
Hermann Hesse has a philosophy of humanism which includes a reli­
gious dimension that verges, at times, on ultimacy, but this ultimacy is 
implied only, not elucidated. Although it is important for man to dis­
cover who he is, man's full humanity is not to be found in himself— for 
the Christian it is found "in Christ."
F or this author, being "in Christ" affects one's relationship
with others. There is an ethical demand to not only love the neighbor
■fj
but also the enemy. Can man demonstrate tha fruits of a moral life |
(love, sacrifice, service) without also possessing its roots? Christians |
maintain that the fruits are dependent upon tha roots. |
Achieving full humanity requires participating in the process of |
assisting others to achieve full humanity. This involves an accepting 
and a caring love that takes part in the social and political processes '
_          . _ _ ___ _..   _ . . .  . . . .
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that uplift and enable others to live as full human beings. It means 
seeking a Just society for all. It involves cultivating the inward life 
as wall as assuming responsibility for the direction of life in the 
external world,
Hesse is a man with strengths and weaknesses. He shares the 
human predicament which involves imperfection. But there is value in 
following Hesse's lead when he encourages man to be faithful to his 
ideals, committed to his goals, and desirous to know and become his best 
self. He challenges man to be a meaning-producer and a music-maker even 
when man does not feel like it. A person needs to practice the disci­
pline of his faith even when he is not so inclined. Plan can become 
fully human— at least relatively so.
The significance of Hermann Hesse has been presented with cri­
tiques of his work from both a literary and a theological perspective.
In addition, a personal evaluation of Hesse's concept of "the human" has 
included specific reasons for appreciating Hesse's thinking as well as 
conveying concern over problematic areas of his work. Attention now 
must be given to Paul Tillich before a comparison of the thinking of the 
two man can be made.
A' Aï,CÀ'-:.-. V.";".-..          ..c- ç -r-— ■c..-, • . v .
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CHAPTER IV
3
PAUL TILLICH THE MAN f
IIn order to appreciate more fully Paul Tillich's concept of "the 
human," it would be helpful to view him as a person. A philosophical |
theologian does not rely as much upon subjective experience to accom­
plish his work as does a poet or a novelist. Knowledge of a philosopher's 
life or a theologian's biography need not necessarily indicate a direct 
correlation between his life and work. Nevertheless, every person's 
experience is reflected in his work to some degree. For example, Paul 
Tillich's encounter with suffering and death (which he experienced as a 
military chaplain in the First World War) contributed to the existential-' 
ist elements in his theology. The demonic is not only a functional term 
that describes a vital part of every person's life; for Tillich, it sig­
nified a lifelong struggle over which he was not always very successful.
This was true in his relationship with his wife. Also, the threat of 
nonbeing and the quest for acceptance can be seen in viewing his life's 
story.
Another reason for including Tillich's biography centers on the 
fact that he was, to an extent, an autobiographical thinker. In his work 
there are frequent references to persons or to particular periods in his 
life that provided a stimulus to his own theological posture. An illus­
tration of this would be the publication of Rudolf Otto's book. The Idea 
of the Holy. Tillich claims that he received it with enthusiasm and 
that it determined his method in the philosophy of religion. He states 
that, thereafter, he started with the experience of the Holy and advanced
171
was said: " . . .  an inclination to meditation tinged with melancholy,
a heightened consciousness of duty and personal sin, and a strong regard
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toward the idea of Cod rather than the reverse. Another instance was 
the influence upon him of the secular existentialism of Martin Heidegger, 
while they were colleagues at the University of Marburg.
The following section on tha life of Paul Tillich will attempt to 
reveal human characteristics and personal traits that are absent in the 
"Autobiographical Reflections" presented at times by Tillich. Through 
these occasions he was being introduced to a wider reading public in the 
English-speaking world. Personal references are contained in On the 
Boundary. My Travel Diary: 1936. and in published sessions of informal
seminars, such as D. Mackenzie Brown's book. Ultimate Concern: Tillich
in Dialogue. Additional information of a personal nature appears in 
the books, Paulus by Rollo May and From Time to Time by Hannah Tillich.
They are subjective interpretations, however, and limited in scope.
An authoritative biography is yet to be written.
Following the section on the life of Paul Tillich, this chapter 
will examine his intellectual heritage— the movements and persons who 
influenced him the most. A section on his methodology will conclude the |
chapter. Each of these sections should provide some assistance in under- |
standing Tillich's concept of "the human," 1I
The Life of Paul Tillich |
On August 20, 1BB6, in the village of Starzeddel, Paul Johannes 
Tillich, the eldest of three children, was born. The small industrial „,|
town in the German province of Brandenburg was tha community in which 1
Tillich's father, Johannes, was a minister of the Prussian Territorial j
2 ‘'-Ichurch. Johannes Tillich was a native of eastern Germany, of which it
/ V - ’-v a a ;-;. ■ ‘ y,.- A. .'y.j . .- - %  ;. .Xit.y,
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for authority and feudal traditions are still alive.* His mother,
i;
Mathilda (Oürselen) Tillich, was a native of western Germany where the
-4
Rhineland implanted other characteristics, such as a * . . . zest for
4
life, love of the concrete, mobility, rationality and democracy.*
These characteristics were in tension with his father's temperament and
disposition. This caused a struggle between father and son that spurred
occasional outbursts of self-assertion from young Paul, Although his
father had a dominating personality, his mother's influence was the more
prevalent in the home. With the passing of time two sisters were born, I
Johanna in 1869 and Elisabeth in 1693.
When Tillich was four years old, his father became superintendent
of the diocese of Schonflisss-Nsumark, and the family moved to Schonfliess.
The community was rural in environment, but the town itself was one rich
in history, the architecture revealing its link with the Middle Ages.
The narrow streets and the town wall contributed to a strong sense of
tradition, Tillich always revered history as something alive in the
present., He described, "The sheltered, protective quality of the town
with its hustle and bustle, in contrast to the eeriness of the forest at
night and the silent fields and sleepy hamlets, is one of the earliest
and strongest of my childhood impressions."®
At six years of age Tillich entered a public school which was a
Lutheran confessional school.
And there we had classes in religion for at least four hours a week.
I learned the catechism; I learned the biblical stories; I learned 
the hymns. And I was a person for whom these symbols were more than 
adequate. They ware received avidly by my subconscious and even by 
my consciousness, and they remained there. They have been alive 
there ever since.8
And living in the home of a minister introduced him to the experience of
the Holy, i.e., the mystical, sacramental, and aesthetic implications of 
the idea of the Holy.
     _
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high value on obedience to authority.
In 1898, at the age of twelve, Tillich entered a humanistic 
Gymnasium in Konigsberg-Neumark. This was a larger medieval town than 
Schonfliess. However, in 1900 Tillich's father was called to a promi­
nent church post in Berlin. His family's moving to Berlin was a sig­
nificant step in Paul Tillich's life. He had visited large cities.
During these formative years Tillich enjoyed nature daily, not 
only where he lived, but at the North Sea where his parents would holi­
day many weeks each year. In nature he found his first freedom as an 
individual. He possessed a mystical involvement with nature that made 
him feel as though he could commune with it. This romantic tendency, 
verging on pantheism, was liberating; he said that it had a profound 
effect on him. "Many of my ideas were conceived in the open and much
Y
of my writing [was] done among trees or by tha sea,"
It was at this early stage that his struggle against authoritari­
anism (as epitomized by his father) began. He considered his father to 
be conscientious and dignified. He loved him, but the senior Tillich 
was " . . .  tyrannical, competitive, and jealous of this son who showed
Q
such remarkable promise," Young Tillich found that philosophy was the 
best tool with which to combat his father and his father's ideas. The 
metaphysical discussions which they had together ware some of the hap­
piest memories for both father and son. It was philosophy that enabled 
Tillich to gain his independence.
During his public school experience, Tillich identified with the 
children who were not part of the privileged social class to which he 
belonged. He learned early the meaning of class hatred, and ha had a
consciousness of social guilt that later would be important to his life 
9and work. These early years stressed a sense of duty and placed a
I
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including Berlin, on many occasions, and he was attracted by the |
■f
quality of life that a major metropolitan community offered, J
At a secular Gymnasium in Berlin he studied Latin and Greek and
developed a love for Greek culture. In addition to the formal subjects
he was studying, he was learning something taught quite implicitly, but
definitely— patriotism. Ha stated, * . . . in those schools where
religion was not taught, something was lacking, Germany was still in
the Bismarckian era, so something else was indoctrinated by teachers— a
terrible nationalism,"^^ Hatred for England was cultivated since it
was the most powerful of the European nations at the turn of the century.
Hatred existed also for France, the natural enemy of Germany for many
years, Tillich remarked*
This hatred was indoctrinated in us, and for me it took much inner 
purging and a trip to England, and a love for the English people, 
to overcome that false indoctrination, . , , And it took ray love of 
the French language, and then for French wines, to overcome this 
kind of indoctrination.
As a boy, though, he had been enthusiastic about uniforms and parades,
military history and strategy.
1In 1903, when Tillich was seventeen, his mother died of a painful y
form of cancer, melanoma. For a sensitive young man who was quite ^{
attached to his mother, her death was a traumatic experience. He turned 
inward and knew the reality of nothingness. i
In 1904 he passed his final examinations and was graduated from j
the Gymnasium, but not before he had experienced a period of withdrawal |
into a fantasy world in which imaginary worlds seemed to be truer than
12 J'
the real World. His delight in imaginative play (games and youthful |
sports) which was expressed during this time remained with him in the |
ensuing years, particularly his active interest in chess and in hiking. <
He considered that "Art is the highest form of play and the genuinely a
   " --    '  ^    .       . . . . . .  . . . .  ... . .. . .., . . . . . . .
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creative realm of the imagination." He was not artistically inclined 
(though his father was an amateur musician), but he did appreciate lit­
erature, especially the German translation of Shakespeare. The charac­
ter, Hamlet, was one with whom he could identify. Interestingly enough,
14Goethe and Dostoyevsky did not capture his youthful imagination.
Before becoming a student of theology, Tillich had been studying 
philosophy privately and had a grasp of the history of philosophy. He 
studied under the theological faculties of the universities of Berlin,
Halls, and Tübingen from 1905 to 1909* Academic life was individualistic 
in Germany at that time, and the thinkers who influenced him the most 
will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
During these university years Tillich participated in the social
life of the academic community. He joined a fraternity that had Chris­
tian principles, and he recalled his experience as being a very happy 
one " . . .  in which friendship, spiritual exchange on a very high level, 
intentional and unintentional education, joy of living, seriousness
about the problems of communal life generally, and Christian communal
15life especially, could daily be experienced."
He never doubted that ha was destined for an academic life that
would include both philosophy and theology. He differentiated between 
the two disciplines by saying: "In religious truth, one's very existence : | i
is at stake. The question is; to be or not to be. Religious truth is
A
existential truth; to this extent it cannot be separated from practice,
16Religious truth is acted, as the Gospel of John says." î"
He passed his first theological examination in 1909 and his second 
in 1911. His dissertation on Schelling resulted in his receiving tha 
Ph.D. degree from the University of Breslau, and the following year he 
received the Licentiate of Theology at Halle, That same year (1912)
f
:
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he was ordained into the Evangelical Lutheran church of the province
of Brandenburg. %
After his university studies he served in parish work for two
years prior to the outbreak of the First World War. During this period
Tillich married a woman named Greti who was considerably older than he
was. He enlisted during the war and served as a field chaplain from
September of 1914 to September of 1918. While he was in the Army a
minister friend (Dox) " . . .  seduced his wife. She was carrying the
17
other man's child when he returned from the war," Although this
affected his relationship with his wife, it did not alter his friendship
with Dox— strange as that may seem they remained best friends.
Although enthusiastic when he entered military service, it was
not long before he could see the disastrous effect of the war. He
observed the definite split between classes of people within Germany.
And " . . .  the industrial masses considered the Church as an ungues-
18
tioned ally of the ruling groups." He was convinced that the war
would go on forever and ruin all of Europe.
Besides the social consciousness that came into being, later
involving him in politics, a personal kairos occurred;
. . . during one terrible night of tha battle of Champagne, in July 
of 1916, he witnessed the suffering and death of hundreds of casu­
alties in the division in which he served as chaplain. The horror 
of that night, during which he lost some of his friends, never left 
him, and the whole structure of classical idealism under which the 
war had taken place was shattered,19
He became a tragic realist as a result of his war experiences.
When the war was over, Tillich worked for a brief period in
church administration but found it unrewarding. His interest in the
theoretical realm was satisfied when his academic career began as a
free lance instructor of theology at the University of Berlin in 1919.
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He introduced the use of class discussion, at a time whan the idea was
yet innovative and exceptional. His wide interest in subjects (and in
how theology related to these subjects) could be seen in " . , . his
effort to create a new 'apologetic theology'* a theology which enters
into constructive conversation with philosophy, politics, art, psycho-
20
analysis, and sociology." He saw his role as that of a mediator, one 
who is (to use his favorite expression) "on the boundary" of many disci­
plines and areas of concern. He wrote articles that expressed his 
"theology of culture." |
During these postwar years Tillich's personal life was in a 
state of transition. In 1919 he was separated from his first wife and |
'J
in the process of getting a divorce. The baby, conceived during his
absence, died in infancy, of pneumonia. Berlin was socially active,
and the young professor was not alone in participating in the night life 3
of the exciting urban German capital. On February of that year he 31
attended a fancy dress ball at the Academy of Art. He met a handsome |
21 ‘i
girl named Hannah Werner who was wearing green silk tights. . Her IJ
recollection of their first meeting noted the fact that he had no money j
and looked moth-eaten in his ordinary, ill-fitting clothes at a costume :j
ball. At that time Hannah was unmarried but engaged to another person. |
Tillich and Hannah saw each other frequently, and then she would stay 
once a week for the entire night at his place. This romantic relation- |
ship, however, did not change Hannah's plans to marry her fiance. She |
became accustomed to the emotional pendulum of Paulus (as she and his !
3
close friends called him) swinging from elation to despair and back j
again, but there was a basic distrust that she felt about him that pre- I
■l;|
vented her from marrying him as he was wanting her to do. Hannah des- |
cribsd herself as a masculine woman, and "Paulus had a feminine
-J
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component that made him vulnerable to masculine women." Rollo May
said that Tillich " . . .  had a spiritual quality combined with sensu-
23ousnsss which women found highly attractive." In any case, Hannah
was not the only woman in his life at that time or in tha future. She
married her fiance (an artist) on schedule, but she maintained her
relationship with Tillich by secret mail and through rare meetings.
In time she became pregnant by her husband, Albert, and this factor 
precipitated a decision on Hannah's part to leave her husband and to 
marry Tillich. Before both of thsir divorces were finalized, the baby 
was born but died of brain fever in its first year. Finally, in March 
of 1924 Hannah and Paulus were married. He was then thirty-eight years
of age and she was ten years younger.
A year later he accepted a position as Professor of Theology at 
the University of Marburg, He was encouraged to accept the post by a 
professor friend, but Tillich was not personally convinced that he 
should accept it. However, at the University of Marburg he became a 
colleague of Martin Heidegger, and he encountered existentialism (both 
atheistic and Christian) which he tried to reconcile with his own system I
■'ii
of thought. During this same period, the popularity of Karl Barth's M
thinking was increasing. Tillich did not approve of Barth's separating 
theology from culture.
In the decade of the twenties Tillich became involved in the 
"Religious Socialist" movement. It was a Christian alternative to the j
social and political chaos that resulted from Germany's defeat in the I
war. The thinking of Karl Marx had contributed to Tillich's understand- i
';1
ing of what was then needed in Germany. Tillich " . . .  became one of 4
j
the founders of German religious socialism and, as one of the major
24 3theoreticians of the movement, developed some of its key concepts." ;
'I
-
I
.‘■<■‘.1. ”'.'r « .-s \ .1 -^V ’ ■= p- .! î ; .. ^  - y ' A- f  ■ ■ > v' • =■• \"ry •
160
In 1925 he received a call to Dresden and also to Leipzig. He
moved to Dresden because of its being a cultural center, but he taught
at both universities. Tillich preferred the visual arts to that of
literature, poetry, or drama. In Dresden he could enjoy the visual
arts; he commented that " . . .  this is one of the points where I am
25
not considered fully Protestant, but rather "Catholicistic.*"
In Dresden their first child was born. Naming tha child pro­
voked impassioned arguments. Tillich wanted his daughter to be named 
Christians, whereas Hannah argued for Erdmuthe. Hannah won, and "Mutie* 
(as she was affectionately called) became an important member of the 
family.
Although all the outward signs of a happy personal and profes­
sional life appeared to be evident, this was not the case on the inner 
dynamic level of their existence. Extramarital affairs were acceptable 
to both of them, but these did create tension. Hannah was jealous of 
his involvement with other women, but she became involved with other men 
(for instance* a mutual friend, Heinrich; a student assistant, Wolfgang; 
and an industrialist, Erwin). Tillich had many similar adventures. 
According to Hannah, "Paulus and I had established the rule that, when
he was on lecture tours, there would be 'no questions asked,' . . .
26Paulus dealt with sex in utmost secrecy." He did not want to know
about his wife's escapades, and he did not want any questions asked
about his. "He had a special Eros for his students in any city in the 
27world." It was not unusual for some of the women in his life to come 
to his wife and to complain about his faithlessness to them. "No one 
could ever speak of Paulus as 'adjusted,' . . .  ha had to live Dionysian 
and think Apollonian, and he seemed to have been born to do precisely 
that."2*
a
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Discussing the sexuality of Tillich raises tha question of his
I
I
honesty and sincerity. Obviously, to the outside world, his life and |
_;V
work ware incongrusnt. But Rollo May is of the opinion that Tillich
I
was psychologically honest, at least; his openness with his wife, and A
his willingness to let her have the same freedom that he demanded, was 
not being dishonest with himself. The attendit here is not to Judge his 
behavior— only to comment on it as revealing an aspect of his character 
that is definitely Dionysian. He did not live only a life of the mind*
One can see the reason that he could writs about the demonic: it was
something that he experienced within himself and that he know sxisten- 
tially.
In spite of the inner tensions, the Tillichs enjoyed life in 
Dresden and remained there until 1929 when he accepted a call to become 
Professor of Philosophy at the modern and liberal University of Frankfurt.
He then remained at Frankfurt until 1933 when he was forced to leave j
because of his conflict with the Nazi movement. '
3
At public lectures Tillich frequently spoke in opposition to the kj
rise of nazism. On one such occasion, at Kassel, he attacked Hitler M
directly. But the specific event that caused his dismissal from his
position at Frankfurt " . . .  was precipitated one day in the winter of
1931-32 when he witnessed the beating of leftist students by a gang of
Nazi storm troopers. His outspoken condemnation of this brutality and
his continued criticism of National Socialism led to his dismissal from
29the university the following year." Eleven Jewish professors were 
dismissed at the same time. Tillich had the honor of being the first 
Christian to be dismissed from his university professorship when Hitler 
came to power.
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He was disappointed with the response of German Protestantism i
to the Nazi peril. Nationalism had drawn many Christians into an un- |
critical acceptance of national socialism and of Hitler's leadership.
Those who would be most vocal later (such as Barth in Switzerland) were 
slow to speak out. Tillich said, " . . .  I seem to have only two alter­
natives* either the Roman church or a nationalist paganism in Protestant 
30
dress." He would have chosen Catholicism but he did not need to do so,
as a movement began within German Protestantism that opposed the tyranny
of Hitler's regime. If Tillich would have remained in Germany, he would
have worked with the underground. "Paulus volunteered to write for the
underground press. But others thought his style was too easily recogniz-
31
able; it would be dangerous for them,"
At the age of forty-seven his distinguished career in Germany had 
ended. Although he was highly esteemed throughout the country, having 
been recognized with an honorary Doctor of Theology degree by the Univer­
sity of Halle as early as 1926, his future looked bleak. However, during 
the summer of 1933 Reinhold Niebuhr was in Germany, and upon learning of . 
Tillich's predicament, invited him to be part of the faculty at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York City, Tillich accepted the Invitation 
and emigrated with his family, arriving in New York in November, 1933.
Needless to say, it was an upsetting experience, having to make this
4
adjustment. But he had a sense of the providential in his life, and he j
believed* "A Christian is to leave his own country over and over again, 3
and go into a land that is shown unto him, and to trust the promise which 'j
32 'V
is for him purely transcendent," Although he was German by birth he was ;1
a man, and that was more important than his national origin. He came to /
America as a stranger, under difficult circumstances, and he made it his
home. Ha had to learn a new language but never mastered its pronunciation.
a
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Several years later he commented upon the spirit of the English Ian-
* I
guage: he thought that it had helped him to be more clear and concrete
33
in expressing himself.
His experience at Union was satisfying personally (a son, Rene, 
was born in New York) as wall as professionally. Despite his language 
problem, he was productive and soon was recognized as the creative 
theologian that he was. In addition to his scholarly pursuits, he was 
immersed in the devotional life of Union (his chapel meditations and 
sermons ware later published as The Shaking of the Foundations and The 
New Being), and he thus began to reach many persons beyond tha walls 
of the seminary.
He assisted the Federal Council of Churches in refugee work, 
became involved with the Depth Psychology movement, and participated in 
the Religious Socialist movement in America (although his political 
involvement was much more subdued than in Germany). He was a member of 
the Graduate Faculty of Political Science at the New School for Social 
Research in New York, so he was able to keep his political interest 
alive in this way, too; and he worked with the refugees, many of whom 
were Jews, with the Self-help for Emigres from Central E u r o p e . H e  g
was chairman of this organization for fifteen years.
!
Life was demanding during these years, and social and professional ]
obligations were infringing upon his personal life. For example, "Christ- |
mas, the most intimate family and children's feast, became a représenta- j
tive enterprise devoted to our Jewish emigre friends, to our Jewish
35 4
American friends, and to other friends as well." At times his wife I
resented his life being so occupied with other people. She found home ^
life to be irritating and thought that it was easier for a student in j
trouble to see her husband than it was for one of his children or for 1
his wife.^^
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An interesting aside that revealed a personal dimension of 
Tillich was his attitude toward decorating the Christmas tree. It was %
something that only he would do* He decorated it carefully and asstheti
I
cally and did not want other members of the family to take part in the |
process. He was a perfectionist, and even what could have been a happy
family occasion he insisted upon doing himself,
Tillich participated in ecumenical work during the decade of the
thirties, and on occasion he found it necessary to travel to Europe— as
was the case at the time of the preparations for the 1937 ecumenical
conference in Oxford, This prompted an extensive trip in 1936 that he
recorded in a travel diary. Several insights into his character (and
life style) could be seen (as revealed in the following pages) in his
observations and daily encounters with people from various countries as
recorded over a period of several months. He had numerous friends from
all walks of life, and " . . . he never permitted his unusual gift for
37abstract thought to cut him off from the human and the historical."
He thoroughly enjoyed talking with people about practically everything.
His range of interests was limitless.
Tillich's admission that he did not read very much was a state­
ment that is surprising. He said that he felt " . . .  like a barbarian
38
because I never read." There could be little doubt that he had read 
the most important books of Western culture and that he had assimilated 
their basic ideas. He had mastered the classics, but apparently he had 
not read much contemporary literature.
His diary revealed such human qualities as enjoying dancing with 
the attractive girls aboard ship. He commented candidly upon the appear­
ance of the women he would meet and about his drinking with them. He 
appreciated his wine and would not overlook an opportunity to tell his
a
■.'7 f ."TA
185
:l
I
wife about what he was drinking and whether he had a "hangover" the t?
4X
next day. For example, he commented upon an English vicar and himself
drinking two bottles of wine while they talked in the parsonage until $
midnight.
?;■
In each country he visited the art galleries and museums whenever 
there was an opportunity to do so. And he attended concerts. He com­
mented upon everything he saw in passing, from prostitutes (in several 
major cities) to the observation that "St. Giles Cathedral has a steeple
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shaped like the Scottish crown. Inside, the usual Puritan devastations."
He described the landscape of Scotland and his feelings when he saw the
North Sea. It brought back strong memories of happier days in Germany.
He still enjoyed taking bicycle rides, playing chess, hiking in the
mountains, and swimming.
His diary also made it clear that ha enjoyed going to bohemian
places. This had been true since his student days in Berlin. He would
describe the people that he would see there. In addition, he would
relate his effect upon those who had come to hear him lecture, and he
would speak about the quality of the discussion that would follow his
presentation. And on every opportunity, he would talk politics and
religion with whomever he encountered.
While he was in Paris his interest ranged, in a day's activity,
from visiting the Louvre to attending a cabaret with a floor show fea-
40
turing nude girls. He told of visiting houses of prostitution with 
friends who found the human nature interesting there. He was fascinated 
by prostitutes. Wherever he had been, for instance, he had eagerly 
sought out the location of the "red-light" districts in that city, and 
he would then take his wife to see where they were. According to Hannah,
Paulus had never engaged in sexual activities with whores, but he did.
............ , 3
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on one occasion, take his wife to a brothel in Paris where they sat J
and talked,
A curious contradiction could be seen in that ha greatly disliked 
dirty or sexual jokes, but he enjoyed pornography.*^ In addition to 
pornographic books and magazines, his wife found a pornographic letter 
under his blotter on his desk. In moments of bitterness she was tempted 
to place it between the pages of his life's work so that all the world 
could see " . . .  the obscene signs of the real life that he had trans­
formed into the gold of abstraction— King Midas of the spirit."*^ There 
were times when she considered getting a divorce, but Tillich did not 
want one and together with mutual friends he would talk her out of it.
Although he would visit historic cathedrals and churches when ha 
traveled, Tillich would not seek out a congregation with whom to worship 
on Sunday. However, even when he was not traveling he did not take an 
active interest in a local church. This was true when he lived in New 
York. The reasons for this would be speculative. But in his book.
Theology of Culture, he said;
While in Continental Europe the theological faculties were the 
leaders of the Protestant churches, in American Protestantism the 
real power was in the hands of the presbytery or the corresponding 
bodies. Theology is not dismissed, but it is reduced to a secondary 
role in American Protestantism— a lesson we had to learn.44
This awareness contributed to his lack of local church involvement.
Still, he was affiliated with an American denomination, the United Church
of Christ. And he frequently would be asked to preach on Sunday in
churches of many denominations.
A serious theologian, reserved in appearance, Tillich was also a
person who would reveal his emotions in public. On his fiftieth birthday
his friends surprised him with a party of cake, flowers, and singing that
45
caused him to "bawl without restraint."
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TilXlch attend chapel every morning, as did everyone else, and Tillich
46
supposedly answered in jest, "But that is before midnight," It was
He had been a prolific writer and had written three books and 
numerous articles before leaving Germany, In America his books were 
translated into English. These were: The Religious Situation. The
Interpretation of History, and The Protestant Era. What was significant 
was that Tillich wrote out of a demand for his thinking about a certain 
topic. A lecture frequently related to the historic situation of tha 
time. These early books were collections of his essaye and lectures.
His writing of articles in America continued in considerable
abundance, as an annotated bibliography would indicate. Suffice it to |
be said, that in spite of the language barrier, his ideas were being 
recognized for their breadth and depth of analysis and were becoming 
increasingly popular. In 1940 Yale University honored him with a Doctor 
of Divinity degree.
During the decades of the 1940s and the 1950s his teaching and 
writing attracted tha attention of a wider audience. In addition to his 
work in the United States, he lectured at German universities, Marburg in
1948 and the Free University of Berlin in 1951. At Nottingham, England,
ha delivered the Firth Lectures; they were published as Love. Power, and 
Justice.
His working habits would be of interest to us. He was a night 
person and found it difficult to start his day early. It was his custom 
to sleep late, and he would complete only an hour or two of working time 
before lunch. He usually had classes in the afternoon. His most produc­
tive hours were from ten at night until one or two in the morning, and 
he prized highly these hours that he had alone. His wife related the 
story that the president of Union Theological Seminary had suggested that
188
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wall known that ha was jealous of his solitude and that he often got
47
his best ideas while he was walking by the ocean or in the mountains.
In spits of his heavy German accent, Tillich was a popular lec­
turer. He had the capacity to convey the impression that what he was 
discussing really mattered, and each person listening had the feeling 
that he was talking to him. "'Sometimes I think it is ray mission to
4S
bring faith to the faithless, and doubt to the faithful.* he wrote."
His lectures communicated this.
In 1951 the first volume of his Systematic Theology was one of 
the significant theological publishing events of the year. This was 
the first stags of his three volume work. He said that he had started 
to work on it in 1925, so it was slow in coming to fruition, but his 
central ideas had not changed much in the little more than a quarter of 
a century that his Systematic Theology had been in the making. The 
favorite concepts that he had bean advocating in his own unique system #
were presented with a careful coherence.
Tillich's career continued at Union Theological Seminary until
' I
1955, when he retired at the age of sixty-nine, only to become University ffi
I
Professor at Harvard University. Tillich was praised for being a mature 
human being with a rare combination of a stimulating mind and a charis­
matic personality.
Rollo May tempered this praise by saying; "I used to say to him
this, because he surely must have known acceptance experientially* His 
inability to cope with tha demonic in his life contributed to his living
Itthat, while his mind had developed magnificently, his emotions had been
49
left behind at the twelve-year-old level." Tillich was a troubled man
who could say, "I have produced the phrase, 'You are accepted.' But I
50
can never say it to me." He must have been depressed when he wrote
. " ' ' :T
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a life that appeared to contain contradictions. An illustration of t
this would be his relationship to his secretary at Union; it was far ;|
from being merely professional. He spent many evenings at her apart­
ment, across the street from his own apartment; and his wife knew that 
his secretary was also his mistress. I
For a philosophical theologian, not only was the sexual side of 
Tillich far from conventional, but he experimented with drugs, too.
According to Hannah, "Paulus and I had gone through many ecstatic ex- |
periences and demonic letdowns and we both felt that drugs provided a
shortcut without the personality development that must accompany such
51experiences to make them fruitful."
It was true that Tillich had a side to him that could experiment 
with life and could participate in the latest developments that were on 
the fringe of acceptable social behavior (his curiosity could run the 
gamut from modern art to burlesque, from Beethoven concerts to jazz in J
Negro night clubs in Harlem). He had a nervous disposition that con­
tained many "highs" and "lows,"
He was ecstasy and despair, with no discrimination. For him, every­
thing was power and force, . . . He forsook life for the word. . . .  s
Paulus lived in fear. His nervous body was tense; his desires many.
His fingers would fiddle with a pebble from the beach, a silver coin, 
or a paper clip. He breathed unevenly and sighed heavily, an ever 
guilt-ridden Christian in distress.52
I
In spits of the restlessness and the disturbing emotional con- p
flicts that were present in his life, Tillich was able to concentrate 
and to be creative. Before leaving Union his Yale Terry Lectures were 
published as; The Courage to Be (a most influential book), and Biblical >3
Religion and the Search for Ultimata Reality.
At Harvard his teaching load was reduced to enable him to have 
more time for writing. He published Dynamics of Faith in 1957, and he
   _ _   ' , . ......
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was finally able to complete volume two of his Systematic Theology that 
had been delivered as the Gifford Lectures in 1953-54 at the University 
of Aberdeen, Scotland* A compilation of essays were published as the |
Theology of Culture in 1959* |
Harvard was an excellent personal and professional experience
for Tillich* It meant associating with scholars who had achieved dis-
1
tinction in their respective fields* According to his wife, he was paid j!
C
large sums of money for lecturing, and they both enjoyed traveling during
■4:
these years* In 1960 they traveled to Japan, and later they visited
Egypt and Israel* He had achieved such national recognition that he was
one of two hundred and fifty intellectuals that were invited to John F,
53
Kennedy's inauguration as president of the United States, During this %
I'
period Tillich's domestic situation had improved considerably, too, '
It was harvest time for Paulus and me, * , , I felt compassion for f
Paulas, I could enjoy him again, loving his noble aging face, lis- A:
tening to him on social evenings. Paulus and I indulged in a new,
secret marriage pact, Ha gave me a heavy gold ring made after our
own design. We felt close again in these years of our advancing 
age, when he felt sheltered in my new understanding of him,54
Many honorary degrees were bestowed upon him from several colleges
and universities. Among soma of the most notable of these institutions
were: the University of Glasgow (1951), Princeton University and the
University of Chicago (1953), Harvard University (1954), and the Free
University of Berlin (1956), In 1956 he received the Grosse Verdienst
Kreuz of the West German Republic and the Goethe Prize at Hamburg the
same year,
Tillich remained at Harvard until 1962, when he retired the 
second time, only to take up teaching responsibilities at the University
I
of Chicago, Although a collection of sermons was published, entitled 4
The Eternal Now, as well as a small book. Morality and Beyond* the most
' " >  - , ^  ^ ’-.“F ‘ A  •/
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important accomplishment was the publishing of the third and final
volume of his Systematic Theology in 1963, At the completion of his
theological system, Tillich was asked what he was going to do next.
"His first answer was, "One translates it into German,* , , , he hoped
to write a series of •retractationes’ (reconsiderations) as Augustine
did in his later years, seeking to take account of major criticism,"
Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to do this.
In Chicago Tillich's health was under the constant supervision
of a doctor, Ha had had a heart condition for several years.
On the evening of October 12, 1965, Paul Tillich presented a public 
lecture entitled "The Significance of the History of Religions for 
the Systematic Theologian," It was the concluding lecture in a 
conference on history of religions held by his colleagues of the 
Divinity School of The University of Chicago, , , , At four o'clock 
the next morning Paul Tillich suffered a severe heart attack, , ,
He was taken from his hotel apartment (the Tillichs had lived in hotel 
apartments at both Harvard and at Chicago) to the hospital. He knew the 
seriousness of his illness, and at the beginning of his stay in the hos­
pital he had said to his wife, "My poor Hannachen, , . , I was very base
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to you, forgive me," On his tenth day in the hospital he knew that 
today was dying day. On October 22, 1955, he died. His body was cre­
mated but not before his brain had been donated to the University of
A
Chicago Medical School for study— another reflection of his humanitarian 
concern.
His ashes ware taken to East Hampton, Long Island, for burial.
It was at East Hampton that the Tillichs had a summer home near the 
coast. It had been a personal refuge for them; what happy times they 
had as a family had been there, Hannah spent two days going through his 
personal papers that he had kept locked in his desk at East Hampton,
She burned them in the fireplace as he had requested, "Eight months
i;
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after Paulus was cremated, the jar containing his ashes was disinterred
in East Hampton, where it had been buried, and brought to New Harmony,
SB
Indiana, where the Paul Tillich Park is located,"
One of the theological giants of the twentieth century was dead.
He was seventy-nine years old. Whenever he had been introduced as the 
greatest theologian of this century, he had always denied it and had 
said that that honor belonged to Karl Barth,
A brief look at the life of Paul Tillich has been presented, with 
an emphasis upon his human characteristics, as seen within his personal 
destiny. In the next section the focus will be upon the intellectual 
development of the man. The persons and the movements that had most 
affected his thinking and, consequently, his life's work, will be 
examined*
Intellectual Influences 
The thinking of Paul Tillich was influenced by many individuals, 
some with whom he agreed, others against whom he reacted, but who left 
their mark on his intellectual development. This section is concerned 
with the men and the movements that influenced him the most. The major I
impact upon his thought occurred prior to the middle 1920s, His basic j
ideas did not change much after that time; his thinking sharpened and |
his expression became more articulate, but the foundation of his theology ^
i
had been laid. |
t
At various times Tillich referred to the important influences upon 
his thought, but since he frequently did not document his sources, it I
remained for other scholars to indicate the minds who obviously had 
affected him. Tillich assimilated significant ideas and made them a part 
of his system without always giving credit where it was due. This was /
I
3
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was the emphasis upon man being subject to the law of change, unable to
Ï
not intentional; he was an original thinker who gave to the ideas of 
others a new interpretation that was uniquely his own. |
The following areas of thought will be examined* Greek philoso­
phy, the Christian tradition, German idealism, existentialism, and 
personal influences (such as his professors and colleagues). These 
areas will include those persons who ware most influential in shaping |j
Tillich's thinking, and the specific ways in which they determined his 
thinking will be presented.
I
Greek Philosophy 
As a young boy Tillich began his lifelong love of Greek culture.
He learned the Greek language and Greek philosophy. He preferred the
pre-Socratics, particularly Heraclitus and Parmenides, because they 
devoted their attention to the phenomena of external nature. They 
raised the question of why there is something instead of nothing,
Heraclitus (540-470 B.C.) taught that all things were in constant
change. Everything was in a process of becoming and decaying. Every- 1
i • 'I
thing was in a state of impermanence. "That is, there is a fundamental ,
tension in every living being, a tension of the creative power of being i
59 t
going down, and the saving power of being going up." What Tillich j
found significant was Heraclitus' interpretation of"the concept of the j
Logos, For Heraclitus it was synonymous with the universal law of |
- ; j
reality. "The Logos for him was the law which determines the movements J
60 ^of all reality;" The law of nature, or universal reason, was the only -î
thing constant in a world of change. Reason enabled man to grasp reality.
For Tillich this meant that reality and man's mind had a logos structure
in which everything participated.
Another aspect of Heraclitus' thinking that influenced Tillich %
I
:
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eliminate nonbeing as a concept, he did ascribe characteristics to being
alter it or to escape from it. Heraclitus believed that good and evil
were two notes in a harmony. Evil was another aspect of what was good.
Evil contributed to the whole of life, and Heraclitus affirmed that as
good. Tillich recognized the creative tension between good and evil in
man, but he did not accept the ethical implication present in combining
the contradictions as harmony. Heraclitus saw the destiny of man as
being determined not by man's actions but by the facts of his creation.
Heraclitus dealt with the powers of fate by "a paradoxical affirmation 
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of them." Tillich would not relinquish the element of freedom within 
man in order to accept Heraclitus* view of fate, but Tillich did discuss 
the tension of the polarity between freedom and destiny.
F or Heraclitus, it was necessary for man to accept the inevitable 
if man were to understand his fate. But Tillich believed that man's use 
of freedom made it possible for man to alter his destiny to some degree. 
Nevertheless, Tillich did appreciate the philosophical advancements made 
by Heraclitus,
Another pre-Socratic philosopher was Parmenides (sixth century B.C.). |
According to Tillich, "Parmenides, the first and greatest of the ontolo- 
gists, knew that being and the logos of being, that is, the rational word
which grasps being, belong together, or, aswe should say, that being is 
always subjective and objective at the same time." Nonexistence was
J
incomprehensible. In order to speak about nonbeing, some kind of being
would be attributed to it, resulting in a contradiction. "The genuine
mystery appears when reason is driven beyond itself to its 'ground and
abyss,' to that which 'precedes* reason, to the fact that 'being is and
nonbeing is not' (Parmenides), to the original fact (Ur-Tatsache) that
63
there is something and not nothing." Whereas Parmenides sought to
I
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that were usually attributed to God— eternal, without beginning, 
invisible, unchangeable, indestructible, beyond passions, and needing |
nothing.^*
%
Because of the profundity of the concepts with which the pre- 
Socratics struggled, Tillich praised the above two philosophers* "I 
have never found a philosopher who I could say progressed over Parmenides 
the Eleatic of the sixth century B.C. Of course, there is much more 
empirical knowledge, there is much more refined analysis, but the vision 
of this man, and of Heraclitus, his polar friend and opposite, cannot be 
surpassed,
Another important Greek philosopher who was superior to all others 
was Plato (427-347 B.C.), The idea of Plato's that had the most influence 
upon Tillich was the stress on the essential nature of reality. For I
Plato, the real world was the world of "ideas" or "forms." The true 
essence of things was not the world of sight, touch, or sensual experi­
ence; it was the world of truth, goodness, and beauty. Such ideas were 
never created— they were in the beginning and always had been. They 
possessed an independence from the world of matter. Physical existence |
was not the real world, "The idea of transcendence, that there is some­
thing that surpasses empirical reality, was prepared for Christian the-
ology in the Platonic tradition, Plato spoke of essential reality, of
'ideas' (ousia) as the true essences of things," Man was different
from the other animals because his soul was part of divine reason; and
therefore he was capable of knowing the eternally real things of the
universe, i.e., the "universals," Plato taught; "God is the spiritual
sphere. The inner telos of human existence is participation in the
67
spiritual, divine sphere as much as possible," Plato advanced the 
idea of providence as being an attempt to overcome the anxiety of fate
196
and the eventuality of death. However, Plato's argument for essential
reality could be seen in his reference to perfection.
Some things are better or more beautiful or more true than others.
But if there are degrees of perfection, there must be something 
absolutely perfect by which we can distinguish between the more or 
less of perfection. Whenever we make value Judgments, we presuppose 
an ultimate value. Whenever we observe degrees, we presuppose 
something which is beyond degree.68
Plato considered the happy life and the good life to be synonymous. But
man did have freedom of choice and could choose to live his life unwisely.
While Tillich did not accept all of Plato's thinking, he was impressed
with certain aspects of it. His concept of essential man was dependent
upon Plato.
This section will conclude with a reference to Neo-Platonism. By
the third century of the Christian Era . Greek philosophy reached
a state in which philosophy had become religion, and religion had become
69
mystical philosophy." The philosopher most responsible for promoting 
the system of Neo-Platonism was Plotinus (2057-270 A.D.), He understood 
God to be the transcendent One who points to that which is beyond the
basic cleavages of reality, i.e., between subject and object, and between
70the self and the world. What influenced Tillich was Plotinus' stress 
on the world originating in the ultimate Ground of Being, Plotinus also 
believed that the Logos was the dynamic principle of reason (the univer­
sal principle of the divine self-manifestation) urfiich organizes life and 
brings order out of chaos. Another name for the Logos would be the natural 
law. The concept of the Logos was fundamental in Tillich's thinking, too. 
For Plotinus, however, God was the source of goodness, and matter was the 
source of evil. Since God was the Ground of Being and of good, God was 
not the source of evil. Tillich would agree with this. Evil was nonbeing 
and negated the spiritual. It had no power of being by itself— it was not 
ontologically real. "Plotinus described this non-being (me on) as that
./a' :
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which is matter and can become being. . . . evil is the presence of this
non-being in our bodily existence. It is the absence of the power of
71
being, the power of the good." The purpose of man, according to 
Plotinus, was to become like God, and since man was free he could sell 
his soul to the sensual or he could strive toward union with God.
Tillich appreciated the ontological thinking of Plotinus,
Although other Greek philosophers (such as Aristotle and his con­
ception of "first philosophy" as the study of "being qua being") contrib­
uted to Tillich's thought processes, it would not be possible to include 
all the persons who influenced him. In the next chapter the familiar 
Tillichian ideas that were shaped by the Greek thinkers already mentioned 
should be evident. Greek thought was existentially concerned with the 
eternal, and it was this that Tillich could understand and appreciate.
He did not see philosophy as something that was abstract and removed Sfi
from life.
The Christian Tradition
At an early age Tillich, the son of a Lutheran minister, came
into contact with the Christian tradition. The Old Testament biblical
stories, plus the teachings of Jesus and the theology of Paul, ware
introduced to him along with secular education. The biblical witness
had a central impact upon his thought that stimulated his desire to be
a theologian, albeit a philosophical theologian. The following section
will not focus on this particular aspect of his intellectual development.
But certainly Augustine (354-430 A.D.) would have to be included
as a major contributor to Tillich's thought. He commented, "I would say,
almost unambiguously, that I myself, and my whole theology, stand much
72
more in the line of the Augustinian than in the Thomistic tradition."
Augustine was able to bring together Athens and Jerusalem; so to speak.
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Both reason and revelation were necessary for a proper understanding
of God and the world. Augustine utilized the thinking of Neo-Platonism ;f
but with a biblical interpretation that turned a philosophical pessimism
into a philosophy of religion that had an optimistic view of reality.
At the same time Augustine held a doctrine of original sin that needed
divine grace to make it possible for man to be saved. Augustine's
starting point was significantt it was the inner man instead of the
73
experience of the external world. It was in man's soul that God 
appeared to man. It was this immediacy of the presence of God, the 
experience of the Unconditional, that Tillich could speak of as the 
experience of Ultimate Concern, In the depth dimension of life the 
immediacy of God was encountered, causing one to transcend oneself.
Augustins saw the continuous threat of finitude and nonbeing. He saw 
God as the supporting Power of Being, which has the character of love.
J
and this love was the power that united the mystical and ethical elements
74
in his idea of God,
Another aspect of Augustine's thought that influenced Tillich was 
his emphasis upon the will of man. It was the will, whose substance was 
love, that united man emd God, This did not mean that man could use will 
power to bring about reunion with God (as in Pelagianism), Man sinned by 
willfully turning away from God and towards himself; consequently, there 
was nothing man could do about his pride. Only the power of God could 
reestablish this broken relationship. It was the grace of God and not 
man's merit that could reunite man and God, Grace was irresistible al­
though received by faith. And faith, for Augustine, meant believing
75
directed toward God or Christ and believing into God and into Christ, ^
This meant both an intellectual acknowledgment and a personal communion 
with Cod.
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God was, for Eckhart, the eternal now who meets man in his existential 
situation, i.e., in his estrangement. Man could empty himself, or lose 
himself, by receiving in a quiet way the birth of God in his soul. This 
was a passive act, but it did not stop there. The inner experience ex­
pressed itself in concrete ways of action. In this way Eckhart combined 
quietism and activism in the Christian life. Tillich had a romantic 
view of the medieval church and responded positively to the mysticism 
present in such men as Eckhart. Tillich's concept of theonomy was in 
part the result of his appreciation for the place of the church in the 
Middle Ages.
&
J
Tillich admitted his dependence upon certain elements in 
Augustine's thought. A friend of Tillich?s, Wilhelm Pauck, also com- 
merited that evident in Tillich's system of thought is; " . . .  Augustins 
with his complex doctrine of God as infinite truth which can be immedl-
i
ately experienced in the depth of the soul, and as infinite will which 4
75
nobody can fully comprehend, . . . "
The next person who affected Tillich was Meister Eckhart (1260?-
71327). This German Dominican mystic believed that God created the world
out of nothing. Pantheistic elements ware in his mysticism, in that he
held that God was all and that man could find salvation only if he could
lose himself in God, The good life was one of being, not one of doing.
Eckhart considered God to be an indefinable spiritual substance— the
ground of the universe in which all things ware united. The principle
in Eckhart's thought that most appealed to Tillich was that God is being
(Deus est esse) and that man participates in being.
This is not a static concept of being. , , , Being is a continuous |
flux and return; he calls it Fluss und Wiederfluss. a stream and a 
counter-stream. It always moves away from and back to itself. ||
Being is life and has dynamic character,??
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Another meaningful figure for Tillich was Nicholas of Cusa |
(1401-1464). This fifteenth-century Roman Catholic cardinal taught j
that the universe was God, divided into parts. God was iji everything 
(but not identified with everything, i.e., he was not everything), and =|
each part of the universe was a part of God. He was the whole of it. Ig
This would be pantheism if God and the world were indistinguishable. I
I
Nicholas did not go that far. Man was capable of having an immediate |
experience of God intuitively. Man could know God by reason alone, but
if he were to go beyond reason he could experience a "learned ignorance"
which would be knowledge of God. It would be similar to a mystical
experience, for " . . .  we do not know anything special any more when
70
we have penetrated into the ground of everything that is," But when 
one would arrive at this point, contact would be made with the Ultimate.
There would be the presence of the Infinite in the finite, and there 
would be mystical union between man and God, According to Tillich,
Spinoza was the real heir of Nicholas of Cusa when Spinoza saw rational­
ism and mysticism as compatible. Furthermore, Nicholas of Cusa laid the 
metaphysical foundation for the modern mind. His thinking was basically 
ontological. "His main principle was the coincidentia opposltorum (the 
coincidence of opposites), the coincidence of the finite and the infinite,
. . .  The finite is in the infinite potentially; the infinite is in the
79
finite actually. They are within each other," It is clear that
Tillich benefited from the thinking of Nicholas of Cusa.
The next important person who contributed substantially to Tillich's
development was Martin Luther (1483-1546), Tillich commented, "I am a
Lutheran by birth, education, religious experience, and theological 
80reflection," Though it would not be necessary to discuss Lutheran 
theology in general, attention should be given to the specific ideas
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that grasped Tillich and made a contribution to his theology. In the 
First place, Utther started with a personal, merciful, and gracious God 
who required that man merely receive (not earn in any way) his grace by 
faith, Tillich interpreted Luther to mean accepting God's acceptance 
of us,^^ The result of this acceptance would be reunion with God, Man 
in his sin, i.e,, separation, could be reunited with the God known in 
Christ. For Luther, the message of the Gospel was the message of for­
giveness. "We cannot fulfill the will of God without being united with
02him. It is impossible without the forgiveness of sins," Tillich 
frequently corrected the popular understanding of Uithsr's "by faith
alone” phrase. It should be " , , , by grace alone, received through
83faith alone.” An ethical life would follow the religious experience 
of grace,
Tillich, along with Luther, could not accept a pietistic biblicism
— it offended their reason and common sense. The "Protestant principle"
would not permit anything that was relative to be elevated to a position
of ultimacy— whether it be the pope or the Bible, Both Luther and Tillich
had a profound sense of the distance between man and God, Sin was unbelief
for Luther. He was not moralistic or concerned about specific sins. He
saw sin in a larger framework, as that which fundamentally separated man
from God, In all areas of life man lived with self-contradictions. The
demonic was real and exerted power over man. Only grace could overcome
man's unbelief— man*s sin. This understanding was parallel to Tillich's
understanding of the nature of sin.
Luther's idea of God was not that of a finite God but that of a
God who was nearer to his creatures than they were to themselves, yet
84
absolutely transcendent, God was made known supremely in Christ: he
was incarnated, the Word that became flash. Luther's conception of God
- ^3
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contained the elements of wrath and love. God was humble enough to 
have been born in a stable, yet great enough to be the Judge of the 
world. Tillich claimed at times that his was not an incarnational 
theology (he thought that the doctrine of the Incarnation was nonsen­
sical), but his concept of the "God above God" approximated Luther's 
doctrine of God. Although irrational at points Luther's paradoxical 
thinking maintained a sense of mystery which Tillich appreciated.
The various ways in which Tillich was influenced by Luther
could be summarized in the following quotation;
The substance of my religion is and remains Lutheran. It embodies 
the consciousness of the "corruption" of existence, the repudiation 
of every social utopia, including the metaphysics of progress, the 
knowledge of the irrational demonic character of life, an apprecia­
tion of the mythical elements of religion, and a repudiation of 
Puritan legality in individual and social life. Not only my theo­
logical, but also my philosophical thinking expresses the Lutheran 
substance.85
Jacob Boehrae (1575-1624) was the philosophical spokesman for 
German mysticism who influenced many persons, including Schelling, and
consequently Paul Tillich. The mystical feeling for depth could be seen
■ 86 
in Boehme's concept of the Unorund. the abyss in the Divine Life.
For Boehme, God was the ground of everything— the union of the opposites
in the universe. Boehme saw the importance of the unconscious element
in life long before Freud called attention to it. And he recognized the
presence of the demonic in both man and God. For example, Boehme
. . .  saw in his visions the full demonic power, the will element,
in God himself. He called it the nature of God and saw that element -É
in God which contradicts the light in God, the logos in God, the JB
wisdom and truth in God. He understood the conflict in the divine
life, the tension between these two elements.87 |
This tension made the Divine Life a dynamic process, one in which the |
I
Logos would be victorious over the demonic, the darkness would be de-
feated by the light. At times Boehme wrote as though evil were neces- J
sary, and at other times he wrote as though evil spoiled the cosmic
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harmony. He was not always consistent. However, it was the dialectical
■I
thinking in mystical-ontological categories that appealed to Tillich.
-I
Boehme thought that the material and spiritual world could 
achieve harmony in moments of divine breakthroughs. Psychologically, 
the breakthroughs revealed choices that man could make. Man could |
remain on the level of the sensations or ha could deny himself and 
identify with the abysmal will.
German Idealism
Another important part of the Christian tradition that influenced 
Tillich was German idealism. Idealism was the view that mind and spiri­
tual values were fundamental to the world as a whole. Idealism was an 
antimaterialistic metaphysic. It was opposed to naturalism. The prime
example of idealism would be the thinking of Plato. However, in Germany
1
in the eighteenth century, several leading philosophers and theologians |
adopted the idealist position with modification. J
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) affirmed a "transcendental philosophy" i
in which the mind transcended sense experience and acted as the coordi- |
nator of experience. Kant distinguished the appearance of a thing (i.e., j
'"I
the phenomenon) from the thing itself. He believed that reason would |
lead man behind the thing-in-itself to God and that man's moral sense ^
would command him to believe it. A sense of duty came from the categori- !
;
cal imperatives every person should act in such a way that all men could
]
follow the same action. The moral law within called man to respect the 
dignity of all men and to treat persons as ends and never as means. Man 
needed God in order to fulfill the moral life even though he could not
?
prove the existence of God. God transcended human experience but was a 
being who possessed the moral ideals to which man aspired. Although man 
could not know that God existed, he could act as if he did exist.
^     . . . .    . . . .  ^ . .i . Ï . ..... . ... . . .J , S  > .J .fl
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So, too, with Kent's concept of the human soul; man could not prove the 
existence of an Immortal soul, but ha cou.ld act as though one existed.
Tillich considered Kant's description of autonomy end the free 
use of reason to be praiseworthy when Kant defined the " . . .  enlight­
enment (Aufklaruno) as man's conquering the state of immaturity so far
as ha is responsible for it. Immaturity, he said, is the inability to
86
use one's own reason without the guidance of somebody else." Tillich
responded to Kant's reference to autonomy by saying that it did not mean
subjective arbitrariness. It did not mean opposing the will of God.
For Tillich, autonomy was reason divorced from its depth, "Autonomy
which is aware of its divine ground is theonomy; but autonomy without
89
the theonomous dimension degenerates into mere humanism." However, 
Tillich recognized that in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason reason 
was united with its depth in the categorical imperative.
Kant stood for a reasonable religion. This meant taking man's 
limitations seriously. "The finite mind is not able to reach the infi-
90nite. . . • you cannot make God a first cause or a universal substance." 
Kant was the philosopher of Protestantism, according to Tillich, because 
" . . .  he is the philosopher who saw most clearly and sharply the fini­
tude of man and man's inability of breaking through the limits of his
91
finitude to that.which transcends it, namely, to the infinite."
"The influence of Kant is most evident in his description of the
philosopher's central task as the exploration of the conditions of the
92possibility of experience." Tillich's philosophical position developed
in critical dialogue with Kant's philosophy of value and phenomenology,
but he thought that Kant, and Neo-Kantianism, could not comprehend the
93
experience of the abyss and the paradox. Kant was too reasonable to 
be concerned about the mystery of nonbeing or the inconsistencies of life.
iUi;.'VÎ, f l ! -h: -=     . ..................
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From time to time Tillich would be critized for being an ideal­
ist, to which he would reply; " . . .  if idealism concerns itself with 
finding the essential structure of reality, then I am an idealist; • • •
But the very moment in which we make a judgment about anything we are, 
at least then, 'essentialist.'*^*
Contributing to Tillich's idealism was Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
(1762-1814), As a young man Tillich had read Fichte's Theory of Science, 
but it was Tillich's philosophy professor, Fritz Medicus, who was most 
influential in representing Fichte's philosophy, Fichte began his 
philosophy with the principle of freedom and believed that the self, or 
ago, was creative and not limited to the material world. Like Kant,
Fichte thought that moral activity was the free, dutiful commitment of 
will in ideal devotion. Evil consisted of being disloyal to one's moral 
duty. Man's real life was in self-commitment to the godly life, for 
belief in God was essentially a recognition of the fundamental moral 
dynamic in reality. Morality demanded that there be a God. The indi­
vidual ego was part of the absolute ego, or God. Since the innermost 
nature of reality was freedom, "Fichte construed the whole world as a 
fight between the principle of freedom in every individual self and the 
resistance of a nonego, an 'id' as Freud would call it, against that 
freedom.
Both Kant and Fichte (as well as Schelling, as will be seen later) 
were idealists who contained elements of romanticism in their thought.
The romantic spirit influenced Tillich greatly. "Romanticism is a philoso­
phy of imagination. He who is not able to transcend the given situation 
in which he lives through his own imagination finds himself imprisoned in 
that situation.Already  mentioned in the biographical section of this 
chapter was Tillich's romantic attachment to nature that had become a
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lifelong attraction for him. This identification with nature in his
I
early life prepared him for the emotional impact of Schelling*s |
philosophy of nature.
Of the various persons who influenced Tillich, Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) was one of the most significant. It 
was Schelling*s concern to unite mysticism and the Protestant principle 
that prompted Tillich to make it the subject of his doctoral dissertation.
And his thesis for the degree of Licentiate of Theology was entitled 
Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelllnq's Philosophical Develop­
ment. In it Tillich attempted to synthesize Kant's critical epistemology 
and Spinoza's mystical ontology,
Schelling was known for his contribution to the German romantic 
movement. His early philosophy had elements of antirationalism, organi- 
cism, and vitalism present in it. Schelling proclaimed the presence of 
the Infinite in the finite, insisting at the same time that the finite
was not "absorbed" by the Infinite but enhanced, asserted, and ful- 
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filled. I The romantic element of Schelling*s early work could be seen
in his philosophy of nature. Tillich read " . . .  in a state of intoxi-
98
cation, as it were, surrounded by the beauties of nature . . . "  , for
Schelling spoke directly to Tillich's own emotional involvement with 
nature. "Schelling showed the inner powers of nature, the conscious and 
the unconscious. . . .  What the romantic philosophers of nature wanted
I
to show is that in nature spirit is struggling for its full actualization |
99 .4
in man." Man, according to Schelling, possessed freedom to know and
w
to act upon what he knows. Man perceived sensations, could reflect upon 4
these perceptions, and then could willfully act upon his reflections.
Man could not separate knowledge from its objects, for concepts had no 
existence apart from their objects. It was the self that was the
I
■$
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condition of all knowledge, for knowledge was where the subject and the 
object met. It was the community of interacting intelligences that con- |
W:
stituted the historic life of man. Objectivity was intersubjectivity, |
The problem of the one and the many, Schelling (like Spinoza)
solved, by affirming the ontological unity of everything in the eternal
s u b s t a n c e . I n  this early period of his thought, he did not separate
the spiritual from the material. "His whole philosophy of nature was
an attempt to show the indwelling of the potential spirit in all natural
101
objects and how it comes to its fulfillment in man." Nature, in
Schelling, was presented as partly biological and partly psychological.
Therefore, the question of consciousness and unconsciousness entered his
thought. And the importance of aesthetics could be seen, in that artistic
intuition, for Schelling, revealed the self-consciousness of intelligence.
The artist was the one who made man aware of the Absolute, i.e., God.
The thinking of Schelling shifted from a romanticism that was close
to Spinoza to a period later in his development when his romanticism took
a turn toward existentialism. He preserved a philosophy of essence, but
ha added an existential concern. In this period the depth dimension of
human existence included not only an upward quest for the Divine but a
downward attraction for the demonic, "Hare the darkness in man's under-
102
standing and in the human situation becomes manifest." The power of 
the unconscious was made evident. Because of the demonic in man, the 
tragic dimension of human existence could be seen. Evil was to be taken 
seriously.
God, for Schelling, was the ungrounded, the abyss, the eternal 
nothing, as well as the grounded, i.e., being. "The principle of con­
tradiction within God affords a ground for human sin; it is not itself 
sin. Particularity, individual existence, is an expression of God's
3
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separation of himself from himself; a necessity of existence."
I
Evil, for Schelling, was nonbeing. Only against the ungrounded could a
the ground arise, because nothing could become evident without resis- :j;>
tance, Man participated in sin (hubris), but the grace of God overcame $-
sin. For Schelling, God became man (in Christ) in order that man might
return to God. "The Spirit is God's on-going struggle against perverted
selfhood; it is a movement beyond repentance to an affirmation and real-
104
ization of the 'ought-to-be.'" What began as a concern for identity
and a desire to define the truth was brought to an end with a call to
105 '
man to do the truth. In man there was a drive to actualize, i.e., 
to existentially realize, his essential or potential being. This uncon­
scious drive was the will of man,
Schelling produced a theology of mediation which sought to com­
bine the reality of the Christian message with the modern mind. For 
example, he would interpret biblical passages symbolically, rather than 
literally, as was done by traditional orthodoxy. He would express the 
Christian hope in unconventional (but meaningful) ways for those who 
required a freshness of approach. Schelling taught: " . . .  eternal
life means the essentialization of what we are in our essential being
as seen by God. It is not a continuation of existence in time and space
106but participation in eternity with what we are essentially," Tillich 
would agree with this thinking.
In addition to Schelling, Tillich was indebted to both Hegel and 
Schleiermacher. Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) attempted to find within 
autonomy the dimension of theonomy without weakening autonomous thought. 
Both ware interested in developing a theology which would transcend 
naturalism and supernaturalism.'
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Schleiermacher, the father of modern Protestant theology, had
his roots in Zinzendorfian Pietism, He was a great romantic theologian A
who translated Plato's thought and rediscovered the language of ergs.
"It is the creative eros in which the emotional and the cognitive ele-
107
ments are united in the intuition of the infinite in the finite,"
It should be understandable why the romantic was so interested in aes­
thetic categories. Religious thinking emphasized aesthetic intuition.
Art was interpreted as having a revelatory character.
Schleiermacher was important because he combined piety and 
philosophy. He thought that a true believer could also be a good 
philosopher. His theology was apologetic theology. Tillich responded 
positively to Schleiermacher's "answering theology," i.e., a theology 
which answers the criticisms of the day. To deal with the question of 
identity, Schleiermacher maintained; "Religion is not theoretical 
knowledge; it is not moral action; religion is feeling, feeling of abso­
lute d e p e n d e n c e . T h e  immediate experience of the Divine did not mean 
merely a subjective emotional experience. It meant the transcendence of 
subject and object in the depth of one's being, Schleiermacher under­
stood the element of the unconditional to be present in the feeling of 
absolute dependence, and this element placed it beyond subjectivity.
The similarity between Schleiermacher's "unconditional dependence" and 
Tillich's "ultimate concern" should be noted. Both were definitions for ^
religious experience. Each man relied upon the Gospel of John as the 
best biblical guideline in understanding religious experience. For 
example, Tillich accepted Schleiermacher's interpretation of eternal 
life; "The unity with God, participation in him, is not a matter of 
immortal life after death; it is not a matter of accepting a heavenly |
lawgiver; instead it is a matter of present participation in eternal
ji
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life," Both men were trying to overcome the conflict between 
rationalism and supernaturalism by stressing the immediate conscious­
ness of a God who was not an object among other objects.
Schleiermacher viewed every moment of life as being lived in the 
presence of Cod; and it was love that could drive man beyond the finite 
to the Infinite, Schleiermacher emphasized the concreteness of religion, 
but it was a spirit-filled concreteness, A meaningful existence was the 
objective of this theology.
In Schleiermacher*s thinking Christ was the representative of 
what man essentially could be when united with God, Christ had a fully
developed religious consciousness; therefore, he did not need salvation;
110
rather, he became the Savior. Tillich followed the same methodology as 
Schleiermacher, but their doctrine of God and their Christology had dif­
ferent emphases. Also, Tillich thought that sin was relativized in 
Schleiermacher. However, there were many points of agreement between 
them. Tillich could say: "Although I am not a mystical theologian, I
would say I am more on the side of the theology of experience and inward-
111
ness, for I believe that the Spirit is in us,"
Further word about the significance of Hegel in Tillich's thought 
was given by Gordon D. Kaufmans "Many Tillichian concepts are reminis­
cent of Hegelian notions, for example, 'kairos,* 'estrangement,' 'dream­
ing innocence,' love and salvation conceived of as primarily a kind of 
ontological reunion, Christ viewed as the principle of the relationship
112
between God and man, the strong philosophical interest in history, etc."
While Schleiermacher excelled in trying to produce a synthesis in 
theology, Hegel excelled in trying to produce a philosophical synthesis—  
the great synthesis of the cultural elements present in Western culture, 
and the synthesis of the conflicting polarities present in religious
ï, V  ^vr-.v;'-, -, -c- ". 'N-'■•■' -■> "  '■•■■• . ' •
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the Logos— the self-manifestation of the divine mind. And Eternal Life
1
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thought. The chief concern of Hegel centered in his thinking about 
religion and politics. The methodology of Hegel became that of dia­
lectical thinking. Tillich's thinking was dialectical, too. However, 
he was able to criticize Hegel for hubris since Hegel's philosophy was 
a closed system that did not allow room for any other interpretation of 
history than his own.
"For Hegel God is absolute spirit and man is relative spirit; or
114
God is infinite spirit and man is finite spirit." Hegel thought that
God was the creative power in man that produced self-consciousness, and
with it— culture. God was not an absolute, static, finished entity. To
the contrary, God was present in all of the life processes actualizing
himself. Hegel stated;
God is not a person besides other persons. . . .  everything in its 
essential nature is the self-expression of the divine life. . . .
God does not find himself in himself, but he comas to himself, to 
what he essentially is, through the world process, and finally 
through man and through man's consciousness of God.115
This was a mystical understanding of God, similar to that of Spinoza;
however, there was a dynamic quality in God's coming to know himself
that was absent in Spinoza. Hegel was an essentialist. God was the
structure of reality. He was not a separate being, but the Ground of
Being. Tillich's dependence upon Hegel at this point should be obvious.
Hegel saw nature as estranged and fallen from what it essentially
I
was to be. In his philosophy of religion he recognized the need for 
reconciliation. Wan, in his historical situation, experienced what was t
'J
paradoxical, i.e., in spite of the immense irrationality in reality there {
A
was a hidden providential power working behind human activity, willing,
and planning, which, through man's rationality and irrationality, would !
116 *
accomplish his purpose. Jesus was seen in his universal dimension as
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was understood as individuals participating in the Divine Life but
A
through the historical process. Immortality belonged to God and not %
to man.
Hegel was interested in seeing the truth in all of reality.
With the passing of time, there were those who attacked Hegel's ideas 
and his method of inquiry. Some of these persons, such as Kierkegaard 
and Marx, influenced twentieth-century thought in general and Tillich 
in particular. For this reason the next important theological develop­
ment to be discussed would be existentialism.
Existentialism
Existentialism was a revolt against the thinking of Hegel— against
I
consciousness and the rational control of life. As stated by Tillich*
"Existentialist philosophy is a revolt against the predominance of the
117
essentialist element in most of the history of Western philosophy."
It saw the weakness in so-called objectivity. And the existentialist
was aware of the baseness and irrationality of man. The unconscious and
the subjective dimension of human existence became important elements in
the understanding of man. Emphasis on the freedom of man to participate
fully (or passionately) in the human situation was one of the basic ideas
of existentialism. Concern for the "newness" of life took precedence
over abstract thinking about life.
Existentialism was a movement that rebelled, in the name of per­
ils
sonality, against the depersonalizing forces of technical society.
It was a fight for what was human against the dehumanizing powers of 
modern society. While Tillich was in sympathy with some of the themes 
of existentialism, he was not committed to the existentialist posture in 
opposition to essentialisra. He considered both of these dimensions of 
thought to be necessary. He said.
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Existentialism could raise questions, but it could not give answers. 
Tillich's theology required a both/and, rather than an either/or, 
response to existentialism and essentialism.
The thinking of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) made a definite 
impression onPaul Tillich, In 1905 Tillich discovered the Dane, and 
with great enthusiasm he found that Kierkegaard's teaching about the 
"finite freedom" of man, the ambiguous and tragic dimensions of man, 
appealed to his own youthful observations of human experience, Tillich 
pointed out the need to see Kierkegaard's response as a reaction to 
Hegel, For example, since Hegel did not address himself to the area of 
personal ethics in his system, Kierkegaard emphasized decision-making 
as being absolutely vital to what it meant to be a man. Social ethics 
took second place to the importance of the individual who was engaged 
in making a serious decision,
Kierkegaard's key criticism of Hegel centered upon the concept
of reconciliation. For Kierkegaard, man was not reconciled* "Existence
is the place of decision between good and evil. Man is in the tragic
situation, in the tragic unavoidability of evil. . . .  Only in the inner
120divine life is there reconciliation, but not in our situation." 
Estrangement was the human lot. Anxiety and despair and guilt were 
real; subsequently, they were the subject of Kierkegaard's creative 
efforts.
Because of the human predicament, Kierkegaard gave a radical 
interpretation of the nature of faith. Tillich remarked*
A
I
. , . for me essentialism and existentialism belong together. It >
is impossible to be a pure essentialist if one is personally in 
the human situation and not sitting on the throne of God . * , On 
the other hand, a pure existentialism is impossible because to 
describe existence one must use language. Now language deals with ^
universels. In using universals, language is by its very nature 
essentialist, and cannot escape it,119
L.'
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You cannot overcome the sickness unto death, the anxiety of 
estrangement. This can only be done by faith. Faith therefore 
has the character of a nonrational jump in Kierkegaard, He speaks 
of the leap from the point of view of the individual,121
historical criticism or with a systematic theology. Tillich was not
This required an act that went beyond the aesthetic or ethical stage—
it required an unconditional interest in, or a passionate commitment to, |
the Infinite. This unconditional interest was what Tillich meant by
Ultimate Concern. But Kierkegaard believed that in order for man to be
reconciled to God, it was necessary for God to come to man. This God j
did in Christ. Here Tillich would differ with Kierkegaard; "According f l
to him, you cannot start with man, not even in terms of questioning.
122
You must start with God who comes to man." And Kierkegaard meant by 
this that God came to man from outside of man. Tillich started with 
man as a questioning being, and God was to be found within the depth 
experience of man.
However, there would be agreement on the fundamental question;
"to be or not to be." This involved the meaning of man's life; only the 
person who was completely involved in seeking the answer would find it.
For Kierkegaard the answer centered upon God's action in Christ, But
%
when he was pursued as to the content of this relationship, i.e., with
a developed Christology, Kierkegaard was not interested in dealing with |
%
A
satisfied to stop with the leap only; he wanted to discuss the direction A
of the leap as well. Tillich thought that Kierkegaard emphasized the 4
I
contemporaneity of Christ, but it was possible only if Christ were seen 
as the Spirit— which Kierkegaard's theology did not consider. In fact,
•I
Kierkegaard could be faulted for his theological refusal to take the 
structure of thought seriously. But he was a prophetic voice who wit­
nessed to the vertical dimension of the Christian faith at a time when 
there was a tendency to speak too much of the horizontal dimension.
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a meaningful interpretation of the times and attempted to contribute to 
the reform of society. "The productive capacities of mankind are to be 
used for the advantage of everyone. . . .  The creative powers of the
Kierkegaard was a corrective to the trend of his day (but he was not
given a serious hearing until the twentieth century). He saw a need
" . . .  to resist a world in which everything was transformed into a
thing, a means, an object of scientific calculation, psychological and
123political management." The individual was being devalued.
Another existentialist (with an entirely different interest) 
who influenced Tillich was Karl Marx (1 BIB-1083), Marx reacted against 
Hegel, as had Kierkegaard, while at the same time he used the dialectical 
methodology of Hegel to develop his own system of thought. Also, Marx 
used the concept of estrangement in Hegel but applied it to an interpre­
tation of capitalism and of religion. "Religion is the escape of those 
who are oppressed by the upper classes into an imaginary fulfillment in 
the realm of the a b s o l u t e . M a r x  introduced the sociological element 
into Hegel’s thought and then arrived at his own interpretation of his­
tory and of the human situation.
Tillich agreed with Marx that the laboring masses were completely 
estranged from the Christian church and that historically the church had 
been on the side of the upper classes. Tillich had experienced this 
firsthand while serving as a chaplain in the First World War. He had 
actively participated in, and had been one of the founders of, the Re­
ligious Socialist movement in Germany following the war. According to
Tillich, the most successful of all theologians since the Reformation 
125
was Karl Marx. While Tillich endorsed much of Marxist thought, he
rejected its utopianism. "What Tillich hoped to develop was a Marxism
126
purified by Christian insight," Religious socialism sought to provide j
a
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soul are to be liberated from the fear, despair, and meaninglessness
of ruthless competition. Neither religious utopianism nor religious
127
escapism is tolerable." While Tillich and the Religious Socialists
were sympathethic to Marxism, it was a Marxism tempered with the Old
Testament prophetic sense of justice and the Protestant principle of
being able to be critical of any idea or institution that would seek to
make absolute that which was relative. It was this critical function
of religious socialism that was important.
As a Religious Socialist Tillich was concerned about the demonic
structures of destruction which were trying to prevail over the creative
elements in individuals and society. And he was concerned about the
concept of kairos. i.e., qualitative breakthroughs of the Eternal in
128history when what was demonic was recognized and opposed. Also, the
Religious Socialist movement aimed at achieving a theonomous state of
society in which the whole of life would be related to the Ultimate.
Tillich and Marx agreed on the idea that man could be distorted
by social conditions in such a way that his humanity could be lost, and
they presupposed that there would be a time when a sense of community
129
would be reestablished. Man was to be seen as a person, not as a
thing— as an end, not as a means or a commodity. Dehumanization and
estrangement could be observed in history,
Tillich appreciated the truth in much of what Marx had to say
about the horizontal relationships of man, but he felt that " . . .  Marx
130
lacked a vertical criticism against himself," Still, Tillich viewed 
Marx as a modern secular prophet.
The thought of another existentialist, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 
(1844-1900), was discovered by Tillich during the First World War. Since 
Nietzsche’s thought was dealt with in the first chapter (see supra.
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pp. 39-40), further attention will not be given to him except to say
that Tillich appreciated his ecstatic affirmation of life. In the name
of life Nietzsche fought against the nihilism of technical culture and
for the humanity of man. He knew the ambiguities of life (both the
creative and the destructive elements); yet he called man to will-to-
power. What made a tremendous impression upon Tillich was Nietzsche’s
131
vitalism and experience of the abyss. In addition to those persons 
already mentioned, there were individuals Tillich knew personally who 
contributed to his thought. i
Personal Influences
The philosophers and theologians who have been discussed up to 
this point have all been persons in history whom Tillich encountered by 
way of their work. A few references to his days as a student at the 
various universities which he attended, and to the teachers or senior 
colleagues by whom he was influenced, will be noted next.
In a letter to Thomas Mann, dated May 23, 1943, Tillich reviewed
• I -
his student years;
The summer semester of 1907, when I was the presiding officer of 
the student-corporation ’Wingolf* numbering then about seventy men, 
appears to me until today as the greatest period of my life. What ^
I have become as a theologian, a philosopher, a man, I owe partly ' ^
to my professors but mostly to this fraternity. The theological 
and philosophical debates we had then till late after midnight and i
the personal conversations before dawn, have remained decisive for 
my entire life.132
This was undoubtedly a nostalgia for his student days, but it did indi­
cate the personal exchange of ideas that had contributed to his learning <
experience. In the years that followed, he utilized the dialogue method 
in his teaching.
Martin Kahier, Professor of Systematic Theology at the University 
of Halle, was one of the most important theological teachers under whom
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Tillich had studied, "Kahier was a man whose intellectual ability and
moral and religious power were overwhelming. • • • In many respects ha
was the most profound and most modern representative of the nineteenth-
133
century theology of mediation," From him Tillich learned the sig­
nificance of doubt. Whereas Kahier emphasized Luther’s doctrine of |
justification by faith, "Tillich carried the concept further than his
professor: not only is the sinner justified while yet a sinner, but |
134
even the doubter is justified while he continues to doubt," Kahier
stressed the combination of the subjectivity of experience with the
objectivity of the biblical witness, Kahier resisted historical criti- |
cism, but he was responsible for giving Tillich " , , • the insight that
even our thinking is broken and is in need of justification and that
therefore any dogmatism of thought is the intellectual form of Pharisaism,
135
Loyalty to Kahier prevented Paul Tillich from being a dogmatist,"
Ernst Troeltsch was a colleague of Tillich’s at the University 
of Berlin, Nevertheless, in a special way Tillich considered him to be 
one of his teachers, even though he did not attend his lectures. He 
appreciated certain aspects of Troeltsch’s philosophy of religion. For 
example, "His main problem dealt with the meaning of religion in the 
context of the human spirit or man's mental structure, • , , there is
'■I
something which belongs to the structure of the human mind itself from |
136 , ^
which religion arises." Troeltsch stressed that it was within the
mind of man that the finite and the Infinite met,
Tillich valued Troeltsch’s philosophy of history, too. If one
were to determine the aim of history, one could determine the meaning
of history, Troeltsch wanted the present generation to transform history
137
by caring for the immediate next stage of history. This obviously
îl
concerned the social implications of the Christian faith, |
i
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At the University of Marburg, Tillich encountered another 
colleague, Martin Heidegger, who caused him to consider new directions 
of thought:
The influence of Heidegger was acknowledged by Tillich to have been 
the source of one of the leading ideas of his philosophical theology 
— the idea that a philosophical anthropology might throw light on 
the nature of, the necessity for, man’s religious quest and thus 
enable the apologetic theologian to articulate the revelation- 
grounded message of Christianity in a relevant w a y , 138
While an attempt has been made to view the most important of the 
influences upon Tillich’s intellectual development, it has been necessary 
to be selective in the persons and movements included. For example, the 
seminal minds of Spinoza, Ritschl, and Jung, as well as the significant 
twentieth-century phenomena of modern art and depth psychology, have 
been excluded.
It should also be mentioned that several scholars (such as Alistair 
Macleod and J, Heywood Thomas) called attention to some of the noticeable 
schools of thought that were conspicuous by their absence in Tillich—  
English empiricism, for example, Tillich ignored the whole English 
philosophical tradition of the eighteenth century and its twentieth- 
century counterparts. However, the question could be raised as to how 
many twentieth-century English philosophers have the grasp of the vast 
scope of historical and contemporary interdisciplinary developments that 
Tillich had. Indeed, there were omissions in the range of Tillich’s 
interests, but one could not help but be impressed with the breadth and 
depth of his mind. It was true that he did not alter his basic concepts 
after 1925; nevertheless, he was open to new possibilities. An illustra­
tion of this would be the impact of Zen Buddhism upon his thought, fol­
lowing a visiting lectureship in 1960, "While not becoming a convert to
Zen Buddhism he was impressed with the ultimate concern he found in forms
139
of religious life uninfluenced by Christianity," In the last lecture
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that he gave prior to his death, Tillich indicated that he would have
liked to have pursued a theology that would have included the history
140
of religions— ha called it the "Religion of the Concrete Spirit." |
'A
His creative mind was ready to go in new directions, even in his advanced i|
age. Ha was a man who found many stimulating ideas that challenged him 
to think and to rethink, if necessary, his own comprehensive systematic 
theology.
Tillich’s intellectual influences included Greek philosophy, the 
Christian tradition, German idealism, existentialism, and personal 
influences as revealed in numerous individuals and contemporary move­
ments. This heritage, coupled with his own experience, contributed to 
his methodology which will be the concern of the last section of this 
chapter.
Methodology
Before examining Tillich’s concept of "the human," his methodology 
should be presented, Tillich started his systematic theology with man 
and was sensitive to the human situation, but he was always consciously 
a Christian theologian, i.e., one who was inside the theological circle- 
one who had a faith commitment that would determine the outcome of his 
theological reflection. At the same time he was concerned about mediat­
ing between the eternal truth as evident in Christ and the changing times 
in which this truth needed to be reinterpreted, Ha wanted to bring 
together the changing and the changeless.
%
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He combined the art of dialectical, with that of systematic thinking, >]
seeking for truth by talking with others from different points of -j
view, moving through Yes and No, and then proceeding to put the -j
results of such thinking together in an orderly system of thought, ^
Tillich felt a special mission to those individuals who had dif- 
ficulty overcoming doubt or who had a hypercritical attitude toward {
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religion in general and Christianity in particular. He said,
I presuppose in my theological thinking the entire history of Chris­
tian thought . , • and I consider the attitude of those who are in 
doubt or estrangement or opposition to everything ecclesiastical and 
religious, including Christianity. . . .  My work is with those who 
ask questions, and for them I am here, , , . And to those who are 
actually in a situation of doubt and are even being torn to pieces 
by it, I hope to speak in such a way that the reasons for their 
doubts and other stumbling blocks are taken away,142
Tillich saw his role as an apologetic theologian, and he stated:
"Apologetic theology is 'answering theology,'" Contemporary theology
needed to take seriously the questions that man always had about the
meaning of his existence. Tillich found the answers in the Christian
faith but in a Christian faith that was grounded in ontology. The
specific method he used in providing theological answers to philosophical
questions was the "method of correlation,"
Man is the question he asks about himself, before any question has 
been formulated, , , , Being human means asking the questions of 
one's own being and living under the impact of the answers given to 
this question. And, conversely, being human means receiving answers 
to the question of one's own being and asking questions under the
impact of the answers,1*4 ^
As soon as one would apply the method of correlation, one would become
aware of the theological circle, i.e., the " , , , point where individual
experience, traditional valuation, and personal commitment must decide 
145
the issue," For Tillich the Christian message was based upon an
immediate experience of what one was intuitively aware of as the Ultimate,
This was the experience of the Holy, "Ultimate concern is the abstract
translation of the great commandment: 'The Lord, our God, the Lord is
one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with
145
all your soul and with all your mind, and with all your strength.'"
This meant accepting the Unconditional in an existential way, for the 
Unconditional would determine one's being or not-being, Man was ulti­
mately concerned about that which provided meaning in his life and which 
would determine his ultimate destiny.
J
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But just because one was committed to the Christian message and 
was inside the theological circle, did not mean that one should be 
uncritical of this message. "Every theologian is committed and alien­
ated; he is always in faith and in doubt; he is inside and outside the
147theological circle." A systematic theologian, or a philosopher of 
religion, was dependent upon the reasonableness of faith. This required 
reflection, which meant having some distance from the object of faith, 
in order to be able to make value judgments. For it to be possible to 
discuss theology (or anything else) in an orderly or coherent way, it 
was first necessary to trust the structure of knowledge. In fact, man 
could not have a language or a culture without the presupposition that 
there was a rational basis to reality. For Tillich it was the Logos 
that made any theological discussion possible, since theological inquiry 
was the logos about theos— the study of God. The unique affirmation of 
Christian theology was that the Logos became flesh in Jesus Christ.
The absolutely universal (Logos) had become absolutely concrete in Jesus 
Christ. But what could be affirmed by the theologian could be criticized 
by the philosopher of religion, Tillich believed that both the philoso­
pher and the theologian were necessary, but he distinguished between them.
"Philosophy deals with the structure of being in itself; theology deals
148
with the meaning of being for us." Whereas ideally the philosopher 
tried to maintain a detached objectivity, the theologian was committed 
existentially to the content of his faith.
Tillich's understanding of systematic theology involved being 
both a philosopher and a theologian. As a philosopher Tillich dealt, with 
a degree of detachment, with the structure of being, but as an existential 
theologian he was passionately involved with the meaning of being— the 
totality of existence. As a theologian he was interested in "saving
1223
knowledge," and for Tillich the Christian symbols were the means by 
which he participated in reality. Therefore, his methodology would be 
expected to reflect a Christian interpretation of reality. And it did.
His existential analysis of the human situation evoked many questions 
that could not be answered except by means of revelation. His method 
of correlation showed the interdependence of the questions and the 
answers. His theology was a philosophy of religion, albeit a Christian 
existential philosophy of religion, A systematic theologian would
methodically explain the content of the faith; and this included apolo-
!
getics, dogmatics, and ethics. The sources of systematic theology were;
the Bible, church history, history of religion and culture. However,
"Experience is the medium through which the sources 'speak* to us,
149
through which we can receive them," By experience Tillich meant
participation in what was mystical and ecstatic. The content of this
experience and the norm of his systematic theology was the "New Being in
150
Jesus as the Christ." This was paradoxical in that the appearance of 
that which conquered existence was at the same time submitting to the 
conditions of existence.
Having said the above, it should be noted that Tillich's method­
ology included a "phenomenological approach," Edmund Husserl made the 
term "phenomenology" popular and meant by it an analysis of certain types |
of human consciousness, Husserl's method pointed to the contents of 
consciousness but without his becoming involved in explanations that went 
beyond appearances, Husserl believed that man's experience of the world 
was immediate— on an intuitive level. The phenomenological method aimed 
at describing the meaning of appearances. Tillich defined this approach:
The test of a phenomenological description is that the picture given -J
by it is convincing, that it can be seen by anyone who is willing to 
look in the same direction, that the description illuminates other 
related ideas, and that it makes the reality which these ideas are i
supposed to reflect understandable,1^1 J
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This approach was consistent with Tillich's emphasis upon experience 
and reason, and he employed phenomenological analysis extensively in 
his theological method.
In summary, although Tillich's life did not affect his work to
the same extent that Hesse's life did, nevertheless, Tillich's
152
" . . , thinking was autobiographical in a remarkable way," The 
personal habits and human characteristics that were part of his life 
gave insights into his personality. The intellectual influences helped 
to determine the foundation of his systematic theology and his method­
ology. He started with man's ecstatic experience of the Holy and tried 
to make sense out of the content of this experience. He used the method 
of correlation which was dialectical in nature. Although Tillich oper­
ated within the theological circle, he was predominantly an apologetic 
theologian. He was a philosopher of religion who appealed to reason 
and revelation, and his methodology included the phenomenological 
approach as well.
It has been hoped that this chapter has revealed an appreciation 
for Paul Tillich as a man and as a theologian. This has been in prepara­
tion for understanding Tillich's concept of "the human" in his work, 
which will be the concern of the next chapter.
it'.
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CHAPTER V
THE CONCEPT OF "THE HUMAN" IN THE WORK OF PAUL TILLICH
Paul Tillich, like Hermann Hesse, has a tripartite view of human 
existence. In fact, Tillich believes that there are three considerations 
of human nature present in all genuine theological thinking: man's
essential goodness, man's existential estrangement, and man's possibility 
of reconciliation. These three elements will form the basic structure 
of this chapter, with the addition of a fourth element that discusses 
how man expresses himself socially when he seeks to be fully human.
Tillich's work will be approached systematically. His three 
volume Systematic Theology will be the primary source, along with his 
other work (including his trilogy of sermonic books), adding to his
'1
comprehensive system of thought. It will not be necessary to include ]
Tillich's entire system but only those areas that are pertinent to his i
understanding of what it means to be human. Anthropology is the starting
I
point for Tillich's theology, whereas Karl Barth starts with revelation. j
Therefore, a considerable amount of Tillich's theological position must j
be elucidated but only to the extent that it intersects with his concept j
i
of "the human."
I
Existential Man: Estrangement
Before the question of man's essential nature can be raised, or i
-■■I
before the question of the fulfillment of human existence can be presented, 
the question of man's current state of being must be delineated. What is !
the human condition? The answer to this question means examining man in 
his existential situation,
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Man as Questioner 4
Tillich's theology begins with man, "Man is the question he 
asks about himself, before any question has been formulated." Man is 
not content merely to accept life as it is without being concerned about 
why it is the way it is, "Being human means asking the questions of 
one's own being and living under the impact of the answers to this ques­
tion. And, conversely, being human means receiving answers to the ques­
tion of one's own being and asking questions under the impact of the 
2
answers." Tillich makes clear the correlation between questions and 
answers. "But, in order to be able to ask for something, we must have 
it partially; otherwise it could not be the object of a question. . . .
If man is that being who asks the question of being, he has and has not 
the being for which he asks. . . . We are a mixture of being and non-
3
being."
Man is a philosopher by nature, as the following statements
reveal;
You cannot prohibit man from asking the most human question . . .
Man is more than an apparatus for registering so-called "facts" and 
their interdependence. He wants to know, to know about himself as 
thrown into being, to know about the powers and structures control­
ling this being in himself and in his world. He wants to know the 7
meaning of being because he is man and not only an epistemological |
subject.4 j
Not to ontologize is to destroy what is human in man, and ontological "i
reason is at the heart of Tillich's thought. !
Classical reason is Logos . . .  Its cognitive nature is one element 
in addition to others; it is cognitive and aesthetic, theoretical 
and practical, detached and passionate, subjective and objective.
The denial of reason in the classical sense is antihuman because it 
is antidivina.5
Man's capacity to raise questions about his existence means ha 
experiences self-transcendence. This enables him to be a philosopher 
and a theologian. "Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably.
ri
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ultimately, unconditionally. It deals with it not so far as it J[s but 
as far as it is for us."^ Man as a theologian is that creature who 
asks questions about ultimate reality as well as about human existence.
"Anyone who raises a question about true reality is in some way sepa­
rated from reality; whoever makes a demand upon reality presupposes
7
that it is not at hand."
In discussing Tillich's methodology, the relationship between
philosophy and theology, between faith and reason, has already been
noted. Suffice it to be said; " . . .  reason is identical with the
humanity of man in contrast to all other beings. It is the basis of |
language, of freedom, of creativity, . . .  If faith were the opposite
8of reason, it would tend to dehumanize man," Both are necessary.
Faith is reason reaching ecstatically beyond itself— fulfilling itself#
Man's existential situation is one of estrangement, and this 
means that all of creation participates in it, including man as philoso­
pher and theologian, Man's faith and man's reason are imperfect. "But
revelation is revelation to man in his state of corrupted faith and cor-
9
rupted rationality," In spite of his corrupted rationality, man's 
reason is sufficient to point out certain factors of his experience which 
he has come to know as true; his present situation is seen in terms of 
disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in 
all realms of life.
Man has a world to which he belongs but it is a broken world, and 
he participates in its brokenness. He is aware of himself, and he knows 
he is related to the world. "Self-relatedness is implied in every experi­
ence. There is something that 'has' and something that is 'had,' and the
two are one. The question is not whether selves exist. The question is
11whether we are aware of self-relatedness," The term, self, includes
 ^Y'-y,
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tha subconscious and unconscious elements as wall as self-consciousness.
2
But being a self means separation from everything else. Every self has
I
an environment in which it lives, but it is never completely bound to a
its environment. Man has the capacity to transcend himself. For ex- |
ample, language " . . .  is the basic expression of man's transcending
12his environment, of having a world." Man cannot be conscious of him-
i
self without having a consciousness of the world. "When man looks at #
his world, he looks at himself as an infinitely small part of his world.
Although he is the perspective-center, he becomes a particle of what is
centered in him, a particle of the universe. This structure enables
13
man to encounter himself." And when he encounters himself he discovers 
finitude, self-contradiction, and ambiguity. It is reason that makes a 
self a self; and without reason, i.e., the Logos of being, being wmuld 
be chaotic.
"Knowing is a form of union. In every act of knowledge the knower
and that which is known are united; the gap between subject and object 
14
is overcome." Knowledge is part of the fulfillment, transformation, 
and healing of man. But knowledge alone is not sufficient. Revelation 
is necessary to answer man's existential concerns. "The word 'revelation' 
('removing the veil*) has been used traditionally to mean the manifesta­
tion of something hidden which cannot be approached through ordinary ways
15of gaining knowledge," The reality of revelation has both a giving and 
a receiving side to it. Man encounters mystery by way of revelation in 
an ecstatic experience, and this encounter reveals something valid about 
tha relationship between the Unconditional, or Ultimate, and oneself.
This will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. It is suf­
ficient at this time to call attention to Tillich's statementi "Revela­
tion is the answer to the questions implied in the existential conflicts 
16
of reason."
this direction can be pursued, other human experiences that are part of 
man's awareness of finitude must be cited.
To be human, for Tillich, involves the experience of anxiety:
22
" , . . the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing."
To be aware of finitude philosophically is one thing, but to experience 
one's own finitude is something else. One is not afraid (this would
I
J
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Man as Finite
The fundamental fact of human existence is finitude. "The ques­
tion of being is produced by the 'shock of no n b e i n g . O n l y  man can ask 
the ontological question because he alone is able to look beyond the
limits of his own being and of every other being. Looked at from the
17
standpoint of possible nonbeing, being is a mystery," Man is that
creature who knows that there was a time when he did not exist and that
there will be a time in the future when he will not exist, Man is mortal.
"Finitude unites being with dialectical nonbeing, Man's finitude, or
creatureliness, is unintelligible without the concept of dialectical non-
being. • . . Being, limited by nonbeing, is finitude. Nonbeing appears
18
as the 'not yet' of being and as the 'no more' of being," This theme 
permeates Tillich's theology. To be a man is to experience tha threat |
of nonbeing. It is this threat that makes man conscious of the fragmen­
tariness of life. "Man is a fragment and a riddle to himself. The more
19
he experiences and knows that fact, the more he is really man." This 
fact forces man to question the meaning of his life. "Finitude taken
20
alone is not self-explanatory; it is a question rather than an answer."
Man need not be driven to despair by the experience of finitude.
According to Tillich: "Finitude implies tha question of the 'infinite'
for man could not look at himself as finite if he ware not in some way
21 'é
beyond it. This is the root of the religious question." But before
I
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require having an object to fear), but one is anxious about death,
23
meaninglessness, guilt and condemnation.
Man's concern about death is partly due to the significance of
time and the element of transitoriness, "It is anxiety about having to
24
die which reveals the ontological character of time," Without time
man would not have a present, and without space ha would not have a place.
But living in time and space means insecurity. Life is continuously
changing, and man is forced to live with contingency. "Angst is the
situation of the isolated individual facing the abyss of nothing and the
25
threat of annihilation of all around him." This produces a sense of 
loneliness, even melancholy at times.
Man belongs to the human family, but he does not always experience 
a sense of belonging. He knows what it means to be lonely, "Man is 
alone because he is roan! . . .  Being alive means being in a body— a body
26
separated from all other bodies. And being separated means being alone."
This need not be a negative feature of human existence— this separation 
allows man enough distance for reflection and love that he might partici­
pate in the transformation of his world. But while he is experiencing 
this separation, man frequently feels isolated in his loneliness.
Another source of anxiety is meaninglessness. "Man's being includes
his relation to meanings. He is human only by understanding and shaping
27
reality, both his world and himself, according to meanings and values," 
Existential man is a spiritual creature; this is very evident when he 
encounters the phenomenon of meaninglessness. "The anxiety of meaningless­
ness is anxiety about the loss of an ultimate concern, of a meaning which
28
gives meaning to all meanings." How man copes with this problem will
. '
be discussed later in this chapter, but it is only necessary now to notice À
1
the profound effect it has upon him.
.si
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A third source of anxiety present in finitude is man's experi­
ence of guilt. Within the ethical sphere of human existence, man is 
conscious of the ambiguity of moral decisions. Nonbeing is present in 
his moral self-affirmation, Man is responsible for what ha has made of 
himself. He judges himself for what he has or has not become. The 
awareness of nonbeing is present in this activity and produces the feel­
ing of guilt. This awareness can drive one to self-rejection— even to 
the point of despair and a feeling of condemnation, "Despair is an 
ultimate or 'boundary-line* situation. One cannot go beyond it, . . .
No way into the future appears. Nonbeing is felt as absolutely victori- 
29
ous." Suicide can result from this state of hopelessness. Though 
everyone suffers periods of anxiety, one does not want to succumb to its 
depth, i.e., to the will to lose one's self. Human life is a continuous 
attempt to avoid despair.
Tillich's understanding of being human involves; asking questions, 
being aware of one's finitude and transitoriness, living with anxiety and 
loneliness that can reach the point of despair. However, another impor­
tant area that reveals man's estrangement is that of human sin.
Man as Sinner
Man as he exists is not «rfiat he ought to be. Man is free to con­
tradict himself, i.e., his true (essential) humanity. When he does, 
self-estrangement is the result. "Man is caught between the desire to 
actualize his freedom and the demand to preserve his dreaming innocence." 
When he moves from potentiality to actuality, the tendency toward sin is 
strong. Sin is separation from that to which one belongs. Sin is estrange
ment. "Man is estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings,
31
and from himself."
30
Christianity combines the belief in the tragic universality of sin and 
man's personal responsibility for it. While creation is essentially 
good, it falls into universal estrangement when actualized. Tillich 
differentiates between "sin" and "sins": " . . .  sins are deviations
232
The question could be raised as to whether it is necessary for
man to sin in order to actualize himself. When Tillich was asked to
respond to the Pauline concept of sin (in Adam all sinned), he replied:
"The Pelagian or Erasmlan question was always. Does this not identify
'being man' and 'being sinner'? It certainly does, but as existential
fact, not as essential necessity. For every individual man affirms with
finite freedom and therefore with responsibility his state of estrange- 
32
ment." Man is not required to sin, but in fact he invariably chooses 
to sin. "It is our human predicament that a power [Tillich calls it the
demonic] has taken hold over us which is not from us but ^  us, hated by
us and at the same time one which we gladly accept. • • • We are fasci­
nated by that which can destroy us, and in some momenta we hiddenly 
desire to be destroyed by it."^^ Tillich does not believe in a super­
natural being (Satan or Devil) who is the source of man's propensity 1
toward sin. He Just recognizes man's natural inclination to raise his ]
finiteness to infinity (playing God, so to apeak). If man has no real 
choice in being a sinner, then why does he accuse himself of not being 
what he ought to be? This must suggest some awareness of a choice, and
]
therefore, awareness of responsibility for his actions. In Tillich's A
I
sermon, "The Good I Will, I Do Not," he states: '
Sin is the name for tha act in which we turn away from the partici- ?j
pation in the divine Ground from which we come and to which we go. ;
Sin is the turning toward ourselves, making ourselves the center of
the world and of ourselves. Sin is tha drive in everyone, even the J
most self-restraining one, to draw as much as possible of the world
into oneself. But we can be fully aware of this only if we have
found a point above ourselves. 34
I
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concupiscence (distorted libido, i.e., unlimited desire to draw the whole
36
of reality Into one's self). God gives man freedom, which opens the
door to the possibility of sin. The presence of moral evil in the world
from moral laws. This has little to do with 'sin* as tha state of
I
estrangement from that to which one belongs— God, one's self, one's
$
35 A
world," Of course, "sins" are expressions of "sin" and are not to be
considered inconsequential. The key issue is the basic brokenness of 
human existence. It is this state of alienation that permeates the *
human condition.
In order to focus more precisely upon the meaning of estrange­
ment, Tillich emphasizes three characteristics of it: unbelief (willful
turning from God towards oneself), hubris (pride or self-elevation), and
I
à
I 
!
is not caused by God but by sin, i.e., man's misuse of freedom. If man :£
s
chooses self-contradiction and self-destruction, that is his choice. i
God punishes sin by throwing man back upon himself. Man is forced to #
cope alone with sin, which in turn creates more sin. Ha experiences 
restlessness, emptiness, and meaninglessness. His alternative is salva­
tion. What Tillich maintains is that man on his own will never achieve 
wholeness of life. Disintegration of his centered self takes place when 
man tries to go it alone. In the end man will be less than he was meant
to be; he will not realize his full potential without God's help.
What Tillich does in pointing out the estrangement of man, is to 
portray the honest ambiguity that makes up so much of life. He shows I
the tensions that are present within the human experience. To be human 
is to live without certitude. In any person's honest perception of hie
existence doubt is a reality, and this doubt extends to a profound doubt
as to the existence of the Ultimate. Genuine skepticism rejects any 
certainty. "But serious doubt is confirmation of faith. It indicates
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I
37 Ï
tha seriousness of the concern, its unconditional character." Doubt­
ing may indicate insecurity, but it also implies making a decision for A
honesty. The man who faces up to the various elements of his limited
existence, according to Tillich, will discover an unknown force present rg
within him that makes him restless in the hope that he will be made
ready to receive an act of grace. In other words, man's restlessness
and doubt are not necessarily negative. They can be the preparation
for religious experience.
But even for those who have experienced the Unconditional, it is
man's plight to have to continue to face the ambiguity and brokenness
of human existence. c-
The strong being is strong only if he watches his strength, aware 
of the fact that there is weakness in his strength. There is a non- 
Christian in every Christian. There is a weak being in every strong |
one. There is cowardice in every courage, and unbelief in every 
faith, and hostility in every love. Watchfulness means that the ?
Christian never can rest on his being a Christian, that he who is 
strong can never rely on his strength.38
Yet, an honest man is unwilling to submit to anything that would deny
him his bonesty.
In this section the emphasis has been on man's experience of
estrangement. While attempting to deal with Tillich’s understanding of
man's existential situation, it becomes clear that inherent in his system
is the important area of potentiality.
Essential Man; Potentiality 
The subject of man as he is, in the human predicament of estrange­
ment, could not even be discussed without an underlying assumption that 
within human nature there must be another dimension that aids in the 
evaluation of man's present condition.
There is no existentialist description of the negativities of the 
human predicament without an underlying image of what man essentially
-A
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is and therefore ought to be. The cutting power of existentialist 
novels, paintings, even philosophical analyses of man's predicament, |
is rooted in the implicit contrast between the negativities they 
show and the positives they silently presuppose*39
A
What is man essentially? What is man potentially? What is his intan-
tionality? The term "essence* has several facets to it.
Essence can mean the nature of a thing without any valuation of it, -'A.
it can mean the universale which characterize a thing, it can mean 
the ideas in which existing things participate, it can mean the norm 
by which a thing must be judged, it can mean the original goodness 
of everything created, and it can mean the patterns of all things 
in the divine mind,40
It is that which empowers and Judges existence.
Essential man is what he is before he becomes actualized. It is
a state of potentiality* " . . .  man never could have appeared if the
41
essence 'man' had not belonged to the potentialities bf being." Tillich
is consistent with his ontological approach to understanding man. There
would be no such words as "man" or "human nature" if there were no uni-
42
versai essence that enabled one to recognize man as man.
Also, man has a capacity for understanding the term "infinite,"
While it is true that man is finite, "He is aware of his potential
infinity while being aware of his actual finitude. If he were what he
essentially is, if his potentiality were identical with his actuality,
the question of the infinite would not arise." It is this self-
transcending quality that contrasts man with other beings. Whereas man
has the potentiality of having a world, other creatures have only an
environment. Man has a capacity for the sublime. "The structure of life
shows that the sublime is the greatest potentiality of life. . . .But
the sublime is something qualitatively new, it demands a creative act-
44
and this means freedom . . . "
If existence means standing out of one's own nonbeing, then 
existence
.A. . ... . ..  ..
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. • , participates in potential being before it can come into 
actual being. As potential being, it is in the state of relative 
non-being, it is not-yet-being. But it is not nothing. Potentiality 
is the state of real possibility, that is, it is more than a logical 
possibility. Potentiality is the power of being which, metaphori­
cally speaking, has not yet realized its power. The power of being 
is still latent; it has not yet become manifest.45
Man never exhausts his full potentiality. He contains potentiality even
when he exists in actuality, i.e., he is a combination of essential and
existential reality. In a sense, existence is tha expression of essence.
I
I
Finite Freedom
That which enables man to move from essence to existence is finite
freedom. "One can say that nature is finite necessity. Cod is infinite
46 '
freedom, man is finite freedom." It is this quality of freedom that 
makes man different from all other creatures. Illustrations of human 
freedom can be seen in the fact that man has a language, raises questions 
about life, receives moral and logical imperatives, and has the power to 
deliberate and to decide. He can play and he can build imaginary worlds; 
he has the power to contradict himself and his essential nature; he is 
even free of his freedom (but this is at the price of surrendering his 
humanity),*^ This radical sense of freedom is what Tillich believes is 
unchangeable in human nature. Man can deny what he essentially is, he 
can try to escape from himself and his true being by becoming a conform­
ist, or by succumbing to compulsive self-seclusion, or by active hostility 
towards himself and other people. Although he may misuse his freedom, the 
reality of his freedom remains evident. Tillich says that for him, the 
philosophical argument over whether man is really free is no longer an 
issue. B. F. Skinner may wish to differ with him, but insofar as Tillich 
is concerned, this issue was clarified with the reappearance of the phe­
nomenological method after 1900. If one begins with man as an object.
II
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then determinism is certainly true; but if one begins with man as a 
subject, then determinism is not the answer. "When we give a phenomeno­
logical description of what happens in an act of moral decision, we 
know that neither necessity nor contingency is involved, but a total
reaction of our centered being. Now we call this total act of our
48
centered being "freedom.*"
To be human means to possess freedom, albeit limited freedom. 
Dehumanization occurs when man does not exercise it. In order for him 
to experience freedom in actuality, it must be part of man potentially,
"Freedom which has ceased to be the power of determining itself in his­
tory has ceased to be freedom, and men who have lost this power have
49
lost their full humanity." Man would not be man without freedom.
But in actuality, freedom is in tension with its polar opposite, 
destiny. When man lives out the "givens" of his circumstances (caused 
by hereditary and environmental factors) plus the consequences of his 
use of freedom (the outcome of former decisions), the unique events that «
result compose his destiny. Therefore, freedom is not in real opposition 
to destiny. Destiny is made up of the unique circumstances of each |
person's life. One's destiny includes the results of one's use of free­
dom. The concern at this point is not with the tension between freedom 
and destiny, but it is with the finite freedom present in man's potential 
nature.
Man is anxious to use his freedom, for he dreads remaining unful­
filled. This is part of the telos (inner aim) of essential man. In 
order to be acknowledged as a person, man must exercise his creative 
freedom, and he must recognize that the degree of freedom varies with 
the individual. "Man's particular nature is his power to create himself.
And if the further question is raised of how such a power is possible
I
Ï,
I
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and how it must bs structured, we need a fully developed #%8entialist 
doctrine in order to answer . .
Tillich maintains that human beings can be changed. For example, 
external events can cause changes in man. And internal questioning as 
wall as the experiencing of what ought to be in the moral realm of life |
can alter the centered self of man's world. However, the " . . .  un­
changeable element in man is his freedom to change himself and his world.
51
It is not an unlimited freedom." Man participates in all dimensions 
of reality, and it is because of this that he can understand himself.
He is a microcosm of reality, and self-awareness brings with it an under­
standing of what is. Freedom is " . . . the reaction of a centered self
to a stimulus in such a way that the center, and not a part or a partial
52
process within the whole, determines the reaction." Each time that one -
experiences deliberation, makes a decision, reflects upon an issue, or
accepts oneself— freedom is experienced.
Finite freedom is the most embracing description of man's basic 
nature; it is in this that both man's creative self-expression and 
the possibility of his estrangement from himself are rooted. The 
actual estrangement, however, even though a tragically unavoidable 
fact, is not a basic part of his nature, and therefore man can be
healed,53
This healing aspect will be discussed later in this chapter.
The underlying concept that permits man to grasp his essential
nature is the Logos. It designates the reasonableness of being itself,
its true, essential nature, its form and structure.Logos is universal
reason. "It is in all things, everything participates in it. It becomes
self-conscious and distorted in man. It is the active, divine power which
forms and shapes the passive matter. It is always present, although in
55
different degrees." Language, and therefore communication and philoso­
phical reflection, would be impossible without the Logos.
■ ■ I
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The essential power of things is the Really Real. "Knowing the
really real of our historical existence presupposes the knowledge of
the really real in ourselves. But knowing one's self on this level is
56transforming one's self." Without finite freedom man could not trana-
cend his existence in order to say yes or no to life; man could not be 
a religious creature. Finite man would not be able to respond to the 
Infinite, the Unconditional. But this he does, and it is because of 
man's essential nature that such things as religious commandments are 
taken seriously. Tillich declares, " . . .  it is our own true or essen­
tial being that confronts us in the moral command, demanding something
57
from us in our actual being with all its problems and distortions."
It is necessary for man to actualize himself if he is to be man,
for " . . .  the separation of man from his essential nature is really
the separation of man from God, understood as the ground of being or the |
58
power of being." It is within tha sphere of finite freedom that God
•I
is able to get outside of the divine life. Here is an example of A
1
Tillich's dependence upon Schelling's thinking. Man's capacity for self- .
consciousness and self-transcendence is God's way of transcending himself. v]
2
"The divine life is realized through the separation of the creatures from a
59 I
the Ground." Divine freedom and finite freedom are identical. So,
too, God would bs unable to love his creatures if man were not separated
from him. It is important to God as well as to man that man move from
the state of essentiality to actuality.
Dreaming Innocence
Tillich uses the term "dreaming innocence" to describe man's
essential nature.
Both words point to something that precedes actual existence. It 
has potentiality, not actuality. It has no place, it is ou topoa
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(utopia). It has no time; it precedes temporality, and it is supra- 
historical. Dreaming is a state of mind which is real and non-real 
at the same time— just as is potentiality. Dreaming anticipates the 
actual, just aa everything actual is somehow present in the potential, 
In the moment of awakening, the images of the dream disappear as 
images and return as encountered realities.60
What drives dreaming innocence beyond itself is temptation. Essential
man is not any more perfect than was Adam before "the Fall." Created
goodness is possibility, not perfection, "The symbol "Adam before the
Fall* must be understood as the dreaming innocence of undecided poten- 
61
tialities." When man actualizes his freedom, he loses his dreaming 
innocence. But before he does this, man experiences what Tillich des­
cribes as "aroused freedom" which is the desire to sin, prior to actually 
committing the sin, "In the state of dreaming innocence, freedom and 
destiny are in harmony, but neither of them is actualized. . . , The 
tension occurs in the moment in which finite freedom becomes conscious
of itself and tends to become actual. This is what could be called the
62
moment of aroused freedom." At the same time a reaction occurs in 
which dreaming innocence wishes to preserve itself. "Man is caught 
between the desire to actualize his freedom and the demand to preserve 
his dreaming i n n o c e n c e * I f  he does not actualize himself, he experi­
ences anxiety over losing himself; and if he does, he is anxious over 
losing his innocence. Temptation is the anxiety created by the ambiguous 
situation. With human possibility at stake, he is pulled in two direc­
tions. His anxiety, i.e., temptation, forces him to make a decision.
Man decides for self-actualization. "Innocence cannot be lost by a
64
natural process but only by a spiritual decision."
If it is necessary for man to actualize himself, the question can 
be raised as to man’s responsibility for "the Fall." Tillich copes with 
this seeming contradiction by saying* "Every ethical decision is an act 
both of individual freedom and of universal d e s t i n y . T h e  Christian
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faith affirms both dimensions of this statement as being true. Moral 
freedom is always connected to tragic destiny. The Creation and "the 
Fall" must be seen as being together. "Actualized creation and estranged 
existence are identical. . . » Creation is good in its essential charac­
ter. If actualized, it falls into universal estrangement through freedom 
and d e s t i n y . T h i s  is not a logical coincidence even though it is con­
sistent with Tillich's system of thought. Sin becomes a rational neces­
sity, and it is at 
Reinhold Niebuhr).
this point that Tillich has been criticized (e.g., by
67
Reconciled Man: New Being
It has been established that existential man is alienated, i.e.,
separated from himself, others, and God. When man seeks, on his own, to
reestablish his lost unity and essential manhood, he meets with failure.
Man is driven elsewhere for the answer to his dilemna. Before discussing
Tillich's answer to the human situation, it should be noted:
If, however, the question— What can I do in order to experience the 
New Being?— is asked with existential seriousness, the answer is 
implied in the question, for existential seriousness is evidence of 
the impact of the Spiritual Presence upon an individual. He who is 
ultimately concerned about his state of estrangement and about the 
possibility of reunion with the ground and aim of his being is 
already in the grip of the Spiritual Presence.68
Being estranged need not be as explicit and direct as the above quotation.
It could be as subtle and implicit as "Our sighing in the depth of our
69
souls, which we are not able to articulate . . . "  Whenever man is 
striving for some ultimate meaning in life, whenever he is wanting to 
believe in Cod and yet is doubtful that there is a God, whenever there 
is a longing for the Unconditional (however vague this yearning may be),
Tillich says that God is at work in man. This is God taking the initia­
tive.
I
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Also, Tillich's use of symbols should be commented upon briefly
before his understanding of reconciliation is presented. Religion
expresses itself through the means of symbols. "Religious symbols are
distinguished from others by the fact that they are a representation of
that which is unconditionally beyond the conceptual sphere, they point
to the ultimate reality implied in the religious act, to what concerns
us ultimately." Through genuine symbols (i.e., those that are alive)
man has an awareness of reality; but it is not objective knowledge.
Authentic religious symbols have an experiential basis to them. "What
determines the truth of a religious symbol is its self-negation and
71transparency to the referent for which it stands." Religious symbols
point to the Holy, i.e., that which transcends finitude. The various
key aspects to the meaning of symbols can be summarized as follows#
Symbols point beyond themselves to something else; they participate in
that to which they point; they open up levels of reality which otherwise
are closed for us; they unlock dimensions and elements of our soul which
correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality; they cannot be
72produced intentionally; and they cannot be invented. One other char­
acteristic can be added, i.e., symbols have integrating and disintegrat­
ing power.
Tillich reminds one that the term "God" is the basic symbol of 
faith and that the various qualities ascribed to God are taken from human 
experience and applied symbolically to that which transcends human experi­
ence. When combined in a story, these symbols become myths about the
73
Divine/human encounters.
According to Tillich, man's true nature is to be found in unity 
with God. Because of his estrangement man experiences separation from
I
God, and life begins to disintegrate. "Reconciliation with God is at I
1
" \ ■- % S' \ " 'w- ,- • •'•‘^ V.» : •_«'•=. 'Vgs- i*,.5 -* /*\ \ ■• ■•'■ *•'• '?
243
The Reality of Cod
'5
the same time self-reconciliation. Thus, Tillich combines the religious 
concern for union with God with the humanistic concern for self- 
realization."^* Tillich's understanding of the nature of God must now 
be articulated. All of the data to which Tillich alludes in his system­
atic presentation of the meaning of "God" need not be included. The 
focus will be upon his basic ideas, which will be helpful in grasping 
his understanding of the experience of reconciliation. The content of 
religious experience, for Tillich, is seen in a trinitarian perspective; 
Baing-itself, the New Being, and the Spiritual Presence.
t;
Man, on his own, cannot find himself or his God. Revelation is |
necessary if man is to find the ultimate meaning of life. Man knows a
restlessness that is caused by the anxiety of his estrangement. To man
in his predicament, God does speak.
The problem of man is not that God does not speak to him; God does 
speak to everyone who has a human countenance. For this is what 
makes him man. He who is not able to perceive something ultimate, 
something infinitely significant, is not a man. Man is man because 
he is able to receive a word from the dimension of the eternal.
Human existence is never without that which breaks vertically into 
it. Man is never without a manifestation of that which is ultimately 
serious and infinitely meaningful.
Revelation is Tillich's term for the insight gained from man's direct
encounter with God.
The concern at this point is to describe the human experience in
this encounter. Tillich uses the term "ecstasy," "The ultimate power
of being, the ground of reality, appears in a special moment, in a
concrete situation, revealing the infinite depth and the eternal signifi-
76 %cance of the present." Tillich distinguishes between human encounters
that are ecstatic (e.g., love) and the Divine/human encounter. It is
not only an emotional experience; it involves the mind as well as the
heart. ,
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It is as in a thunderstorm at night, when the lightning throws a 
blinding clarity over all things, leaving them in complete darkness 
the next moment. When reality is seen in this way with the eye of 
a self-transcending realism, it has become something new. Its 
ground has become visible in an "ecstatic" experience, called 
"faith." It is no longer merely self-subsistent as it seemed to 
be before; it has become transparent or, as we could say,
* theonomous."??
This ecstatic experience takes one beyond the limits of one's own being.
It moves toward union the other one. On the human level, man knows 
ecstasy when in genuine communion with another parson, when conscious 
of the depth dimension of his own being, when he experiences freedom, 
and when the categorical imperative places its claim on him.
Religious ecstasy contains an unconditional element. It is being 
grasped by the Really Real. Tillich uses this poetic term when he des­
cribes an encounter with the Holy. "Such experience is the most human 
of all experiences. . . .  It is effective in the restlessness of the 
heart, in the anxious question of one's own value, in the fear of losing
the meaning of one's life, in the anxiety of emptiness, guilt, and of 
78
having to die."
Revelation is not the reception of supernatural information. It 
is an event in which; "The genuine mystery appears when reason is driven 
beyond itself to its "ground and abyss,' to that which 'precedes* reason, 
to the fact that "being is and nonbeing is not' (Parmenides), to the
79
original fact (Ur-Tatsache) that there is something and not nothing." 
Revelation can be defined as being grasped by an Ultimate Concern. It 
provokes a human response of commitment to what one believes is valuable 
(love and human personality), instills a meaningful confidence in life, 
and provides a sense of personal security and worth.
Tillich has difficulty describing the content of religious experi­
ence, and he reinterprets the usual theistic characteristics in discussing 
his doctrine of Cod. Ha maintains, "'Cod' is the answer to the question
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implied in man's finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man
ultimately."®^ Human beings cannot produce Ultimata Concern (i.e., the
Really Real) although the object of Ultimate Concern may have many names.
81
F or Tillich, God is Being-itself. God is not ^  being, but the Ground 
of Being. This definition has caused Tillich to be called an atheist or 
a pantheist. These criticisms will be investigated in the next chapter. 
But it is necessary at this time to call attention to a distinction in 
Tillich's thought that is important. Man can elevate what is less than 
ultimate to ultimacy, but this is idolatry. Artistic expression can be 
8 0  interpreted, for example. Aesthetic experience, when held to be ulti­
mate, becomes that person's religion. But usually the word "ultimacy"
means nothing finite. "Nothing which by its very nature is finite can
82rightly become a matter of ultimate concern." Man may seek to make it
so but will fail in the process, for " . . .  the ultimate that grasps us
will be more powerful, demanding a decision of our whole personality.
Yet it is not produced by our own intellect or will; it is something
S3that transcends our decision."
God is the Power of Being that transcends every being as well as
64
the totality of beings— the world. God is the eternal power that 
resists nonbeing, for Being-itself does not participate in nonbeing. 
Tillich realizes that little can be said about God literally. Symboli­
cally speaking, man has attributed to God self-transcendence and such 
personal qualities as love (aoaoe). Because he communicates with man,
God is, of necessity, seen in a personal way. "Therefore, man symbolizes 
that which is his ultimate concern in terms taken from his own being.
gc
• • • He sees the divine life as personal, dynamic, and free." God 
cannot be less than what man is, i.e., a-personal, for it is God who 
makes man completely personal. Consequently, God is completely personal
___  _ ______ __
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In his encounter with man. It is this very reciprocity that provides
the dynamic character of biblical religion.
Although, in biblical religion, God is the one who gives and man the 
one who receives, reciprocity is always present in the divine-human 
relationship and expressed without any fear that it might limit the 
absolute divine supremacy, God reacts differently to different 
human actions. Logically, this means that he is partly dependent 
upon them.86
God is alive as the life process in which potential being becomes
actualized. On the human level, "Ultimate concern is the integrating
center of the personal life. Being without it is being without a center.
Such a state, however, can only be approached but never fully reached,
because a human being deprived completely of a center would cease to be 
87
a human being." When man encounters the Ultimate, he experiences a
degree of integration; but it is never a completed action. "Man is
integrated only fragmentarily and has elements of disintegration or
88
disease in all dimensions of his being." God may be fulfilled in 
himself (and therefore called Spirit), but man possesses the limitations 
of finitude.
"God's life is life as spirit, and the trinitarian principles are
89
moments within the process of the divine life," Tillich uses such 
terms as originating creativity, sustaining creativity, and directing 
creativity, to describe God's participation in the processes of life.
Man is made in the image of God in that man has a rational struc­
ture. It is essential man that is made in the image of God. It is this 
creation that is good. Estrangement occurs in the process of actualiza­
tion, and assistance is necessary for man to achieve any degree of reunion 
or fulfillment. Tillich refers to this activity of God as "providence."
"Providence is a quality of every constellation of conditions, a quality
90
which 'drives' or 'lures' toward fulfillment." It takes into considera­
tion man's freedom, and it works within the wholeness of life as inner
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directedness In every situation. The inference is that God dose not |
J
interfere with natural law. He works through the interdependence of 
all things.
God is the "God above Cod." Tillich uses this phrase at the 
conclusion of his book. The Courage to Be. to differentiate his inter­
pretation of God as Being-itself from the traditional theistic inter­
pretation of God. He wants to make it clear that God is not a being
besides others. "The ultimate source of the courage to be is the 'God
above God' , . . Man, in his anxiety and estrangement, is enabled
by God to take doubt and meaninglessness into himself and say yes to 
life. It is absolute faith in the Power of Being that makes this pos­
sible. Nonbeing and the threat of death are conquered.
The traditionalist who objects to Tillich's terminology can be 
reassured when Tillich states; "God and love are not two realities; 
they are one. . . .  he who does not speak of God may abide in Him if ha
is abiding in love. . . • many of those who do not know Him, belong to
92
Him, . . . The criterion, the only ultimate criterion, is love." The %
traditionalist may object to the ideas in the latter part of the quota­
tion, but the humanist would find himself included as a religious man 
according to Tillich's definition. "If we speak of the ontology of love 
we indicate that love belongs to the structure of Being-itself, that
every special being with its special nature participates in the nature
93of love since it participates in Being-itself." Love toward God is
the love of love, and this is an ecstatic experience which involves the |
process of self-realization. If the Ground of Being (God of love) is
understood to have the character of self-separating and self-returning
life, then that which was separated is reunited when one experiences 
94
this love. Loving God means finding oneself. It means affirming
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oneselft " . . .  man discovers himself when he discovers God; ho dis­
covers something that is identical with himself although it transcends
him infinitely, something from which ha is estranged, but from which he
95never has been and never can be separated," This does not mean that 
estrangement is an illusion or that it is not real. It just means that 
it is not total or absolute separation. In order to further elucidate 
Tillich's meaning of love, one must begin to use New Testament termi- |
nology such as aoaoe to describe Christian love, and this leads to 
Tillich's Christology. It is here that the abstract can be seen in the 
concrete, i.e., in a historic person, Jesus as the Christ. I
Jesus as the Christ
Tillich's Christology has a unique emphasis that retains the
element of paradox in its interpretation of the traditional concept of
the Incarnation, but he also affirms a liberal criticism of this concept. '#
He says that it is nonsensical to take the Incarnation literally. "The
Word became flesh" is at the heart of incarnational theology, but for
Tillich, the Divine does not become flesh— it always remains what it la-
divine. "The Incarnation of the Logos is not metamorphosis but his total i
manifestation in a personal life."^^ The two natures of Christ suggest |
two realities. Tillich copes with this dilemma by saying* " . . .  the
name Jesus Christ must be understood as 'Jesus who is called the Christ,'
97
or 'Jesus who is the Christ' . . . "  This maintains the paradoxical |
necessity in understanding the mystery and depth present in the historical 
fact of Jesus of Nazareth.
However, Tillich prefers to discuss this theological issue by 
shifting from thinking about the two natures of Christ to thinking in 
terms of the essential and the existential. The fundamental Christian 
assertion has been " . . .  that Essential God-Manhood has appeared within
4
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existence and subjected itself to the conditions of existence without
98
being conquered by them." In Jesus as the Christ is the reestablish­
ment of essential man. The reconciliation of essence and existence is
I
achieved. In Christ is the fulfillment of human life. He is what man I
'I
is potentially and what man ought to be. Even more important; "The
99
Christ is God-for-usl" The source of these affirmations is the bibli-
100
cal picture of Jesus as the Christ. Tillich stresses the fact that 
New Testament scholarship has been unable to come up with the historical
I
Jesus. All that it can do is to shed light upon the historic witness of 
Christians, which has been a picture of who Jesus was and what he did.
Tillich does not accept the view that the Jesus of history is in competi­
tion with the Christ of faith; he wants to maintain the necessary tension 
between the two interrelated concepts.
Jesus as the revelation of God is the Messiah, the Christ. Chris­
tians believe that he is the center of history. Indeed, he is the "Son 
of God" because ha is
. . ♦ the one in whom the essential unity of God and man has appeared 
under the conditions of existence. The essentially universal becomes j
existentially unique. But this uniqueness is not exclusive. Every- j
one who participates in the New Being actualized in him receives the 
power of becoming a child of God himself.101 |
The full humanity of Jesus must not be sacrificed in understanding his !
i
various titles. According to Tillich, Jesus had human weaknesses (e.g., i
’^i
Bros), and as all men, he participated in the tragedies of human axis- |
]
tence. But the significant difference was that he maintained his rela- |
tionship with God, in the process. He was transparent to God. He never
Î
allowed the relative to be elevated to the position of the Ultimate. He
surrendered himself completely to God. Therefore, in him man encountered
the best in man as well as the clearest picture of God. Jesus had "con-
102
tinuous communion with God." If sin is that power which separates man
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Christians affirm that the New Being has appeared in the life of a
person, a person who could transform human life. The character of the
bearer of the New Being is known because he sacrificed himself as Jesus
104
to himself as the Christ. Ha took suffering and death upon himself,
105
"The Cross is the symbol of a gift before it is the symbol of a demand,"
The personal experience of Jesus' disciples was that their picture of
from God, than it would have to be said that Jesus conquered sin. He 
overcame the demonic in man.
For Tillich it was the New Being that created the picture of
Jesus as the Christ. The disciples knew the reality of the New Being
because it had transforming power.
New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, 
conquering the gap between essence end existence. For the same 
idea Paul uses the term "new creature," calling those who are "in"
Christ "new creatures." "In" is the preposition of participation; 
he who participates in the newness of being which is in Christ has ^
become a new creature. . . .  In him has appeared what fulfillment #
qualitatively means.1^3
t
This introduces the element of grace into Tillich's Christology. The
Cross symbolizes the suffering of Christ and is an expression of the New
Being in him. It is important because it clearly shows the humanity of
Christ and the extent of his participation in the human situation. "And
salvation can be derived only from him who fully participated in man's
existential predicament, not from a God walking on earth, 'unequal to us
106
in all respects.'" Participating in human existence, Christ conquers 
it.
The Resurrection (as the Cross) is both symbol and reality for
Tillich, "It is the certainty of one's own victory over the death of
existential estrangement which creates the certainty of the Resurrection
of the Christ as event and symbol; but it is not historical conviction
*107
or the acceptance of biblical authority which creates this certainty."
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the Christ as he who was the New Being could not be destroyed with the 4
"7I'
death of Jesus of Nazareth. What Tillich appeals to is an interpretation .$
of the New Testament that "deliteralizes* rather than "demythologizes"
as Rudolf Bultmann would suggest. Tillich is trying to affirm the reality
of the Resurrection experience without ignoring reason, "Resurrection
is not an event that might happen in some remote future, but it is the
power of the New Being to create life out of death, here and now, today |
and tomorrow. Where there is a New Being, there is resurrection, namely,
108
the creation into eternity out of every moment of time."
The emphasis here has been on the content of religious experience
for the Christian. The focus will now be upon man's part as the receiver 4
of this content, as understood in Tillich's interpretation of salvation.
Recognizing that all religions have a message of healing, he emphasizes
109
"salvation as 'healing.'" However, it is the New Being who brings
salvation for all men. All men participate in the healing power to some
degree. "In this sense, healing means reuniting that which is estranged,
giving a center to what is split, overcoming the split between God and
110
man, man and his world, man and himself." No one is ever totally
healed, nor is healing power totally withheld from man. "Providence
means that there is a creative and saving possibility implied in every
111
situation, which cannot be destroyed by any event," Although even 
the Christian is in a state of relativity regarding his salvation, the 
New Being in the Christ transcends this relativity.
While it is God in Christ who initiates the process of reunion, 
man does play a dynamic part In the process as well. The element of free 
participation is basic to Tillich's threefold character of salvation.
Regeneration is man's participation in the saving power of the New Being 
in Jesus as the Christ.
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It Is the new state of things, the new eon, which the Christ brought; 
the individual "enters it," and in so doing he himself participates 
in it and is reborn through participation. The objective reality of S
the New Being precedes subjective participation in it. The message 
of conversion is, first, the message of a new reality to which one 4
is asked to turn; in the light of it, one is to move away from the 
old reality, the state of existential estrangement in which one has 
lived, . . .  Regeneration is the state of having been drawn into the 
new reality manifest in Jesus as the Christ.11%
This action involves faith. Regeneration is the call of faith and the
objective action of God.
The second characteristic of salvation is man's acceptance of the
New Being. This is Justification. It involves a subjective element.
Faith " . . .  is participation in the subject of one's ultimate concern
113
with one's whole being." It is not merely a matter of belief (i.e.,
an intellectual activity), or a matter of the will, or a matter of
emotional feeling. "Faith, in the New Testament, is the state of being
grasped by the divine Spirit. As Spirit it is the presence of the divine
power in the human mind; as holy Spirit it is the Spirit of love, justice,
114
and truth." There is a tension between participation and separation, 
however. Man cannot possess the object of his faith; therefore, separa­
tion will always be part of his experience of having faith. There is a 
"having" and a "not having" that make up the dynamic quality present in 
the experience of the Ultimate. "Out of the element of participation
follows the certainty of faith; out of the element of separation follows
115
the doubt in faith. And each is essential for the nature of faith."
Faith is being able to say yes to God in spite of the anxiety of the no.
This involves the total personality. It is an ecstatic experience of the 
Holy that includes both an awareness of truth and an ethical awareness.
If sin is being separated from oneself, one's neighbor, and God, 
then being saved involves the overcoming of separation in each of these 
areas. This is the experience of grace— the reunion of life with life.
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overcoming estrangement. It is reconciliation. How this happens cem
best be seen in Tillich's famous sermon on acceptance.
Grace strikes us when we are in great pain and restlessness. It 
strikes us whan we walk through the dark valley of meaninglessness 
and empty life. It strikes us when we feel our separation is deeper 
than usual, . . .  Sometimes at that moment a wave of light breaks 
into our darkness, and it is as though a voice were saying* "You 
are accepted. You are accepted, accepted by that which is greater 
than you, and the name of which you do not know. Do not ask for 
the name now; perhaps you will find it later. Do not try to do 
anything now; perhaps later you will do much. Do not seek for any­
thing; do not perform anything; do not intend anything. Simply 
accept the fact that you are accepted!" If that happens to us, we 
experience grace. . . .  In that moment, grace conquers sin, and 
reconciliation bridges the gulf of estrangement.
A sense of peace and wholeness results for the person who knows accep­
tance. Tillich saw the therapeutic value of this experience of accep­
tance. But he stressed the fact that it meant accepting the demonic in 
man, i.e., the very worst elements. Only when man can accept the worst 
in himself can he accept it in others. The power of the New Being in 
Christ enables him to do this. It is a liberating and freeing experience. 
In traditional language it means being justified. It is life-affirming 
and puts man in touch with the mystery, the depth, the greatness of 
existence.
Reconciliation involves the experience of forgiveness. This is 
implicit in acceptance. Because man has received love and forgiveness, 
he can respond in love for God. To be genuinely forgiven is to partici­
pate in the reunion that overcomes estrangement. It is becoming whole 
or healthy again. It means being healed. "Forgetting in spite of 
remembering is forgiveness. We can live only because our guilt is for­
given and thus eternally forgotten. And we can love only because we
117
forgive and are forgiven." Life is still possible.
In Tillich's thinking the third characteristic of salvation is 
Sanctification. It is in this dimension of experience that one might
4
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speak of the possibility of becoming fully human. "Sanctification is
the process in which the power of the New Being transforms personality
11Aand community, inside and outside the church." The important word 
here is transformation. Man is transformed by his participation in the 
New Being.
Experiencing Sanctification does not mean arriving at perfection.
119"Perfection means actualization of one's potentialities . . . "  But 
this is always a matter of degree. It does not mean a finished product. 
It does not mean being divine. "Man can be healed, he can be saved. But 
it is man who is healed and s a v e d . M a n  may achieve self-realization, 
he may become liberated, he may realize his potential, but these are all 
ways of saying that growth is an important element in man's experience. 
All of life is limited by the law of growth. Man may go beyond ordinary 
life to that which Christians call "abundant life," but it is still human 
life, albeit life under the impact of the Spirit. Struggle, pain, and 
death will still be part of the human lot, but abundant living means 
taking these realities into oneself and saying yes to life in spite of 
the noes. The impact of the Unconditional, i.e., the Eternal, upon man 
enables him to endure the ambiguities of life. A mature person is one 
who lives with his ambiguities.
The reconciled person knows the depth of human experience, and
although he recognizes the demonic that he discovers there, he also
recognizes the joy that is present.
But eternal joy is not to be reached by living on the surface. It 
is rather attained by breaking through the surface, by penetrating 
the deep things of ourselves, of our world, and of God. The moment 
in which we reach the last depth of our lives is the moment in which 
we can experience the joy that has eternity within it, the hope that 
cannot be destroyed, and the truth on which life and death are built# 
For in the depth is truth; and in the depth is hope; and in the depth 
Is joy.121
I
I
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fulfilled in our true being, in our personal center. • . • Joy is born
122
out of reunion with reality itself." Fulfillment is the realization 
that the inner aim of life and the experience of salvation are one.
It is a state of blessedness.
Being reconciled brings a sense of fulfillment, but Tillich warns 
that it does not mean becoming divine. The "old Adam" may be conquered, 
but he is still there. Even sanctified man will continue to be human, 
i.e., he will have to cope with the contingencies of life. He will still 
have to face his inner doubts and uncertainties— but he will not be alone 
in doing so. In a thought-provoking sermon entitled "Be Strong," Tillich 
comments upon the strong Christian personality. He would possess watch­
fulness, faith, courage, and love. According to St. Paul, the Christian 
could be expected to be what he is— Christian. He will be honest with 
himself and accept his own weaknesses.
There is a non-Christian in every Christian, a weak being in every 
strong one. There is cowardice in every courage, and unbelief in 
every faith, and hostility in every love. Watchfulness means that 
the Christian never can rest on his being a Christian, that he who
is strong can never rely on his strength.123
Recognizing one's weaknesses is part of recognizing one's dependence upon
the divine Ground of Being. Even reconciled man can be dominated at times
by forces that conquer parts of his being. What helps him to stand, i.e.,
to exist meaningfully, is the power of love that is present in the New
Being. It is this love (God) that participates in human weakness and
gives man strength.
To be reconciled is to know this joy. The lack of it is caused by 
separation from God. "But only the fulfillment of what we really are 
can give us joy. Joy is nothing else than the awareness of our being -4
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The Spiritual Presence 
That Tillich's systematic theology is trinitarian in structure '4
has been stated. Since his doctrine of God and his Christology have 
already been examined, it will now be necessary to view his thought 
centering upon the Spiritual Presence, In addition, his thinking about 
the multidimensional unity of life will be considered. In this section 
attention will be limited to man as an Individual; his social relation­
ships will be explored in the last section of this chapter.
Tillich begins by describing the different dimensions of life f
(time, space, causality, and substance). These dimensions were commented 
upon earlier, e.g., when reference was made to man's finitude; attention 
will now be focused upon the importance of man as a spirit. "Spirit as
a dimension of life includes more than reason— it includes eros. passion,
124
imagination— but without looos-structure. it could not express anything."
Only man has this spirit dimension. He may share the other dimensions, 
more or less, with others in the animal world, but it is the dimension of 
spirit that singles him out. "Man cannot not be man, as animal cannot 
not be animal. But man can partly miss that creative act in which the
125
dominance of the psychological is overcome by the dominance of the spirit."
For example, whenever man makes a moral decision it is the centered self, 
under the dominance of the spirit, that makes distinctions, choices, and
value judgments. "Morality is the function of life by which the realm of
126the spirit comes into being."
Although life is ambiguous due to the essential and existential
elements in it, Tillich calls attention to " . . . the three functions of
life; self-integration under the principle of centeredness, self-creation
under the principle of growth, and self-transcendence under the principle 
127
of sublimity." Of course, man's unity can be threatened by disintegra­
tion, destruction, and profanization.
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Human U f a  oscillates between the possible and the real and
1
I
I
I
requires the surrender of the one for the o t h e r . T h i s  is the sacri­
ficial character of life. Choices and risks are involved in human exis­
tence. But with the dimension of self-awareness man can get beyond 
himself, i.e., he can transcend himself, so that he has access to re­
sources that assist him in living with the ambiguities and risks that 
are part of his life. The tragic dimension of existence can be faced 
and taken into oneself. One may have a terminal illness, for example. 
Accepting the reality of it will not alter the fact that one is going 
to die within a given period of time. But the attitude with which one 
faces death can be altered by taking the tragedy into oneself and accept­
ing it. This does not mean stoically accepting it. It means cooperating 
with the Power of Being and allowing the strength that comes from the 
Spiritual Presence to support one in the midst of tragedy. Religion can
be defined " . . .  as the self-transcendence of life under the dimension 
129of spirit." Religion is the answer to man's ambiguous situation,
i.e., it enables him to transcend his finite tensions and conflicts.
This quest for the unambiguous life has produced three religious
symbols: Spirit of God, Kingdom of God, and Eternal Life. "The Spirit
of God is the presence of the Divine Life within creaturely life. The
Divine Spirit is 'God Present.' The Spirit of God is not a separated 
130
being." The symbols of the unambiguous life are interrelated, but 
Tillich distinguishes between them in the following quotation: "Spiri­
tual Presence for the conquest of the ambiguities of life under the 
dimension of the spirit. Kingdom of God for the conquest of the ambigu­
ities of life under the dimension of history, and Eternal Life for the
131
conquest of the ambiguities of life beyond history." They are all 
facets of the same reality.
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The concern here is with human experience as a dimension of 
spirit. Even though man desires a unified life, ha encounters estrange­
ment and disintegration. The human spirit is ambiguous, and although 
it may seek the ecstatic moment that would overcome his ambiguity, it 
eludes him, Man cannot control the Spiritual Presence. "When it grasps 
man, it creates unambiguous life. Man in his self-transcendence can
reach for it, but man cannot grasp it, unless he is first grasped by 
*132
it." When man is grasped by it, he experiences meaning— he experi­
ences faith and aoaoe. Through the means of prayer, the Word, and the 
sacraments, the Spiritual Presence makes contact with man's spirit:
" . . .  the Spiritual Presence elevates the human spirit into the tran­
scendent union of unambiguous life and gives the immediate certainty of
133
reunion with God." This is the same as being grasped by the New Being
manifested in Jesus as the Christ. This is not speaking of two separate 
experiences. Two symbols are being used to convey the same meaning, 
i.e., reconciliation.
To return to the concept of Sanctification, seen as the work of 
the Spirit— Sanctification is the life process under the impact of the 
Spirit. It is the same thing as experiencing the New Being. Sanctifi­
cation is a process, however, and in it can be seen the following four 
characteristics which best illustrate man's becoming fully human.
The first characteristic is that of increasing awareness. Man 
" . . .  becomes increasingly aware of his actual situation and of the
forces struggling around him and his humanity but also becomes aware of
134 :;i
the answers to the questions implied in this situation." This implies |
, 'ft
being aware of the divine and the demonic in man. It means affirming
I
life, in spite of its ambiguities. "Such awareness includes sensitivity 
toward the demands of one's own growth, toward the hidden hopes and 1
i
j
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emphasis here is a mature relatedness which keeps in balance man's need 
for solitude and for communion with others. These elements are inter­
dependent, and the result is victory over loneliness. Immaturity cannot 
sustain solitude and is frequently superficially outgoing. Maturity is
?
-I
disappointments within others, toward the voiceless voice of a concrete
situation, towards the grades of authenticity in the life of the spirit
135
in others and oneself.*
The second characteristic of Sanctification is that of increasing 
freedom. This refers to liberation from compulsions that impede spiri­
tual growth. Morally this indicates freedom from the commandments of 
law, i.e., being more conscious of the spirit of the law than of follow­
ing the letter of it. It means overcoming one's willfulness and one's 
enslaving habits. Maturity seeks to create and maintain the conditions 
that would make this freedom available for others. Conversely, maturity 
resists anything that would destroy this freedom. Tillich says that
such action as asceticism, or even martyrdom, would be resorted to in
136
order to preserve freedom in the concrete situation.
The third characteristic of Sanctification under the influence of
the Spirit is that of increasing relatedness. "Relatedness implies the 4
awareness of the other one and the freedom to relate to him by overcom- |
137 1
ing self-seclusion within oneself and within the other one." The key 1
I
both inward looking and outgoing, making it possible for responsible ]
relationships to take place. It involves the vertical and horizontal
dimensions of life in complementary tension with each other. Hostility
and unhealthy introversion is replaced with loving acceptance and balanced
extraversion. A mature self-relatedness involves exercising self-control
and self-discipline. The individual becomes more spontaneous and self-
138
affirming without engaging in self-elevation or self-humiliation.
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man's reach. Even a sanctified life has its ups and downs. The imper­
ial
tant thing is that it is a "movement toward maturity," Perhaps the 
term "saint" indicates the direction toward which one should be striving. 
According to Tillich, a saint is one who is transparent to the Divine. 
Certainly Jesus had this quality, but he was more than a saint; he was 
the bearer of the New Being. Still, a saint has an image of perfection, 
but in reality saints remain sinners (although justified ones). Obvi­
ously Tillich is not advocating a Roman Catholic conception of a saint 
as a special person who is canonized by the church. He is thinking in
I
A person's search for identity reaches the stage of arriving, i.e., of
finding one's identity. One's essential self becomes evident through
one's existential self.
The fourth characteristic of Sanctification revealing the process
of growth is that of increasing self-transcendence* " . . .  sanctifies-
tion is not possible without a continuous transcendence of oneself in
the direction of the ultimate— in other words, without participation in 
139
the holy," Possessing a devotional attitude toward the Ultimate is 
entailed. Not withdrawal into a private devotional world but, to the 
contrary, participation in corporate devotion is indicated. Tillich 
makes it clear that that maturity in this area does not limit itself to 
worship services (although it would include it). Private meditation, 
mutual sharing of meaningful experiences with others, and appreciation 
of creative works of art are examples of ways in which one's devotional 
life can be expressed. "Perhaps one can say that with increasing matu­
rity in the process of sanctification the transcendence becomes more
140
definite and its expressions more indefinite."
The four characteristics, or principles, of life under the Spirit 
point toward perfection. But perfection is a goal beyond the grasp of
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Pauline terms, in which ordinary followers of Christ are called saints. 
Saints are persons through whom the Ultimate can be seen. "The saint 
is saint, not because he is 'good,' but because he is transparent for 
something that is more than he himself is,"^*^ Saints point the way, 
they are sign-events for others.
This discussion of the significance of the Spiritual Presence 
can be concluded with quotations from one of Tillich's sermons in 'I
The Eternal Now*
A
. . . this is what Divine Spirit means* God present to our spirit.
. . .  in communities and personalities, grasping them, inspiring 
them, and transforming them. For Spirit is first of all power, the 41
power that drives the human spirit above itself towards what it 
cannot attain by itself, the love that is greater than all other 
gifts, the truth in which the depth of being opens itself to us, 
the holy that is the manifestation of the presence of the ultimate.
. . . The Spirit can work in you with a soft but insistent voice, 
telling you that your life is empty and meaningless, but that there 
are chances of a new life waiting before the door of your inner self 
to fill its void . . .  The Spirit can give you the courage that says 
"yes" to life in spite of the destructiveness you have experienced 
around you and within y o u , 143
This brings us to the final major section of this chapter. Up to 
this point Paul Tillich's view of what it means to be human, with God's 
help, has been the main concern. The following division of human experi­
ence— what man is essentially, what he is existentially, and what he may 
become if reconciled— has been observed. Attention has been on man as
J
an individual. It is now necessary to look at man in his relationship |
;1
to others, i.e., man in community. What man does when he is involved in 
becoming fully human will be seen.
I
Theonomous Culture* Social Fulfillment
In Paul Tillich's concept of the human, maturity is equated with
fulfillment. "A mature man is one who has reached his natural power in
144
life and thought and is able to use it freely." This is the equive- t
]
lent of being wise, which Involves being aware of the mystery in life j
a
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the thou can personality arise." Man needs to be in relationship
with other men in order to realize his full humanity.
To be truly human, i.e., to be an individual embodiment of creative 
freedom, is to be a person. But to be a person is to be simulta­
neously a member of a community of persons. One can become a person 
— a self-determining being with the power to grasp and shape reality 
— only by entering into communion with other persons,146
Tillich makes it clear that the interdependence of man is part of the
process of becoming human.
Because Tillich understands religion to be essentially social
(culture is the form of religion and religion is the substance of cul- 
147
ture), this dimension needs to be explored. What he advocates is a 
theonomous culture, i.e., one whose creations express an Ultimate Con­
cern, Transcendent meaning would be explicit in this culture; it would 
not be viewed as something strange or foreign to it. In contrast to 
autonomy (obedience to the law of reason) or to heteronomy (obedience to 
laws external to man), Tillich speaks of theonomy; "Theonomy does not
mean the acceptance of a divine law imposed on reason by a highest
148
authority; it means autonomous reason united with its own depth,"
The Middle Ages would be an example of a time in which culture was con­
scious of, and oriented to, an unconditional concern. Obviously Tillich 
does not suggest a return to the Middle Ages (as some romantics would 
desire). He does seek a consciousness of the depth element of existence 
such as was present at that time.
The Spiritual Community 
"The divine Spirit's invasion of the human spirit does not occur 
in isolated individuals but in social groups, since all the functions of
,
but also of the conflicts within life. However, becoming mature as a K
■I
person necessitates another dimension— the social dimension of man.
■?
"A person becomes aware of his own character as a person only when he 
is confronted by another person. Only in the community of the I and
^ M n n  nooH«! 4'rt h o  in t*ol i n n o h i n  4
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hood. The experience of the moral imperative is a substantive part of
being man; he would not be a man without it, "A being without the con-
151
sciousness of a moral demand is not human," The moral command is 
unconditional in character, and without the reunion of man with his own 
essential nature moral action would be difficult. That is, in estrange­
ment man is still wrapped up in himself, and he is insensitive to other 
persons' "having" and "not having." It is only after liberation to full 
humanity that man realizes:
In every death we encounter, something of us dies, and in every 
disease, something of us tends towards disintegration. . . .  no one
the human spirit— moral self-integration, cultural self-creation, and h
4
religious self-transcendence— are conditioned by the social context of
149 I
the ego-thou encounter." Tillich uses the term "Spiritual Community" •
to describe the social correlate of the New Being, This can include the 4
i
social reality of the institutional church, but it is not limited to I
I
social or religious organizations. The Spiritual Community is a com- ||
munity of faith and love and is the unity of religion, culture, and
morality. It is known in great moments (kairoi) of history. Those who 
are grasped by an Ultimate Concern form a community of faith, but it is 
a community that is universal in nature, i.e., it desires to include all
mankind. And it is a community that has the mark of holiness since its
foundation is the New Being, the Really Real.
Before commenting on Tillich's thought about the nature of the 
Christian church, further attention must be given to man as an ethical 
creature (whether he is inside or outside the institutional church). A 
person , is a moral concept, pointing to a being which we are asked
to respect as the bearer of a dignity equal to our own and which we are i
' 'Inot permitted to use as a means for a purpose, because it is purpose in 4
i t s e l f . M a n ' s  relationship to other men requires respect for person- ,!
264
can be liberated from himself unless he is grasped by that power ■'§
which is present in everyone and everything— the eternal, from 
which we coma and to which we go, and which gives us ourselves 
and liberates us from ourselves.152
J
This is another way of saying that man becomes responsible for others i|
when he is freed from himself.
The moral experience of mankind has been expressed in such codes |
of conduct as the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount. But
Tillich says that these, and the codes of other religions, are not
absolutes. The only absolute principle that he recognizes is agape: the
codes are derived from it. Whereas codes may be relative, i.e., tran- |
sient, human beings are immersed in these relativities. While being
part of the relativities, man has the power of knowing what enables him
to transcend them. "A conscience may be called 'transmoral' which judges
not in obedience to a moral law but according to the participation in a
153
reality which transcends the sphere of moral commands." Man's ethical 
existence is based upon his relationship to God; therefore, his religious 
existence is fundamental to his ethical and social existence.
The ethics of Tillich can be found at various places throughout 
his writings. However, his book. Morality and Beyond, goes into consider­
able detail in explaining his ethical ideas. "The moral act establishes
154
man as a person, and as a bearer of the spirit." Man has the freedom 
to respond responsibly to the world, or he can ignore or reject the moral 
claim on his life, Man's essential baing was created in the image of God, 
and it was considered to be "very good" by Cod in the creation myth.
I
According to Tillich, it is this essential being of man that can be inter- !
1
preted to be "God's Will." To do "God's Will" man seeks, as much as poe- i
sible, to approximate his essential being. This can occur only when he I
has experienced reconciliation. "For us the 'Will of Cod' is manifest I
in our essential being; and only because of this can we accept the moral
!
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imperative as valid. It is not a strange law that demands our obedience,
but the * silent voice* of our own nature as man, and as man with an
155 f
individual character." What this means in terms of human relation-
ships can be seen in the demand to treat other persons as subjects and 
not as objects. People are persons, not things. "The "Spiritual Pres­
ence,* the presence of the divine Ground of Being toward and in the
human spirit, opens man's eyes and ears to the moral demand implicit in
_156
the concrete situation."
Aoaoe serves as the motivation for loving others and justice is
the social form of uniting love. Therefore, man is to act responsibly
by " • • . being guided by the divine-human wisdom embodied in the moral
laws of the past, listening to the concrete situation, and acting coura-
157
geously on the basis of these principles." Acting responsibly is not 
out of a requirement to obey the moral laws present in the ethical com­
mandments of one's religious heritage. Rather, it is out of a genuine 
response to man's being accepted that his moral action is motivated.
"The unconditional character of the moral imperative, love as the ulti­
mate source of the moral commands, and grace as the power of moral
motivation are the concepts through which the question of the relation
158
of religion and morality is fundamentally answered."
Only love, i.e., aoaoe. is able to adapt itself to a changing 
world. It can meet the specific needs presented by each concrete situa­
tion. It is able to be found in every kairos situation. While each 
ethical system needs laws and institutions, the true meaning of ethics
is: " . . .  the expression of the ways in which love embodies itself,
159
and life is maintained and saved."
A further word needs to be said regarding the interrelationship 
of love, power, and justice. In his book by that title, Tillich makes
d
I
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it clear that love, power, and justice are rooted in an ontological basis.
"Constructive social ethics presuppose that one is aware of the element
of love in structures of power and of the element of power without which
love becomes chaotic s u r r e n d e r . L o v e  is the foundation of power,
and love is the principle of justice. Whenever man treats other man as
things, justice is violated. One needs to be conscious that* "Love does
not do more than justice demands, but love is the ultimate principle of
justice, Lx)ve reunites; justice preserves what is to be united. It is
161
the form in which and through which love performs its work." Since
Being-itself is God, love, power, and justice come from God. for Tillich
they are symbols of the Divine Life. Therefore, an ethical person who
has experienced reconciliation is one in whom love, power, and justice
are evident and in the proper perspective. Not only does ha embody these
principles but he works in society to show the unity and interrelatedness,
of love, power, and justice. He is a witness to their source, God,
In order to live an ethical life, man must have the courage of his
convictions. His intentionality is to live "in" meanings, i.e., in that
162
which is valid logically, aesthetically, ethically, and religiously,
'ÂI
Ethical man participates in the social structures that are meaning- ,
producing. This means political and economic involvement in the social J
■
fabric of life. A sensitivity to the values that create and sustain life
by making it more human receive high priority for ethical man. It means |
being a conciliatory factor in life, and even at times having to absorb
hostility from others, in the process of conciliation. The ethical man
affirms being, in realistic ways, in spite of the presence of nonbeing. |
He can do this because he has had the courage to accept himself as having }
163
been accepted in spite of his being unacceptable. He is free to become 
involved in concrete ways of improving the social conditions of man. j
>.■4
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The ethical life is an expression of man's life in relationship to the
Spiritual Presence. Tillich's purpose is to show man as one who stands
in nature, taking upon himself inevitable reality, not fleeing from it
either in the world of ideal forms or into the related world of the
164
supernatural, but making decisions in concrete reality.
The Christian Community
While it is true that man is man only when he is in community,
comment needs to be made upon the particular community of Christians.
"Such words as 'body of Christ,' 'assembly (ecclesia) of God' or 'of
Christ,' express the unambiguous life created by the divine Presence,
165
in a sense similar to that of the term 'Spiritual Community,'"
Although it is a fragmented community because it is limited to the con­
ditions of finitude, it is, nevertheless, unambiguous in that it has 
overcome the human predicament of estrangement. This community possesses 
such characteristics ast ecstasy, faith, love expressed in mutual ser­
vice (especially toward those in need, whether members of the group or
. 166 
not), unity, and universality.
An interesting facet of Tillich's thought involves what he calls
the "latent" community. By this term he means those u^o are part of the
I
community before the encounter with the New Being. "Latency is the state
167of being partly actual, partly potential; . . . "  For example, Chris­
tian humanism would be the Spiritual Community in its latent form. There 
are people within the Spiritual Community of most of the major religions 
of the world who have not been really grasped by what is ultimate.
Tillich even goes so far as to suggest that world communism is living in 
the latent dimension of the Spiritual Community.
The manifest Christian community is the church. "The church in 
New Testament Creek is ecclesia. the assembly of those who are called
260 I
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out of all nations by the apostoloi, the messengers of the Christ, to
the congregation of the eleutheroi. those who have become free citizens
16Ô
of the 'Kingdom of the Heavens.'" Wherever the Gospel has been
I
Ipreached and a fellowship has come into being, there is a church. The 
church is both a sociological and a theological reality. "The paradox
of the churches is the fact that they participate, oh the one hand, in |
'I
I
I
the ambiguities of life in general and of the religious life in particu­
lar and, on the other hand, in the unambiguous life of the Spiritual
169
Community." Such attractive characteristics as faith and love and
holiness can be found in the church, but so can the unattractive char- É
acteristics of the demonic and the destructive be found there. In other
words, the church is human, i.e., with all the grandeur and mibery of f
man. At the same time, the church is the community of the New, Being.
The church contains the ambiguities of life; it is the point at which
170
the ambiguities are recognized and rejected but not removed. It is
a community that points to and affirms the New Being in Jesus as the 
Christ. It is a community of love that tries to make love possible in 
others. Because its members have received grace and have known the 
experience of worship, it has a purpose to expand itself, i.e., to actu­
alize the Spiritual Community within concrete churches all over the 
171
world. This requires that the church be involved in educational and
evangelistic work. The evangelist does not address himself to "lost #
souls," men without God, but to people in the stage of latency who need
to be transformed into persons who are consciously in the Spiritual Corn-
172 #
munity. It is beyond our scope to go into further detail concerning
Tillich's understanding of the church and its various functions. What |
I
need to be emphasized are some of the specific things which a person
;|
does when a member of the Christian community.
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aftarai!, is everyone's predicament* By identifying with people, wher­
ever they are, persons can help in sharing their concerns so that when 
the questions are asked Christians can point to the Christian answer.
The responsibility that the Christian has in communicating the Gospel is 
" . . . putting it before the people so that they are able to decide for
or against it. The Christian Gospel is a matter of decision. It is to
176
be accepted or rejected." It is not a Christian's responsibility to 
make disciples. His task is to give an invitation for decision-making. 
His responsibility is to provide a state of readiness in which others 
might experience the New Being. Whether or not they say yes to the 
healing reality of the New Being is up to them.
The strategies used to communicate the Gospel may be implicit or 
explicit. Whatever means are consistent with the individual who is
For example, a person who has been saved, i.e., healed, has the |
■?
responsibility of helping others also to become liberated and to be set
4:
free. In a sermon on salvation Tillich says;
Who are these healers? Where are these saviours? . , . They are 
here; they are you. Each of you has liberating and healing power 
over someone to whom you are a priest. We all are called to be 
priests to each other; and if priests, also physicians. And if < 1 7 3  
physicians, also counsellors. And if counsellors, also liberators.
The person who has been the recipient of the Gospel has a responsibility
to communicate the Gospel. This means helping man to understand his
predicament, i.e., helping others to become conscious of the factors
that causa estrangement. In some cases this would mean making people
aware of their predicament. A Christian's task " . . .  is to heal those
174
who are sick, which includes those who are not aware that they are sick,"
This is done by communicating through participation. "Participation
means participation in their existence, out of which the questions come
175
to which we are supposed to give the answer." Their predicament.
a
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The Christian is required to engage in battle wherever the demonic 
threatens to make human life less than human. If it has not already been 
started, the Christian must initiate the rebellion against the dehumaniz­
ing actualities of social existence; or he must join in it if it has al­
ready been started. This means participating in the social revolutions 
of the time that seek to make human life more human. For example, it 
means being involved in such social realities as the fight against
y
communicating the Gospel and are not repulsive to the Gospel itself ll
should be employed. It may be a silent penetration of society or a 
highly visible approach to society; the point is that the reconciled 
member of the Spiritual Community has an obligation to share his experi­
ence. He is called upon to make a difference in the larger human family.
Tillich refers to these approaches as "priestly" and "prophetic" func­
tions. "The churches silently give Spiritual substance to the society
in which they live, and the churches silently receive Spiritual forms
177
from the same society." But there are times when there must be a x
critical attack upon the dehumanizing structures of society. This is 
what is meant by the prophetic function. Sometimes this attack is 
directed against the church itself. Tillich calls this the "Protestant 
principle." Whenever anything relative is elevated to the position of 
that which is ultimate, the prophetic spirit criticizes, attacks, and 
condemns whatever authority is responsible for this idolatry. This 
power to be self-critical is most important for the church. At other 
times the church may find it necessary to level criticism against the 
state, and this has political ramification.
Christian action today must preserve the tradition of social criti- ;
cism, and it must attack wherever social patterns become visible by |
which persons are treated as means or transferred into things or «
deprived of their freedom to decide and to create, or thrown into 
anxiety or bitterness or hate or tragic guilt.1^8 i
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poverty, racism, war, and ecological suicide. It also indicates that 
sacrifice and risk taken in social service are necessary in living out 
one's Christian faith. Social action is an important part of demonstrat­
ing one's theological commitments. What is at stake is the survival of 
man. The problems are monumental; the need is urgent, Christians are 
to join with other Christians and even with those who have different 
reasons for being (such as humanists end communists), in order to work 
for a future for man, God has given man creativity and responsibility; 
the time for man to act is now. The kairos is here and the Christian is 
one who bears witness to it. In spite of the pessimistic predictions 
about man's future, the Christian responds to the current crises with 
hope because God is at work within his creatures and within his creation.
Tillich, however, was very conscious of the possibility that man 
may act irresponsibly and become "rebarbarized." "Every newborn infant 
has, when it comes to a certain point of self-awareness, the possibility
of stopping progress by contradicting fulfillment in man's essential 
179nature.": Tillich opposed any belief in natural progress in humanity.
He preferred the concept of maturity and the need to rise to the occasion
of pregnant moments. For example, "Perhaps there are great moments in
history. There is in these great moments not total fulfillment but there
is the victory over a particular power of destruction, a victory over a
160
demonic power which was creative and now has become destructive."
Tillich challenged persons to participate in the fight. Comment was made 
in the last chapter upon the particular battlsfronts in which Tillich was 
actively engaged (e.g., religious socialism, anti-Nazi cause, Jewish 
refugee work, etc.).
In an article on "The Person in a Technical Society," Tillich 
revealed his concern for homo faber. industrial man. He said that
A
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everyone must join in the rebellion of creative life against any
structure that contributes to the degradation of man.
The technical development is irreversible and adjustment is neces- :|
sary in every society, especially in a mass society. The person as 3
a person can preserve himself only by a partial non-participation |
in the objectifying structures of technical society. But he can 
withdraw even partially only if he has a place to which to withdraw,
And this place is the New Reality to which the Christian message 
points . , . the picture of Jesus as the Christ.181
The Christian can help a technical society by pointing to the ultimate
roots of personal being. Only the ground of the personal can save the
personal. "It is the New Reality which is manifest in Christ and against
which even technical society and its power of destroying the person as
.182
person cannot prevail." Out of the depth of human existence arises 
the courage to resist pattsrnization and dehumanization in contemporary 
social life.
Tillich saw the demonic power of capitalism. He saw the injustice
that resulted from its misuse. This was the reason that he participated
in the Religious Socialist movement of post-World War I in Germany. While 
it was Marxist in philosophy, it did not have utopian goals nor did it
lack a self-critical element. Although religious socialism as a movement
was not successful (if judged by its effect upon the twentieth century), 
Tillich maintained that it had the ingredients for political ideals of 
the future. Reflecting upon the lack of reception that religious social­
ism received, he thought that its time had not yet come (although he 
thought differently in the 1920s). However, he believed that because it 
was based on the concept of a theonomous culture the main objectives of 
the movement of religious socialism would be present in the social reality 
of the future, whatever form the future would take. If man is to survive 
into the future, he must be a part of a theonomous culture— one in which 
healing can take place. Modern man cannot tolerate a society with a
.:À
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this was a call to border-crossing. Modern man will either fall back 
upon the familiar and static ways of the past, or he will transcend him­
self and move into the untried future. He will cross over the boundary 
into a theonomous culture where existence will continue to be full of 
tension but with a consciousness in culture of the Ultimate. Theonomy
is " . . . the state of culture under the impact of the Spiritual Praa- 
184
ence." It is the Spiritual Presence that creates a theonomous culture. 
It is a culture in which grace abounds. Those who will live in a theono­
mous culture will live with hops. "Hope unites the vertical and the
horizontal lines, the religious reservation and the religious obligation.
Therefore, the ultimate word that religion must say to the people of our
185
time is the word of hope." For a theonomous man is one who lives in
history but as one who is also above history. Theonomous man is in touch
with the Really Real. He has entered deeply into the contemporary moment
and has discovered the Ultimate transforming the personal and historical
situation. The future of this world may be in man's hands, but)
• . • there is another order to which we, as human beings, belong, 
an order which makes man always dissatisfied with what is given to 
him. . . .  Ha passes, as no other being is able to pass, beyond the
limits of his given world. He participates in something infinite,
in an order which is not transitory, not self-destructive, not 
tragic, but eternal, holy, and blessed.186
The Christian community is part of the Spiritual Community. It 
has members who participate in the Kingdom of God (a term which Tillich 
uses to include all elements of reality). The Kingdom of God in its ful­
fillment is identical to Eternal Life: it is the nonfragmentary and
187
total conquest of the ambiguities of life. In a sermon on "The
II
spiritual vacuum. He cannot live long with a lack of ultimacy. The |
Christian and the church need to " . . . return to the frontier, to
cross over it and wrestle for the Beyond in the to-and-fro between
183
church and culture," For Tillich, who was at home "on the boundary," %
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Mystery of Time," Tillich refers to the Gospel of John in which Eternal 
Life is seen as a gift in the present time;
he, who listens to Christ, has eternity already. He is no 
longer subject to the driving of time. In him the "now" becomes a 
"now eternal", , . . Time is not meaningless. It has a hidden mean­
ing— salvation. It has a hidden goal— the Kingdom of God. It brings 
about a hidden reality— the new creation.188
Man becomes fully human when he arrives at the state of blessed­
ness. The Spiritual Presence produces a feeling of fulfillment in which 
man, while recognizing the negativities of life, cannot be threatened.
It is a state that has personal and social implications.
The concept of "the human" in the work of Paul Tillich has been 
examined. All of his various avenues of thought have not been summarized, 
but an attempt has been made to pursue those which were most pertinent 
in conveying his understanding of man. Attention must now be given to 
the significance of Paul Tillich as a contemporary theologian, which will 
be the subject of the next chapter.
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In this chapter an attempt will be made to see Paul Tillich and 
his work in perspective. There will be three particular areas of con­
cern; first, the reasons for Tillich's wide influence and his possible 
lasting theological contributions; second, the various critiques of his 
philosophical theology; and third, an evaluation of his concept of "the 
human" as discovered in this study.
The Contributions of Paul Tillich 
At the time of his early work, Tillich's popularity was limited.
He had been recognized in Germany as an outstanding theologian prior to 
his exodus to the United States. But the extent of his influence did 
not reach its height until the latter part of his career (during the
1950s and early 1960s). Since he lived a long life and was a prodigious
!
writer, his fame increased up to the time of his death in 1955. The 
reasons for his popularity were manyfold.
First of all, Tillich was a theologian of culture. Daniel Day 
Williams praised " . . .  Tillich's extraordinary power to speak to con­
temporary culture in its own t e r m s . T h i s  was because Tillich took 
seriously the questions of modern man. On another occasion Williams 
commented that the effect of Tillich's intent to units personal faith 
and rational understanding was that secular culture and the Christian 
church deepened their self-understanding. As Edward Dowey, Jr. noted,
"The incorporation of the whole range of human experience, indeed 'open !
experience,' into the matter of Christian theology is a hall-mark of
275 il
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Paul Tillich's thought," Ha was not interested only in a specialist's 
approach to life— to the contrary, he saw life in its wholeness, and 
this forced him into contact with persons of many different fields.
His colleague for many years, Paul Lehmann, said: "No theologian in
the tradition of the Reformation has addressed himself to the tremendous 
responsibility for culture, for the life of man as it is actually lived
in space and time, with the passion and persistence, the consecration |
3 ■ I
and the learning that mark Professor Tillich's life-long work." Another
colleague. Reinhold Niebuhr, called Tillich " . . .  the Origen of our
period, seeking to relate the Gospel message to the disciplines of our
4
culture and to the whole history of culture." Tillich was not limited
to his own narrow discipline. He saw his work in the larger context of
all of life. Religion and culture were directly related to each other.
Reality was the subject of his interest, and it took him into many
avenues of thought.
Tillich stands forth as the theologian for Everyman in the predica­
ment of his existence. He sees his central task as one of mediating 
between faith and culture . . .  It is his passion for reconciliation 
that has made Tillich so sensitive to the antagonism of separation 
and struggle which he finds on all levels of individual and social 
life.5
The emphasis here is on the word mediation. His concern for the boundary 
situation (he saw himself as always on the boundary) gave him a unique 
position from which he could play a mediating role. His dialectical 
methodology enabled him to see both sides of issues. For example.
Tillich seems to emerge as a prophet of both doom and promise. It 
is the vision of holiness, the ultimacy of the divine, the God beyond, 
which moves him. He has, in his "Protestant principle," forged a ■]
hammer for crushing the idols of modern man: he rejects all attempts 3
to make the conditional into the unconditional.& /:j
Perhaps the reason for Tillich's preference for the boundary i
situation was the fact that it was his own existential experience. Erik I
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Erikson thought that part of Tillich's charismatic and personal appeal 
was a result of the combining of " , . . his opposites— and his occa­
sional extremes— in what he called his qlaeubiqer Realismus. his bland
7
of realism and faith, his utter sensual and spiritual Hereness." He
could talk about what was noble in man, but he never lost sight of the
demonic in man. While reason played an important part in man's self-
understanding, for Tillich, the element of depth which belonged to reason
pointed to the ultimate realities of truth, goodness, beauty, love, and
justice. At the same time, Tillich diagnosed the human situation as
" . . , one which is experienced in terms of disruption, conflict, self-
8
destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life."
He saw the tensions of life, and he knew what it meant to live
with these tensions. "He was himself a living example of the divinely
given power and courage to be; he was a union of Apollonian and Dionysian ,
powers, a marriage of undogmatic humility with the abundance of daring
exploration of creative possibility. . . .  He was more than a hero of the 
9
mind." I He recognized the interdependence of reflective and responsive
thought, i.e., that reason and revelation were necessary in order for man
to grasp the meaning of reality. "The point of juncture for reflection 
and response is the christological paradox. This paradox is a concept f
which expresses the ungraspability of being-itself and a symbol which {
10 1
embodies the utter transcendence of God." In Jesus as the Christ the "
■
mystery of ultimacy became intimate and concrete in the life of one man.
Tillich had the ability to press reason to its limits and then to suggest
that it is in the arena of the paradoxical that the truth can be found. 'J
g
As a theologian of culture, Tillich was a creative thinker. |
I
Samuel H. Miller remarked, in a critical review of The Courage to Bet
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There are two kinds of books in the world; one, the Liber oriqinalis. |
in which the insights of the author form a perspective peculiar to |
his creative relationship with the world in which he lives; and two, Æ
the Liber régurgitas, in which the author, having more or less chewed 
on the meat of other authors, comes up with certain conclusions 
reached by a process of addition or subtraction of opinions. . . .
There are few of the former in our day, and too many of the latter.
Dr, Tillich's book belongs to the former class. It is the work of |
an "original" mind, in whose breadth and depth this confusing world ;|
is reflected with new meanings and clarity.H
Certainly Tillich was appreciated for his original thinking. While his
critics pointed to his dependence upon certain historical figures, such
as Hegel, and accused him of warmed-over Hegelianism, this was really
unfair. His thinking reflected that he was both a nineteenth-century
and twentieth-century man. Although his thinking mirrored some of the
-I
major movements (e.g., existentialism), his theology was nevertheless a i
new creation. Tillich did have a fresh way of approaching the theological 
enterprise, and his influence was definitely related to his unique way
of expressing his thought. Even Mels Ferre, who was very critical of
Tillich's key ideas, could say: "Tillich is a scientist in his respect
for fact, a philosopher in his demand for explanation, and a theologian i
i
in his insistence on relevance for life. . . .  Above all, however, Tillich
is the profound wrestler with reality who refuses intellectual short-cuts
12
and spiritual sedatives."
3;
In the second place, Tillich was an apologetic theologian, and
this contributed to his influence. The existential foundation to his 4
theology was at the same time thoroughly apologetic in intent. He tried
to unite Athens and Jerusalem. He was attracted by Greek thought and by
revelation as evident in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In a very real
sense he was called an "apostle to intellectuals."
Occasionally, he was called an "apostle to the intellectuals speaking 
in their language." What is correct about this description of Tillich 
is that he felt himself to be sent as an interpreter of the Christian 
religion to intellectuals who had become disaffected from the church
■;î
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and thrown into the spiritual emptiness which in modern life has 
so often been the result of secularization. But what is not correct 
about it is that he spoke their language. He understood their con­
dition and felt empathy with them in their anxiety, but ha spoke to 
them in hie own language, not theirs,13
Tillich was a reasonable man and would react vigorously to anyone who
would deny a religious man the value of thinking. He asserted on one
occasion; "The intellect is also a God-given function, and I resent it
very much when somebody accuses the theologian of sin when he thinks.
This is his job."^* He had little patience for the literalist with a
closed mind. He did not consider it his mission to reach that segment
of the population. "My work is with those who ask questions, and for 
15
them I am here." He was not an elitist in the sense of being indif­
ferent to some people.
He saw more clearly than most the predicament of the intelligent, 
educated, concerned people in the twentieth century who had been cut 
off from the energies of faith by the cultural orthodoxies of this 
period. . . .  he could be of help in this age, and was of help, 
because artist and philosopher as well as theologian, he cared for 
culture as well as for Christ.16
Tillich was fearful that students would fail to develop their full
humanity*
Tillich had the ability to speak to modern man with a penetration
unequaled by most contemporary theologians. He was concerned about truth,
17
but the truth of man's being, i.e., the meaning of life. He used reason 
to drive man to the depth of reason— the purpose being the truth of Ulti­
mate Concern. Jerald C. Brauer remarked; "Paul Tillich stood alone as 
the interpreter of Christian faith to American culture as one of the few
theologians who could speek to the entire modern world so it would listen.
It is one matter to speak to the world; it is quite another matter to be 
18
taken seriously." He had the ability to speak across denominational 
lines, and in his charismatic appeal to students he could cross diverse
1
:
... . ‘ ___  •. 1 _Aj
-, T ----T - T T ^  — ., .'A,---:--- •-- A  -.A:
ÿ
f
280 Î
boundaries and reach such persons as agnostics, Buddhists, Unitarians, 
and nonbelievers, as well as Christians. "Above all, Paul Tillich made 
it possible for countless modern men to become or remain Christian with- Ï
S
out ceasing to be modern men. He demonstrated what it meant to love God
19 %
with the mind as well as with the heart and the soul."
'i
A physician, Hal B. Richerson, M.O., wrote in an open letter in
The Christian Century*
For a man involved in life's ambiguities, no one speaks to the point 
as Tillich does. Perhaps to the analytic philosopher the question 
of life's meaning is irrelevant; to the academic theologian wrapped 
up in logic, mathematics and semantics, life may have no ambiguities 
or questions. But to the layman, struggling with life's frustrations 
and joys, shaken by doubt, attempting to find significance in his 
Christian heritage, Tillich's apologetics is God-sent. What Christian 
thinker is in closer communication with twentieth-century man?20
This ability to communicate to both laymen and professionals made him a
great apologetic theologian.
In the third place, Tillich made a significant contribution as a
preacher. It might seem contradictory to comments made earlier, but a
study of his sermons would reveal that his preaching was evangelical. |
He excelled as a biblical preacher. "He communicated best with persons
of a philosophical orientation and he had an almost evangelistic zeal to
recommend the Christian message to the intellectual doubters and scoffers 
21
of the faith." He could communicate effectively with people from all
walks of life because he spoke as one who was involved in the same world
as those to whom he was speaking.
It needs to be recognized that Tillich's deepest concern is to be an 
evangelist. If this has a strange sound to some, we should remember 
that a sophisticated evangelist is still an evangelist, and in cer­
tain circles the only kind of evangelist who can have any hope of a 
hearing. When it is viewed from the side of motivation, Tillich's 
thought is strikingly similar to that of the Schleiermacher of the 
"Speeches" to cultured despisers of religion, and to that of Bultmann, 
both of whom should be appreciated as sophisticated evangelists.2%
A A  .Y. A 3-.'A  Y; ’A  -, A  -4 A  A'-'-vt .... À v. a a Y A ' A . a s / ' , A r  ' i'.A-
201
In his famous sermon on acceptance he advocates adopting an attitude 
rather than believing certain truths or joining in some project of social 
action. "The sermons Tillich wrote manifest in their strategy the conclu­
sions to which he comes in the theological argument about the dynamics of
27
revelatory events," D. H. Kelsey further notes that Tillich was more 
concerned about human experience in general and life as a whole than about
" -I
I
Robert C. Johnson continues* "While Tillich is standing within the %
church, he is not facing the altar as he thinks theologically. He 
faces the world outside the church, his basic concern being that those 
for whom Christ died shall not fail to hear of him because of unneces­
sary clinging to tradition, to ineffectual Biblicism, and to outmoded
23
forms of thought."
Notice some of the characteristics of Tillich's sermons. Thought,
rather than structure, is the most important feature of his preaching,
and there is little illustrative material. He frequently uses questions
and word studies as a stimulus for t h o u g h t . H i s  conclusions are open-
ended and not final.
He does not preach a "how to" gospel. His is a gospel which speaks 
of a transformation of life, a transformation which is slow, limited 
to series of "ecstatic" moments, a transformation performed by God 
after which the "how to" message is no longer necessary. And Tillich 
speaks to the level of life where men are lost and where new birth 
must begin.25
Tillich was more concerned about attitudes than he was about 
preaching a gospel of activism. But his sermons ware aimed at developing 
Christian attitudes that would affect one's behavior. For example, in a j
sermon on "Holy Waste," with Mark 14*3-9 as his text, Tillich comments:
"The history of mankind is the history of men and women who wasted them- I
selves and were not afraid to do so. . . . Keep yourselves open for the
26
creative moment which may appear in the midst of what seemed to be waste."
" 1
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the particularities of Jesus as the Christ. Criticism of Tillich's
work will be made latpr, but now the point must be made that he was
an effective preacher with considerable outreach and influence.
In the fourth place, Tillich made a contribution as a theologian
of synthesis. "Only Tillich among the major theologians may be fully
described as a theologian of synthesis, one whose consuming desire has î
been to take seriously and utilize positively the cultural needs,
patterns, and modes of expression in reformulating and attempting to
29
communicate Christian truth." It was the ability to speak to the
existential situations of man that marked him as a valuable member of
the Christian community. This was very evident in his preaching, and
it certainly was evident in his comprehensive system of thought.
His system, for example, reverses the trend, characteristic of both 
liberalism and Neo-orthodoxy, toward a radical cleavage between man 
and nature. Rather, he sees human existence as the fulfillment of 
the drive of nature (indeed of all being) toward individualization 
and self-relatedness. This systematic construction brings Tillich's 
thought into contact with the sciences of physics and biology, as 
well as psychology and sociology. . . . As a result, Tillich can 
enter into appreciative dialogue with a wide variety of concerns 
manifested in modern culture: existentialism, psychoanalysis,
modern art, non-Western religions, secular religions (such as Marx­
ism), Western secular humanism, etc.30
This rare ability to be conversant with so many other disciplines was a '
]
valuable asset as a Christian theologian. "Tillich's uniqueness, his |
creativity and originality, lay in his power of thought, the comprehen- j
sive scope of his vision, his depth of insight, the systematic consis- 3'
I
tsncy with which he developed the internal relations of the various
elements of his philosophy and theology, and the daring he displayed in j
31 j
crossing borders into new fields." He was able to show the essential |
i
relatedness of each discipline to its religious ground.
It was Tillich's border-crossing that was significant. One of |
the borders he crossed, in particular, illustrates his intact upon it.
•H
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Ha was interested in entering into dialogue with practically everyone,
but nowhere was this more obvious than in the area of psychoanalysis. 'ê
"There is a difference between a technical scientific understanding of
man as a conditional 'thing' and an ontological understanding of man as
a subject or self. Psychoanalysis belongs to the latter. Both as theory
32and as therapy, psychoanalysis is predominantly ontological." Since 
Tillich was an ontologist, he could appreciate this facet in psychoanaly­
sis, In a study entitled "Implications for Ego in Tillich's Ontology of 
Anxiety," S. J. Beck comments on the relationship between a person's ago 
and a person's values. I
One's values are also the measure of one's ego • • . for living is 
ego and ego is living; and the more ego— as honoring value— the more 
one lives. Here begins immortality « . . The persons who have in 
human history lived at the furthest limits of their ego's boundaries, 
are those who continued to be esteemed after their somatic deaths.33
When one incorporates (i.e., accepts) anxiety with courage in spits of
the difficulties that it presents, this is equivalent to affirming one's
self. In order to be oneself, one must live with anxiety courageously.
"Tillich believes that psychoanalysis has helped man realize the
i
'existential' predicament— the meaninglessness, the loneliness of exis­
tence with which man is confronted when he wakes from the state of 
'dreaming innocence' of childhood to realize his own finitude, his own
g A
limitations," Theology has been able to learn much about the inner 
and unconscious self from psychoanalysis. For example, in the acceptance 
of one's own inner conflicts and in suffering under their ugliness with­
out an attempt to suppress them and to hide them from one's self, they 
lose their destructive power. While psychology can be informative in 
regard to aspects of the self, it has difficulty presenting a model of 
wholeness. Theology is better able to offer this. Earl A. Loomis, Jr. 
reports; "Among other criteria for being a person or a self versus an
I
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automaton or something subhuman, one must, according to Tillich, be
individual, separate, discrete; but one must also simultaneously be a
35
participant, engaged and involved in the lives of others," This 
polarity corresponds to that of the psychoanalytic theory of human 
development,
J. Heywood Thomas has pointed out that Tillich " . . . has used
psychological ideas in his discussion of the doctrine of original sin
and in the analysis he has himself offered of the concept of sin. • , •
psychology is for Tillich one of the most instructive teachers the theo- 
36
logian can find." With his ability to see the interrelationship 
between theology and psychology, it is not surprising that Tillich con­
tributed many articles to such journals as Pastoral Psychology. In his 
article "The Contribution of Paul Tillich to Pastoral Theology" Wayne E.
Oates has shown such factors as; the psychological method in the study 
of theology, the method of correlation (by which Tillich sought to unite 
message and situation, questions and answers, human existence and divine I
manifestation), ontological and pathological anxiety, the concept of the |
demonic, and the fact that Tillich was able to bridge the gap between |
the disciplined naivete of biblical Images of man and the secular images
37
of man set forth by contemporary psychology and psychotherapy. All of
these factors contribute to the clarification of the pastoral task.
While others have praised Tillich's contribution to psychotherapy,
Tillich's own words express his dependence upon other disciplines for the
theological insights that he gained. "I do not think it is possible today
to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man, without using the immense ma-
38
terial brought forth by depth psychology." The field of psychology is 
but one example of the multiple interests of Tillich. In addition, he 
was influenced by the thinking in politics, education, sociology, and
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art (especially expressionism), and he was stimulated to write about 
them from his theological viewpoint. It is beyond the purpose of this 
study to discuss his contribution to each of these areas of contemporary 
thought.
In the fifth place, Tillich is appreciated because of his contri­
bution to making human life more human. His theology addresses itself 
to modern man's experience of meaninglessness. He observed the dehuman­
izing power of technical society, and he participated in the fight against 
these dehumanizing powers. "Tillich's intention was nothing else than to
work for the reconstitution and rehabilitation of the human, including
39
spiritual and material concerns, in the context of modern life." He
could bring the wisdom of the ages to bear upon the current situation
with creative results. "He was a humanist in the fullest sense of the 
40
word." But his humanism was a Christian humanism that contained the 
ideal of a theonomous culture, i.e., a culture in which everything was 
related to the Ultimate. He was a humanist who saw the place of mystery 
in life, and he chose a position of "belief-ful realism" as his theologi­
cal posture. "One of the things that contributed to Paul Tillich's
tremendous influence was that he spoke out of our broken culture but he
i
always spoke believing . . .  Ho knew only too well the tragedies and suf- [
faring, the demonic and evil aspects of human love. But he loved beliav- 4
41 1
ing. and always with ultimate concern." The meaning of life, for
Tillich, was to give meaning to life. Man is that creature who is a 
meaning-producer in spite of the meaninglessness and ambiguity that he 
encounters in the process. Man on his own cannot do this, but as one in 
whom the New Being is present he is in touch with the source of healing 
power, i.e., the power of God.
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Wilhelm Peuck, a close friend of Tillich's, makes the following
references to one source of Tillich's richness.
In all his works and throughout his activities, Paul Tillich gave 
expression to this dimension of life in which man is most authenti­
cally human. . . . [His systematic theology] had never ceased to 
think of plans of action for himself and his fellowmen through which 
a true humanity would be realized, namely a way of life which renders 
man human and separates him from all that is inhuman, superhuman, or 
subhuman.42
How the authentically human is to be realized In a broken world has been 
discussed in the last chapter. Certainly Tillich worked for the realiza­
tion of a theonomous culture in which the secular would discover the pos­
sibilities of the sacred, i.e., the presence of the Holy in the profane.
In addition to the above reasons given for Tillich's wide accep­
tance, there are many specific points of his theology that have elicited 
praise. An example would be found in Robert P. Scharlemann's article 
"After Tillich, What?" He refers to Tillich's enduring contribution 
being due to his use of the method of critical reflection and distancing 
by doubt. "Tillich solved the problem of reflection and doubt not by 
equating the absolute with the whole content of a system of thought or 
of religious feeling, but by Identifying it with a paradoxical object- 
one whose objectivity can be grasped only in its self-cancellation and 
whose power is exercised by its self-negation." Even though Tillich's 
Christology comes under heavy attack (as will be seen in the next section), 
it needs to be stressed that his doctrine of Christ played a most impor­
tant role in his systematic theology. This contributed to his ability to 
speak in a meaningful way to an age in which nihilism and atheism were 
live options. Tillich was able to speak to those persons who in honesty 
could not accept the traditional theism offered to twentieth-century man.
In summary, it has been suggested that there are five major reasons 
for Tillich's greatness; he was a theologian of culture, an apologetic
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theologian, a theologian of synthesis who crossed borders into other
disciplines, an excellent preacher, and an outstanding teacher who was
committed to making human life more human. Perhaps the praise by one
of his former assistants, Paul Lee, expresses it best; "Tillich was
44a one-man theological symphony,"
The Critiques of Paul Tillich 
It is true that Paul Tillich was held in high esteem for his
theological efforts and that he received many honors from the best uni-
!
varsities in America, Britain, and Germany; nevertheless, he did not 
escape considerable criticism from various parts of the theological 
spectrum. As he was richly praised, so he was vehemently damned. Many 
of his critics appreciated his work, but there were some who were much 
more extreme in their condemnation, out of fear of the serious implica­
tions of his thought. In this section the focus will be upon the most 
important criticisms made against Tillich's work.
First of all, a common criticism of Tillich is that he was fre-
t
quently obscure in the presentation of his ideas. He chose words that 
clouded rather than clarified the meaning of his subject. When he could 
not find words to express himself, ha created words to convey his real 
meaning. Paul Edwards is quite scathing in his attack upon this point 
of obscurity. He finds the following words descriptive of Tillich's 
thought; meaningless, unintelligible, devoid of cognitive content, fail- J
i
ing to make an assertion, saying nothing at all, and lacking referential ^
45 i
meaning. For instance, 1
Being-itself is, even in principle, inaccessible to anybody's obser- |
vation . . . merely saying that a sentence, or any part of it, has
meaning does not by itself give it meaning . , . Tillich constantly j
engages in circular translations . . .  he "explains" the meaning of |
one "symbolically" used expression in terms of another which is
really no less symbolic.46 i
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Edwards agrees with Sidney Hook that " . . .  despite Tillich's denial.
Being is endowed with a certain kind of existence— that which cannot 
not be.**^ ^
David Hopper thinks that part of Tillich's problem of being 
obscure is a result of having shaped " . . , a philosophical-theological
idiom that in its strangeness and novelty worked against his purpose of
48
speaking to and for his time." Some of Tillich's favorite terms, such 
as "Ultimate Concern" or "Being-itself," have a peculiar quality that 
makes one unsure of their full meaning, Hendrik Kraemer approaches the 
same criticism from a different theological stance. He says that Tillich 
" . . .  lives in the incompatible situation of wanting to be wholeheart­
edly an ontological philosopher and as wholeheartedly a Christian thinker 
or theologian. This is impossible . . .  Tillich has in his definitions
avoided a single-minded decision, and has to pay for this omission by
49
imprisonment in opaqueness."
Too often Tillich's terms conceal rather than reveal what is being
discussed. Kenneth Hamilton's polemical work, The System and the Gospel.
states: "Ambiguity of language can apparently reconcile the irreconcil-
50
able and make incompatibles agree." Tillich's obtuseness can be seen
in what ha means by God. Being-itself needs elucidation, and "Power of
Being" and "Ground of Being" do not help much as they need interpretation.
How can one love Being-itself? It is so vague and elusive.
The experience and awareness of the power of being is not equivalent 
to a sense of being accepted by this power of being. We feel accepted 
by the divine only when we believe that the divine literally knows or 
experiences our distortions and yet accepts us in spite of them. Since 
being-itself cannot literally be said to know or experience, it becomes 
impossible to know that one is accepted.51
Charles Hartshorns addresses this theme of Tillich's being non-
intelligible: " . . .  that Being-itself is 'neither abstract nor concrete'
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can legitimately mean only that it is not exclusively either. For what
52is in no aspect either is, I contend, sheer nonentity," Therefore,
the definition for God falls outside the boundaries of intelligibility.
In his recent book on Tillich, Alistair Macleod, a Canadian scholar, is
even more harsh in critical comment. He sees Tillich's view of ontology
as containing many linguistic confusions. For example,
, , , the ontological doctrine that Being is "the Power of Being in 
everything that is" and that "everything that is" ^  only in virtue 
of its "participation" in Being. So baffingly opaque are such 
pronounc8ments--even when they have been traced to their source in 
Tillich's sense of the mysteriousness of the fact that there is a |
world at all— that it is difficult not to feel that Tillich would 
have been wiser to adhere more consistently to the view that the 
existence of the world would not be a "mystery" if it could be 
explained,53
Macleod believes that Tillich's ontological solutions are the result of
a reaction to nominalism and an interest in etymology.
Lewis S. Ford expresses his concern over the direction of Tillich's
thought: "If we limit ourselves solely directly to a religious foundation
for symbolic predication of God, we find that we are left with nothing but
a referent without content, a mere cipher, 'God,' The language of ultimate
54
concern fares badly when subjected to a non-symbolic theoretical analysis," 
Bruce L. Smith reacts to Tillich's use of symbols: He " . . . has produced
a symbolic theology that injects into Christianity an epistemological un­
certainty and religious comprehensiveness that are quite foreign to its
55
original character,"
How seriously the criticisms are to be taken depends, of course, 
upon the particular theological commitment of each critic of Tillich. Such 
authors as Michael Novak and J, Haywood Thomas attribute Tillich's obscurity 
to his not taking Anglo-American empiricism seriously. Ronald Gregor Smith 
accuses Tillich of obscuring the positive implications of the Christian 
doctrine of Creation. He asserts that Tillich
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, . . loses both man and God in the Unqrund in which, if he ware 
true to his conclusion, there would be nothing to say. For the 
Unqrund in which the "polarities of being disappear" is by defini­
tion nothing, nihil; it is the formless void, the unmoving ground, 
out of which all movement comas. Tillich has rescued the concept 
of being at the expense of the concept of beings and of any ulti­
mate distinction between beings.56
According to Smith, the end of Tillich's theology is not far from a
worldly mysticism. He thinks that Tillich violates biblical faith.
Smith quotes Carl Michalson's words, "The Bible . • . does not ask the
57
question of being but of historical meaning and act.."
The second major criticism of Paul Tillich is that his thinking 
is unbiblical. Although he knew his Bible and selectively chose passages 
supportive of his thought, he is accused of omitting threads that are 
important in maintaining a Christian theology. His impersonal philosophy 
appears to be alien to the spirit of the Christian faith. Walter Marshall 
Horton calls attention to the question of whether the Greek metaphysical 
conception of God as Absolute Being advocated by Tillich can be reconciled 
with the biblical conception of a Creator God who is the Father of mankind, 
"Tillich begins with the ontological element in the concept of God, and 
then adds the Biblical attributes of holiness, love, and power, as Thomas 
Aquinas does,"^^ Certain scholars (e.g., Lewis S, Ford) believe that 
Tillich tells us more about what God is not than about what he is. "The 
assertion that God is not a being runs counter to the monotheistic char­
acter of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, which conceives of God as a
living personal being. It is more akin to the monistic view of the uncon-
59
ditioned, impersonal Brahma of Hinduism." This line of thought is 
similar to Rabbi Bernard Martin's statement; "One may doubt, indeed, 
that Tillich and the Bible are even talking about the same God. The God 
who is described by Tillich as 'being-itself' seems to have little in 
common with the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob or the God of Jesus and
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Paul,"^^ It is just this question of ths personality of God that
prompts Nels Ferre to call Tillich a dangerous theologian.
The deepest significance of finite spirit is its capacity to have 
intercourse with the infinite Spirit, Being-itself unfortunately 
affords no such significance, really, and offers no hope or help 
for prayer as an I-Thou relation. Neither can man count on the 
personal Purpose of God in providence. What happens to him is not, 
at the deepest, ordained by a loving Will who creates and controls, 
directly and indirectly, human lives and the order of nature. We 
can participate in Reality, adjust ourselves to It by powers inher­
ent in It and available to us, but God never literally acts in our 
behalf, answers prayers, or shares His purpose in special providence. 
The security, the intimacy, and the fullest creative conditions for 
personal growth within the eternal Purpose are therefore gone,61
But it is Ferre's thought that Tillich was so profound and persuasive 
that if he would ever defect from the mainline of the Christian faith 
he would choose Tillich's theology as the next best thing,
Roman Catholic thinkers have faulted Tillich for his lack of 
dependence upon biblical material. George H. Tavard alleges, "Actually 
it would be difficult to discover a systematic theology that appeals 
less to the historical sources of Christian doctrine than that of 
Tillich, , , . the notion of faith, the notion of original sin, the 
notion of revelation, have been stripped by Tillich of their specifi­
cally Christian elements and made into universal philosophical con- 
62
cepts," And Avery R. Dulles states: "The Biblical message is
63
reduced to the dimensions of an all-too-human philosophy."
It is thought that Tillich reduces Christianity to a set of 
sophisticated rational propositions and that he is guilty at times of 
oversimplifying and caricaturing biblical personalism and theism (e.g., 
the traditional conception of "a God walking around on e a r t h " ) . T o  
persons such as T. E. McCollough, it is a question of biblical personal­
ism or ontology. In order to accept Tillich's theology, it is necessary 
to accept his philosophy.
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Reinhold Niebuhr takes issue with Tillich on this point*
Yet I shall dare to ask whether in this field his ontological 
speculations have not, despite the great precision of his thought, 
falsified the picture of man as the Bible portrays it, and as we 
actually experience it. . . . Faith in the Bible is not so much 
the "ecstasy of reason" thinking beyond the limits of reason to 
touch the divine mystery, as an apprehension of the divine made
possible by a destruction of the idolatry of the self, and a
destruction of the idolatry of the self by the recognition that 
the ultimate source and end of life stands against the pretensions 
of the self.65
And John B. Cobb is very conscious that many biblical ideas cannot be
taken at face value in Tillich's system.
With respect to what is said about God, it is ontology and not a
specific appeal to revelation in Jesus Christ that is decisive.
. . .  it leaves Tillich highly vulnerable to the objection that 
in fact his philosophy does not do justice to the specifically 
Christian vision of reality as embodied in Scripture or Christian 
tradition. It forces us at point after point to abandon Biblical 
and traditional beliefs. 6 6
It is in the area of Christology that the most criticism of 
Tillich is provoked. Rabbi Bernard Martin comments: " . . .  we cannot
help wondering if the price is not too high and if most Christian theo­
logians would not ask whether, in Tillich's doctrine that Jesus negates 
all personal claims for himself, Jesus is not lost as the unique person 
classical Christian thought has considered him to be throughout the 
centuries.
Certainly Tillich's position on the Incarnation has been mislead­
ing. Nels Ferre says, Tillich's writings show two faces, e.g., he states 
at times that the Incarnation is indispensable to the Christian faith
but on other occasions he maintains that the doctrine is blasphemy and
6 8
nonsense as a historical and factual statement. Further in the same 
article, Ferre is more pointed in his criticism of Tillich. Since the
Christian faith stands or falls with the reality of the Incarnation,
/
Tillich's " . . .  position simply cannot be held or confined within the
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Christian faith without fundamentally altering and destroying it. In
intellectual honesty a person is Christian or Tillichian, but he cannot
69 /
be both." It is no surprise, according to Ferre, that Tillich was
the father of the American death-of-God theologians and that Altizer 
and Hamilton's book. Radical Theology and the Death of God, was dedi­
cated to him.
"The Christ which Tillich produces is not the Christ of the Bible.
He is a human man who becomes divine, while the Biblical Christ is a
divine person who becomes man by taking upon Himself a complete human 
70
nature." Objection is raised in regard to Tillich's not believing in
the Christian God who works personally in history and who raises the
dead. Christians
. . . must affirm that the human nature and personality of the man 
liesus were not obliterated by death, but were resurrected, consum­
mated, and survive. Yet, this is the witness of the scriptures; 
and this is just what the church has said. Furthermore, it would 
appear that it is what the church must say if its faith is to remain 
faith in Jesus Christ, and not an analoqia imaqinis kind of faith in 
a "picture," or an empathetic faith in the faith of Peter in the 
Christ.71
Even Tillich acknowledges that some persons could interpret his system 
as being self-sufficient and as possessing a content derived from itself 
rather than from the Bible. Robert C, Johnson is of the opinion that 
Tillich shifts the questions and reverses the biblical order of concern. 
For example, "Hubris, and unbelief or unfaith, are related to estrange­
ment, rather than estrangement being related to hubris and unbelief 
. . .  it is much as though Adam and Eve had found themselves outside the
Garden, and had been prompted by this estranged situation to eat the 
72
forbidden fruit.” It is for this reason that Tillich interprets sal­
vation in terms of healing and not in terms^f redemption. "Instead of
the biblical question, 'What must I do to be saved?' Tillich has substi­
tuted the question, 'How can man best pursue the quest for the New Being
■ nrî:-—  - .,. ..r ■- 7”  “  %77T?7
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upon which he ie universally engaged because he is man?*" According
to Kenneth Hamilton, Tillich's concept of salvation as "healing" is
little more than impersonal "reintegration," and forgiveness of sins
is merely the conquest of the contradictions of human existence,
Grover E. Foley's article, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," states; |
"Tillich, in fact, confesses that Christology only became possible for
74
him after the concept of the 'New Being' had given him the key."
Therefore, one should have the clue to Tillich's diluted Christology,
His soteriology becomes subordinate to his ontology. This contributes
to a de-emphasis upon the particularities of the Christian faith and |
to an openness to other religions. Consequently, " . . .  the church
should not 'convert' but should enter into creative conversation with
other vital religions of the world. In fact, at times it seems that
the church has no 'mission' except the task of interpreting the world 
75
to itself."
The New Testament proclamation does not always aline itself with
Tillich's thinking. But what is upsetting to biblical scholars is his
view of the relationship between historical research and Christology.
To hold, however, that "faith cannot be shaken by historical 
research even if its results are critical of the tradition in which 
the event is reported" . . . is, in fact, to insulate faith from 
any real questioning of the object of faith and thereby to hold that 
nothing, in effect, can really count against the object of faith.
For this reason, Tillich's sharp distinction between faith and 
history . . .  makes him as liable to the charge of seeking an "indu­
bitable basis" of belief as the most positivistic of historians in 
search of the "real" Jesus of Nazareth.76
Tillich emphasized the experience of the New Being at the expense of the 
historic event, and if objective evidence could be produced and he would 
deny its significance, he could then be accused of subjectivism or of 
presuming to possess the mind of God. Without historical research, how 
can any proper interpretation be given to the biblical account of Jesus 
as the Christ?
i
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[Tillich] • . , is therefore guilty, as is Barth, of imputing to 
the historical Jesus a self-understanding and self-actualization 
which is based on purely theological requirements. For instance, 
since Tillich's Christology requires that the new being "surrender 
himself completely," such claims are made concerning Jesus, Since M
"a revelation is final if it has the power of negating itself with­
out losing itself," therefore "in the picture of Jesus as the 
Christ we have the picture of a man who possesses these qualities." -A
How does Tillich know that the biblical picture of a Jesus "who |
possesses these qualities" corresponds to "a concrete historical 
actualization" without opening the theological claim to historical |
research???
Father Tavard believes that "Paul Tillich has failed to account
for the biblical picture of Jesus and for the Christological dogma as
78the Church has always believed it,” Tillich is open to the charge of
being unbiblical and heretical. And to try to interpret the cornerstone
of the Christian faith, the physical resurrection of the body of Christ,
using a "restitution theory" is blasphemous, according to Tavard, "The
main deficiency in the Tillichian solution is, as we have seen, that it
provides no definite passage from the philosophical conception of 'eter-
79
nal Godmanhood' to the concrete existence of the man Jesus."
Paul Ramsey expresses his concern over Tillich's ethics. Ramsey
thinks that an ethic grounded in ontology is inadequate. It fails to
define love in terms of a covenant, "The one meaning Tillich assigns
to love is reunion, which is a philosophical concept quite different
80
from covenant-fidelity."
Enough illustrations have been given to show the critical response 
to Tillich's use of the biblical witness. The range of criticism in­
cludes both conservative and liberal Protestants, and Roman Catholics 
who argue from the standpoint of tradition. No attempt will be made to 
answer these various attacks upon Tillich's thought. Only a quotation 
in Tillich's defense from Daniel Day Williams will be included* "Dr.
Tillich has accepted fully the distinctive historical claim of the
,iî
Christian faith to the saving event in history; and yet has faced ÿ
"I
I
, ....................................... ^  ..................................................... ............ ......................................................................
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profoundly the issues concerning historical factuality and the limits
of our historical knowledge. He does not dissolve the meaning of
81
Christ into a general abstract idea."
The third major criticism of Paul Tillich originates with keryg-
matic theologians, i.e., those who represent theological positivism.
Tillich's reliance upon reason, and the fact of his starting point being
man (rather than God), are the source of their objections. " . . .
Tillich's starting-point in an idea of (universal) theology by-passes
the starting-point of Christian theology in an authoritative kervoma.
and for that reason has cut loose from the specific ground of faith out
82
of which all Christian thinking grows." What is offensive to such
persons as Kenneth Hamilton is that "Tillich makes faith the servant of
knowledge because he has started out from the assumption that truth
83
comes nowhere else but in the whole that a system gives."
G. D. Kaufman has written an article entitled "Can a Man Serve 
Two Masters?" in which he locates the theological difficulties that 
arise in Tillich's attempt to include philosophy and theology in the 
theological enterprise. If reason participates in "the Fall," then it 
cannot be relied upon in any way to aid man in coping with his predica­
ment.
In The Courage to Be Tillich describes the nature of man in terms 
of the idea of "ontological anxiety" and then shows that this 
anxiety is overcome through "ontological courage" which is rooted 
in the nature of "being-itself." Now the significant thing about 
this analysis is that the whole of it proceeds with scarcely any 
reference to the historical Christian revelation as the source of
the answer.84
Kerygmatic theology begins with revelation— the particularity of Chris­
tian revelation. Any other starting point is suspect.
Not only must one start with Christ but one must start with a 
certain interpretation of Christ in order to be considered orthodox.
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In other words, there can be a post-Chalcedonian Christology employ­
ing twentieth-century categories; but there cannot be a non- 
Chalcedonian Christology fashioned to conform to the categories of 
an ontology recognizing eternal God-manhood but not Jesus the God- 
man. There can be a restatement of traditional doctrine; but there 
cannot be a sudden discovery of the "real" meaning of doctrine,85
Hamilton objects to Tillich's assumption that discovering one's self is 
the same as discovering God, and vice versa. Ha attributes this weak­
ness to the fact that Tillich’s system denies the existence of God.
T. E. McCollough is supportive of Hamilton's criticism by noting in an 
article on Tillich* "As the philosopher Walter Kaufman says, the athe­
ist can agree with Tillich in his denial of the 'existence' of God and
86
the affirmation of 'being-itself'— only why name it God?"
Many persons attack Tillich from the Barthian kerygmatic posture.
It is feared that where the kerygma does not control ontology there is
danger of it becoming pagan. If it is to remain Christian, apologetic
theology must be the servant of kerygmatic theology. David Hopper
believes that Tillich places Christology in a secondary position.
"However broad Tillich's starting point in ontology, the place ha
finally allows for Christ is really too narrow, too restrictive . . .
Christology itself is reduced to the statement that 'essential manhood
has appeared under the conditions of existence,' In effect Tillich
brings the whole of Christology down to a single theory of the atone-
87
ment, the moral exemplar theory." Tillich appears to be more con-
earned about presenting an intellectual construct that attempts to
resolve ontological problems than he is about bearing witness to the
message of what God has done for man through Christ. It is not what
man doss (e.g., affirming himself through courage) but what has been
dons for man through the Cross that is at the heart of Christianity.
Man's separation and sin have been overcome, from the side of God.
Man receives God's grace which enables him to act with courage. It is
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the message that makes this possible, not something within man that
assists him in living "in spite of" the circumstances of life. "The
effort to baptize courage with grace leads on to a major dilution of
the Gospel . , « the church would do well to remind itself that
•courage" as a concept, a way of life, does not appear in the New
Testament." This was a Greek concept rather than a Judeo-Christian
89
one, according to David Hopper.
Other thinkers, from differing theological viewpoints, have criti­
cized Tillich's Christology. William Hamilton suggests that Tillich's 
" . . . unwillingness to relate Jesus to the doctrine of forgiveness
of sins may be taken as unfortunate, leading to some real inadequacies
90
in their formulations," Mem needs not only "acceptance" but a word 
of judgment to "go, and sin no more," In Tillich's understanding, Jesus 
is abstract, a possibility of existence rather than the Lord of life. 
Robert C. Johnson agrees with William Hamilton's concern over Jesus' 
abstractness in Tillich. There was " , . . an orientation of Tillich's 
thought that has permitted him, increasingly in his later writings, to 
employ such concepts as faith, hope, love, revelation, conversion, and
91
salvation without reference to the act of God in history in Jesus Christ."
George S. Hendry states in his review of Tillich's second volume
of Systematic Theoloov* "However Christian he may be in intent (as all
heretics have been), he cannot prevent his readers from shying at what
looks suspiciously like an attempt to put Hindu wine into Christian 
92
bottles." Later he observes; "The reading of this volume strengthens
the impression that this conception forms a bed of Procrustes which the
93
Christian message has to be trimmed to fit."
A much more polemical and unlearned critique is given by Leonard 
Wheat* "Tillich's theology, as theoloov. is a sham from beginning to
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end, and nobody knew It better than Tillich," He accuses Tillich of
cleverness and of deception— a masquerade designed to undermine Chris-
95
tian theology. "For Tillich, salvation is becoming a humanist,"
Wheat thinks that Tillich's work was satirical in intent— that he was 
an imposter: "Tillich's chief claim to fame will be that ha fooled a
lot of people.
Certainly the imbalanced attack by Wheat upon Tillich cannot be 
taken seriously. A more balanced view is maintained by Edward A. Dowey,
Jr. who thinks that Tillich is in danger of "being swamped in generali­
ties" and that Barth risks "babbling in tongues." "Tillich's formalized 
criteria run the risk of being made to contain almost anything, but 
Barth's wholly material, concrete event of Jesus Christ risks being so
particularistically understood as to be discontinuous with life and cul- j
97
ture and thus irrelevant." For Dowey, in the final analysis, "The J
only criterion of Christian theology, finally,is Barth's* Jesus the j
Christ, as event and un ' translated.' But a task of translation remains ^
•3
and to this Tillich is a great contributor so long as there remains a
' I
self-conscious and critical kerygmatic theology to keep the language of ,
98 ]
any one translation from becoming canonical." ;
Perhaps the best defense against an overly critical attack from
1
Barthian theology is Tillich's own word on the subject. He wrote an j
article entitled "What is Wrong with Dialectic Theology?" in which he "j
declared, "A dialectic theology is one in which 'yes* and 'no' belong |
inseparably together. In the so-called 'dialectic' theology they are j
irreconcilably separated, and that is why this theology is not dialectic. j
Rather, it is paradoxical, and therein lies its strength; and it is I
99 ;
supernatural, which constitutes its weakness." He raises important j
issues after singling out Barth's fundamental affirmations. For ekample, "{Î
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"Between God and man there is a hollow space which man is unable of
himself to penetrate, • • • But if the act of faith is purely a work
of God, then man can be allowed no antecedent possibility of knowing
God,"^^^ While it may bo true that God reveals himself to man, still
there is something within man that recognizes and responds to the God
who is revealing himself. Therefore, man does play an important part
in the Divine/human encounter. "But when he deprives the human of any
relation to the divine, as he does in his teaching about the God-likensss
of man, about Christ, about God's word, and about the Bible, Barth's
101
peculiar formulations are objectionable or wrong." Tillich summarizes
the significance of Barth in the following quotations!
He believes in a godless objectivity of human action ravaged by sin 
and without any relation whatever either to the divine or to the 
demonic. This seems to me to be one of the weakest points in 
Barthian teaching; and on this ground his refusal to recognize a 
theological ethics is also based. Now belief in an objective exis­
tence, indifferent with respect to both divine end human dominion, 
is an illusion. We never live merely in the first and second dimen­
sions of our existence (in dead matter and in the form we give to 
it), but we also live constantly in the third dimension (on the 
divine mountain-top and in the demonic abyssX . . .  By his mighty 
proclamation of the Christian paradox Barth has saved theology from 
forgetting the deity of God and has saved the church from lapsing 
into secularism and paganism. . . .  But there is this defect; 
although he has been called a dialectic theologian, he does not 
think dialectically, but supernaturally. 1 0 2
The fourth major criticism of Paul Tillich centers upon his 
alleged pantheism. Sidney Hook says, "For all his talk of God as an 
•unconditioned transcendent,' Tillich's God is the all-in-all of pan­
theistic spiritualism. • . . Substitute nature, the universe, the
totality of things, or any similar expression for God as being-itself
103
and denial of its existence gives the same result." Because Tillich 
denies the existence of God, the charge of atheism is frequently leveled 
at him. "The pantheistic nature of Tillich's view of God thus comes 
fully to the fore— pantheistic, that is, in its denial of a true
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relationship between God and creation, where individuals are real 
because God made them and not simply because they participate essen­
tially in b e i n g , S e p a r a t i o n  from God is understood to be sépara-
♦
tion from our deeper selves. Transcendence becomes not a theological 
category but a human experience of self-transcendence. When God is 
seen as the Ground of Being, the elements of unity and totality enter 
the picture and invite the possibility of criticism. It then becomes 
easy to identify God with the reality of the universe.
N. H. G. Robinson does not call Tillich a pantheist, but he does
call attention to pantheistic elements in Tillich: i
1
. . . characteristics of Tillich's thought render ambiguous and prob- ?|
lematical his references to person-to-person encounters, whether i|
between humans or between man and God, They do so because unmis- '>{
takably they point towards an ultimate pantheistic monism and J
mysticism in which is fulfilled "the drive toward reunion with 
essential being in everything . . . with things and persons in |j
their essential goodness and with the good itself," and for which |
inevitably "the moral stage is a station on the way," The cmi- -j]
trality of the concept of love in Tillich's thought should not be j
allowed to deceive us. It was an important idea too of Benedict ^
Spinoza. 105
And Tillich would admit to a certain strain of pantheism. "I myself -J
have spoken of a 'pantheistic element' in every adequate doctrine of J
-IGod. This, of course, has been said against the half-deistic theism of §
106 Ja
much Protestant theology." Because of Tillich's definition of God ||
and his reliance upon the laws of immanent reason, the problem of pan- ,#l
theism arises within his system. Tillich's attachment to nature and 7||
comments that ha has made in conversation could give one the impression
that if he is not a pantheist he has at least a tendency toward pantheism. J
Tillich recognized the embodiment of Ultimate Concern in finite realities. ||
For instance, $|
Jesus was a finite reality. Buddha was a finite reality. But §
through them ultimacy shone. Which can even happen through a mother!
. . .  And it can happen through a child, or a flower, or a mountain. |
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It has happened to me innumerable times through the ocean. It is 
not the ocean in its empirical reality, but its transparency to 
the infinite, that makes it great.1 0 ?
When one hurriedly calls attention to the implications of these state­
ments, Tillich replies* "God is in every moving atom, in it as its 
creative ground. He is not identical with it; that would be pantheism. 
But ha is its creative ground. And he is jUi it, not substantially only
but also spiritually, and therefore knowingly. That is what divine 
108
knowledge means." Tillich's conception of being is not static (i.e., 
it is the Power of Being). A tension is maintained between the pan­
theistic elements and the self-transcending and ecstatic elements present 
in his theological system, so that he does not succumb to this criticism 
in toto.
The fifth major criticism of Tillich centers upon the philosophi­
cal problems raised by his philosophical theology. Some of these issues 
have been discussed In criticisms mentioned earlier. Attention is now 
called to specific flaws in his system as seen by other philosophers 
and theologians. William L  Rowe's book. Religious Symbols and God; A, 
Philosophical Study of Tillich's Theoloov. is an excellent critique of 
Tillich's thought from a philosophical point of view. Rowe finds 
Tillich's language disturbing. For example, Tillich claims that God 
does not exist, but he claims this in such a way as to imply that God 
does exist. This leads one to believe that there is a fundamental 
incoherence in Tillich's theology. "It may be that the question 'Why 
is there not nothing?' is inappropriate in the sense that no answer is
possible. But one who asks that question cannot be accused of attribut-
109
ing being even to nothing."
According to Rowe, the distinction that Tillich makes between 
symbols and signs seems to be uninformative. Tillich may be correct in
I
1
I
I
"yk-%
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saying that symbols ara similar to the reality that they symbolize, but 
" • • • this fact about symbols does not seem to be regarded by Tillich $
eludes that the phenomenological approach of Tillich does not establish 
the objective existence of the Holy. "We may, I am suggesting, experi­
ence something as 'out there,' as existing independently of us, as 
'grasping us.' In thus describing what we have experienced we are not
implying that it does exist independently of us, only that we experience
114
it as independent of us, as something 'out there.'"
as an explication of the participation of symbols in what they symbolize
1 1 0but as a consequence of that participation." The issue here is 
between the means by which one participates in reality and the conse­
quences of participating in reality. Therefore, the distinction between 
signs and symbols becomes blurred.
Another issue for Rowe is Tillich's statement that everyone has 
an Ultimate Concern, that everyone is grasped by the Holy. "For to
claim that everyone has an ultimate concern is to imply that everyone
111 1
has an awareness of the holy." The fact that all people are not aware I
of the Holy is puzzling to Rowe, Having an Ultimate Concern of which one
is not aware is like having a sharp pain and yet being unaware of it. |
And Tillich's use of the concrete and the abstract creates problems for
Rows. If a humanist is committed to an abstract ideal, to which Tillich %
refers as the foci of Ultimate Concern, then " . . .  if something cyjlte
abstract (the natural opposite of 'concrete') can be the concrete content
of ultimate concern, the word 'concrete' has been taken from its natural §
112 7Î
environment and given a technical meaning within Tillich's system." Î
Tillich uses the phenomenological method in his theology (in fact,
he is criticized by Edward D, O'Connor for being too much at home on the
113
phenomenological level of the history of philosophy). Yet Rowe con-
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Tillich does not distinguish between what is phenomenologically ulti-
::
mats and what is ontologically ultimate. A description of religious i
I
experience can establish the Holy as being phenomenologically objective,
115
but it cannot establish that the Holy is the ontological ultimate.
Furthermore,
It is impossible on Tillich's theory to ever explain or interpret |
any religious statement about God. For,since "God” stands for 
being-itself, the symbolic statement about God would be correctly 
interpreted only by soma ontological statement about being-itself.
But,since "being-itself" is ineffable, every ontological statement %
about being-itself is necessarily symbolic.'I®
This is inconsistent with the semantic principle (i.e., a symbolic state­
ment is meaningful only if its cognitive content can be expressed by a
literal statement). Tillich's symbolic language becomes autonomous.
Another problem for Rowe focuses upon Tillich's reference " . . .
'to exist as a man' and 'to be estranged from one's essential nature'
117
are either equivalent or the second is presupposed by the first."
The question of man's responsibility is at stake. If estrangement is a 
necessity of existence and also the result of the misuse of freedom, how
j
t l ^  can man be held responsible? Tillich's answer to this question was 
discussed in the last chapter (sea supra, pp. 231-233 and pp. 240-241).
In Religious Experience and Truth, a book edited by Sidney Hook, 
several philosophical premises of Tillich's are challenged. Appearing 
in this book. Brand Blanshard's essay entitled "Symbolism" takes issue 
with the distinction Tillich makes between symbol and sign— it is not of 
philosophical importance but is a matter of degree psychologically. And 
Tillich's insistence upon Cod being "the unconditioned transcendent" 
presents a dilemma because any attempt by reason to understand God's 
nature must end in complete frustration. "An absolute that goes beyond
reason in the sense of being wholly alien to it is a notion without
, .118 
meaning."
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In an article by Paul Weiss, "Thank God, God's Not Impossible," M
-'b
the problem of Tillich referring at times to God and Christ as though %
they were symbols of a higher reality (the God above God) makes one
wonder whether Tillich is inside or outside the Christian religion.
"But what ha does not make clear is his appreciation of the truth that
not all symbols are on a footing, end that even apart from all revela-
119
tion it is possible to recognize some to be better than others."
Paul F. Schmidt takes issue with Tillich's criterion for recog­
nizing one's Ultimate Concern. Schmidt (like Rowe) cannot accept a 
person's having an Ultimate Concern without being aware of it. "The 
criterion for an ultimate concern is now so stretched that Wiatever ha
claims, positive or negative, passive or active, is said to be his t
120
ultimate concern."
'I
Tillich's ontology is a source of much criticism, for " . . .
ontology cannot explain how being, in its finitude, sustains itself.
1 2 1
The quest for an unconditioned being fails," Guyton B. Hammond
raises such interesting questions aet " • « • is God's life in Tillich's
view complete in itself or completed only through the life of the crea- 
1 2 2
ture?" Also, "Does Tillich break with reductionist naturalism only
123
to reinstate a 'self-transcending' naturalism?" Others criticize 
his naturalism (e.g., Edward D. O'Connor), but Tillich defends himself 
by saying, "My thinking is not naturalistic. Naturalism and supernatu­
ralism provoke each other and should be removed together. Protestant 
theologians have criticized me on the grounds that 'God above God' is 
mystical.
A concern has been voiced over the depersonalization of reality 
when one starts with an ontological premise. "Tillich's real God always 
tends to emerge mysteriously near the end of his analysis, so that God
.■L, 4" '
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often seems to have been the end product of the consideration rather
125
than its guiding force," According to Tillich, however, God ie the
1ground of the personal. But it is argued that God could not be a per­
sonal center without being a being. This would mean that God was a 
Self. The adequacy of Tillich's concept to express the ontological 
foundation for selfhood may be debated. Certainly the Power of Being
possesses the power to create personhood, but " • • • Tillich's ontology
126does not preserve the ultimacy of a personal divine-human encounter."
What does it mean to love Being-itself? Pater Bsrtocci raises the ques­
tions "Unless God's being and my being are to some extent and in some 
way ontologically distinct— at least so that the center of my being and 
the center of God's being exclude each other ontologically (without deny­
ing interaction)— can there be real individuality for me, and individual
127
freedom in any degree?" Tillich responded by saying, "One cannot
speak of a relation of the divine to the human center as if they were in
the same ontological dimension. If we speak of a divine center at all—
symbolically— we must say that the periphery of which one's center is
the center is infinite and includes everything that is (therefore the
128
symbols 'omnipresence' and omniscience')."
Another accusation which is hurled at Tillich is that of Gnosticism.
When the Gospel is made into something which cannot be understood by 
unlettered men through the reading of the Holy Scriptures and by 
faith, and becomes only accessible to men developed in the science 
of myth, demythologization, and interpretation . . . [so that] only 
those who know the language of Gnosticism and the philosophy of ;{
religion can decipher it, then we have a distinct trait of Gnosti­
cism. 129 {
Indeed, W. F, Albright has called Tillich a modern Gnostic. This is vj
because of the transhistorical symbolism of Tillich. This has lead ;|
J. Hey wood Thomas to say that " . . .  Tillich's profundity turns out to ‘3
be merely verbal."1^0 Thomas agrees with Father O'Connor's statement
ti
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about Tillich; "He ia not so much a "philosopher* • , , as a lover of
philosophies, or better, a man with a taste for philosophies, like an
131aesthete's taste for works of art."
Thomas also criticizes by describing some of Tillich's statements
as tautology, e.g., "Jesus is the Christ because he is the bearer of the
132 4
New Being." And at other places in his system Tillich misinterprets
the expression ex nihilo by giving it a descriptive function which it
133
does not have and hypostatizing the nihil. Thomas finds Tillich's 
use of psychological categories problematical, but " . . .  the central
I
difficulty in Tillich's doctrine of man is the ambiguous status of finite 
freedom. From one point of view it is man's end, the telos of creation, 
but from another point of view this is man's s h a m e . T h i s  is the same 
criticism leveled by other theologians, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, over 
the issue of Tillich's understanding of sin and human responsibility.
Perhaps Tillich could have eliminated some of his critic's mis­
interpretation of his thought if he had taken British empiricism more 
seriously. It might have helped him to overcome some of the charges that |
were made against his use of language. "Consider these three statements;
(1 ) every concrete thing is less than the ultimate; (2 ) we can be ulti­
mately concerned only about something concrete; (3) we are ultimately
concerned about the ultimate. We cannot assert all three statements
135
without contradiction." H. Richard Niebuhr questions Tillich's terms 
"Ground of Being" and "Ultimate Concern." "The problem of ultimate con- |
cern to many men does not seem stateable simply in terms of being but 
only of being and value; they know of the ground of being, but what they 
do not know is the goodness of that ground.
The last philosophical criticism to be mentioned comas from Raphael 
Demos, who regards Tillich as a profound but abstract theologian. He
%
-,
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considers Tillich's Christianity to be closer to the Hegelian school of
philosophy than it is to any other.1^? And he is baffled by Tillich's
devoting only two pages in the first volume of Systematic Theoloov to
the problem of evil. Demos considers this a weakness. Also, the notion
of Being-itself is inadequate for the Christian idea of God because
I don't think it proper to refer to being by a name ("being-itself") 
in the fashion in which one refers to a particular. . . . for being 
is not a "that" any more than it is a "what," . . . [jilliçh] treats 
existence as an "it" or as a "something" to be pointed at, an entity 
or substance. . . .  Value by itself is impotent; being by itself is 
morally indifferent.
This, for Demos, is a misuse of language. But in the final analysis 
(in another article) Demos commented; "Perhaps the trouble with Profes­
sor Tillich is that he has all the answers; I miss that anguish of doubt 
which, he tells us, is part of f a i t h . F o r  some critics Tillich knew
«
too much, others thought that he did not know enough to avoid contradic- |
tions and confusions, some thought that his thinking was fresh and origi­
nal, yet others thought that his thinking was eclectic. Tillich's system 
provoked a diversity of philosophical criticism.
The sixth and last major criticism of Tillich's work is aimed at |
his being outdated. This is a reaction to the uncritical acceptance of 
the relevance of his thought. "Harvey Cox, arguing that religion and 
metaphysics 'are disappearing forever,' pronounces Tillich passe for his 
attempt to foist on modern man 'religious' questions that this man does 
not really ask."^*^
Even though Tillich has been called "the modern father of radical 
theology,"141 it is from the radical theologian that this criticism of 
being outdated comes. "Altizer feels that Tillich's subjectivity-faith 
equation has bean rendered obsolete by the contemporary Christian experi­
ence, and that in consequence Tillich's dialectic fails to be a theology
142
and is actually only a metaphysic of the sort made obsolete by Nietzsche."
■5
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IPaul Van Buren has an appreciation for Tillich as a philosopher 
who has been a penetrating observer of life. However, "Something in 
the obscure, logically chaotic, German-accented, assured words of this 
fatherly figure may speak to a nostalgia for a world where everything 
fitted in, for a monistic whole which has been lost in nuclear uncer­
tainty in our pluralistic a g e . "143 The damning emphasis here is upon a 
nostalgia for a bygone day. According to Van Buren, modern man is not 
the kind of man that Tillich portrays. "Perhaps he would not find so 
many questions if he weren't so burdened with a way of thought loaded 
with so many answers."1*4
Other persons attack fundamental elements in Tillich's thought. 
The concept of finitude, for example, is basic to Tillich. "It is ques­
tionable whether there is any such thing as a normal fear of death; actu-
i 45 I
ally the idea of one's own death is subjectively inconceivable." And
■
added to this, Earl A. Loomis states: "I should like to propose that v
what Tillich called existential anxiety is the normal anxiety of every­
day life, the usual signal anxiety, the normal inquietude of human beings 
in the face of their innate sensitivity to vulnerability."^46
Whenever Tillich's accuracy in describing modern man as being 
anxious over the contemplation of his own death was challenged, the late :i
Professor Joseph Haroutunian would come to his defense by saying* "Ha 
could not conceive human life without anxiety. And when man claimed to
be free from it, he saw them in bondage to the demonic and sick to the 
death at the core of their being."14? Haroutunian would point out that 
human beings are saddened when their loved ones die, and the loss of love
I
relationships poses the question of personal extinction that for many 
causes considerable anxiety. "A society In which men live without anxi­
ety, caring not whether they are alive or dead, is one in which they care
•;
I
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not whether their neighbors are alive or dead, which may be a sign of |
death itself,"148 The awareness of finitude is at the heart of an 
authentically human existence.
More serious evidence of Tillich's being out-of-date is given 
by Jamas Sellers.
Despite the contemporaneity of his theology, in his appraisal of 
the human situation Tillich now and than almost seems to recur to I
the cultural anthropology of the sixteenth century. . . . We may 
seriously doubt whether the life-is-meaningless formula, with its 
implied appeal to healing meaning from beyond, really gets at the 
essential predicament . . .  Man's problem is not that he is natu­
rally strengthless and finds no meaning In life, but on the con­
trary that he is too strong, too able, finds too much meaning on 
interesting side journeys.'49 j
Walter Kaufmann argues similarly in the conclusion of his analysis of J
4
contemporary students; ^
Not only frivolous people lack any ultimate concern and are in an ]
important sense uncommitted but the same is true of millions of
very serious college students who wonder what they should do with
themselves after graduation. There is nothing to which they
greatly desire to give themselves, nothing that matters deeply to
them.1 50 ^
Michael Novak argues from the same point of view. i
The truly serious threat to Tillich's future relevance comes from "I
the widespread indifference among the active and the intelligent
to ultimate questions. Tillich himself seemed to sense this threat
in his definition of indifference as the only true atheism. A grow- ^
ing band of young religious thinkers believes that Tillich relied
too much upon the inwardness, the romantic wonderment, the pervading •
religious experience of finitude, so natural to German romanticism
but so foreign to American urban pragmatism.151 '
Novak includes Rabbi Richard U  Rubensteln's reference to Tillich; "Ha i
had spoken for and to his time, but we have moved beyond that t i m e . "1 ^ 2  ;
And in Kai Nielsen's sardonic article "Is God So Powerful that He Doesn't ,
Even Hava to Exist?" is stated the following; "Tillich doesn't put new ,
wine into old bottles, he puts in grape soda and than labels it Chateau
Latour."^^^
Sufficient references have been presented to show that Tillich N
was not accepted uncritically. Many critics have given their reasons as
.'J'y,' r. . . . <  :__  .    J
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to why he is now considered to be out-of-date. However, an outspoken Xi
attitude of openness and dialogue rather than confrontation and conver­
sion is appealing. This may mean accommodation in order to maintain an 
inclusive stance, but so be it. There is too much at stake (survival, 
in fact). Tillich addresses himself to universal issues. He is caught
critic, Nels Ferre, could also say* "Tillich as a towering theological |
figure is now more relevant than ever. To call him passe is to classify 
oneself as theologically superficial, as a journalist rather than a 
scholar."154 ' |
Attention has been called to six major critiques of Paul Tillich.
'Ï
He has been accused of obscurity, of being unbiblical, of being unchris- J
tian from the viewpoint of kerygmatic theology, of being a pantheist, of J
being an inadequate philosopher, and finally, of being irrelevant. These |
are all serious charges, but they must be balanced with the many words of 
appreciation that were expressed on behalf of Tillich, as referred to In i
the first section of this chapter.
Ï ^I
Evaluation of Paul Tillich* s Concept of "the Human"
Having presented a critique of Paul Tillich's thought in which an 
attempt was made to reveal an understanding of Tillich's significance as 
a contemporary theologian, the author will now represent his personal 
evaluation with the following views. The shortcomings of Tillich's 
thought have been recognized, and it has been conceded that there is an 
element of heresy in some of his affirmations; nevertheless, there is '{1
much in his thought that is commendable. 1
First of all, his world view is that of modern man. He takes 
seriously the realities of the twentieth century. The world continues
to become a smaller place in which to live; and other faith commitments, 3
including secular faith commitments, must be encountered. Tillich's
 I
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"on the boundary" between Christian faith and philosophy— but perhaps 
that is where one ought to be. Truth is universal and Tillich tries J
'I
to interpret Christian truth in a way that reveals consciousness of 
the scientific and cultural achievements as well as the political and 
economic disasters of this century.
Tillich may have idealistic tendencies, but he counterbalances 
these with a realistic awareness of the demonic and the need for a 
"Protestant principle." His starting point (man) is in harmony with |
■'Ï
that of the author. The criteria for evaluating Tillich rests upon the 
interrelationship of three elements* self-authenticating human experi­
ence; a reference point that serves as a norm consistent with life M
’M
experiences; and the corporate experience of the community of faith 
which validates by demonstration its faith commitments. Tillich's 
system, with all of its weaknesses, comes the closest to meeting the f
criteria just mentioned.
In every person's experience there occurs a time in which ques­
tions are raised as to the meaning of life. While not everyone will 
answer these questions in the same way, man is that creature who asks g
questions. And whatever answers may be found come from within man on 
the depth level. This means that the need to be within the theological 1
circle is essential for finding ultimate answers. Indeed, revelation 
is necessary, but it finds a response that does not come from foreign 
territory. There is within man a spirit that can know the Spiritual 
Presence and respond actively, not merely passively to the Divine/human 
encounter, i.e., man does not only receive grace, but he takes the 
initiative as well in seeking grace (by the raising of questions and 
searching for answers to his existential situation). Tillich would say 
that this is evidence of God's activity, too. But man has a personal
a
.................  , . _ , j
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center, eurid it is not only God who can initiate the relationship; or, |
prayer would be merely a response. The relationship between God and |
man is a dynamic one.
Being-itself may be inadequate for a meaningful definition of 
God, but other alternatives have limitations, too. If one is to avoid 
the problems of the supernatural world view of the first century, then |
other words are necessary in order to communicate the experience of |
;|
self-transcendence present in authentic religious experience. The
'iî
author finds Henry Nelson Wieman's definition for God as "Creative Inter­
c h a n g e "  155 be suggestive of the direction that one could go. God is I
experienced through persons— an encounter in which creativity and concern 
for fulfillment results in reconciliation. The assumption here is that 
the human condition is in a state that needs reconciliation (therefore, 
grace), but that the human condition is not totally corrupt and incapable 
of significant interchange. It is grace that makes it creative because 
forgiveness and acceptance are part of the interchange, opening the way 
for it to be so. Man is not experiencing only Man with a capital M. It 
is not his ideal or best self. It is an experience of transcendence that 
is beyond (or within) oneself that is ecstatic and paradoxical in nature.
But it is not nonsensical or absurd in content.
The author agrees with Tillich that it is Jesus as the Christ wAio 
is the norm and the means by which the Ultimately Ultimate is experienced -sw
and the Invitation to participate in the New Being is extended. He is 
the historical ev»it that is the clue and the reality that men have known 
since the first century.
When man is honest with himself there is an awareness of inade­
quacy, of being less than he ought to be, of failing to realize his poten­
tial, of being "full of himself," i.e., self-centered, and there is a need
' \ , j \ 4 .^'v .-..B V'V " '"■ ■
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to become free from the inhibiting and binding elements of human exis- 
tence. Freedom and liberation come from participation in the New Being.
When he participates, man becomes a new creature. His awareness and 
sensitivities are expanded, and he is freed to be more responsible for
himself and his neighbor. When he is acting responsibly, i.e., caring
in concrete ways, God ie presents New Being is made available to others.
It is in God's working through persons and events that he is made known
and man is made more fully human.
1
The trinitarian concept indicating God's activity as that of
: I
creating, redeeming, and sustaining becomes descriptive of the kind of %|
activity that a Christian is called to perform. He is to bring order ’ *
out of chaos; ha is to be a life-changing influence by way of partici- I
pation in the New Being; and he is to be a supportive and an enabling j
presence wherever human life seeks to become more human. j
Since all of life has been engaged in the creative process, death j
is faced with hope because man returns to the creative ground from iWiich 
he came. The nature of Eternal Life cannot be discussed, since it lies j
outside of human imagination. Personal experience in this life has had i
qualitative moments (kairoi). and participation in them hints at what I
may be in store for man following physical death. Whether or not there !
is a Day of Resurrection, the author cannot say. He can only say that ;
he has had experiences that have caused him to participate in a graceful . J
love that suggests no limits or boundaries. More than this cannot be |
i
known. The symbol of the Cross is the central symbol that indicates 
that redemptive love cannot be destroyed. It always rises from the dead. |
Wherever two or three persons experience unconditional love there is com- i
munity, there is hope, there is God, there is creative interchange in j
which grace abounds. Certainly these views are not orthodox, but neither
315
do they go so far as to suggest the possibility of having Christian
156
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faith without belief in God (as advocated by Alistair Kee).
Tillich's thought is important because he does make the Gospel 
intelligible to modern man. He may be accused of diluting the Christian 
message, but he tries to enable modern man to love God with his mind as f
well as with his heart. His theology may be speculative, but it is also 
existential. On the one hand, contemporary man may be more concerned 
about surviving as a species on this earth than about having a meaning­
ful existence; yet, on the other hand, there is in evidence a profound 
interest in Eastern religions, the occult, and a resurgence of Neo- 
Pentecostalism and the charismatic ministries. In the modern world, 
apparently, man is both more secular and more religious. Tillich has ^
something to say to that man.
Although indebted to Tillich for his seminal philosophical the­
ology, the author raises several questions about Tillich's concept of 
"the human."
First, must one be consciously religious, i.e., can a person be 
an honest agnostic, or humanist, without Tillich calling him religious 
by saying he has an Ultimate Concern? Tillich's categories are so broad 
and inclusive that he does not give a person room to be without an
Unconditional or "Really Real" content of faith. It is the author's
1
observation that many people find life meaningful without a conscious j
reference to the Ultimate (e.g., the many persons who consider family, |
occupation, and human causes to be sufficient reasons for being). i
Second, does defining God as "Being-itself" really tall anything
about Cod? Tillich thinks that to say anything more is to say too much, '
-?i
i.e., more than can be honestly articulated. But does Being-itself say , 1
"i
enough? Is the "God above God" another example of a contantless faith? :|
r- V  . w,:; ,'— 7 .V 7- , ......  - —  — ^  rrrr  ^ 7
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Also, his doctrine of God does not seem to need a doctrine of Christ, i{
in that his ideas of providence and of the "courage to be" seem to be 
sufficient in and of themselves. One wonders whether man on his own 
can live courageously "in spite of" the human predicament. Is faith 
in Jesus as the Christ necessary in order that man may experience "the 
acceptance of being accepted"? Tillich is not clear at all times about 
the real role in his theology that Christ plays. It at least appears 
that his Christology is brought into his system by the back door, so to 
speak, regardless of his claim to the contrary.
Tillich's concept of reconciliation raises the questions How 
essential for reconciliation is the New Being? If salvation is possible 
for those in the latent church, the result is a universalism that may be 
reasonable and inclusive of other religions but it is at the expense of
the uniqueness and particularity of traditional Christianity. This |
interpretation may make sense, but it does emasculate the Christian claim 
to a considerable degree. Perhaps Tillich the theologian concedes too 
much to Tillich the philosopher. Nevertheless, Tillich is working in 
the right direction.
Third, his discussion of essential man raises the question of 
whether the responsibility for sinning in "the F all" and the necessity 
to actualize oneself by way of "the F all" have been adequately explained 
(this has been discussed previously). Tillich makes an admirable attempt 
but still leaves something to be desired.
Fourth, Tillich's concept of estrangement makes much of man's 
experience of finitude. Does Tillich make too much of the unnaturalness 
of death? It is questionable whether he is correct in this. For many 
persons, humanism and "this worldly" answers appear to be sufficient.
Death does not seem to be a haunting problem that drives man to despair,
I
I
Iif-:.'
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but meaninglessness does continue to be a problem. Perhaps emptiness 
and purposelessness are but symptoms of the deeper malady of finitude.
In this chapter the significance of Paul Tillich*s thinking has 
been presented. His strengths and weaknesses have been examined. The 
author has added his personal evaluation of Tillich which reflects his 
appreciation for, and his difficulty with, Tillich's understanding of 
man. In the final chapter the concept of "the human" in the work of 
Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich will be compared.
CHAPTER VII
A COMPARISON OF HERMANN HESSE AND PAUL TILLICH
Having examined the life and work of Hermann Hesse and Paul '.W
Tillich in regard to the concept of "the human," a comparison of them g
■1
will now be made. There are definite parallels in their life and |
thought as well as definite areas of departure. In this chapter three 41
■1particular aspects will be presented in comparing the two men; first, 
the similarities between them; second, the contrasting differences #
between them; and finally, the implications of their thinking. î;|
Similar Elements in Hesse and Tillich
There was much that Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich had in common.
To begin with, there were some striking biographical similarities. Both 
men were born in Germany. Their parents were Pietistic Christians who 
were vocationally in the Christian ministry. Tillich later commented;
" . . . Pietists were right in stressing that theology involves existen­
tial commitment, but wrong in making that commitment a matter of absolute 4
certainty.Besides being children of clergymen, they were also close 
enough in age (Hesse was nine years older than Tillich but died only 
three years before him) to share the same historic period.
Tillich's youth was more stable and less turbulent than Hesse's, 
but because of the dominance of their parents both young boys coped with 
them as best they could; Tillich, by turning to philosophy, and Hesse, 
by willful self-assertion. Adolescence was much more traumatic for Hesse 
than for Tillich, but the loss of Tillich's mother when Paul was still a 
teenager produced psychological and spiritual problems of growth,
318
319
What was significant during these early years was the fact that both 
persons had a sense of destiny and a belief that they were to be the 
kind of persons that they actually became in later life; Hesse knew 
that he was to be a poet (his future was to be a literary one), and 
Tillich knew that he was to be a teacher of philosophy and theology.
In 1925 while reflecting upon his writing career, Hesse commented;
"I saw my task, or rather my way of salvation, no longer in the realm 
of lyric poetry or philosophy or any one of the occupations of special­
ists but rather simply in letting what little there was in me that was 
vital and strong live its life, simply in unqualified loyalty now to 
what I felt to be still alive within myself. That was Life, that was 
Cod. " 2
As young men away from home and on their own for the first time,
they were attracted to the bohemian life that was present in academic
"i
communities; Hesse at Tubingen and Basel, and Tillich at Berlin, Halle,
and Tubingen. They identified with bohemians who " . . .  followed 
international artistic and literary movements; they were skeptical, 
religiously radical, and romantic; they were antimilitaristic and if:
influenced by Nietzsche, expressionism, and psychoanalysis."^ The two "
young man delighted in the independence and personal freedom that they 
experienced.
The first marriages of both Hesse and Tillich were to older 
women, and these marriages ended in divorce shortly after the First 
World War. Although Hesse was a pacifist during the war and Tillich |
was a front line chaplain, they both saw the serious implication that 
the war had upon European culture, and each in his own way triad to help 
with the reconstruction of that culture. It was only with the passing 
of time that Hesse saw that he could not alter anything in Germany (so £
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he became a Swiss citizen), and Tillich's religious socialism was inef-
Ifective against the rise of national socialism and the Nazi movement.
Hesse and Tillich opposed the anti-Semitism in the Germany of 
the 1920s and the 1930s, and they were victims of nazism. While 
Tillich's attack upon nazism was explicit (see supra, pp. 181-182),
Hesse's response was implicit (see supra, p. 19 and p. 22). Both men I
were critics of culture and saw the danger of emotionalism connected 
with ignorance. They criticized members of the intelligentsia who 
refused to sea the inhumanity present in the Germany of that periods 
" . . .  if the philosophers remain in their closed spheres of mere 
logical inquiry of logic, and do not go into relevant problems of life, 
then they abandon the reality of our existence to movements which unite 
emotionalism emd ignorance."* Hesse and Tillich were humanists in the 
best sense of the word. They viewed life from a universal point of view 
rather than from a nationalistic one. Each man spoke out against the
I
I
demonic in the twentieth century. They saw the distortions of truth in 
a controlled press and feared the final destruction toward which nazism 
would lead. Whereas Tillich saw the dehumanization and injustice of 
society rooted in man himself, Hesse saw it as a product of certain men 
and not as a result of the sinfulness of all men. They were part of a 
minority of influential persons who recognized the sinister character­
istics of the period and who addressed themselves to it (ineffective 
though they were to combat it). There were many who refused to even 
recognize it, let alone try to do anything about it.
On the personal level, their life styles were similar. They were 
"night" people who were committed to their work, and they were prolific 
in their creative efforts. However, it was at the expense of their 
family life. Rollo May remarked, "Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote to the
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effect that he turned a deaf ear to friends, family members, and every 
other demand "when my genius calls me.' Though this appears as ruth­
lessness, and often is, it is present in greater or lesser degree in 
every creative individual I have k n o w n . W h e t h e r  this Justified the 
lack of emotional investment in their families would not be possible to 
say. Each man treated his family as secondary to his work. Regarding 
Paul Tillich, his wife asserted* "His children had to bear the brunt 
of knowing that he had sensitivity and eros in abundance for hundreds 
of other persons in the world but not much for them."^ One could see 
the reason for considerable resentment in this area. And it was known 
that Hesse's children were passed around between relatives and friends 
who assisted in providing a home for them while Hesse devoted himself 
completely to his work.
Both men appreciated the Apollonian and Dionysian sides of life. 
The life of the mind attracted them (their work witnessed to this fact), 
but they we^e not limited to an appreciation of only the. mental side of 
life. They each enjoyed the sensuous in life and had a this-world 
emphasis. At age fifteen Hesse wrote to his parents* " . . .  that 
though they foresaw a better life after the one on earth, he thought 
differently, and therefore would either do away with this life or enjoy
7
it." Many of his literary characters have a reckless abandonment to 
the physical side of life. Hesse lived in Goldmund as well as in 
Narziss. And Tillich had a similar aspect to his nature* "While he 
greatly appreciated the 'madonna* side of women, he also from time to
g
time saw them as prostitutes."
Both individuals ware free spirits and looked upon orthodoxy as 
intellectual Pharisaism. Their personal ethics were similar in that 
Hesse lived with Ninon Dolbin five years before marrying her, and Paul
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and Hannah Tillich lived together prior to marriage. Both Hesse and 
Tillich enjoyed good music and art and associated with artistic people. 
Their closest friends were free thinkers who represented diverse life 
styles and commitments.
s
I
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Hesse and Tillich ware each recognized and honored for their 1
achievements, and their mature years were similar in that they were 
expatriates with an international following. They lived long lives and 
left sizable intellectual legacies. Their work reflected their lives 
to a considerable extent. Indeed, the methodology of each mirrored 
his personality.
The biographical circumstances were not the only parallel factors 
affecting Hesse and Tillich, They shared an intellectual background 
containing many similar influences. This might be expected even though 
Hesse was a novelist and Tillich was a philosophical theologian. For 
example, there were idealistic elements present in each man's work. 
German idealism as a philosophy left its mark upon Tillich directly and 
upon Hesse indirectly. Essentialist categories were evident in each of 
them. Tillich's entire system of thought was heavily dependent upon 
these categories, and Hesse (like Jung) thought that there were essen­
tial structures in the human soul and that it was possible to search for 
personhood and true humanness and attain It to a certain degree.
Romanticism was another common element in their development.
Their aesthetic appreciation and nature mysticism illustrated romantic 
characteristics with pantheistic overtones. They saw the value of an 
"aesthetic-meditative" attitude toward nature (water, in particular) 
and history. Their ancestry made them value the mystic tradition with 
the ecstatic dimension of human experience. Hesse was influenced by 
Novalis who had been influenced by Schelling who in turn influenced
a
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Tillich. It should be noted that Schelling " • • • belonged to the old 
tradition of Württemberg piety which extended back over the theosophist
Q
Oetinger to the great biblicist Bengal." And Württemberg piety produced 
Hesse's spiritual ancestry.
Hesse and Tillich were conscious of the polarities of existence,
the ambiguous nature of reality, and they sought to overcome these
polarities* Hesse, by obtaining harmony and balance in life by way of
aesthsticism and Magical Thinking; Tillich, by participating in the
unambiguous life through the New Being. Hesse used the symbol of the
hermaphrodite and Tillich used the symbol of Eternal Life to describe
the oneness of mystical union.
Symbols such as divine androgeny, orgy (in which all opposites such 
as right and wrong, male and female, are overcome), mystical experi­
ence (which wipes out sensitivity to pleasure and pain, etc.), myths 
in which God and Satan are brothers, and so on, all point to a state 
of ultimacy in which the conditions of this life are overcome. Thus, 
the symbol embodying the coincidence of opposites is a transcendent, 
noncosmic, nonnatural, nonhistoric form, since nowhere in this world 
are the "pairs of opposites" reconciled. Here, in this world, all 
is relative: there is always pleasure and pain, male and female,
heat and cold, I and Thou, up and down.10
Hesse and Tillich shared this concept of the union of opposites and the
validity of mystical experience. The experience of transcendence was an
inner experience of depth. Hesse would agree with much of the following
statement by Tillich*
[Love] strives for a union with that which is a bearer of values 
because of the values it embodies. This refers to the beauty we 
find in nature, to the beautiful and the true in culture, and to 
the mystical union with that which is the source of the beautiful 
and the true. Love drives toward union with the forms of nature 
and culture and with the divine sources of both.11
Existentialism was another area of mutual influence upon their 
thought. They each prized freedom and responsibility in a world that 
reflected considerable meaninglessness. Hesse scholar, Theodore 
Ziolkowski, maintained that Hesse was neither a romantic nor an
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existentialist in the full sense of the terms but that he was somewhere 
in between,
• , , Hesse's conception of humor lies somewhere between Romantic 
irony, which for Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel is an objective |
aesthetic attitude, and the more subjective existential awareness 41
of the absurd. We can observe over and over again in Hesse's major |
themes a reduction of transcendence to immanence, of the ontological 
to the ethical, of the speculative to the existential, . . . But the 
shift in emphasis from romantic resolution to problems of existence 
in this world is a step in the development of existential thought.1%
Certainly Hesse and Tillich were concerned with being, i.e., with what
it means to be human. The previous quotation contained several of their
differences; however, the interest here is in the similarities between
them and in the existential elements present in each. Their interpréta-
tions were uniquely their o«m. For instance, Hesse advocated joy and 4
Tillich recommended courage, as that which enables man to face despair,
And they both had an "in spite of" quality about them.
They appreciated aesthetics and viewed symbols as means by which
one could communicate with deeper levels of reality. Tillich pointed
out the limitations of aesthsticism, though. "Aesthsticism deprives
art of its existential character by substituting detached judgements of
taste and a refined connoisseurship for emotional union. No artistic
expression is possible without the creative rational form, but the form, |
even in its greatest refinement, is empty if it does not express a |
13spiritual substance." The difficulty arises when artistic expression 
becomes one's Ultimate Concern, and therefore, one's God, according to 
Tillich, Hesse suggested this in Klingsor and in Goldmund. Tillich 
would say that this was idolatry.
They each stressed being what you are (even though Tillich me^t 
by this being Christian), but they realized that discovering what this 
meant would involve a tripartite view of human nature. In man's process 
of becoming human, he would move from innocence through the Fall, to
 .
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reconciliation. Their differences in interpreting the meaning of the 
process of becoming more fully human will be discussed in the next 
section of this chapter.
They were alike in their appreciation of certain movements and 
developments in intellectual circles* for example, they were attracted 
by Eastern philosophy and culture; and they saw the significance of 
psychotherapy in gaieral eund of certain aspects of it in particular
1 s
depth." Finitude was very evident in their thinking, but Hesse did 
not agonize over it as Tillich did.
The human predicament needed answering and each man approached it 
in different ways, but the answer for both was religious in content. The 
unambiguous life (Tillich) and the balanced life (Hesse) had as their 
models of transparency Jesus as the Christ and Siddhartha. Sanctifica­
tion for Christians was " . . .  the realization or progressive attainment
16of likeness to God or to God's intention for men." Siddhartha accepted 
the principle of being in becoming, embraced reality as a harmonious 
unity, and considered the unifying principle to be that of love. Balance 
and harmony, in Hesse, was equivalent to the reconciliation of estranged 
man in the healing creation of the New Being, in Tillich. In a sermon 
entitled "I Am Doing a New Thing," Tillich referred to the " . . .  deep
I
(such as the réintroduction of the female element in the idea of God).^* 
Together they saw the multidimensional quality of man’s person­
ality. For Hesse and Tillich, the problem of ambiguity was experienced 
by man because life was seen as a multidimensional unity of the essential 
and existential states of being. And they were conscious of the demonic 
in man. Hesse was more accepting of it than was Tillich, but both saw 
the power of the demonic and the need to deal with it. "The courage to 
affirm oneself must Include the courage to affirm one's own demonic
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things for which religion stands* the feeling for the inexhaustible
mystery of life, the grip of an ultimate meaning of existence, and the
17invincible power of an unconditional devotion." It might appear on
the surface that Hesse and Tillich were diametrically opposed to each
other when discussing Ultimate Concern, but both affirmed a feeling for
the mystery, meaning, and power within the depth dimension of man's
existence. They would articulate this depth experience differently,
but the basis of the experience would be similar.
Man is again a child of Natur whose destiny is Geist . . .  a dis­
cordant composite . . . prey to life's relentless flux • . , The 
acceptance he [Hesse] had long and vainly sought in philosophical 
speculation is now realized instead in religious experience* a 
faith in the ultimata meaningfulness of life. In this faith, that 
love is now made possible which can make harmony of chaos, allevi­
ate anxious loneliness in humaneness, reconcile the principles of 
Geist and Natur . . .  and acclaim life's flux . . .  1®
In the thought of either Hesse or Tillich, man never achieves perfec­
tion; nevertheless, a significant (but relative) degree of achievement 
can be realized. Man experiences oneness, or wholeness, in Siddhartha 
and Joseph Knecht, for Hesse, and by participation in the New Being,
I
for Tillich. While perfection is beyond human reach, fulfillment is 
not. This experience is not supernatural but self-transcending. "As 
Hesse confesses in 'My Faith,' the idea of the fundamental oneness of |
all being is his deepest belief. Again and again he tries to communi­
cate his noumenous experience, although he knows (and tells us in 
Siddharta) that no one can describe what happens to him in the hour of 
illumination.Self-realization, in Hesse, and salvation, in Tillich, 
are qualitatively similar.
Both Hesse and Tillich were sensitive to the mystical and social
dimensions of life. This was evident in their personal involvement in
the social and historical developments of their day. They each saw the 
universal significance of man and the need for dialogue and openness
I
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between all countries and cultures. Tillich's emphasis upon Logos
■f
stressed reason as a structural part of reality. His interpretation |
1
of Christian theology enabled him to be at home with humanists and 
Marxists as well as with Christians and persons of other faith commit­
ments. Hesse shared this inclusiveness in his belief in international­
ism. Hesse would agree with Tillich that if there is a God ha must be
'I
revealed in other religions as well as in Christianity. It would have
I
been interesting to Hesse that the direction of Tillich's thought at |i
the end of his life was moving toward the history of religions. Hesse |
’I
and Tillich argued for the same human values and opposed the dehumanlz- ^
ing elements in society as they encountered them, for example, they 
recognized the achievements of technological man; but at the same time, I
they saw the dehumanizing effects of the misuse of technology. While i
they opposed a prescriptive ethic (of laws and codes that must be |
obeyed), they were both moral men in the sense that they were witnesses 4
4
to truth that was not mere abstraction. The realities of daily life |
required concrete action. Joseph Knecht considered the educating of |
youth to be a worthy goal that required him to leave Castalia and to II
become a tutor to a particular problem student. This was a literary {
allusion to Hesse's ethical awareness. And Tillich maintained the 
creative tension of the boundary situation between abstraction and 
concreteness. In Wv Search for Absolutes he revealed his both/and 4;
i
posture of keeping in proper tension the accumulated ethical wisdom of j
■ 13
the ages and the immediate needs of the current concrete situation. ^
This section on the similarities in Hesse and Tillich could be
concluded by noting; " . . .  the greatest surprise of all, surely, is {
20
to see how faithful Hesse remained to himself from start to finish . . . "
This could be said of Tillich also. The authenticity of their personhood
.1
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was evident in their work. Their interaction with other human beings 
revealed a confidence in the life process and an outlook of hope toward 
the future if man would harness his destructive potential and realize 
his constructive possibilities.
Contrasting Elements in Hesse and Tillich 
While Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich had much in common, they 
also differed with one another. Some of their differenced were merely
the model for understanding reality. Faith, for Hesse, was anthropocen-
Î
a matter of degree, but others were quite marked. In this section the M
focus will be upon the contrasting elements in their concepts of "the 
human."
i
In the first place, Hesse and Tillich differed over the impor­
tance of ontology. "The belief in an ontological unity of nature and 
spirit underlies all of these [Hesse's] visions. But ontological ques- f
tions are secondary. It is not an exaggeration to say that ontological
21monism is an accepted fact of twentieth-century thinking." Ziolkowski 
saw this factor in Hesse and believed it to be the cause of Hesse's
I
immanent mysticism (rather than transcendent mysticism); still, Hesse's 
emphasis differed from that of Tillich. Ontology was the cornerstone 
of Tillich's thought.
Hesse stressed the concept of becoming, above that of being. For 
Hesse the essence of man was seen in searching, in being on the way (e.g., 
Siddhartha, Goldmund, and Knecht). Certainly the process of becoming was 
important to Tillich's understanding of being, but the difference was 
significant (and was one reason why Tillich did not follow the lead of 
process theologians such as Whitehead and Hartshorne). Jacob Boehme pro­
vided Tillich with a powerful model of dialectical thinking in mystical-
■
ontological categories; whereas, Goethe by way of poetry was for Hesse
•I"
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trically conceived as a feeling (emotionalism); Tillich understood faith 
to be a state of being grasped by an Ultimate Concern. Tillich believed I
that the solution to the problems of existence had an ontological basis,
but Hesse believed that the solution was an ethical one. Man would |
undergo an ethical transformation rather than an ontological transforma- #
tion. Of course, Tillich's understanding of transformation included an /r
ethical side, but it involved other dimensions of human existence as
well. Tillich's system was based upon his observation of reality, but 4#
Hesse found reality unpleasant and unworthy of his wholehearted attention;
therefore, he exercised the phenomena of phantasy and imagination. Also,
Hesse mistakingly understood the Protestant temperament to be one that
affirmed becoming rather than being. "I consider reality to be the last
thing one need concern oneself about, for it Is, tediously enough, always
present, while more beautiful and necessary things demand our attention
and care. Reality is what one must not under any circumstances be aatis- 
22
fied with . . . "  With this attitude of Hesse's, one could see why 
escapism was so prevalent in his writings and why he lived so much in 
the future. But for Tillich, reality was what should be man's main con­
cern. It should receive the highest priority in one's system of values.
The second fundamental difference centered upon the importance of 
aesthsticism. For Hesse, aesthetic self-expression was at the heart of 
what it meant to be human. He could not conceive of life devoid of artis­
tic creativity. To be man was to engage in one or more of the arts. It 
was in this experience that man was driven beyond himself to a fuller 
.and more complete level of existence. The aesthetic realm was where man 
came to know who he was and what he was meant to become. It was there 
that true selfhood could be explored and discovered. It was there that 
man drew near the ultimate, i.e., for Hesse, the closest thing to God.
I
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This theme appeared more often in Hesse's earlier works than in his €
mature works; nevertheless, he never completely abandoned this convic­
tion (as evidenced by the role of music in The Glass Bead Game).
Tillich saw the significance of man's aesthetic experience. He 
considered artists to be those persons who created essential images in 
various media of expression; painting, drama, poetry, novels, etc. And 
these forms of creative expression pointed beyond themselves. "This 
pointing beyond itself of every work of art shows the presence of some­
thing absolute In art, despite all changing styles and tastes in the 4|
23realm of artistic creation." But whereas Tillich saw the creative
. . .  we have shown by analytical description the presence of abso­
lutes within the universe of relativities and have pointed to the 
ground of everything absolute— the Absolute itself. . . . whether 
it is called "God," or the One, or Brahman-Atman, Fate, Nature, or 
Life. That to which our analysis led us, the Absolute itself, is 
not an absolute being, which is a contradiction in terms. It is 
Being-itself.24
Tillich thought that the artist was expressing Being-itself whether or 
not he was consciously aware of it.
But there was danger in being an aesthete because the aesthetic 
attitude could succumb to demonry. Man might create the world of mean­
ing by aesthetic activity, but there was a tragic quality in human 
experience. Authentic works of art would reveal this; an example would
!
encounter involving contact with the Ultimate, Hesse would be more 
Jungian in his interpretation by giving it a psychological rather than |
a religious or spiritual interpretation. It would be the Collective 
Unconscious rather them God that was mediated through the symbols used 
by the artists. The archetype of the mother in Demian and Narziss and 
Goldmund and the water symbol in Siddhartha and The Glass Bead Game 
illustrated this. Tillich would respond to this explanation of the 
source of symbols in aesthetic expression by saying*
Î
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be Picasso's "Guernica." Man's powerlessness and estrangement could 4
be seen in the painting, "Demonry breaks down only before divinity,
the possessed state before the state of grace, the destructive before
redeeming fate." It was this very weakness of aesthsticism which
Tillich pointed out that Hesse failed to accept. For example, Hesse
treated death aesthetically and did not see such existential anxiety
as it produced in Tillich, One could not help but be conscious of
Kierkegaard's description of the aesthetic stage, "The characteristic
of the aesthetic stage is the lack of involvement, detachment from 
26existence." However, Hesse was not satisfied to remain within the
aesthetic stage; he moved on to the ethical stage. Detachment became
impossible for him, and responsibility became a critical part of «rtiat
he considered to be essential (as was true with Joseph Knecht),
Hesse and Tillich parted company concerning the religious stage.
"The religious stage is beyond both the aesthetic and the ethical and
is expressed in relation to that which interests us infinitely or which
27
produces infinite passion," Hesse was content to stop with the ethical 
stage, Tillich was not, Hesse hinted at wMiat was ultimate but did not 
spell it out. Tillich certainly was quits explicit in discussing what 
he meant by Ultimate Concern.
The third contrasting element in the thought of Hesse and 
Tillich was the nature of sin. Hesse did not ignore the reality of sin, 
but he saw it as underachievement. He did not see sin as a given part 
of man's inner life. Rather, " . . .  sin is Imposed on human nature 
from without, being no intrinsic element in the soul. Sin is seen never­
theless as a necessary channel for the soul's progression out into con­
sciousness: without a guilty conscience, the child would not be fully
aware of the world." But for Hesse, sin and guilt were not due to a
'.y-
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broken relationship with God; they were due to a failure to become one's
Ï
I
whole self— one's best self. It was not a state of having fallen from
grace as Tillich understood it to be. The description by Tillich of sin II
I
as unbelief, hubris, and as concupiscence would go beyond anything that 
Hesse could honestly say was the truth of his observation of human 
experience.
Hesse would agree with some of the descriptions of the human 
condition that Tillich would give. For example, Hesse could accept the 
following statements by Tillich; j
It is my conviction that the character of the human condition, like 
the character of all life, is "ambiguity"; the inseparable mixture 
of good and evil, of true and false, of creative and destructive 
forces— both individual and social. Of course, there are degrees 
to which the one or the other side prevails, but there is nothing 
unambiguously destructive. They accompany each other inseparately.
. . .  The awareness of the ambiguity of one's own highest achieve­
ments (as well as one's own deepest failures) is a definite symptom 
of maturity.29
The human experience of ambiguity was not the same as a broken relation­
ship with God, according to Hesse, as he was unable to speak about such 
a relationship. Therefore, he would not be expected to be concerned 
about God's liberating forgiveness. In other words, Hesse did not speak 
in terms of traditional theistic categories. Tillich did not affirm a 
traditional theistic position either, but he did use theological language 
that discussed faith and disobedience, forgiveness and grace, etc.
The fourth difference between Hesse and Tillich centered upon a 
humanistic definition of man's existence versus a religious one. At 
various times Hesse proclaimed his belief in man and denied possessing 
any belief in the Christian understanding of God. At other times he 
approximated some of the religious experiences that were closely allied 
to human experience. For instance, "Hesse finds that faith, irrespec- j
tiva of the particular religious garb it wears, is essentially a -j
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realization of the need for submission to the forces which rule man, a
30state of confident acceptance." This was close to Tillich's "accept­
ing acceptance." In "the Father Confessor" narrative that was added to 
The Glass Bead Game. Hesse attributed to the character the following
words; "We are believers because the faith, the power of the Redeemer
31
and His death for the salvation of all men, has overwhelmed us."
This was very close to Tillich's being grasped by the God made known in
the picture of Jesus as the Christ. Hesse's stress on harmony had an
"in spite of" quality to it. Tillich was conscious that harmony was
32the ultimate concern of the Enlightenment.
A significant difference between Hesse and Tillich was their
understanding of humanism. According to Tillich,
Humanism is the attitude which makes man the measure of his own 
spiritual life, in art and philosophy, in science and politics, in 
social relations and personal ethics. For humanism the divine is 
manifest in the human; the ultimate concern of man is man. . . .
For this reason the humanist faith is called "secular," . . .  
Secular means, belonging to the ordinary process of events, not 
going beside it or beyond it into a sanctuary.33
Tillich recognized the fact that modern humanism rested on a Christian 
foundation and possessed a sense of the "ought to be." But it had no 
unconditional concern that possessed a demanding, directing, or promis­
ing element in it. For Tillich the humanist answer was inadequate, 
"According to it, the divine Spirit is nothing but the religious func­
tion of the human spirit. If this were so, healing would be self- 
healing. But only something healthy can heal what is sick. The sick 
cannot overcome Itself by itself. It can only receive healing powers 
from beyond itself."^* The difference between Hesse and Tillich would 
be that Tillich would say that man could not gain power over himself 
because he could not gain power over what was ultimate; in the process 
of becoming fully human man would fall into sin. Hesse's humanistic
334
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faith might rest on a Christian foundation, but it was still humanism 
and subject to the above criticisms by Tillich. "If sin is separation
from and contradiction of one's true nature, and if salvation is the
35
realization of that nature through reunion, . . . "  then man could |f
4
not save himself. ,
;l
Hesse emphasized the importance of "awakening," but a growing ®
1
consciousness of the self was not the same thing as a growing conscious- #
ness of the Holy. Indeed, Tillich included self-awareness in religious 
experience, but he did not limit it to only that. Salvation was more 
than the achievement of harmony within— more than the balance of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian elements in man. The presence of divine grace 
actively at work within man was affirmed by Tillich. He would agree
with Ronald Gregor Smith's statements "Man does not make himself. He
36
is made." And he would agree with A. D. Galloway's statement* "When
man reflects the image of God, it is then that he is fundamentally 
37
human." Tillich's own words would best illustrate this cleavage
between his thinking and that of Hesse* " . . .  we must realize that
the content of theology is not to be found by 'looking at one's self,'
38
but must be sought by 'looking beyond one's self.'" Hesse, in his 
early work, was opposed to this idea. In his later work, he was not 
content with the idea of looking only at oneself; but he was looking 
beyond, to other men, however, and not to God. For the mature Hesse, y 
man was truly human when he assumed personal responsibility for others.
Alistair Kee would be supportive of Hesse's position. One need 
not be driven to nihilism because of lacking a belief in God* " . . .  it 
would be absurd to say that a life without God is a life without meaning.
Many atheists give their lives to serve higher causes than their own 
self-interest. . . . the life which transcends our 'nature' may ultimately
'■4
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prove more natural, since in it we find fulfillment."^^ People could 
live mature lives without God. Some people might not be interested in 
asking the question of the meaning of life (and therefore fall into 
nihilistic skepticism), but those people would be in the minority.
Tillich would remind the person who claimed to be an atheist*
" . . .  he who seriously denies God, affirms him. Without it I could 
not have remained a theologian. There is, I soon realized, no place 
beside the divine, there is no possible atheism, there is no wall be­
tween the religious and the n o n r e l i g i o u s . I f  this were true, Hesse 
would not be diametrically opposed to Tillich after all. "According 
to the Protestant principle, it is possible within the secular world 
grace is operating not in a tangible but in a transparent form. . . .
God may speak for a time more powerfully through a nonreligious, and 
even anti-Christian, movement, such as the early social democracy, than i
through the Christian churches."*^ If this were the case, Hesse might 
be one of those persons who, although claiming a secular position, would 
have grace operating in him. Although not referring to a supernatural 
being, Hesse could meet Tillich's definition of being religious* "Reli­
gion in this sense is the state in which we are grasped by the infinite 
seriousness of the question of the meaning of our life and our readiness 
to receive answers and to act according to them."*^ The content of 
these answers might not be that of traditional Christianity, but there 
could be little doubt that Hesse was religious;
. . . that there is a meaning to life" sprang from a religious 
ground. The state of having been thrown into nothingness he [Hesse] 
rejected. . . . His religion corresponded to the Taoist experience 
of the unity of all being. . . .  In terms of consciousness, this 
faith means the integration of the paradoxical. Religion and faith 
as a cosmic experience constantly break through the confines of
rationalist logic and causation-linked realities in the direction I
of the ultimate, absolute reality.*3 j
I
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Hesse and Tillich both affirmed a human experience of transcendence by 
way of the depth dimension of existence. Hesse's humanism contained 
religious elements, but the content of these elements was not that of 
Tillich's content. The difference was due to the content of Christian 
theology, made explicit by Tillich. Hesse's theology was syncretistic, 
whereas Tillich's Christian theology was not. For Tillich, everything
I
I
was to be subjected to the picture of Jesus as the Christ. He was the
norm for understanding man and God, "A mixture of religions destroys
44
in each of them the concreteness which gives it its dynamic power,"
Hesse appealed to Eastern thought and emphasized self-liberation;
Tillich called attention to revelation, specifically the Christian 
revelation as the means by which man could be liberated, Tillich 
sought to reconcile the humanistic and the Christian traditions. Hesse 
was not limited by any particular faith commitment to Christianity.
Herein would lie a major difference between Hesse and Tillich.
Concerning the question of Christology, Hesse saw no need for 
revelation in order for man to break out of his self-centeredness.
Jesus of Nazareth was a noble or admirable human model for individuals 
to follow (along with the Buddha and other great personalities of his­
tory), but Jesus remained an example rather than the bearer of the New 
Being as believed by Tillich. For Hesse, man had it within himself to 
will his better self. Self-reliance was the key for Hesse, not being 
"in Christ," as advocated by Tillich. The Christian man would become 
responsible for the world and history because; "The Christian cannot 
be indifferent to this world which God made and l o v e s , I t  was only 
when man would be "in Christ" that he would be lifted out of himself 
and would become "the man for others." Therefore, becoming fully 
human would be directly related to the reception of new life that
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compléta balance." Man would need help if he were to cope with the
■
elements that would limit his becoming what he was meant to be. He 4
would need revelation. "Revelation occurs when some concrete event, 
object, or interpersonal relationship becomes 'transparent* to its own 
ground and thus reveals the unity of finitude with being-itself. This 
may occur, for example, in the apprehension of a moral imperative, in 
an aesthetic experience, or in a recognition of some ultimate m e a n i n g . |  
Providence, for Tillich, was God actively involved in human life, urging 
man by persuasion to realize his potentiality by becoming reconciled to 
the Ground of Being: " . . .  providence means that God is creating in
every moment, and directing everything in history toward an ultimate 4
51 Vfulfillment in the kingdom of God," For Hesse, man's destiny was i
determined by human choices within each person's unique circumstances 
but with a distinct additional ingredient of what was similar to Eastern 
Oriental fatalism. Destiny called from within, but the source of this 
call would be closer to Jung's Collective Unconscious than to biblical 
revelation as Tillich would maintain.
Autonomous man and theonomous man called for one to become mature, i.
i.e., to be able to live with ambiguities. Hesse claimed that this was l!
possible without belief in God, but Tillich disagreed* man was most ^
human u^en he became theonomous man. Both Hesse and Tillich called for M
man's responsible use of freedom* For what was man free, and to whom 
was he responsible? The content of their answers was the difference 
between autonomy and theonomy.
The sixth and last major difference between Hesse and Tillich 4
centered upon the issue of community. Hesse was very much a solitary ^
person, and his early literary characters reflected his solitariness.
This contributed to the criticism that his characters were one-dimensional.
I
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resulted from an encounter with the reality of the New Being. "It is 
not in the individual himself that we find the reality of man."*^
4
The fifth point of departure could be seen in Hesse's emphasis
•i
on autonomy while Tillich's en^hasis was on theonomy. This difference
grew out of the arguments presented earlier. Tillich defined each of
these terms in the following quotations:
Autonomy asserts that man as the bearer of universal reason is the 
source and measure of culture and religion— that he is his own law.
, . . Theonomy asserts that the superior law is, at the same time, 
the innermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which 
is man's own ground: the law of life transcends man, although it
is, at the same time, his own.47
The key omission in autonomy would be that of an Ultimate Concern.
Tillich understood theonomy to have a spiritual ground that transcended 
the secular sphere with a reference to the Ultimate. Autonomy could be 
indirectly religious, but it possessed no direct relationship with the 
Unconditional. |
Both Hesse and Tillich appreciated the need for autonomy, but 
Tillich found it necessary to go beyond it to theonomy. For Tillich, 
the concept of theonomy was healthy-minded and life-affirming and human­
istic to an extent; " . . .  man discovers himself when he discovers 
Cod; he discovers something that is identical with himself although it I
transcends him infinitely, something from which he is estranged, but
48 a
from which he never has been and never can be separated." i
• "V?
Hesse argued that autonomous man was "on his own" and free to M
>¥
develop his potentialities. He would set up his own standards and work #
toward his own goals. By exercising his freedom, man could discipline ]
himself so that he would realize his goals and would become fully human ,I
in the process. Tillich would say that that was naive because it did
not come to terms with the irrational and demonic elements in man: i
4
" . . . man is finite and he can never unite all elements of truth in
'-sky-..;-' yV y.'- - V-:" r v,-  4 .._____.______  . ...    ... a.. . . . .f
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living mainly in their own experience (which was predominantly mental),
1
Whenever interpersonal relationships did occur in Hesse's work, they |
were usually one-to-one relationships rather than one-to-many or one 
person to a group. Therefore, his work revealed a conspicuous void in |
regard to the usual social institutions of family, church, vocational 7
or political organizations, etc. It was for this reason that Hesse was
%
unfair in his overreaction to external authority, Tillich, likewise,
was wary of heteronomous culture, but he was fairer in his assessment |
é
of institutional life; " . . .  every individual, even the most creative, |
needs given structures that embody the experience and wisdom of the past,
that liberate him from the necessity of innumerable decisions of his own,
52
and that show him a meaningful way of acting in most cases," Tillich 
considered institutional forms of the faith to be its concrete expres­
sions, and he thought that external sources could be helpful in assisting 
one to know oneself. He was critical of the institutional forms of 
religion (note the Protestant principle), but he could not imagine a 
formless expression of religion. Some sense of community involvement 
was an essential part of being human.
He who cannot relate himself as an "I" to a "thou" cannot relate 
himself to the true and the good and to the ground of being in which 
they are rooted. He who cannot love the friend cannot love the 
artistic expression of ultimate reality. Kierkegaard's stages of 
the aesthetical and the ethical and the religious are not stages but 
qualities which appear in structural interdependence.53
Tillich stressed the need for seeing the interrelationship of the "I" 
and the "thou." According to him, apace, redemptive love, had an onto­
logical basis, and every human enterprise was rooted in it.
Hesse had difficulty in perceiving the different dimensions of 
love. Only a motherly image conveyed the sentiment of unconditional love, 
for Hesse (e.g., in Narziss and Goldmund). Goldmund remarked that his 
mother was everywhere;
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She was Lisa the gipsy, and the sorrowful madonna of Master Nicholas, 
She was life and wantonness, and fear and hunger, and love, • • ,
Even a short while ago I should have thought it unbearable to die 
without having carved my mother's image. My life would have seemed 
so useless. But now, see how wall she contrives it. Instead of my 
hands moulding her shape, it is she who moulds me, and informs me.
She has her fingers round my heart, and loosens it, and makes me 
empty. She has led me to death, and my dream dies with me— my statue 
of Eve, in wood, the Mother of all men.54
Tillich argued against separating justice from love and against separating 
love from its ground, God. Both Hesse and Tillich saw the importance of 
love; the difficulty came in regard to the shape of its expression when 
it involved more than two people.
In several of his novels, Hesse dealt with unselfish love (love 
that continued to give without expecting a return), Joseph Knecht's 
commitment to Tito in The Glass Bead Game illustrated sacrificial love.
But again it was a one-to-one relationship. F or Hesse, community life 
was unimportant in his concept of *the human," For Tillich, being fully 
human was synonomous with being Christian* " • . • nobody can be Chris­
tian in isolation from the historical event, or in isolation from the 
Church— or better, the community (I call it the spiritual community), for 
outside of this we cannot be called Christian.Achieving blessedness 
meant having relationships that mattered.
This line of thought would need to be tempered if it were to mean 
excluding Hesse from the human family. It should be remembered that he 
personally sacrificed a considerable amount on behalf of other people.
His pacifism forced him to absorb much hostility, and his humanistic 
values came at a high price. Among other things, it cost him his home­
land. For this reason, Tillich would say that Hesse was a member of the 
latent church. He rejected the choice of becoming a member of the mani­
fest church, but he was what Karl Rahner would call an "anonymous Chris-
I
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tian." Hesse's thinking lacked a developed sense of community* . to
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57humanity." Whether recognized or not, the biblical view affirms that 
Cod is involved in the process of helping man to become human and to move
1
make life human will be composed of many who cannot 'name* him [christ]
but who are just as concerned for koinonia in such basic human issues
as the supply and distribution of bread, civil liberties, race, peace,
pollution, population control, literacy, law reform, minority rights,
56
etc., etc." Indeed, for man to be man, a community was needed-even 
if the community was only a small one. |
To summarize the differences between Hesse and Tillich, the fol­
lowing should be recalled* the contrasting views of ontology, the 
importance of aesthetics, the interpretation of the nature of sin, the 
humanistic versus the religious tradition, the emphasis upon autonomy 
versus theonomy, and the issue of community life. |
I
I
Implications of Hesse's and Tillich's Concepts of "the Human"
A considerable distance has been journeyed in viewing the subject 
of what it means to be human according to Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich.
The particular concern in this concluding section will focus upon certain
i
specific implications of their thought.
First of all, becoming human is a lifelong process, and one never ^
■fî
arrives at a stage of completion. Life is a restless driving toward 41
fulfillment, a person's reach exceeding his grasp. One engages in self- '
discovery and participates in the process of continual exploration of 
reality. And reality has destructive as well as creative elements in 
it. Roger Shinn quotes Glenn Greys "I have become profoundly convinced 
that man is never on the level of animals. Either he falls below th«n, 
as so often in his mad rages, or he rises above them when he achieves
I
into a responsible use of the future.
1
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In the twentieth century it has been evident how subhuman man 
can be, but there has been evidence, too, of the self-giving expressions 
of man, Tillich advocates consciousness of the arts if man is to under­
stand the values and directions of his time, Hermann Hesse has been 
selected as a contemporary literary figure who has influenced the current 
university generation. What has been discovered in him is a man who has 
a firm belief in the goodness of human possibilities and who thinks that 
man can realize his potential if he desires to do so. Hesse believes in 
man becoming human by utilizing the spiritual dimension. But he is refer­
ring to a spiritual dimension that is grounded, so to speak. He speaks 
of transcendence and of the inward way of meditation, but he does not ‘F
mean by this an encounter with the God made known in Christ, However, it 
is this author's contention that Hesse could not have arrived at the
place that he did without a profound dependence upon his Christian back- M
'i;
ground. He is able to speak about an ethical existence and of sacrificial 
living because he had been taught the significance of the suffering ser­
vant role that Jesus assumed, Hesse reacts against the excessive pietis- 
tic desire of those who attempted to break his will and who tried to make 
him accept certain theological doctrines. Even though he did not submit 
to this pressure, he had a value-affirming background to which he could 
react. Many of his youthful followers have not been so fortunate. They 
desire to arrive at his mature position, but they are without the philo­
sophical and religious presuppositions that were part of Hesse's experi­
ence, A heritage with a spiritual void, or one that witnesses to the 
meaninglessness and absurdity of life, will not produce the quality of 
life advocated by Hesse. Therefore, there is danger in unthinkingly j
;-t
following Hesse as one's spiritual mentor. There is truth In Tillich's ,
statements j
■ J
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The author's response to the experience of the unknown is that it is 
more than self-transcendence— it is a glimpse of the Eternal. When
%
I
Autonomy is able to live as long as it can draw from the religious 
tradition of the past, from the remnants of a lost theonomy. But 
more and more It loses this spiritual foundation. It becomes 
emptier, more formalistic, or more factual and is driven toward 
skepticism and cynicism, toward the loss of meaning and purpose.
The history of autonomous cultures is the history of a continuous 
waste of spiritual substance. At the end of this process autonomy 
turns back to the lost theonomy with impotent longing, or it looks 
forward to a new theonomy in the attitude of creative waiting until
the kairos a p p e a r s , 53
Hesse's thought has benefited from his theonomous cultural heritage.
His followers may not be aware of this source that had affected his
Ï
thinking, Tillich directly acknowledges his dependence upon the Chris- Æ
tian revelation, and his work portrays this dependence. Man becomes f
fully human when he participates in the New Being, Perfection is not a 
state of being that is ever attained, but reconciliation and Sanctifica­
tion produce a sense of fulfillment. i
In the second place, man is most human when he mirrors the image 
of God, When the author takes Hesse seriously and is as honest with
j
himself as he can be, he arrives at different conclusions. It is true
.i
that many persons appear to live without a conscious reference to a 
theologically transcendent dimension. But it has been the author's 
experience that on rare occasions meaningful moments occur in which a <^1
mysterious Presence makes itself known, A sense of awe and wonder pre­
vails over the gift of life and the miracle of birth, Pascal's state­
ment is appreciated: j
When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the ^
eternity that went before me and the eternity that comas after, the |
small extent of space I fill, the narrow limits of my field of view, {
swallowed up as I am in the infinite immensities of space, which I 
do not know, and which know not me, I am terrified and astonished to j
find myself here rather than there. For there is no reason whatever ,
why I should be here rather than there, why now rather than then,59
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significant moments occur during life (the giving and receiving of love, 
forgiving and being forgiven, sacrificing and being the recipient of 
others' sacrifices, and experiencing the death of loved ones), there is 
art overwhelming, even ecstatic, awareness of something more, a Someone 
who is present and known in that moment. This exceeds what humanism can
affirm. But life can be meaningful for both humanists and Christians In ||
the following ways: by possessing relationships that matter; by fulfil-
ling one's vocation, i,e,, having a job worth doing and doing it well; 
and by giving oneself to a cause that will outlive oneself.
For the author, fulfillment has a Christian orientation. Christian 
theology is relational at its center (man to God, man to man, and man to 
himself); it has a vocational dimension that seeks to do all to the glory 
of God, and the only cause big enough is the Kingdom of God, Certainly 
these purposes have concrete and "down to earth" expressions: living
responsibly by loving the neighbor, participating in an occupation or 
profession that uplifts human values, and being involved in the social 
concerns of the day that seek to make human life more human. However, 
for the author the motivating factor is commitment to Christ. Creative 
interchange is related to a covenant relationship with the God who is 
made known in Christ, Although the covenant expresses itself in human 
relationships, there is a definite distinction between the glory of God 
and the glory of man.
If the source of man's future hope rests only on man, there is 
little historic precedence to justify this hope. The question may be 
raised as to the justification for Christian hope. Historically there 
have been times of kairos when new Impetus for living has occurred. For 
example, the rise of the Franciscan movement in the latter Middle Ages,
the birth of Christian humanism during the Renaissance, the spiritual
.1 '^1' ■ ''JV'. ■•• '• - . : 1 *' •> • • -'i ' ■*: - % yrtr* « - J ' * ' y - T ' L  j i- Sï'-v s’-.V-î 1 I  ^ -J? f  '1'=^ * / a
345
renewal present in the Reformation, the missionary expansion of the 
nineteenth century, and the radical involvement of the church in social 
issues of the twentieth century illustrate theonomous periods of history.
Many persons are indebted to Hesse for making a case for authen­
ticity, but authenticity (for Tillich and for this author) comes in those 
moments when man is pressed to the limits of human experience and the 
"beyond" breaks in or the "within" breaks out. Hesse speaks of ecstatic 
moments in which the contradictions of life can be accepted, if not 
resolved. He points to a reality that suggests there is something more,
but his faith Is contentless. Christ incognito may have been present in
Hesse and may be present in the world, but why deny modern man spiritual 
content that could give substance to his faith? Tillich succeeds in
giving this substance. He reacts to supernaturalism and to the world
view of traditional Christianity, but he attempts to restate these views 
in contemporary terms that are more acceptable. This author is apprecia­
tive of Tillich's efforts.
In the third place, an adequate understanding of being human must 
address itself to the universal problems of sin, suffering, and death.
Hesse speaks eloc^ently about man, but ha is lacking when it comes to 
addressing himself to the perennial problems of man. Hesse may have 
done well to have followed the advice of Goethet "Only as we see the 
'limits of humanity' . . .  do we see what man is, that is, not what this 
or that man is, but man as such."^^ Hesse writes about modern man's 
propensity for the mysterious. He hints at the deeper levels of human 
existence, but his own experience and his commitment to humanism do not 
allow him to penetrate more deeply or to say much more about the nature 
of reality encountered in fulfillment. Perhaps Dean Inge's remark, as
quoted by Peter Berger, is applicable to Hesse; " . . .  a man who
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marries the spirit of the age soon finds himself a widower." Never- $
theless, there is much that commends Hesse to modern man in that at the 
core of humanitas Hesse believes there is something that a person can 
trust. What it is he cannot say. Tillich calls it Being-itsolf or 
Ultimate Concern. While it may be argued that this does not tell us 
much more than what Hesse is saying, it could be that both Hesse and 
Tillich are trying to use different words to convey the same reality.
Does one need to consciously profess Christ in order to be Christian 
in attitude and action? If the answer is yes, then Hesse is not a 
Christian and Tillich is. But if the answer is no, then there is evi­
dence in Hesse's work that indicates that he is a Christian. From his 
writing of Peter Camenzind (patterned after St. Francis of Assisi) to 
The Glass Bead Game (with a suffering servant motif), Hesse admires 
Christian values and suggests they are worth emulating. Hesse is not 
a Christian theologian, so he should not be expected to do more than he 
does in his writing. He makes one conscious of the universal problems 
of man even though he does not affirm specific Christian answers to 
these problems. His answers are his own answers, however inadequate 
they may be from the viewpoint of Christian theology. "The knowledge 
of self and the encountering of oneself behind all the phenomena of the 
world are basic experiences of a new, transparent consciousness, as it 
manifested itself in Hesse's life and work."
Hesse and Tillich both make a case for man realizing his own 
potential within the given limits of his talents and capabilities. The 
important implication centers upon how this is done; " . . .  the true 
dimension of humanness is not what we are when left to ourselves, but 
what we have it in us to become when taken out of ourselves into the 
full potential stature of humanity in Christ , . . The Christian sees
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what it means to be a man in Christ • , . " Nothing human is foreign 
to him. In him the problems of sin, suffering, and death are met.
The fourth implication derived from studying Hesse and Tillich 
is that anthropology rather than dogmatic theology is the arena in which 
the theological enterprise should take place. However, it is an anthro­
pology that includes ecstatic human experiences. Hesse is at home in 
Eastern mysticism. "This fundamental quality of mysticism has been 
classically formulated in Hinduism by the formula tat tvam asi— 'thou
art that,' that is, the depths of the human soul are identical with the
64
divine depths of the universe." Hesse approaches this understanding 
in his thinking. Tillich's mysticism is more in accord with the Chris­
tian tradition. However, the content of ecstatic experiences remains 
problematic. How to maintain an absolute distinction between man and 
God (while at the same time sustaining a meaningful relationship between 
man and God) is one of the most obvious problems that appears in compar­
ing the two men. If God is to be understood by understanding man, then 
some human model is needed. Hesse's ideal man (whether Siddhartha or 
Joseph Knecht) leaves one with something yet to be desired. It is the 
figure of Christ who is " . . . the living exemplar of our possibilities 
as human beings. We encounter the unexpected and the unimaginable, the 
presence within history of the consummation of human reality; the reality 
of spirit which joins us to one another, and to God."^^ Interpersonal 
relations may be the place where God is encountered, but it is in Jesus 
as the Christ that the final clue of #%o God is and what it means to be ]
human is discovered. In him the transcendent and immanent characteristics i
M
of divinity are in proper creative tension. God is separate from man but ^
personally related to man. In other words, the Ultimate is experienced
as intimate. j
'1
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The fifth implication that is significant centers upon the need 
for the contemporary church to be aware of the necessity for both 
personal religious experience and social action. Individuals have 
found in Hesse a modern man who is fascinated by, and concerned with, 
the spiritual dimension of what it means to be human, Ha appeals to 
those who are seekers, to those who are hungry for reasons for being 
that are more than the obvious ones advocated by a secular or material­
istic culture. The human spirit has a life within that needs to be 
explored, and Hesse is willing to try various ways (including the use 
of drugs) to expand one's consciousness of reality. His emphasis upon 
the inner life of man suggests that considerable spiritual needs are 
going unmet.
Tillich's thought contains the combination of rational coherence 
and appreciation for the ecstatic in human experience. His concern for 
depth and ultimacy is very much a part of his preaching, and there is 
little reference to becoming active in the social causes of the day.
Although Hesse and Tillich were personally involved in social 
concerns, their work elevates personal needs that require attention.
This suggests that modern man needs deep roots that nourish personal 
faith, hope, and love, A church oriented toward social action will be 
failing in a most important part of its purpose if it ignores this need 
for spiritual nourishment. There are signs of this need for the mysteri­
ous to be encountered experiencially seen in the rise of the charismatic 
ministries within the mainline churches. Even contemporary secular films 
reveal: "Man is not alone on earth, and the space explorers are search­
ing among the stars for evidence that man is not alone in the universe."
The church of today must be sensitive to modern man's need for a 
faith that is both warmhearted and tough-minded. While the vast majority
«
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of churches never broke out of the spiritual compartmentallzatlon of 
life, there may be a tendency on the part of some churches to over­
compensate for the social activism of the 1960s by retreating into an 
insulated capsule of spirituality. A both/and posture is necessary if 
the church is to be faithful to its calling and if it is to fulfill its 
ministry. Hesse illustrates this message in that Joseph Knecht is not 
forsaking the values of Castalia when he makes his decision to leave 
the seclusion of the secular monastery. He is taking Castalia*s values 
into the real world where he will continue to practice meditation while 
at the same time providing a useful service by teaching Tito. The method 
he uses to accomplish this indicates Hesse's relevant message for the 
church of today. The role of the suffering servant must be rediscovered 
and applied, not with grandiose scales of operation but by starting with 
the need nearest at hand (even if it is a friend's son who requires 
tutoring). There is a direct connection between the roots of faith and 
the fruits of faith; they belong together if one listens to Hesse and 
Tillich. Sensitivity to the God within will produce outward manifesta­
tions of this experience.
In summary, this section has attempted to sea the implications of 
Hesse's and Tillich's concepts of "the human"; becoming human is a life­
long process that can result in fulfillment but can never arrive at com­
pletion; man is most human when he reflects the image of God; an adequate 
understanding of being human must address itself to the universal problems
.'j
of sin, suffering, and death; anthropology is the arena in which the
%
theological ehterprise must take place; and the contemporary church must 
keep in balance both personal religious experience and social action.
Hesse and Tillich have much to say about what it means to be 
human, and considerable benefit can be derived from their thinking.
I
350
However, neither man wanted disciples, but each wanted those who took 
their work seriously to go beyond them. Neither man has the answer 
(if there is one), but both have made valuable insights that are worthy 
of attention and careful study. They counsel those who seek advice to 
be true to the best within themselves and to make their own way with 
all the possibilities that comprise their unique destinies. Critics of 
Hesse and Tillich may consider them to be dangerous spiritual mentors: 
one can get lost in vague aestheticism or in ontological speculation 
with spurious Christian content. Others hail them as exceedingly modern 
man with something relevant to say. While recognizing their shortcomings, 
this writer agrees with those who appreciate them. The reasons for this 
should be clear now that a comparison of the work of the two men has been 
made. Their similarities, their differences, and some of the implications 
aroused by their thought have been presented.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study began with an interest in the question* what does 
it mean to be human? The life and thought of two men, Hermann Hesse 
and Paul Tillich, were selected as an interdisciplinary study in 
theology and literature, Tillich was chosen as a philosophical theo­
logian who addressed himself to cultural concerns and who claimed that u
the artist best reflected the values of any given period of history.
Hermann Hesse, a novelist and poet by profession and an amateur painter 
and musician by avocation, was chosen to test Tillich's high praise for 
the artist's perception of the human situation. "The Concept of 'the 
Human' in the Work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich" was the specific 4
subject of this research. J
Because Hesse's writing was that of self-portrayal and self- j
analysis, it was essential to examine his life if his work was to be
understood. He was born in Germany in 1877, His personal independent 4^
; ^
Spirit came into conflict with his parent's desire that he conform to ^
their faith commitment. His struggle during adolescence became a later j
favorite literary theme. From the ago of thirteen he knew that he 
wanted to be a poet, and finally in 1904 he was able to support himself 
as a writer. His first marriage ended in divorce. His pacifist stand 
during the First World War, plus personal circumstances, contributed to 
a crisis in his life for which he sought relief in psychoanalysis.
After a brief second marriage ended in failure, he did achieve a last­
ing relationship with his third wife. His middle years were productive 
and successful. In spits of difficulties caused by Hitler's rise to 
power, Hesse went on to achieve international recognition as a writer,
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and one such honor he received was the Nobel Prize for Literature. He
:idied in 1952 at the age of eighty-five.
There were several intellectual influences that affected Hesse's 
thinking; religious mysticism as seen in the Christian tradition of 
Roman Catholicism and German Protestant Pietism; pantheism and the 
religions and philosophies of the East; romanticism as seen in Goethe, 
Novalis, Jean Paul, and Holderlin; and finally, humanism as evidenced in 
such diverse personalities as Mozart, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Rolland, 
and Burckhardt. The last major influence on Hermann Hesse was that of 
Analytical Psychology* Jungian psychology not only helped Hesse person­
ally but professionally, as his literary efforts were filled with 
illusions and imagery that had Jungian connotations.
The work of Hermann Hesse reveals the following information about 
his concept of "the human." Hesse regards the artist as an example of 
true manhood, but he believes that all persons (if they are to become 
what they are meant to be) must pass through three stages of developments 
innocence and irresponsibility, innocence lost with knowledge of good 
and evil and the accompanying guilt which can lead to despair or on to 
the third stage, that of victorious faith. This is the Kingdom of the 
Spirit. It is individuation and authenticity. It is the stage of ser- 
vanthood. Balancing both the sensual and the spiritual aspects of life 
is necessary for a fully human life. Thinking and doing must be synthe­
sized. They must be brought into harmony— another term which Hesse 
finds descriptive of maturity.
How man becomes fully human can be seen in the aesthete. The 
poet, the artist, the musician, mediate between the polarities in man. 
Humor, especially when it is ironic, serves as a mediator between the 
ideal and the real areas of existence. For example, humor in a person
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may be developed through suffering. The beatific smile in many of 
Hesse's characters is a symbol of fulfillment.
Relationships are necessary if man is to become that which he 
is meant to be. To love someone, to experience suffering because of 
someone, to know acceptance, to love unconditionally— these are what 
make human life worthwhile. Friendship in which responsible caring 
for one another occurs is also important. The threat to man that 
technology and mechanization create is brought to attention by Hesse 
as is the inhumanity of the educational system of his day. Regarding 
the issue of war and peace, Hesse is an internationalist.
Hesse's work also reflects that man is a religious being who 
struggles with self-love (which can be a definition for sin). Suffer­
ing, too, is a part of human reality. The questions that arise within 
man about the meaningfulness of life and the transiency of life are 
sources of suffering. Death is another human concern. However, for 
Hesse, finitude is not a preoccupation of man. To live fully in the 
here and now is all that can be expected. Immortality is reserved for 
the great people of history, even though there is a yearning on occasion
■I
within ordinary people for something beyond this life.
Hesse's conception of God includes the polarities of male and 
female, good and evil, light and darkness. His understanding of the 
nature of God is vague and unclear, but he does maintain that man has 
ecstatic experiences that are mystical in content. Their source, how­
ever, is not revelation but originates in experiences within man. Man 
can be awakened to an expanded consciousness of reality. Man is a free 
spirit who needs to be honest with himself and to trust himself.
There are times when man is only truly himself when at play, for 
life can be seen as a game. Blessedness arrives when life is not taken
■ ■ . i
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Hesse was preoccupied with the theme of adolescence and that this con­
tributed to an emotional and intellectual immaturity in his work that
1
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so seriously, when one relaxes and enjoys the game. And it is Magical 
Thinking that aids man in his quest for wholeness. Inner and outer 
reality are reversible, i.e., they can be exchanged. The polarities à
of life can be overcome whan man transcends himself and sees the syn­
thesis of nature and spirit. All antitheses are resolved, as in 
mystical experience. Even drugs can be one of the means by which 
Magical Thinking is induced.
Hesse indicates that if man is to become fully human it is in 
the inward way that results in man acting responsibly in historical 
events. Regarding the human condition Hesse shifts from an answer that 
is aesthetic to one which is ethical. His final statement is one in |
which meditation and responsible action belong together. It is in 
sacrificial commitment that man realizes the meaning of full personhood. 
Self-realization through service is love demonstrated; for Hesse this 
is the higher way.
In this study the significance of Hermann Hesse was viewed from 
a literary and a theological perspective. Hesse was praised by his 
literary contemporaries for being one of the first writers to recognize 
the importance of the subjective world and its power over persons. He [j
pointed to that which is universal in man. In his writing ha expressed j
hie concern for the spirit of man and his fear over the negative aspects j
of an age of science and technology.
Hesse was criticized for being too inward looking and subjective. j
His characters lived mainly a life of the mind; they were unbiological, J
according to some literary critics. These same individuals were dis- 1
il
turbad at the passive nature of Hesse's characters. It was true that
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tended toward sentimentality. Unthinking romanticism was another
1
major criticism of his writing. He did stress the feeling level of f
existence but not to the neglect of the mental or spiritual levels.
Hesse was not a theologian, but his work did concentrate on 
the question of the meaning of life. From his first major book to his 
last, the idea of love and sacrificial service of others was central 
to his thinking. Hesse recognized the reality of alienation and the 
irrational factors in human experience, but he also elevated commitment 
and the "in spite of" quality of man coping with the circumstances of 
personal destiny. Finitude was seen as a concern of man but not one 
that contained existential anxiety. In fact, death was frequently 
portrayed as a welcomed friend, maternal in characteristic.
Hesse adhered to a belief in a god who encompassed both good 
and evil. He could not explain the presence of evil in any other way.
He rejected the traditional Judeo-Christian conception of the God of 
ethical monotheism. He affirmed the god of the opposites of Jung. Cod 
was understood in pantheistic categories. Hesse was too syncretistic 
in his thinking, and his critics would say that he did not take seri­
ously the uniqueness of the Christian God made known in Jesus Christ#
Hesse's view of human nature centered upon an interpretation of 
sin as man's refusal to be his full self. Sin was not disobedience to 
the living God. There were amoral dimensions to his thought, too. In 
his early work there was little sense of accountability for one's 
life. Good and evil were interchangeable at times. It was life devoid 
of the "shoulds." Consequently, he offered few ethical guidelines.
However, in his mature work he did advocate responsible living: the
reference point being one's own best self— not the Creator of man's life 
with whom there is a covenanted relationship. Awakening to oneself was
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not the totality of religious experience. Discovering who God is
was not the same as discovering oneself. According to Hesse, salva- |
tion was what man did for himself. Historic Christianity always 
claimed that true reconciliation, i.e., salvation, happened only with 
God's help because it meant being reconciled to God as well as to 
oneself and to other people. It was religion without a Savior.
This author believes that Hesse did argue for an authentic 
existence. In a world that too often values doing, Hesse stressed the 
value of being. He accepted the ambiguities of life. He recognized the 
primitive forces and the polar opposites within man. As an internation­
alist he was a witness to what was universally human. Important themes 
in Hesse's mature work ware selflessness and social responsibility.
His theology was more anthropological than theological, but
beneath the surface of his religious humanism there was a hint at some­
thing more. He suggested an Ultimate Concern although not explicitly.
On the other hand, his thinking has questionable implications; 
as a spiritual mentor to youth there Is little critical assessment of 
Hesse. His young admirers have not had the benefits of his background 
against which to react. For example, Hesse's elevation of wandering 
as a life style can encourage a person to become a parasite and to waste 
his life. Some selections of his work are escapist in nature. A matu­
rity is assumed that is not always there on the part of his readers.
Nevertheless, Hesse's concerns seek to make human life more human. He
i
desires that man be faithful to his ideals and, above all, that man be
true to his best self. For these reasons, Hesse's life and work need i
.to be taken seriously.
Although Paul Tillich's work was shaped by his life experience |
H
less than was Hermann Hesse's, the events of his life did affect his ,^
1
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concept of "the human," Born in 1886 in the home of a German 
Lutheran pastor, ha was introduced early to the experience of the 
Holy. A relationship with his authoritarian father was made possible 
through philosophical discussion. His mother's death when he was 
seventeen was a traumatic event for him. His interest in philosophy 
and theology prompted him to prepare for a career that would permit 
both disciplines to be part of his vocation. This meant an academic 
future. He was graduated from the University of Breslau in 1911 and
During the First World War he served as a front line military chaplain.
.1
I
.1
was ordained the following year as an Evangelical Lutheran minister. |
I
with the result that he became a tragic realist. While teaching at the 
University of Berlin after the war, he mat Hannah Werner. He married
her in 1924 after a turbulent courtship. He taught at the universities 
of Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt. He was active in the 
Religious Socialist movement. His personal life was erratic* outwardly 
it was happy, but inwardly his infidelity and that of his wife were |
taking their toll. His opposition to national socialism caused him to 
be the first Christian professor to lose his position at the time of 
Hitler. Consequently, he came to the United States and taught at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York City. As a warmly personable individual 
with considerable creativity, it was not long before his talents were 
appreciated. His popularity continued until the time of his death in 
1965. His many books received a wide reading audience, and numerous 
universities granted him honorary degrees. After his retirement from 
Union Theological Seminary, he taught at Harvard University and at the 
University of Chicago. In the last years of his life his domestic life 
improved, so that ha experienced satisfaction in his personal life and 
in his professional accomplishments.
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The intellectual influences upon Tillich's thought were many.
Greek philosophy, particularly the thinking of Heraclitus, Parmenides,
Plato, and Plotinus, was instrumental in the shaping of his own ideas.
The Christian tradition was most influential in the development of his 
theology. Biblical study, along with the thought of Augustine, Meister 
Cckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Martin Luther, and Jacob Boehms, left its 
impression upon him, German idealism, as revealed in the persons of 
Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, Joseph von Schelling, Friedrich Schleier- 
macher, and Georg Hegel, played its part also, as did existentialism 
interpreted by Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Personal influences on his life and thought included his teachers and 
colleagues; Martin Kahler, Ernst Troeltsch, and Martin Heidegger.
All of the above persons and movements contributed to Tillich's 
methodology. He was an apologetic theologian. His method of correla­
tion started with man asking questions from within the theological 
circle. As a systematic theologian he was a philosopher of religion 
but one who was existentially involved with the meaning of being. Yet 
his concern was also for "saving knowledge," and for Tillich, Christian 
symbols were the means by which he participated in reality.
Paul Tillich's concept of "the human" begins with man's existen­
tial predicament— which is one of estrangement. Man is a questioner 
who asks the questions of being. Man is a philosopher by nature and 
experiences self-transcendence, but he is also a theologian who raises 
questions about ultimate reality. Finitude is the fundamental fact of 
human existence. The threat of nonbeing and the anxiety that it pro- i
duces contribute to a feeling of loneliness and guilt. Man is a sinner, *
i.e., he is estranged from himself, from others, and from the Ground of )
Being (God). To be human means to live with the ambiguities of life 4
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and with the demonic* it means to know doubt and uncertainty*
In order for man to know that he is broken and separated from 
what he is meant to be, an assumption is made which is based upon 
essential man* A vision of wholeness, of potentiality, underlies 
man's experience of alienation. Finite freedom is that which enables 
man to move from essence to existence. Human beings can deny what 
they essentially are; they may feel anxious about exercising their
freedom, but unless freedom is exerted unfulfillment will result.
Universal reason. Logos, is what permits man to grasp his essential 
nature. "Dreaming innocence" is Tillich's term for man's essential 
nature. It possesses potentiality and not actuality. Temptation 
drives innocence beyond itself. Man before "the Fall" is but the 
prelude to participation in "the Fall," at which time potentiality 
becomes actuality, and with actuality comes estrangement.
Man's true nature is to be found in unity with God. The I
encounter with Being-itself is an ecstatic experience in which man is
in touch with the Unconditional, the Really Real. Loving God means 
finding oneself. In order for this to happen, Jesus as the Christ is 
the one who helps a person to re-establish essential manhood. In
I
Christ is the fulfillment of human life. He is transparent to God,
He is the New Being who conquers the gap between essence and existence.
The New Being brings healing, i.e., salvation. That which was separated 
is reunited. But man must accept God's acceptance of him. For Tillich, 
faith is the state of being grasped by the New Being; it is saying yes 
to God. It means being justified. Becoming whole involves accepting 
the demonic in oneself; it involves being forgiven and becoming healed. 
Sanctification is becoming fully human* it does not mean perfection; 
it means maturity and being able to live with the ambiguities of life;
%
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it means fulfillment; It means reconciliation. It is the Spiritual 
Presence that enables man to participate in the process of Sanctifi­
cation; man experiencing increasing awareness, freedom, relatedness, 
and self-transcendence. It points toward perfection. It means being 
a Christian— transparent to the Divine Spirit.
Being fully human requires that the individual participate 
in the Spiritual Community, a theonomous culture, one in which an 
Ultimate Concern is expressed. Seeking to be conscious of the depth 
dimension in life, the person has a moral imperative to assume 
responsibility for others. Aoaoe motivates one to love others, to 
accept persons as persons, to embody love, power, and justice. It 
means being involved in concrete social ways of making human life more 
human for others. Helping others to become liberated, extending an 
invitation to people so that a decision can be made regarding Christ, 
and encouraging a state of readiness in which others might experience 
the New Being, are all aspects of being Christian. Theonomous man 
lives his life under the impact of the Spiritual Presence. It is a 
state of blessedness.
In order to examine the significance of Paul Tillich, it was 
necessary to focus attention upon his contributions. He was praised 
for being a theologian of culture, an apologetic theologian who tried 
to unite Athens and Jerusalem; and he was called "an apostle to intel­
lectuals." Tillich was an outstanding preacher as well as a theologian 
of synthesis. His ability to cross borders into other disciplines and 
to show their religious ground was unique. He sought to make human 
life more human with his "belief-ful realism," and he worked at creat­
ing a theonomous culture.
I
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On the other hand, a considerable number of critiques were made 
from various segments of the theological world, attacking Tillich's 
thought with such comments as* he was obscure in presenting his ideas; 
he was unbiblical in his thinking, and his Christology was more onto­
logical than Christian; he compromised theology to philosophy by start­
ing with man rather than with revelation; ha had pantheistic elements |
in his theology that seriously distorted historical faith; there were 
philosophical inadequacies in his system of thought (e.g., his use of
language and his Gnostic tendencies); and the final criticism centered
i
upon the accusation that he was outdated.
This author believes that Tillich's world view is that of modern 
man, Tillich addresses himself to universal issues, including the 
demonic in man. His starting point for interpreting theology is man; 
therefore, he makes Christian faith intelligible to modern man. However, 
does he by definition permit anyone to be without ah Ultimate Concern?
Does the term "Being-itself" really communicate anything, i.e., is it 
contentless? Is his Christology necessary? There is a question concern- î
in g man's responsibility for sin if it is necessary for him to sin in
43
order to become actualized. All things considered, for this author, 1
Tillich is closer to reality than any other contemporary theologian. }
His strengths outweigh his weaknesses. !
In comparing the life and work of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich, 
similarities as well as contrasting elements were revealed. Biographical 4
factors and intellectual influences appeared that were similar. Both men 
had a tripartite view of human nature, and each saw the significance of 
psychotherapy. The ambiguities of the human situation were recognized 
along with the demonic in man. Balance, harmony, unity within, as seen 
in Siddhartha, were similar to Tillich's understanding of reconciliation
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and his concept of Sanctification. Both men believed that man when 
fully human never reaches perfection but that he can achieve fulfill­
ment as a persons when this occurs it is not a supernatural but a 
self-transcending experience. Hesse stressed self-realization, and 
Tillich stressed becoming whole, healed, or reunited with the Ground 
of Being. At points the qualitative content of this manifestation had 
similar characteristics. Hesse and Tillich opposed the dehumanizing 
elements in society and were humanists in their appreciation for the 
common experiences of man. They each had a strong ethical emphasis and 
remained true to himself. They were authentic human beings who lived 
with hope for man's ability to create a human future.
There were also contrasting dimensions in the thought of Hesse 
and Tillich. Ontology was the foundation of Tillich's thinking. For 
Hesse, becoming was more important than being. The search in which 
feeling prevails was significant for Hesse in his early work, but an 
ethical faith commitment was his final statement.
Tillich appreciated the aesthetic and ethical stages of existence 
but believed that the depth dimension was grounded in reality, Hesse 
disliked reality and preferred fantasy and imaginative flights from 
reality. Tillich saw the limitations and the possibilities of idolatry 
inherent in aestheticism. He enjoyed artistic expression but only to 
the extent that the art pointed beyond itself to the Ultimate. Hesse's 
interpretation of art would be more psychological than religious. The 
relative must never be elevated to ultimacy, according to Tillich.
Hesse was content to stop at the ethical stags but Tillich was not.
According to Hesse, sin was underachievement and was not due to 
a broken relationship with God. For Tillich, becoming one's whole self 
could only happen when grace enabled man to overcome his estrangement#
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In Tillich's thinking, self-reliance and will power were insufficient 
as answers to man's brokenness, but in Hesse's thought they were 
adequate in overcoming ambiguity and alienation.
A basic difference between the two men could be seen in their 
understanding of humanism. For Tillich, man could not save himself; 
revelation was necessary. For Hesse, Jesus was a model to follow, 
like Buddha; but for Tillich, Jesus was the bearer of the New Being. 
Hesse's emphasis was on autonomy whereas Tillich emphasized theonomy.
In Hesse's work reference to the Ultimate was lacking or veiled, but 
it was very much a part of Tillich's system of thought and was made 
explicit by him.
The last contrasting element between Hesse and Tillich was the 
issue of community. In Hesse's concept of "the human," community life 
was unimportant. For Tillich, being fully human meant being Christian 
which meant requiring participation in the church. Hesse could be 
included as a member of the latent church, but he did not concern him­
self with institutional life and even small communities were absent in 
his thinking. He favored one-to-one relationships. This was in con­
trast to Tillich's consciousness.
The implications of both Hesse's and Tillich's thought about 
becoming fully human would include the following: first, it is a life­
long process and one never arrives at perfection; second, mevi is most 
human when he reflects his best self or the image of God; third, being 
human must address itself to the perennial problems of man (sin, suffer­
ing, and death); fourth, anthropology rather than dogmatic theology is 
the arena in which the theological enterprise should.take place; and 
finally, the contemporary church needs to be aware of the necessity for 
both personal religious experience and social action.
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The artist may best indicate the values of man at any given 
period. He may portray the moral confusion of the day or the new 
ideas and persons on the scene that will affect tomorrow's interests 
and concerns. However, it is the theologian who must bear witness to 
the presence of God in the events of history and who must serve as an 
interpreter of his activity if history is to be seen as going somewhere 
and not merely repeating itself. Hesse reflects the values of contem­
porary man, to a degree, but Tillich places these values in a religious
context— it is God's world as well as man's.
I
It is hoped that the insights of Hermann Hesse and Paul Tillich 
about what it means to be human and the direction man must go if there 
is to be a human future have been presented with fairness and with a 
grasp of the essential elements of the life and thought of both men.
It is believed that what they have to say to modern man is significant.
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